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ABSTRACT 
 
 
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF RURAL WATER GOVERNANCE IN 
THE LIMPOPO BASIN 
 
D Phil Thesis, Institute for Poverty Land and Agrarian Studies, Faculty of Economic and 
Management Sciences, University of the Western Cape 
 
In this thesis I examine and explore whether and if Integrated Water Resources 
Management (IWRM) inspired water reforms respond to- and address the diverse 
realities of women and men in informal (and formal) rural economies of Sekororo,  South 
Africa and Ward 17 in Gwanda, Zimbabwe which are both in the Limpopo basin.   South 
Africa and Zimbabwe, like other southern African countries, embarked on IWRM-
inspired water reforms, culminating in the promulgation of the National Water Acts in 
1998, four years after the attainment of South Africa’s democracy in 1994 and 18 years 
after Zimbabwe attained independence in 1980.  I argue that the adoption of IWRM, 
which emphasises second generation water issues such as demand management, water 
quality, environmental flow requirements etc, and not the development of water 
infrastructure, begs the question whether such reforms can make a meaningful 
contribution to the development agenda in countries where, during apartheid and 
colonialism, the water rights (among other rights) of millions of blacks were 
compromised because of unjust legislation and skewed underinvestment in water 
infrastructure. 
 
I explore the emerging contradictions between the post-apartheid and post-independence 
water legislation (and related policies) on the one hand, and the rural realities of informal 
water use on the other by employing the ‘hydraulic property rights creation’ to analyse 
how people, as individuals and/or as groups, assert rights over water, and how such 
claims become legitimised through multiple arrangements.  The negotiability/flexibility 
concept was used to analyse how resource rights and access are negotiated and contested 
in view of changing conditions and contexts within informal systems in the two study 
sites.  Discourse theory was utilised to unpack and illuminate the ways in which power is 
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multi-locational and normalised in networks of everyday life, regulating social practices 
and relationships; while the multiple water use approach (MUS) was instrumental in 
addressing the limitations of sectoral segmentation of water as productive or domestic use 
by recognising that people’s water needs are integrated and are part and parcel of their 
multifaceted livelihoods, and that the necessity to better meet both women’s and men’s 
multiple water needs is a main driver for integration within the water sector itself.  The 
multiple water use approach concept addresses the issues of gender as well.  For 
methodology and methods, the study mainly drew upon social science contributions from 
rural sociology and anthropology, through historical analysis, to document and analyse 
hydraulic infrastructure investments based on literature reviews, archival and textual 
analyses, interviews, surveys and participant observation.   
 
Results indicate that state funding on water infrastructure development was biased 
towards formal irrigation, which caters for a small proportion of the rural population.  
There are dynamic investments in hydraulic infrastructure in Sekororo and Gwanda 
financed through private investments and NGO support.  Poor management of public-
owned and managed, domestic and productive water schemes have become important 
catalysts for local investments in water infrastructure. Results also show that there are a 
number of local level institutional arrangements that govern access to water sources in 
communal areas. These vary depending on the source (man-made or natural), ownership 
(privately owned or communally owned), yielding capacity and the purpose for which the 
water will be used.  Traditional leaders, elected leaders and the relevant water point 
committees tend to complement and compete with each other as institutional pillars in 
enforcing rules of access and use.  Results also indicate that water reforms, in their 
current form, ignore the development of adequate water infrastructure to harness water 
resources for social and economic development for rural small-scale users; without 
access to water/infrastructure, there is nothing to manage for rural small-scale users, 
hence, the focus and agenda of catchment management institutions tend to only cover the 
interests of large-scale water users and uses.   
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The study concludes that the informality of institutions and property rights in rural water 
governance seems to facilitate flexibility to allow for resource sharing, which is a 
common feature in the two study sites, where property rights overlap in both time and 
space with different degrees of intensity being applied in the management of different 
portions of the hydraulic landscape.  We also conclude that permit systems as individual 
water rights based on an administrative act completely ignore existing uses and 
arrangements while favouring the administrative-proficient, and entail explicit 
discriminatory conditions with high transaction costs.  The study further concludes that 
there is no service improvement for taxes imposed on water users and uses.  Another 
conclusion is that customary systems have a holistic approach to water development and 
management in the use of multiple sources for multiple domestic and productive uses in 
both Sekororo and Mzingwane; hence overcoming counterproductive sectoral boundaries 
in services delivery while opening up new opportunities for women and men.  The study 
also concludes that single purpose and resource-specific institutions such as catchment 
management institutions are not practical and relevant for managing water resources at 
the local informal level where people use multiple institutions and sources.  It also 
concludes that without denying the gender and age hierarchies and potential ethnic-based 
exclusions in customary arrangements, and the power plays; self-supply and investment 
is still the main form of water provision for the rural poor and poorest. Finally the study 
concludes that there is need to support infrastructure for small-scale water users and uses. 
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CHAPTER ONE: Introduction and Background to the 
Research Context and Agenda 
1.1. Introduction 
In the 1990s, South Africa and Zimbabwe, like other southern African countries, 
embarked on Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM)-inspired water reforms 
(Manzungu, 2004) culminating in the promulgation of the National Water Act in 1998, 
four years after the attainment of democracy in 1994 (South Africa), and 18 years after 
independence (Zimbabwe).  It is worth noting that IWRM originated in the developed 
North, which had completed its hydraulic mission, referring to the development of 
adequate water infrastructure to harness water resources for social and economic 
development (Allan, 2003). The adoption of IWRM raises questions regarding its 
applicability in a region such as southern Africa that is characterized by poor water 
access, mainly as a consequence of lack of water infrastructure (SADC, 2005) and 
endemic underdevelopment among the majority (Swatuk, 2008). By focusing on second 
generation water issues, which IWRM emphasises, such as demand management, water 
quality, environmental flow requirements among other things, that presuppose the 
existence of water infrastructure, the water reforms missed an opportunity to chart a 
practical course of action to confront real development challenges (Merrey, 2008). This 
assumes greater significance if it is remembered that prospects for attaining or quickening 
and sustaining water- related attainment of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in  
sub-Saharan Africa, such as Goal 1 and 7,  are reported to be off track by at least 20 years 
in many countries including South Africa and Zimbabwe (UNDP, 2006).  
 
It is debatable against such a background as to what purpose the water reforms in sub-
Saharan Africa serve, if not to address real development challenges (van Koppen, 2003). 
Such a lack of coincidence between the development agenda and water legislation in 
Africa is unfortunately not an isolated occurrence. Similar observations have been made 
with regards to transnational water resource management (Lautze and Giordano, 2007; 
Merrey, 2009). One example of such a ‘poor fit’ has been the promotion of direct state 
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administration of all water resources based on a permit/licence system,  on the grounds 
that  such a system is efficient and the ‘most beneficial use of available water resources’ 
(GWP, 2006). As a consequence many rural communities in Africa who use water in 
their localities for small but critical productive water use on the basis of traditional 
principles have had their existing rights expropriated while new permits remain 
inaccessible due to cumbersome and costly administrative requirements (van Koppen, et 
al 2007).  Given the foregoing, it is necessary to unpack the main elements of the water 
reform.  
 
There are four central elements of the water reform which this study will further explore 
to unpack and illustrate how or whether there is a mismatch between water reform and 
local realities.  The first element being that the water reform appears to neglect the 
infrastructure agenda for productive and domestic uses, and focuses on second generation 
issues such as the Water Act.  In the process, state support to infrastructure development 
and maintenance for domestic/small-scale/multiple uses diminished and/or were 
neglected after the introduction of water reforms in Zimbabwe.  In South Africa, 
subsidies to infrastructure development for small-scale water uses and users were 
withdrawn post-1994.  The development, financing and maintenance of water 
infrastructure was left to water users with little or no support from local and national 
government.  Support for such development largely came from non-governmental 
organisations although the support remained uncoordinated. 
 
The second element that will be explored in unpacking the water reform is that of the 
state imposing a new layer on the hydraulic landscape through resource management 
institutions such as catchment and sub-catchment councils (CCs and SCCs) in Zimbabwe 
and catchment management agencies (CMAs) in South Africa.  These resource 
management institutions are imposed to regulate different infrastructure users as well as 
direct water access such as livestock watering.  At the local level, redress to the access of 
water in Mzingwane, like other catchments in Zimbabwe, is already underway, but still 
very little has been achieved in terms of making productive water available to the 
majority of smallholder communal area residents.  In Sekororo, South Africa, there is 
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nothing on the ground yet in terms of the actual operationalisation of the catchment 
management agencies, however, from other evidence there is very little redress that has 
been achieved and the process has been halted.   
 
The third element is that in both South Africa and Zimbabwe, the state appear to impose 
and recognise one legal system, the permits.  Permit systems intrinsically discriminate 
against small-scale users in favour of the administration-proficient.  The adoption of 
permit systems as single regime formally or factually dispossesses water claims under 
other plural legal systems especially in rural areas where colonial permit systems have 
hardly been implemented as yet.  This questions the legitimacy of permits.  The permit 
system raises the prospect and/or intent of war with local government.  In Mzingwane, 
Zimbabwe, the permit system, despite the good intentions, became a rent seeking and 
perverted taxation system without service improvement. For example, primary water uses 
where no permit is required to use small quantities of water are relegated to second class 
exemptions.  In Sekororo, South Africa, there is nothing yet at the local level, but 
national level is considering a similar arrangement.  The fourth and final element is that 
of international rivers. It is however not the focus in this thesis, hence, it will not be 
addressed herein. 
 
The threats posed by permit-based water policies to smallholders’ agriculture-dependent 
livelihoods are a paradox for two main reasons. First, the quantities of water that are 
involved represent a small proportion of the total available resources, which means that 
there are no significant impacts on overall water use. This however, should not be 
misconstrued as advocating for the continuance of low level water use. Second, more 
often than not, water is used without state financial assistance unlike in formal irrigation 
schemes where huge public infrastructures/investments are often used inefficiently and 
ineffectively. From this perspective it can be argued that local investment helps to 
address the problem of economic water scarcity, which is widespread in Africa (see van 
Koppen, 2003).  The desire to bring about state administration of water resources, thanks 
in part to IWRM, however well justified, can easily work against the ‘redress’ objectives 
of the water reforms. For example in South Africa, it is possible that the administrative 
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requirements that came about because of the water reforms may compromise access to 
water by Historically Disadvantaged Individuals (HDIs), a politically correct term for 
blacks, coloureds and women. The possibility of such a situation developing is real. The 
much fettered 1998 National Water Act (NWA, South Africa), celebrated for its 
progressive modern ideas on how to manage water resources, has not resulted in an 
improvement of access to water for productive uses on the part of the Historically 
Disadvantaged Individuals (HDIs) in communal areas of South Africa, although 
commendable effort has been made on improving water access for domestic uses. For 
example, to date, only 4% of the licensed new users have been allocated to HDIs in South 
Africa (Karar, 2008).  There are also other problems that explain the poor water access by 
HDIs.  
 
This study aims to explore and unpack what seems to be an emerging contradiction 
between the post-apartheid (South Africa) and post-colonial (Zimbabwe) water 
legislation and related policies on the one hand and the rural realities of informal water 
use and access on the other by debunking the first three elements of the water reform as 
explained above.  Given this mismatch between the water reform and local realities, the 
principal objective of the study is to contribute to the empirical and theoretical 
understanding of ways and linkages in which institutions (formal and informal), networks 
and resource rights with regards to water are organised, negotiated and contested in poor 
rural economies of South Africa and Zimbabwe, and determine whether the prevailing  
formal institutional arrangements adequately address the informality of water use by 
examining the nature and pattern of investment in water infrastructure and other aspects 
of reform by rural communities. 
 
The study adopted the concept of ‘hydraulic property rights creation’ as one of its 
underpinning theory so as to shed light on how people, as individuals and or as groups, 
assert rights over water, and how such claims become legitimized (Coward, 1986). 
Hydraulic property rights creation refers to the creation of value of water by means of 
establishing, and recognizing claims to water of a certain quantity and quality in a 
particular locality as a consequence of investments made in developing physical 
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infrastructure and related institutional arrangements for the purpose of abstracting, 
storing, conveying and/ or applying water to the field.  People who invest in water 
infrastructure are entitled to use water while those who have not contributed to the 
investments can be excluded, although there are exceptions to the rule. For example 
drinking water tends to be made free to whosoever is in need (Derman et al, 2007; 
Nemarundwe, 2003; Matondi, 2001).  Water is also availed to kith and kin and other 
community members through complex exchange systems. Investments may be 
individual, like investments in boreholes, small pumps or homestead wells, or communal 
like village reservoirs, communal boreholes and irrigation furrows, and these have a 
bearing on how the hydraulic rights are operationalised. 
 
 Processes of hydraulic property rights creation may be entirely ‘endogenous’ (or ‘local’ 
or ‘informal’), with claims recognized at the local level by communities, or they may 
depend upon government, formal Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs), or other 
outsiders in which case they are ‘exogenous’).  However, the differences between 
endogenous and exogenous are not always clear-cut because local people interact with 
‘outsiders’ in ways that blur the endogenous-exogenous differences. In the case of public 
investments, where governments build the systems, the state usually expects that users 
will take up at least some part of the investments in operation and maintenance, which 
usually gives the users a formal entitlement to the water. But it is also possible that the 
rights may not be clear at all or people are not claiming rights and abandon the scheme. 
The lack of clarity or interest and/or ability regarding such issues may lead to a process of 
‘hydraulic property rights extinction’, where water users fail to enforce their water rights.  
Identifying causes of the extinction of hydraulic property rights, their interrelationships 
with institutions and the processes involved is an integral part of this study. 
 
This study was developed as a comparative between two communal areas that have high 
economic water scarcities, are semi-arid and water resource use is central to the 
livelihoods of the residents.  Murphree (1991) suggests that methodological frames for 
studies of natural resources should include comparison at various levels and be 
multidisciplinary.  However, Ranger (1985:3) cautions against use of comparison that he 
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describes as “dangerous intellectual tools” if used by people who do not understand the 
context within which the society has developed or is developing.  Despite this caution, 
the study will demonstrate that there are many contrasts, occurring at different levels and 
between different types of users over water (re)sources.  Although the two research sites 
selected for this study Sekororo in South Africa and Gwanda in Zimbabwe both fall 
under communal land tenure and are in economically water stressed catchments, and are 
both in the Limpopo basin, there are many differences, similarities and dynamics both 
within and between the sites upon which grounds for comparison and contrast are based.  
The basis for comparing and contrasting the two paths (South Africa and Zimbabwe) is 
framed by empirically examining, documenting and analysing (how and in what ways): 
(i) the processes and genealogy of hydraulic property rights creation in the two countries 
in terms of access, use and control of the resource, and the implications of such rights on 
men and women; (ii) the state policies and legislation in place to govern and regulate the 
resource from the user level through to intermediate1 and higher levels, and how they 
influence and are influencing the form property rights take; (iii) the institutional 
processes that people utilise to canvass and claim their interest and stakes in the resource 
(both formal and informal) and how such institutional processes emerge and evolve; and 
(iv) the power play and relations between and among stakeholders, institutions and 
policies used to control, defend and enforce claims to the resource.  This study is 
therefore about contrasts between policy processes and legislation, property rights, 
places, people, contexts and communal areas within a shared hydrological basin. 
1.2. Background and Context 
1.2.1. The Context 
Despite somewhat different ecologies and histories, water policy reforms in the two 
countries (South Africa and Zimbabwe) share certain features in common: an emphasis 
on decentralisation of authority, a call for greater participation by stakeholders in 
management, identification of watersheds (catchments) as the most appropriate 
                                                 
1 Intermediate level is used here to refer to the middle-ground institutions that operate within the local 
government level such as local and district municipalities, rural district councils and subcatchment 
councils, NGOs and research centres/institutes. 
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ecological and administrative management unit, a focus on water as a scarce commodity 
to be allocated according to market principles (permits), as well as an expressed concern 
with increasing racial and class equity in distribution.  The legal and institutional 
frameworks for water governance in South Africa and Zimbabwe have evolved in very 
different ways however (see Derman et al, 2007).  In international and national policy 
circles, these features reflect a shift in thinking since the mid-1980s from an emphasis on 
supply-side features and consideration of water as a common property resource and a 
public good to viewing it from a demand-side perspective with emphasis on it as a 
productive and increasingly scarce asset to be managed by market principles.  The policy 
reform and related political and economic changes underway in Southern Africa 
(particularly South Africa and Zimbabwe) make it their aim to improve access to 
resources regardless of gender, ethnicity or race2 as well as encourage sustainable use of 
scarce resources.  This thesis is designed to help push this process forward by providing 
necessary data and analysis on patterns of access to the critical resource of water by the 
majority, and highlight the major discourses and narratives that shape and define the 
process.  It provides a conceptual analysis of how property rights are created and 
transformed through time and how they shape (and are shaped by) policy, legislative and 
institutional processes for governing water resources.  
 
In this section I go beyond hydraulic property relations to look at some of the wider 
connections and interrelations between (and among) global discourses on broader issues 
of water governance and local realities as governments grapple with issues of reforming 
the water sector from national to local levels.  I demonstrate how these discourses are 
negotiated, contested, and conceptualised by the stakeholders at different levels to 
broaden our understanding of such dynamism beyond the formal-informal, local-global 
binaries of property rights and institutions.  In particular, I contribute to understanding 
the ways in which formal institutions intersect with the wide range of organisations 
glossed as “informal institutions” in economic terminology and customary ones in 
anthropological terms. 
                                                 
2 Not withstanding the accelerated land reform programme (since 2000) that degenerated into a racial one, 
water policy reform in Zimbabwe is not necessarily designed to segregate on racial grounds. 
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Since current water reform largely originates in international discourses and policies 
including the Dublin Principles, Agenda 21, inter alia,( Derman, 2003) I will address how 
these international policy changes are being understood and adopted for South Africa and 
Zimbabwe national water policies.  Given that the water reforms have been funded by a 
range of donors, donors pay great attention to these international discourses and policies, 
often having played an important role in the formulation of such policies and discourses.  
In turn, these national policies and directives may be changed again when implemented at 
the local level.  I will examine the changing international policies (e.g. FAO 1995, DFID 
2000, GWP 2000 et al) and how these are translated and acted upon at the national and 
local levels in South Africa and Zimbabwe.  During the 1990s and early 2000s, policy 
reforms put much emphasis on integrated water resources management (IWRM, see 
GWP, 2000).  The premise appeared to have been that if we can get the institutions (laws, 
regulations, organisations) right, the water will easily flow to where it is needed, as well 
as managing scarcity.  Consequently, many countries overhauled their water law and 
related regulations, and in many cases formal water titles were introduced or 
strengthened, in the form of registered water permits or water rights, as well as water 
levies and fees.  The expectation was that formalising water use and introducing fees 
would stimulate more rational water use and development.   
 
The results of these reforms have, however, been limited in Southern Africa and there is a 
growing realisation that without physical hydraulic infrastructure people in semi-arid 
environments will not be able to enjoy access to sufficient productive water (van der 
Zaag et al, 2010:138; van Koppen, 2010; see also Grey and Sadoff, 2007; World Bank, 
2007).  The analysis will focus at the empirical interface between the new water laws and 
dominant policy agendas of the water reform institutions (see chapters 7 and 8) on the 
one hand and the rural realities of informal water users (see chapters 4 and 5) on the 
other.  The challenge and need of most rural people in Southern Africa in general, and 
Zimbabwe and South Africa in particular is to mobilise or obtain external support for 
investments in water resources development for multiple uses so as to enlarge the pie of 
available water resources for all, rather than sharing the limited pie that has been 
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developed to date.  This seems at odds with the priorities and dominant discourses of 
governments and international water development and investment institutions.  The 
following section reviews and analyses literature on how the dominant policy agendas of 
(global and national) water institutions are translated by (and through) government 
regulations, and how this impacts on rural households and institutions’ attempts to access 
productive water.      
1.2.2. Global Discourses and National Water Management Policies 
International conferences and principles (UNCED Agenda 21, The Dublin Water 
Principles) as well as the World Bank, European Union, Asian Development Bank and 
other lending organisations have promoted the creation of decentralised Catchment, 
Watershed or River Basin Councils to assume many management functions from central 
government.  At the heart of most of these efforts is the concept ‘integrated water 
resources management’ (IWRM), defined as follows: “IWRM is a process which 
promotes the coordinated development and management of water, land and related 
resources, in order to maximize the resultant economic and social welfare in an equitable 
manner without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems.” (GWP3; the World 
Water Council4).  IWRM encapsulates each of the four Dublin Principles: 
Principle No. 1 - Fresh water is a finite and vulnerable resource, essential to sustain life, 
development and the environment 
Principle No. 2 – Water development and management should be based on participatory 
approach, involving users, planners, policy-makers at all levels 
Principle No. 3 – Women play a central part in the provision, management and 
safeguarding of water. 
Principle No. 4 – Water has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be 
recognised as an economic good. 
 
These four principles have been embraced by Southern African planners and inform, if 
not underpin, the character and content of current water reforms in the region (Derman et 
al 2001; Swatuk, 2005:873; van der Zaag, 2005).  The stated goals of these reforms are 
                                                 
3 http://www.gwptoolbox.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8&Itemid=3. 
4 http://www.worldwatercouncil.org/index.php?id=1764 
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equity, efficiency and sustainability - the heart and nerve centre of IWRM.  The means to 
achieve these goals combine activities undertaken at the global, regional, and national 
levels (Gumbo et al, 2004).  Integrated water resources management provides 
justification for river basin management that calls for demand management and pricing 
policies anchored in several storylines (Molle, 2008).  Policies, technical assistance 
grants, and development projects translate these concepts into concrete actions.   
 
An intriguing issue is the social and political life of these concepts.  In other words how 
do they emerge, spread, and influence policy and practice and intellectual production, 
how do they become resilient, sometimes hegemonic, adapt/mutate or just vanish?  There 
are no easy answers to these questions, however, an attempt is made here to highlight the 
processes, events and outcomes of the IWRM-inspired water reform bureaucratic 
machine in general, and in Southern Africa, and how these are translated in South Africa 
and Zimbabwe.  Concepts do not emerge from a vacuum, and can only be understood as 
social and political constructs shaped by the interplay of institutions, networks, interests 
and visions of the future (Mosse, 2004).  Those involved with promoting IWRM 
supported the creation of the Global Water Partnership (GWP) while promoters of river 
basin management supported the establishment of the International Network of Basin 
Organisations (INBO); the GWP and the INBO have also established regional branches 
(Molle, 2008).  All these themes (IWRM, basin management, IMT) have been supported 
by many donors, and have paved the way for innumerable MSc programmes, capacity 
building activities, field trips, international conferences, World Water Forums, and 
publications (Swatuk, 2005; Conca, 2006). 
 
Development agencies like Sida, GTZ, USAID, AusAID or DFID, and UN agencies, 
have all contributed to these dynamics but none of them comes close to the role and 
influence of the international development banks, principally the World Bank.  The Bank 
has always maintained a keen interest in the dissemination of ideas and has even recently 
morphed into a “knowledge bank”, claiming to be both a neutral gatekeeper and a major 
producer of knowledge (Mehta, 2000).  A study commissioned by the Swedish 
government in 2000 concluded that “the World Bank continues to be dominant as the 
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main purveyor of development ideas” (Bretton Woods Project, 2007 cited in Molle, 
2008).  Molle argues that for national elites, models and frameworks such as IWRM offer 
solution to significant water management problems; they also offer a means to espouse 
the referential of bilateral and multilateral donors and to attract funds from countries 
eager to spread their model (2008: 145; see also Chambers, 1997).  The models also bring 
legitimacy and embody a promise of success (Mollinga and Bolding, 2004), they are 
often mobilized in bureaucratic struggles in order to justify/impose a particular 
reconfiguration of the bureaucracy or decentralisation policies.  Although IWRM has 
been largely adopted as international players wanted, by state bureaucracies, the concept 
has also internally been appropriated in different ways.  It is within this conundrum that 
the water scarcity lexicon is widespread within the dominant IWRM paradigm which 
gives meaning and an immediacy to the looming water crisis, which is also a social 
construct.  The visual imagery of a looming water crisis is a powerful framing device that 
demands equally dramatic measured solutions, such as the establishment of Catchment 
Councils, CMAs, sub-catchment councils, and water committees, along with heavy 
taxation/levies for water use.  From the foregoing, the infrastructure agenda is missing in 
this framing of IWRM.  Climate change largely heralded the return of the infrastructure 
agenda therefore making my analysis in this study more important (see also Molden, 
2007; GWP, 2009).       
 
This study aims to analyse the water governance frameworks in the two countries (see 
chapter 7 and 8) and how these processes, discourses and narratives are conceived and 
transformed within the Southern Africa region.  Van der Zaag (2005), an IWRM 
proponent, observed that the momentum for IWRM in Southern Africa switched pace 
after 1997 when water ministers from the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) and the European Union met and frankly discussed the challenges of sharing 
international rivers, where “…consensus was reached over the need for integrated water 
resources management” (2005:867).  This culminated in the formation of WaterNet5 in 
                                                 
5 WaterNet is a region-wide programme funded by the Netherlands Development Agency, with technical 
assistance from IHE-Delft. 
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2000 and the Water Research Fund for Southern Africa (WARFSA)6 in 1999.  In essence, 
WARFSA and WaterNet, and later the Southern Africa chapter of the Global Water 
Partnership “…together have jointly initiated the annual Water Symposium, which is 
gradually becoming the place to discuss water issues in Southern Africa” (ibid: 868).  
The activities of these institutions (WARFSA/WaterNet/GWP-SA) overlapped, paths 
crossed, and interrelations multiplied through conferences, professional associations, 
alumni and multilateral funding among other things.  Through these influences they 
increasingly shared and disseminated a number of cultural and ideological 
understandings, values and practices that underpin the success of the IWRM policy 
model, and also provide a platform for sharing some of the challenges facing the concept.  
It is this self-reinforcing congruence that shaped the production of the IWRM policy 
model and its acceptance and fashionability among peer communities and policy elites in 
relevant political, financial, and hydraulic institutions in the region (see also, Swatuk, 
2005, 2010; Molle, 2008).  
 
Van der Zaag (2005:870) argues that despite its elusive and fuzzy nature, IWRM as a 
concept offers learning insights that its implementation requires real participation of 
stakeholders and transparent decision-making processes.  This re-affirms, and perhaps re-
defines the relationship between citizens and authorities and clarifies their respective 
roles; relationships which have been scarred by the colonial and post-colonial experience 
(Mamdani, 1996).  As such, good governance lies at the heart of IWRM (Rogers and 
Hall, 2003).  Regardless of the utility of the concept as articulated and argued by van der 
Zaag and others, they still acknowledge the fact that many people are still without 
adequate water and sanitation facilities, highlighting the political nature of water use 
decisions.  Van der Zaag (2005:870) further argues that the new water institutions will 
have to address and resolve such fundamental challenges, even if this implies treading on 
political turf (see also Allan, 2003).  Awareness of this fact will help guide the actions 
and inform the decisions made by water professionals in the region (Swatuk, 2004).  By 
2005, Swatuk in one of his most critical analysis of the new water reform system argues 
                                                 
6 Funded by the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA).  These two institutions (WARFSA 
and WaterNet, seek to build on the Dublin action agenda items regarding capacity and knowledge base 
building (see Swatuk, 2005:873). 
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that evidence of the implementation of the IWRM-inspired reforms in the SADC region 
shows “…that governments have been reluctant to devolve power to stakeholders; that 
rural dwellers are suspicious of the motives behind the reform; that already empowered 
actors dominate new institutions touting broad-based participation, and that new 
institutions have undermined existing forms of cooperation and conflict resolution, 
making matters worse not better” (2005:872).  For Swatuk, the challenges with the 
reforms reflect the inherent and highly political nature of the process, where the new 
water architecture proposes a profound realignment of decision-making power in already 
fragile, underdeveloped states (ibid).  Against this background, Swatuk contends that “it 
is important to reflect on the political nature of these activities and to reconsider (and be 
prepared to revise or discard) the basic assumptions and ideologies driving the reform 
process (ibid)”.       
 
Selective borrowing from the original IWRM or river basin management models can 
also, more positively, be construed as an initial step on a common trajectory that 
gradually  institutionalises decentralisation in resource management and democratization 
of decision-making (Meublat and Lourd, 2001).  Models can also foster top-down 
bureaucratic approaches that preclude genuine participation of stakeholders (Miller and 
Hirsch, 2003); and they allow replication of capital intensive projects that meet the 
interests of a powerful coalition of construction firms, banks, politicians and bureaucrats 
(Ostrom et al, 1993; Molle and Renwick, 2005).  We consider models such as IWRM-
based water reforms to keep politics at bay by promoting ahistorical recipes such as the 
complete overhaul and recasting of ‘new’ water management institutions without 
acknowledging or being informed by already existing customary (often informal) 
arrangements. On catchment and sub-catchment councils, discourse on the future of 
water reform institutions tends to focus on representative democracy, achieved through 
successive stakeholder representative elections, and the rotation of catchment and sub-
catchment councils, and CMAs without much thought and analysis on the power 
dynamics at play.  I will study this for the case of catchment councils in Zimbabwe, in 
Sekororo, South Africa, there is no catchment management agency as yet. 
 
 
 
 
 29
1.3. Problem Statement 
A key issue relating to resource access is how to characterize property regimes for descriptive 
and analytical purposes.  Historically, property rights have frequently been depicted by terms 
such as "common property" or "private property" (Mukamuri et al 2006; Meinzen-Dick and 
Di Gregorio, 2004). However, such distinctions may be too general for detecting critical 
differences between existing resource tenure structures. In practice, natural resources are most 
often managed by more than one property regime (Murphree 1993), with a varying mix of 
legal, formal and informal elements.  Much of the literature has focused only on the static 
context of property rights (Little and Brokensha 1986). The key distinction regarding the 
dynamic versus the static properties of such rights has thus tended to be lost. The static 
approach assumes that households will respond in predictable (and a priori defined) ways to 
incentives connected with the different tenure regimes. However, common pool resources 
tend to evolve over time, through external and internal pressures and changes, and the 
institutional changes that help facilitate, modify or create common pool resources are thus not 
well understood. A historical perspective is necessary to identify and isolate events or 
combinations of events that independently or in combination have impacted on creation, 
modification, weakening or strengthening of various facets of common pool resources. Thus, 
this study inevitably focuses on trying to understand history of institutions and organizations 
that are central for describing and understanding dynamic change processes related to 
common pool resources and the creation of rights. 
 
The IWRM discourse revived and promoted the enforcement of permit systems with even 
greater force, without questioning its colonial purposes. The water scarcity lexicon used 
in some way to promote IWRM, has also served, unwittingly, to scuffle ‘new’ water 
development, rather focusing on sharing available resources.  Although there is some 
ample evidence of physical water scarcity in some basins in Africa, there is growing 
critique that “if you build a dialogue around a belief in absolute scarcity you are going to 
get a limited range of outcomes specific to those assumptions” (Swatuk, 2005:877).  This 
brings us to the poignant question, what do we mean by scarcity?  Mwendera et al (2002) 
state unequivocally that SADC states use too little water and that this is an 
incontrovertible sign of underdevelopment.  Van Koppen (2003:1048) argues that 
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Africa’s available water resources have hardly been harnessed at all.  She argues that 
water scarcity is more accurately understood as ‘economic water scarcity’ – the resources 
are available in most of Africa but the economic resources and incentives to develop that 
water is lacking.  The above scenario (see also Molden,2007) is compounded by the 
changing climate, inadequate access to water and poor water quality does not only affect 
domestic supplies but also impacts agricultural production and the care of livestock, and 
increases the overall amount of labour that is expected to collect, store, protect and 
distribute water.     
 
It would seem that what is lacking in most countries is not necessarily only the economic 
resources and incentives as noted by van Koppen, or the inability to recover costs as 
asserted by Robinson, but also a question of political will by those in power, especially 
owing to the insufficient budget allocations at the national level, which in turn manifests 
in local challenges in most district and local municipalities and rural district councils.  
These processes and challenges are influenced by national events, hence the need for a 
broader analysis of the background of the so-called ‘local issues’ of water access.  
Highlighting the dominancy of global discourse on water scarcity, Savenije (2002: 744) 
argues that “…although the drinking water and sanitation issue is one of the largest 
societal challenges of the 21st century, it is a minor issue with regard to global water 
scarcity”.  It would seem that Savenije acknowledges the importance of water supply 
services, yet also highlights that such issues pale into significance when the global 
discources of water scarcity are considered.   
 
Failure to appreciate the dynamic nature of institutions governing water often leads to the 
proliferation of simplistic interventions for community management which undermine the 
dynamic nature of people’s responses to property rights and institutional uncertainties.  In this 
context, resources need to be viewed as both material and symbolic products rooted in 
contests of power.  The conceptualization of how we see resources, their management and 
their interaction with local livelihoods raise a range of key questions about institutional 
dynamics.  These touch on property rights, legal systems, and governance, as well as on 
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broader questions of knowledge, power and control.  In this study, resources are viewed as 
both material and symbolic products.  
 
Much of the earlier studies on resources in communal areas have been descriptive with little 
offering in the way of new theories or testing existing theories about rural livelihoods and 
dynamic processes that make those systems sustainable and amenable to flexible changes 
(Cousins 1993).  Resource use must be put in the context of overall production strategy of 
farmers, their investments to infrastructure, and the attendant rights, rules and obligations 
derived by such investment.  In all these discourses the infrastructure development agenda 
is missing leaving a huge gap in terms of options available for small-scale water users 
and their constituencies.  This is where the concept of hydraulic property rights creation 
(HPRC) comes to the fore to try and unpack how “rights”, real access to invested water, 
HPRC, are locally conceived, conceptualized and contested.  Hydraulic property rights 
creation refers to the creation of value of water by means of establishing, and recognizing 
claims to water of a certain quantity and quality in a particular locality as a consequence 
of investments made in developing physical infrastructure and related institutional 
arrangements for the purpose of abstracting, storing, conveying and/ or applying water to 
the field for multiple uses.  The study is interested in how hprc alters use and access to the 
resource depending on both context and contest.  Existing literature on use and management 
of common property as well as resources that are held by individuals shows that behaviour 
and practices of people with regard to resources change (Croll and Parkin 1992, Davies et al 
1991, Richards 1997).  What is still being contested is the nature of the change and the 
outcomes resulting thereof.  Through a historical approach, this study seeks (in part) to fill 
these gaps by offering insights on how property rights and institutional arrangements emerge 
and evolve over time, and how this impacts on resource access.   
 
New water laws and policies in South Africa and Zimbabwe such as the National Water Act 
(1998) and South Africa’s Water Services Act (1997) are difficult to implement owing to 
resistance by those with vested interests, especially in South Africa. Besides, implementing 
the laws and policies imply important institutional changes with little offering in terms of 
infrastructure development in the water sector.  The framing of water legislation was done 
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with little or no consideration for the rules and norms that govern informal arrangements, 
hence the legal requirements for regulatory measures such as permits and licences might open 
up the possibility of the clever few to register or apply.  Besides, the water reforms seem to be 
found wanting in terms of administrative justice where applying for a license might be too 
costly that it erodes the whole essence of redress for historically disadvantaged individuals 
(HDIs).  A major challenge is not at community-level but at the intermediate level, where the 
current mandates and reporting structures of local government, line agencies, private service 
providers, NGOs, catchment councils and international programs often jeopardize providing 
for needs-based accountable and participatory infrastructure development and maintenance.  
As a component of globalization, external investments are driving property shifts.  External 
investors want to deal with a private sector that looks familiar, with corporate structures and 
laws that protect private property.  Unfamiliar common property entities are marginalised and 
avoided, when possible.  Yet there is also a trend of the continuation, not without large 
struggles, for significant parts of communal areas to remain under local arrangements.  These 
local arrangements are also in motion, striving for new ways to balance longstanding values 
and practices with new opportunities and constraints wrought by both internal and external 
pressures, where climate change is one of the most fundamental threats.  
 
Whilst these IWRM-based approaches, policies and legislation have made important 
contributions in focusing attention on the importance of local institutions in natural resources 
management, they have tended to neglect the many everyday contexts within which 
institutions are located and their rootedness in local history and society.  Within the same 
breathe; the whole discourse of IWRM-inspired water reforms in South Africa and Zimbabwe 
neglected the infrastructure development agenda for the rural majority and its importance in 
mediating access to water resources (see Van Koppen, 2010).  The global discourse of climate 
change brought back the issue of infrastructure development to the centre of water resources 
discourse. Given this background the study seeks to analyse and understand 
interrelationships between property rights creation and investments, and decision-making 
institutional arrangements on accessing water resources; and the coping strategies 
employed by vulnerable individuals and households under increasing water scarcity and 
 
 
 
 
 33
climate change based on an in-depth analysis of both formal and informal institutions and 
processes. 
1.4. Objectives, Research Questions and Hypothesis 
The overall aim of the study is to examine whether and how IWRM-inspired water 
reforms respond to and address the diverse realities and needs of women and men from 
different races and classes in informal (and formal) rural economies. 
1.4.1. Objectives seek to:  
1. Describe, document and analyse the processes of how water resource management 
institutions come to life at the local level in poor rural areas; 
2. Examine and analyse state policies and legislation that govern and regulate resources 
(across local, intermediate and national levels) and how they influence access and 
control over water resources at the local level;  
3. Document and analyse whether prevailing formal institutional arrangements 
adequately address the informality of water use by the majority of rural small-scale 
water users; 
4. Document and analyse the dynamics of power, interests and knowledge among 
stakeholders that shape institutions and policies used to control, defend and enforce 
claims to the resource; 
5. Examine the relevance and usefulness of single purpose and resource-specific 
institutions for managing water resources at the local level where people use multiple 
institutions 
1.4.2. Research Questions 
Do IWRM-inspired water reforms adequately address the diverse realities of women and 
men from different races and classes in rural economies? 
1. How and in what ways are hydraulic property rights established, conceptualised 
maintained and enforced in informal economies and why? 
2. How and to what extend do prevailing formal institutional arrangements adequately 
address the informality of water use by the majority of rural small-scale water users?  
If formal institutions should serve a purpose, what purpose should they serve?  
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What/which institution should be responsible for infrastructure development?  Are 
catchment management agencies and councils the appropriate vehicles for meeting 
the expectations of informal water users?  How does this compare with local 
government?   
3. How and to what extend do existing policies and legislation that govern and regulate 
access to and control over water resources influence (and are influenced by) hydraulic 
property rights creation? What are the national policies on paper?  How are they 
operationalised?  How are they implemented in Mzingwane and Sekororo, if 
implemented at all?  How do they interface with practices? 
4. How and in what ways do power, knowledge and interests mould and pervade 
catchment management agencies and councils, and local arrangements, and give rise 
to differentiated access to and control over resources? 
5. How relevant and practical are single resource and resource-specific institutions 
wrought by the water reforms such as catchment councils and management agencies 
for managing water resources at the local level where people use multiple 
institutions? 
 
1.4.3. Hypotheses 
IWRM-inspired water reforms, setting universal standards (e.g. registration and permit 
applications) do not adequately address the diverse realities of women and men from 
different races and classes in formal and informal rural economies of South Africa and 
Zimbabwe.  This is so because: 
1. Water reforms (in their current form) ignore the first generation hydraulic mission 
(i.e. the development of adequate water infrastructure to harness water resources for 
social and economic development) for rural small-scale users; without access to 
water/infrastructure, there is nothing to manage for rural small-scale users. State 
support to infrastructure development and maintenance for domestic/small-
scale/multiple uses diminished and/or were neglected after the introduction of water 
reforms in Zimbabwe.  In South Africa, subsidies to infrastructure development for 
small-scale water uses and users were withdrawn post-1994.  The development, 
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financing and maintenance of water infrastructure was left to water users with little or 
no support from local and national government.  Support for such development 
largely came from non-governmental organisations although the support remained 
uncoordinated. 
1. Although the formation and composition of catchment management agencies in 
Zimbabwe (and to a lesser extent South Africa) provided potential for more equitable 
water resource allocation, the process is less inclusive than envisaged; largely donor 
driven with sustainability problems; and it favours the interests of commercial large-
scale users.  I view the role of catchment councils and management agencies inter alia 
as protecting interests of small-scale users from abuse by large users, and to facilitate 
development and/or progression to more productive uses. Hence, the water reform 
process has failed to adequately address the issues of equitable resource allocation, 
stakeholder representation and inclusiveness for the majority rural small-scale water 
users because people are excluded.   
2. Permit systems as individual water rights based on an administrative act completely 
ignore existing uses and arrangements while favouring the administrative-proficient, 
and entail explicit discriminatory conditions with high transaction costs.  In 
Zimbabwe permits formally dispossessed customary arrangements in good colonial 
tradition; and later became just a taxation tool to address severe sustainability 
problems.  In South Africa, permit system only remained a formal tool primarily 
applied among large-scale vested users. As existing lawful use pre-1998 is 
recognized, it also recognized customary arrangements. However, for new uses, it 
imposes a discriminatory license system or second-class exemptions of Schedule one.  
3. Single resource institutions are not practical and relevant for managing water 
resources at the local level where people use multiple institutions.  Through  time 
(from colonial to post-colonial) small-scale rural water users in both South Africa and 
Zimbabwe relied on multiple (customary) institutions for managing water despite 
numerous interventions by the state.  The introduction and/or emergence of single 
resource and resource-specific institutions under the rubric of catchment management 
agencies or councils brought by the water reforms became an additional layer on the 
(often congested) local institutional landscape.  These single purpose and resource-
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specific institutions are hardly relevant and practical for the majority of small-scale 
water users (and uses) who rely on multiple institutions, resources and sources for 
their livelihood.   
 
Table 1.1: Linkages between the research questions, research objectives, hypotheses, 
data requirements and analytical tools used in the study 
Research Objectives Research Questions Hypothesis Data required/source Analytical 
Tools 
The overall aim of the study is 
to examine whether IWRM-
inspired water reforms 
respond to- and address the 
diverse realities of women and 
men from different races and 
classes in informal (and 
formal) rural economies; 
 
Describe, document and 
analyse the processes of how 
water resource management 
institutions come to life at the 
local level in poor rural areas;
Do IWRM-inspired water 
reforms adequately address the 
diverse realities and needs of 
women and men from different 
races and classes in rural 
economies? 
How and in what ways are 
hydraulic property rights 
established, conceptualised 
maintained and enforced in 
informal economies and why? 
 
IWRM-inspired water 
reforms, setting universal 
standards (e.g. registration 
and permit applications) 
do not adequately address 
the diverse realities of 
women and men from 
different races and classes 
in formal and informal 
rural economies of South 
Africa and Zimbabwe 
- Compile detailed 
qualitative data able to 
capture the dynamism 
through Focus Group 
Discussions (FGDs) 
, interviews & survey: 
socio-economic & historical 
data on different water 
sources, uses and users; 
social networks & sharing 
arrangements; technologies 
involved, levels of 
investment and materials 
invested. 
- Mainly primary data, with 
augmentation from 
secondary data  
Discourse 
analysis, 
Narratives, 
descriptive 
statistics, focus 
group study, 
and interviews.
Examine and analyse state 
policies and legislation that 
govern and regulate resources 
(across local, intermediate and 
national levels) and how they 
influence access and control 
over water resources; at the 
local level in rural 
communities  
 
How and to what extend do 
existing policies and legislation 
that govern and regulate access 
to and control over water 
resources influence (and are 
influenced by) hydraulic 
property creation? What are the 
national policies on paper?  How 
are they operationalised?  How 
are they implemented in 
Mzingwane and Sekororo, if 
implemented at all?  How do 
they interface with practices? 
 
Water reforms (in their 
current form) ignore the 
first generation hydraulic 
mission (i.e. the 
development of adequate 
water infrastructure to 
harness water resources for 
social and economic 
development) for rural 
small-scale users; without 
access to 
water/infrastructure, there 
is nothing to manage for 
rural small-scale users 
- Gather secondary data:  
review of policies, 
legislation, minutes and 
records of water institutions 
and government 
departments 
- Collect primary data on 
the operationalisation and 
implementation of policies 
and regulation; data on 
local, intermediate and 
national level stakeholders 
and participation – through 
FGDs and interviews  
Narratives and 
descriptive 
analysis + 
stakeholder 
analysis and 
FGDs 
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Document and analyse 
whether prevailing formal 
institutional arrangements 
adequately address the 
informality of water use by the 
majority of rural small-scale 
water users 
How and to what extend do 
prevailing formal institutional 
arrangements adequately address 
the informality of water use by 
the majority of rural small-scale 
water users?  If formal 
institutions should serve a 
purpose, what purpose should 
they serve?  What/which 
institution should be responsible 
for infrastructure development?  
Are catchment management 
agencies and councils the 
appropriate vehicles for meeting 
the expectations of informal 
water users?   
 
Although the formation 
and composition of 
catchment management 
agencies in Zimbabwe 
(and to a lesser extent 
South Africa) provided 
potential for more 
equitable water resource 
allocation, the process was 
less inclusive than 
envisaged; largely donor 
driven with sustainability 
problems; and favouring 
the interests of commercial 
large-scale users 
Gather primary data: 
stakeholder participation, 
socio-economic status, 
quantities of water used and 
uses.  
Narratives and 
descriptive 
analysis + 
stakeholder 
analysis 
-Examine and analyse state 
policies and legislation that 
govern and regulate resources 
(across local, intermediate and 
national levels) and how they 
influence access and control 
over water resources at the 
local level; 
 
 
How and in what ways do power, 
knowledge and interests mould 
and pervade catchment 
management agencies and 
councils, and give rise to 
differentiated access to and 
control over resources? 
 
Permit systems as 
individual water rights 
based on an administrative 
act completely ignore 
existing uses and 
arrangements while 
favouring the 
administrative-proficient, 
and entail explicit 
discriminatory conditions 
with high transaction costs
Gather data on stakeholder 
interactions, contestations 
and negotiations through 
observation, FGDs, 
interviews and document 
review 
Discourse 
analysis, 
narratives and 
stakeholder 
analysis 
Examine the relevance and 
usefulness of single purpose 
and resource-specific 
institutions for managing 
water resources at the local 
level where people use 
multiple institutions 
 
How relevant and practical are 
single resource and resource 
specific institutions wrought by 
the water reforms such as 
catchment councils and 
management agencies for 
managing water resources at the 
local level where people use 
multiple institutions? 
 
Single purpose institutions 
are not practical and 
relevant for managing 
water resources at the local 
level where people use 
multiple institutions 
Gather data on stakeholder 
interactions, contestations 
and negotiations through 
observation, FGDs, 
interviews and document 
review 
Narratives, 
stakeholder 
analysis and 
discourse 
analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 38
1.5. Significance of the Study 
Although there have been recent work on resources management at local levels in 
Zimbabwe and South Africa, most of it has either focused on areas with very high 
rainfalls (Matondi 2001), or wetlands and sponge areas (Sithole 1999, Derman 2000, 
2003, 2005).  Those that focused on semi-arid areas also tended to focus on the local as 
the opposite dichotomy of the global.  Nemarundwe’s work on negotiating access to 
water and forestry resources in the Romwe catchment of the Chivi district in Zimbabwe 
offer some insights on local level processes (2003).  Ntshebeza (1997, 1999a and b) 
reported on the issue of land access and traditional authorities in South Africa.  Van 
Koppen’s earlier and recent work offers further insight in challenges faced in addressing 
inequitable access to water resources in South Africa and the Olifants Basin (2003, 
2008).   Research studies from the different parts of Zimbabwe point towards the 
existence of a set of interrelated norms of sharing of land and water that are essential for 
livelihood in terms of wetlands and dambos (Sithole 1999; Matondi 2001; Nemarundwe 
2003; Derman et al. 2005, Derman et al, 2007).  The widespread acceptance of these 
norms appears to be vital in the ways in which local communities handle poverty and 
food security.  These local norms and practices resonate with the human right to 
livelihood in a broad sense, encompassing both clean drinking water and adequate access 
to water for subsistence farming and for securing livelihoods.  This practice is not as 
common in South Africa for communal farmers.  Neither the Zimbabwean land reforms 
nor the water reforms address how to assist those engaged in this type of small-scale 
agriculture (Derman et al, 2007).  The IWRM-inspired reforms have been criticized but 
still not looking at infrastructure.  There is very little understanding of operationalisation 
and impacts through intermediate level institutions at the local level in poor rural areas.  
With revived interest in infrastructure to adjust to climate change, it is important to 
understand local practice.  This study will fill the gaps by providing data and empirical 
evidence to understand local practices.  
 
Molle (2008:133), observed that South Africa and Zimbabwe provided good examples of 
how (IWRM)-inspired reforms were enthusiastically adopted by governments as a 
common ground for black and white water users with a promise to deliver equitable 
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access to, and sustainable use of, water resources by all stakeholders at catchment and 
regional levels, while maintaining the characteristics and integrity of water resources 
within agreed limits.  However, after more than ten years of experience, expected benefits 
have not materialized (see also Manzungu, 2002; Schreiner and van Koppen, 2002; 
Merrey and van Koppen, 2007; Manzungu et al, 2010).  Experiences for such failure 
varies between the two countries and reasons for stagnated water reform roll-out are 
diverse, the common thread seems to be the fact that powerful users tended to dominate 
catchment councils and “power asymmetries surfaced when hard-nose issues such as 
water sharing agreements were considered” (Molle, 2008: 134).  Perhaps Merrey and van 
Koppen (2007) summed it up when they observed that in the Olifants river basin, the 
Kruger Park staff, mine owners and large-scale white farmers producing fruit for export 
markets soon dominated the process at the expense of rural black communities.  In 
Zimbabwe Dube and Swatuk (2002) and Tapela (2002) highlight how the fast tracking of 
the process in the Save River Basin, resulted in a crass scramble for authority among the 
farming community where extant power relations were reproduced in the new institutions 
(see also Manzungu, 2002; Swatuk, 2005:875).  Other groups identified by government 
as key stakeholders refused to participate (Kujinga, 2002).  Latham (2002), Manzungu 
(2002) and Marimbe and Manzungu (2003) reported similar results.  It is also interesting 
to note that in Zimbabwe, the catchment council manager is an employee of the 
Zimbabwe National Water Authority, is the government’s overseer in the whole process 
limiting the process to some form of decentralisation, but certainly not the devolution of 
power envisaged and envisioned in strategy and policy documents (see also Latham, 
2002).   
   
Although these studies developed major insights into our understanding of resource 
access, appropriation and allocation there is yet to be grounded research that focuses on 
water as a resource, and the infrastructure development agenda, in the semi-arid tropics, 
without the fragmented binary of domestic and productive uses as is often presented, but 
water as a resource with multiple uses as understood, conceptualized and contested by 
those who live with, use and control the resource. A much broader view and 
understanding of intricate household and local level allocation processes and rights 
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creation reflecting a range of individual and communal options, investments, negotiations 
and how these change over time in the aftermath of both pre- and post-colonial water 
reforms and climate change becomes a necessity.  This study contributes to the growing 
debate and discussions on hprc, formal and informal institutions by offering empirical 
data that contribute insights (and where possible, foresight) and builds upon the growing 
body of knowledge and theory on resource rights, institutions and networks, and how 
such processes affect women’s and men’s access and control of the resource for multiple 
uses.  
 
Anthropological and sociological work on institutions suggests useful ways in 
considering institutions and natural resources management in relation to countervailing 
rural realities in Africa (Mehta et al, 2006).  Institutions are conceived in terms of 
practices and their social, cultural and political structuration; in terms of what people do, 
and their structural capacity to respond to events in shaping their own histories.  This 
study sought to employ ethnographic approaches to the processes and relations operating 
within and between multiple sites (Zimbabwe and South Africa) to try and transcend the 
local-global and formal-informal divides.  Finally, by offering an empirical examination 
and understanding of institutions, property rights and power this study highlights and 
explores the importance of analysing institutions and property rights as part of what 
people know or believe, as well as what they do.  The results of the study aim at 
generating recommendations for adaptations in the law and in other public support that 
build upon people’s ongoing spontaneous investments in water development. This will 
speed up and promote the increased access and productive use of water, which will 
enhance livelihood security and socio-economic development. 
 
1.6. Outline of the Thesis 
The thesis consists of ten chapters, (with six empirical chapters 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9) with 
references and annexure. 
CHAPTER ONE (Introduction and Background to Research Context) is an introduction 
of this study, it gives a background and context to (property rights, institutions and water 
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governance and) the challenges besetting water reform in South Africa and Zimbabwe.  It 
also outlines the problem statement, and describes the objectives and research questions 
of the study as well as the outline of the thesis. CHAPTER TWO (Theoretical 
Framework and Literature Review) provides a detailed presentation and analyses of the 
main conceptual frameworks for analysing the interrelationships between and among 
natural resources, property rights and institutions.  It presents the key concepts around 
which the study is built and how these concepts are interpreted and used in the study.  
CHAPTER THREE (Methodology and Description of Study Sites) sets out the 
methodology and methods used for data collection and analysis, why the methods were 
chosen, their utility and shortcomings, and challenges faced.  This is followed by a 
detailed description of study sites and why the study sites were selected.  The chapter also 
builds arguments for comparing and contrasting the two countries, South Africa and 
Zimbabwe. CHAPTER FOUR (Political History of Water-Related Investments and 
Institutional Arrangements in Mzingwane) examines and analyses the nature and patterns 
of investments in water infrastructure by rural communities in Gwanda, in order to 
understand how people, as individuals and or as groups, assert rights over water, and how 
such claims become legitimized. The chapter presents political and historical accounts of 
infrastructure investments and development of (natural and human) resources from the 
colonial to the post-colonial period assessing and analysing communal and private 
investments in water resources. CHAPTER FIVE (From Homeland to Democracy: The 
Politics and History of Water Resources Investments and Institutional Arrangements in 
Sekororo (B72a and B72c), South Africa) examines and analyses the nature and patterns 
of investments in water infrastructure by rural communities in Sekororo in order to 
understand how people, as individuals and/or as groups, assert rights over water, and how 
such claims become legitimized. The chapter presents political and historical accounts of 
infrastructure investments and development on (natural and human) resources from the 
colonial to the post-colonial period assessing and analysing communal and private 
investments in water resources. CHAPTER SIX (Hydraulic Property Rights Creation in 
South Africa and Zimbabwe – A Conceptual Analysis) provides conceptual and analytic 
insights on how the dynamic processes played out in South Africa and Zimbabwe 
(presented in chapters four and five) can be understood within the broader property rights 
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and institutions debates. CHAPTER SEVEN (Institutional Networks, Bureaucracies and 
Hierarchies of Power for Water Governance in Zimbabwe’s Gwanda Communal Areas) 
provides detailed accounts, cases and analyses of power dynamics and intricate 
interrelations between and among: the policies, legislation and frameworks governing 
natural resources; the existing and resultant institutional arrangements; and the nature 
property rights and investments take.  The chapter documents the dynamic processes of 
engagement, negotiations, contests, conflicts and sharing arrangements that exist. 
CHAPTER EIGHT (Bureaucracies and Hierarchies of Governance for Water 
Management in Sekororo, South Africa) provides detailed accounts, cases and analyses 
of power dynamics and intricate interrelations between and among: the policies, 
legislation and frameworks governing natural resources; the existing and resultant 
institutional arrangements; and the nature property rights and investments take.  The 
chapter documents the dynamic processes of engagement, negotiations, contests, conflicts 
and sharing arrangements that exist. CHAPTER NINE discusses and analyse the findings 
drawn from Chapters 7 and 8; while CHAPTER TEN (Discussion and Conclusions) 
synthesises and reviews the key findings of the study in a thematic manner that allows for 
reflection on the key issues relating to research objectives and hypotheses.  The chapter 
also provides the key concluding statements of the study.   
1.7. Conclusion 
This chapter provided a grounded background to the study by comparing and contrasting 
the historical and socio-economic trajectories in the water sector of the two countries.  
The chapter also outlined the problem statement, the justification of the problem 
statement, and the objectives, research questions and hypotheses to be explored in the 
thesis. It further provided an outline of the structure of the thesis. The next chapter 
presents the theoretical framework underpinning the study. 
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CHAPTER TWO:   Literature Review / Theoretical 
Framework 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The chapter provides a detailed presentation and analyses of the main conceptual 
frameworks for analysing the interrelationships between and among natural resources, 
especially water, property rights and institutions.  It also sets the foundation for exploring 
the nature of interaction of various actors in the management of common pool resources.  
Power relations and situated practices of different actors located in specific contexts and 
mediated by sets of changing institutions, which may lead to different outcomes are 
analysed.  Most analysts dealing with institutional issues in community-based natural 
resources management make reference to the Common Property Resource (CPR) theory 
(see Ostrom, 1990; Sithole, 1999); hence it becomes imperative to commence the 
discussion from this viewpoint before exploring the alternatives presented by other 
scholars.  The chapter elaborates the conceptual framework of the study of institutions 
and property rights in relation to investments in- and the use and management of common 
pool resources.  A focus on property rights, investments and institutions leads into a 
discussion on the dynamics involved in private and collective management of resources 
such as water, and how access rights and control over resources are strengthened or 
weakened.  Such processes are often context bound, with history shaping the evolution of 
contestations and negotiations around the resources in question as well as hydraulic 
property rights creation. 
2.2. Property Rights, Institutions and Resource Governance 
This section provides a review of literature aimed at demonstrating how conventional 
understandings of institutions neglect the everyday processes and contexts within which 
institutions are located and the overlapping domains between different institutional 
arrangements.  Dominant theoretical approaches to understanding institutions are 
reviewed to illustrate the need for a radical shift and new thinking on relationship 
between institutions, property rights and power, and ways of viewing resources.  This 
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calls for new forms of governance which addresses the questions of power and the 
overhauling of sharp dichotomies between local and the global as well as formal and 
informal processes. 
 
In the natural resources management literature, institutions are considered to be key in 
sustainable livelihoods adaptation and natural resources management where institutions 
are understood and seen as central to successful policies.  These analyses have tended to 
borrow from approaches grounded in the Common Property Resource (CPR) theory, with 
its related links to the New Institutional Economics (NIE) (Ostrom, 1990; Wade, 1988; 
Mehta et al, 1999; Murphree, 1996).  The NIE became very famous for the transaction 
cost approach and the collective action approach, yet the two strands conceive of 
institutions in different ways despite sharing the same basic tenets.  An analytically rich 
branch of institutional economics, the property rights paradigm, analyses the evolution 
and changes in property rights in society as a process of reducing transaction costs in 
exploiting new economic opportunities (Shah, 1996:24).  Institutions are generally 
conceptualised as the ‘rules of the game in society’ which provide constraint on action 
(Ostrom, 1990; North, 1990).  In the meanwhile, North (1990) sees institutions as the 
formal rules and conventions, including informal codes of behaviour or norms, which 
emerge to regulate human behaviour and interaction.  Common property analysts such as 
Ostrom (1990) look at collective action dilemmas and focusing on the ways in which 
institutions or rules can be purposively crafted to produce collective action.  However, 
much of the CPR literature tended to dwell on local situations, and on establishing the 
conditions under which collective action in resource management operates effectively, 
with emphasis on clear resource boundaries and relative socio-economic homogeneity 
among users (Ostrom, 1990; Wade, 1988; Mehta et al, 1999), although attempts have 
been made to use CPR theory to address global environmental problems (Keohane and 
Ostrom, 1995). 
 
CPR analysis has also made meaningful contributions in directing attention on the 
importance of informal institutions in natural resources management.  Bromley and 
Cernea (1989) highlighted the utility of CPR in showing how planners have erroneously 
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neglected and often delegitimized indigenous institutions governing resources.  Without 
denying its utility as noted, CPR approaches have focused largely on purposive 
institutions with the assumption that institutions are designed (or ‘crafted’, in Ostrom’s 
terms) specifically to perform certain natural resource management functions, where 
emphasis is placed on matching of particular institutions to particular issues such as water 
management committees, forestry groups, and fishing groups among others.  This 
contrasts with the complex matrix of institutions in which people live their lives, and in 
which natural resource management span across different resources and different 
institutions.  The collective action focus also tends to shift attention away from the fact 
that institutions by nature are beset with conflicts, social difference, and diverse interests 
as much as they can serve to enhance cooperation.  Thus policy suggestions often result 
in a focus on ‘getting the institutions right’ in order to guarantee or stabilize uncertain 
human behaviour through such action as establishing a formal legal system, fixed 
property rights and coded norms of behaviour. 
 
CPR/NIE approaches also presuppose a non-interactive divide between formal and 
informal institutions where policy prescriptions have tended to focus on either state-level 
recommendations or on local level (often informal) institutions.  This dichotomy fails to 
capture empirical realities in which interrelationships and overlaps link various 
institutional domains, refuting the existence of a straitjacket formal-informal divide.  It is 
this ‘messy middle’ (Mehta et al, 1999, Lund, 2003) where institutional arrangements 
may be, highly contested and beset by ambiguity and flexibility to divergent 
interpretations.  Yet within NIE and CPR approaches, there has been virtually no attempt 
to conceptualise this middle-ground, rather it has been obscured as an area of inquiry by 
the privileging of either the formal or the informal realm.  Although CPR and NIE 
theories have successfully established a tradition of concern with the significance of local 
institutions in natural resources management underscored by robust theory especially 
appealing to economically minded policy makers, there is a growing inability of these 
theoretical perspectives to comprehend the complex institutional arrangements in which 
people live their lives in contemporary settings. 
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Notwithstanding the debates around CPR and NIE theories and their influence on 
institutions as indicated earlier, the last decades have seen a growth in the influence of 
supra-national and global institutions of governance which are increasingly embedded in 
a larger set of globalised economic and political processes such as IWRM and 
Community Based Natural Resources Management (CBNRM) which tend to shape and 
re-shape global discourse on natural resources governance.   
 
Anthropological and sociological perspectives to natural resources management started 
ways of breaking down the local-global and formal-informal dichotomies and offer 
alternative insights and approaches concerning institutions. Sociologists of the middle-
ground such as Giddens (1984) and Bourdieu (1977) argue that structure and action 
reinforce each other, thus conceiving of institutions more in terms of practice and less in 
terms of fixed rules.  The argument follows that some action and practices serve to 
reproduce structures whereas other action has agency, subverting established norms and 
perhaps serving overtime to shift them (Mehta et al, 1999).  This interplay of agency and 
structure only becomes visible through a historical sociology, where institutions are 
viewed as what people do – their practices – albeit those practices that are regularized 
over a period of time.  In this perspective, institutions exist only in as much as they are 
continually practiced or invested in, and rules and norms cannot be considered apart from 
their constant making and re-making through people’s practices.  Consequently, 
formalization of an institution needs to be seen as a practice which regularizes other 
practices; for example the constituting of a committee with a chairperson, secretary and 
treasurer may be seen as an alignment with the state’s legal forms and norms.  Similarly, 
it can be argued that casting something as an institution, re-inventing tradition and 
presenting something as ‘the way we have always done this’ can equally be understood as 
a social practice to gloss over unwanted complexity, conflict and ambiguity (see Li, 
1996; Nuitjen, 1992; Lund, 2003).  A practice-based approach to institutions helps to 
deconstruct the distinction between formal and informal institutions, which as shown 
earlier, characterises mainstream approach to institutions in natural resources 
management. 
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Giddens’s structurationist perspective offers a conception of institutional dynamics that 
accommodates the structuration of power and influence, in a frame that is open to both 
agency and uncertainty.  A growing body of work by anthropologists, geographers and 
social historians is using and developing this broad type of perspective on institutions as 
social practice in relation to natural resources management issues (Leach, 1994; Berry, 
1993; Li, 1996; Cleaver,1993).  Emphasis is drawn to people’s socially differentiated 
experiences in relation to the structuration of particular institutions, and to how people 
may draw differentially on a wide range of social and political institutions in order to 
obtain or defend access to the same resource (Mehta et al, 1999; Lund, 2003; Lund and 
Benjaminsen, 2003).  These insights are similar to those formalized in work on ‘forum-
shopping’ within legal anthropology (Benda-Beckmann et al, 1981, 1997; Meinzen-Dick 
and Bruns, 1999, 2000).  Anthropologists and sociologists have also argued for the need 
to incorporate the symbolic dimensions that people accord to resources, where struggles 
over resources are seen simultaneously as struggles over meaning (Agarwal, 1994).  In 
this sense, the use and control of resources may be both material and symbolic means of 
renegotiating one’s social position within broader social networks (Whitehead, 1984; 
Guyer and Peters, 1987).  Hence, it is recognised that people are always members of 
multiple institutions and access to resources is influenced by people’s positions in a wide 
variety of social networks not necessarily linked to resources management. 
 
Understanding institutions as social practice also helps clarify the ‘messy-middle’ 
through its transcendence of local versus national or global distinctions in concepts and 
ideas.  For example, anthropological work has amply shown how the concepts people 
practise in understanding their broader world are those of their everyday lives writ large 
(Mehta et al, 1999; Croll and Park, 1992; Parry and Block, 1989).  Work on the sociology 
of knowledge, and in particular on feminist critique of science, have shown explicitly 
how people’s perspectives on the world, and the questions they ask science of it, reflect 
their broader positions in social institutions (see Harding, 1987; Haraway, 1989).  Over 
the last decade there have been attempts to move beyond the local in anthropology to 
include the ‘global’ without setting up dichotomies, for example the ‘multi-sited’ 
ethnography of Marcus (1995) and Appadurai (1996).  Some work in this genre has 
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applied a structuration approach to processes of linking rural livelihoods to national and 
international processes, the actor-oriented work of Long and Long (1992) offers a good 
example.  Yet, a rather different theoretical tradition has drawn on the work of Foucault 
and his concept of discourse, illuminated by the politics of anti-politics studies of 
Ferguson (1990) in Lesotho.  In this perspective, rather than focusing on the structuration 
of institutions through the interplay of agency and structure, where both agency and 
structure ‘have power’, Foucault stresses the mutual production of institutions and 
knowledges, which embodies and reproduces relations of power (Foucault, 1980).  In 
strong contrast with structuration theory, people’s apparent agency (and even their belief 
in it) is ultimately a product of these relations, and is analytically relevant less for the 
creativity it brings to social life, than for the way it is structured by and constrained 
within dominant discourse.  What discourse theory has done, not withstanding its short 
comings, is to focus attention closely on the relationship between institutions and the 
knowledges they purvey, showing the centrality of power relations.  It also emphasises 
that an analysis of institutions must extend to include the conceptual regimes of its 
publics, since part of an institution’s power is public belief in the institutions categories, 
concepts and issues. 
 
Amidst the diversity of tradition and contributions as shown in the literature presented, 
anthropological and sociological work on institutions suggests important emphases which 
stand out as useful ways forward in considering institutions and natural resources 
management.  The first is a conception of institutions in terms of practices and their 
social, cultural and political structuration; of what people do, and their structured capacity 
to respond to events in shaping their own histories.  Second is an ethnographic approach 
to the processes and relations operating within and between multiple sites, transcending 
local-global and formal-informal divides.   The final emphasis is the conceptual linking 
of institutions, knowledge and power, suggesting the importance of analysing institutions 
and property rights as part of what people know or believe, as well as what they do.  To 
this end the study will employ the hydraulic property creation, the negotiability/flexibility 
concept, the multiple-use water services approach and discourse theory to unpack and 
analyse the issues of property rights, resource access, institutional arrangements and 
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power relations.  The four concepts and their usefulness for the study are discussed 
below. 
2.3. Hydraulic Property Rights Creation and Institutions 
Against the background provided above, the study adopted the concept of ‘hydraulic 
property rights creation’ as its underpinning theory so as to shed light on and understand 
how people, as individuals and or as groups, assert rights over water, and how such 
claims become legitimized (Coward, 1986; Sithole and van Koppen, 2008; Manzungu et 
al, 2010). Hydraulic property rights creation refers to the creation of value of water by 
means of establishing, and recognizing claims to water of a certain quantity and quality in 
a particular locality as a consequence of investments made in developing physical 
infrastructure and related institutional arrangements for the purpose of abstracting, 
storing, conveying and/or applying water to the field (ibid). As far as ensuring access to 
water is concerned, investment seems to be the single most important legitimation for 
laying claims to water. 
 
This thesis adopted the concept of ‘hydraulic property rights creation’ as the core of 
vesting claims to water. This concept not only allows analyzing empirical processes but is 
especially relevant focusing on the alignment between the legislation and the major 
policy agenda in Southern Africa and sub-Saharan Africa of investing in rural water 
development (see also Van Koppen and Van der Zaag, 2010:2-3). On the basis of earlier 
conceptualization and empirical evidence (Coward 1986; Boelens and Dávila 1998; 
Mohamed-Katerere and Van der Zaag, 2003; Sithole and Van Koppen, 2008; Van 
Koppen and Van der Zaag, 2010; Bolding et al, 2010; Manzungu et al, 2010), the concept 
was operationalized as follows. 
 
Hydraulic property rights creation is defined as the process of establishing recognized 
claims to water of certain quantity and quality on a particular site at certain timings 
(Coward, 1986; Van Koppen and Van der Zaag, 2010:3). Making investments in the 
physical infrastructure to abstract, store, and/or convey water and, thus, create such use 
value of water in terms of quantity, quality, site and timing, is the single most important 
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ground for vesting claims to water. Others who have not contributed to the investments 
can be excluded, although this does not normally apply in case of households and 
livestock accessing water for the most basic needs (see also Derman, Hellum, Manzungu, 
Sithole and Machiridza, 2005; Derman and Hellum, 2003; Derman and Gonese; 2002).   
 
Investments may be individual (like investments in small pumps, boreholes or homestead 
wells), or communal (like village reservoirs and irrigation furrows). Processes of 
hydraulic property rights creation may be entirely ‘endogenous’ (or ‘local’ or ‘informal’), 
with claims recognized at the local level by communities, or they may depend upon 
government, formal NGOs, or other outsiders (publicly supported or ‘exogenous’). In the 
case of public investments, governments who built the systems can exert claims, but the 
public constructors mostly expect users to take up at least part of the burden of operation 
and maintenance, as a condition for their formal entitlement to the water conveyed. Lack 
of clarity on such hand-over and lack of other needed support may lead to a process of 
‘hydraulic property rights extinction’: water could physically be made available, but 
nobody exerting claims, or hydraulic property reconfiguration where users re-arrange 
relationships to suit the prevailing hydro-political and social circumstances.  Manzungu, 
Sithole, Tapela and Van Koppen (2010) contend that hydraulic property rights creation is 
related to land tenure where access to land situated above groundwater or near surface 
water is an important practical and sometimes also legal condition for vesting water 
rights. Servitudes may be obligatory, though. Van Koppen and Van der Zaag (2010) 
argue that the weaker land claims of tenants and (often) women affect their incentives to 
invest in land-bound infrastructure, unless arrangements with those holding the stronger 
land rights assure sharing of benefits. 
 
Water is typically used for multiple purposes. In exogenous water infrastructure 
development, which typically follows the rigid fragmentation of the water sector 
bureaucracies according to single uses, either domestic or irrigation or livestock, or 
fisheries, the factual uses of these single-use designed schemes are, invariably, multiple 
as well.  The concept captures these dynamics by highlighting several dimensions that 
bear out the fluid nature of hydraulic property creation and reconfiguration. I first treat 
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the default pattern of hydraulic property creation at different hydrological levels, namely 
local/village scale and the quaternary catchment scale before examining the effects of 
outside interventions on these hydraulic property regimes.  In each country, the thesis 
applies the concept of hydraulic property rights creation to analyze a set of frequently 
occurring endogenous and exogenous, and individual and communal processes of water 
rights creation by small-scale rural users. They include groundwater development 
(manual and mechanized irrigation, domestic supplies, livestock, other enterprises) and 
surface water development (reservoirs of various sizes, recession agriculture, irrigation 
furrows and other enterprises). 
 
Findings and comparative analyses will enhance our understanding of the nature and the 
triggers of water rights creation and the respective roles of communities and public 
agencies. The factual role of the new water laws are studied where possible, but such 
cases are few, because the new laws have hardly been implemented as yet in informal 
settings (see also Van Koppen and Van der Zaag, 2010). For each country a historical 
analysis of the relevant laws and early implementation of the recently promulgated laws, 
including the formal institutional set-up and institutional reforms, where applicable, is 
conducted to provide the context under which hydraulic property creation evolve. Also a 
quantitative and qualitative assessment of the numbers and volumes of informal water 
users and uses is made in the two countries to ascertain the prevalence of investments in 
water use and access dynamics.  The results of the study aim at generating 
recommendations for adaptations in the law and in other public support that build upon 
people’s ongoing spontaneous investments in water development. This will speed up and 
promote the increased access and productive use of water, which will enhance livelihood 
security and socio-economic development. 
2.4. The Negotiability/flexibility concept 
The negotiability/flexibility concept (Peters, 2004; Lund, 2002; Berry, 2002) will be used 
to unpack and analyse the processes of negotiation and power relations.  The concept is 
based on the premise of understanding the property regimes and stresses that property 
regimes are about people and relations among them as well as about values and norms and 
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their enforcement. This means that careful attention has to be paid to the specific 
meanings and constructions, including narratives and stories, placed by different social 
actors on the principles justifying access, use and control. In response to this stress, 
recent research has pointed up the dangers of over-privileging notions of flexibility and 
negotiability in the social relations around natural resources in Africa, and the need to 
assess ongoing processes of exclusion and the production of winners and losers.  The 
concept of power relations has been instrumental, at a variety of levels, and in 
interactions across these levels (Berry 2002; Lund 2002; Peters 2004). As a result, some 
interest groups have tended to benefit more than others, notably chiefs and headmen (e.g. 
in relation to powers of land allocation) and men (e.g. in relation to control of productive 
land and its income streams). The concept contends that both authority and rights have 
been constructed, and should be understood and analysed, in ways that are ‘historical, 
contextual and contingent’ (Lund 2002: 33).  This concept will be useful in examining 
and analysing institutional arrangements in the two study areas owing to its utility to 
address power relations rooted in historical and contextual arenas.  Processes of 
mediation, bargaining, conflict and power are important in institutional landscapes where 
uncertainties prevail regarding policies, norms, and legislation on access to and control 
over resources.  This is an important aspect which the hprc concept, despite its overall 
analytical utility, does not adequately address. 
2.5. Discourse theory 
A rather different theoretical tradition has drawn on the work of Foucault and his concept 
of discourse, illuminated by the politics of anti-politics studies of Ferguson (1990) in 
Lesotho.  In this perspective, rather than focusing on the structuration of institutions 
through the interplay of agency and structure, where both agency and structure ‘have 
power’, Foucault stresses the mutual production of institutions and knowledges, which 
embodies and reproduces relations of power (Foucault, 1980).  In strong contrast with 
structuration theory, people’s apparent agency (and even their belief in it) is ultimately a 
product of these relations, and is analytically relevant less for the creativity it brings to 
social life, than for the way it is structured by and constrained within dominant discourse.  
What discourse theory has done, not withstanding its short comings, is to focus attention 
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closely on the relationship between institutions and the knowledges they purvey, showing 
the centrality of power relations.  It also emphasises that an analysis of institutions must 
extend to include the conceptual regimes of its publics, since part of an institution’s 
power is public belief in the institutions categories, concepts and issues.  The discourse 
concept is very instrumental in this thesis to address the shortcomings of the concept of 
hydraulic property creation which does not directly address issues and relations of power. 
 
2.6. Gender Analysis: the Multiple Use (MUS) Water Services 
Concept 
Realising the limitations of the three frameworks used in this thesis (as highlighted 
above), I adopted a gendered analysis of water access and management.  Van Koppen 
(2002:2) argued that “...concepts used in the past intervention-oriented and theoretical 
research were inaccurate with regard to the specific character of water as a natural 
resource, and to the precise involvement of women and men in irrigated farming and 
water management”.  She further argues that water for productive uses in agriculture 
obtains its value only as input in an encompassing farm enterprise.  In this context, argues 
Van Koppen (2002), gender analysis cannot just differentiate women for variables like 
class, race, ethnicity and age, as it did in the past.  Gender analysis also needs to 
differentiate between women and men with and without their own farm enterprise.  A 
conceptual distinction between patterns in agricultural roles that women play clarifies 
whether water management agencies deal directly with gender issues under their own 
mandates or not. 
 
Multiple-Use water Services, or “MUS” in short, “is a participatory, integrated and 
poverty-reduction-focused approach in poor rural and peri-urban areas, which takes 
people’s multiple water needs as a starting point for providing integrated services, 
moving beyond the conventional sectoral barriers of the domestic and productive sectors” 
(Van Koppen, Moriarty and Boelee, 2006:v).  Van Koppen et al (ibid:2), argue that it is 
widely recognized by now that, in addition to good governance, decentralisation and 
participatory technology development, “it pays to think in a more holistic way”, as 
 
 
 
 
 54
reflected in the concept of IWRM.  IWRM has become the overarching consensus of the 
water community at the abstract level.  At a more concrete level, the IWRM paradigm 
has been critiqued for being “amorphous and open to multiple interpretations, and 
perhaps most seriously for lack of practical tools and approaches by which to implement 
it” (Van Koppen et al, 2006:2; see also Biswas, 2004).   
 
Van Koppen et al (2006:2) argue that the single most important reason why planning and 
design of water services on the basis of multiple water needs are still not the norm, in 
spite of water services providers’ genuine and intensive efforts to improve users’ well-
being, is that people’s integrated need for and use of water do not match ways in which 
the water sector itself is organised, “...the structuring of policymaking, implementation, 
subsidization and financing by government and, often to a lesser extent, by Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs), private water services provision and commercial 
financing, is sectoral and top-down, dividing water services provision into a domestic 
sector, an irrigation sector, a livestock sector, a fisheries and aquaculture sector, etc”.  
In this setup, each sector specialises in one single use and plans and designs its 
interventions according to what can be called a “single-use planning and design” 
approach where it is assumed that “other sectors” take care of the other water needs of 
their clients regardless of whether the “other sectors” are actually present or not.  Van 
Koppen et al (2006:4) point out that this sector-based structuring goes hand in hand with 
efforts to formalise and standardise implementation procedures and norms for 
infrastructure, water quality, or water committees, especially by governments.   
 
This does not sit well with the informal and highly variable water situation of the rural 
and peri-urban poor.  In these informal poor rural settings, where the presence of public 
agencies is limited, the priority of infrastructure development for better water control 
tends to be low (Van Koppen et al, 2006).  An individual’s own initiative and private 
sector initiative prevail in accessing water from rainfall, streams, ponds, springs, 
groundwater, or wetlands.  Important synergies are derived from complementary use of 
multiple water sources, where access to multiple sources is also at the heart of strategies 
to cope with seasonal and annual droughts and floods.  A MUS approach “...addresses the 
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challenges mentioned above by recognising that people’s water needs are integrated and 
are part and parcel of their multifaceted livelihoods, and that the necessity to better meet 
people’s multiple water needs is a main driver for integration within the water sector 
itself” (Van Koppen et al, 2006:2; see also Moriarty et al, 2004, and 2005).  Van Koppen 
et al (2006:4) content that multiple-use water services in the interests of the poor stand 
for: “water services planning and design that take people’s multiple water needs as a 
starting point and that searches for incremental improvements in access to water across 
the range of needs within informal settings and a highly variable water situation”. 
 
The MUS concept was adopted in this study for being implicitly gender-friendly at three 
broad levels.  Improved well-being under multiple-use water services benefits women in 
particular in three ways.  While the domestic sector already recognises the importance of 
improved domestic water supplies to alleviate women’s and children’s burdens, 
domestic-plus approaches add productive activities which are often around the 
household.  Secondly, from a productive-plus perspective, the added device for domestic 
uses are often the most important, if not the only benefit of public irrigation investments 
for women (Hussain, 2005), especially in the past when women tended to be entirely 
excluded from newly introduced irrigation (Van Koppen, 2002).  As women tend to 
spend a higher proportion of their incomes for family welfare than men, this also 
benefited their families (see also Menzen-Dick and Zwarteveen, 1998; Van Koppen, 
2002).  Finally, full-fledged multiple-use water services, which encompass women’s and 
men’s entire range of water needs, may take gender issues further to the centre stage of 
water services planning and design.  If service providers take the multiple water needs of 
all users as a starting point in inclusive community-based participatory planning fora, 
women are likely to prioritise reducing their and their children’s excessive labour 
demands of fetching water and watering animals, and to try and convince their male kin 
and service providers to support that (Van Wijk-Sijbesma, 2001).  Meeting domestic 
needs would be discussed as their shared responsibility of men and women for household 
welfare.  Van Koppen et al (2006:11) highlight that “this would expose current divisions 
of the responsibilities for domestic water provision, in which women bear the heaviest 
labour burdens while men may contribute through, for example, well digging”.  This does 
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not only provide greater scope for understanding the gendered nature of MUS, but also 
offers potential for inequitable burdens to be shared when new opportunities arise.   
 
Most striking, the MUS concept was adopted for this study for its ability and potential to 
take everybody’s needs as equally important from the outset, where opportunities to 
better use water for productive purposes would, a priori, be equally open to women and 
men.  Following after Van Koppen et al (2006:11), such negotiated consensus between 
the genders at the start of the planning process “is a firm basis for technical design, 
institution building, and any water-prioritisation issue later”.  Analysis of local practice 
through alternative services approach using multiple uses of the same natural resource. 
Taking poor people’s multiple water needs (quantities and qualities) as a starting point in 
new water public and private project-based (domestic-plus, productive-plus, or multiple 
use) schemes, the MUS concept is used in this thesis to further improve insights and 
understand the gender implications in implementing IWRM by offering a more gender-
equitable approach to service provision.  This also confirms what IWRM proponents 
GWP already stated, that MUS approaches are appropriate forms of implementing IWRM 
in poor areas with a backlog of infrastructure development and advancing the Millennium 
Development Goals (GWP, 2004).         
2.7. Conclusions 
This chapter has presented and reviewed literature on conceptual issues in natural 
resources management, and discussed the various conceptual frameworks used for 
analysing the empirical materials presented in the thesis.  Common Property Resource 
theory provides a firm conceptual background for understanding natural resources 
management as depicted in the review of literature on property rights, institutions and 
resource governance in section 2.2.  Although attempts have been made to use CPR 
theory to address global environmental problems much of the CPR literature tends to 
dwell on local situations, and on establishing the conditions under which collective action 
in resource management operates effectively, with emphasis on clear resource boundaries 
and relative socio-economic homogeneity among users.  CPR approaches presuppose a 
non-interactive divide between formal and informal institutions where policy 
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prescriptions have tended to focus on either state-level recommendations or on local level 
(often informal) institutions.  This dichotomy fails to capture empirical realities in which 
interrelationships and overlaps link various institutional domains, refuting the existence 
of a straitjacket formal-informal divide.  Realising this shortfall, anthropological and 
sociological perspectives to natural resources management started ways of breaking down 
the local-global and formal-informal dichotomies and offer alternative insights and 
approaches concerning institutions.  The study utilised the hydraulic property creation, 
the negotiability/flexibility concept, the multiple-use water services approach and 
discourse theory to unpack and analyse the issues of property rights, resource access, 
institutional arrangements and power relations.  The four concepts and their usefulness 
for the study were discussed in detail in the chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE:    Methodology and Description of 
Study Sites 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter sets out the methodological framework adopted for the study as well as 
presenting the background and context of the study sites, Sekororo (Olifants catchment, 
South Africa) and Ward 17 Manama (Mzingwane catchment, Zimbabwe).  The study was 
located within a broader research project, the Challenge Programme for Water and Food 
(CPWF) and the “Mobility, networks and institutions in the management of natural 
resources in contemporary Africa” initiative.  The qualitative research methodology 
forms the basis (if not backbone) of this study although some quantitative methods were 
also utilised.  The bulk of the qualitative data presented in this thesis is drawn from a 
combination of ethnographic, participatory, key-informant and in-depth interviews, 
secondary review of policies and legislation, and archival records.  In the methodology 
section, a detailed description is given of the research strategies adopted, methods of data 
collection and analysis, field procedures and experiences as well as challenges faced 
during fieldwork. 
3.2. Research Framework and Research Methodology 
Research Framework 
Much of the analytic work of common property resources has been undertaken at 
group/community level.  Blaikie (1992) suggests that analysis should be structured by a 
hierarchy of explanatory levels, for example, state, agrarian society, local CPR, 
household, and individual.  Bradley (1991:303) underscores that within a "complex array 
of investigations, at different scales, and within different disciplines, the construction of 
synthetic images at the end, linked upwards to broader levels, yet relating concretely to 
individuals is not simple".  An attempt has been made in this study to manage a hierarchy 
of scale investigations, each confined internally to its own particular sets of goals, but 
each linked to a broader and pre-configured structure.  The level of entry for this study is 
the resource base.  The resource was chosen as a point of entry because this is where the 
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user is effecting management (Murombedzi, 1990; Mandondo, 1997; Sithole, 1999).  
Davies et al (1991) argues that many environmental problems particularly those that 
threaten household food security are highly localised, despite the tendency for 
governments and international organisations to focus on global or aggregate issues and 
therefore understanding use, must be at both use and management levels.  Bruce and 
Fortmann (1989) demonstrate that tenure on a resource is incredibly complex comprising, 
as it does, different layers of rights that sometimes overlap on different services and 
products derived from the resource.  Therefore to "deal meaningfully with tenure one 
must deal with it at the parcel or field level that one can be certain of capturing variations 
in tenure by field managers within the household and so explore what maybe important 
gender based differences" (Bruce and Fortmann, 1989:23).  Thus, by studying linkages 
between members of a household or a user group, one is able to see how many 
households use and access a wider range of resources (Haswell and Hunt, 1991); and be 
able to interrogate the institutions that mediate and control access and use of resources 
(Sithole, 1999). 
 
This study was developed as a comparative between two rural areas in two countries with 
a high level of livelihoods dependent on subsistence farming; and where effects and 
implications of water scarcity, rainfall variability and climate change are most felt.  
Murphree (1991) suggests that methodological frames for studies of natural resources 
should include comparison at various levels and be multidisciplinary as highlighted 
earlier in the introduction chapter.  However, Ranger (1985:3) cautions against use of 
comparisons that he describes as "dangerous intellectual tools" if used by people who do 
not understand the context within which the society has developed or is developing.  
Despite this caution, the study will demonstrate that there are many contrasts, occurring 
at different levels and between different types of users over different resource units.  This 
study is therefore about contrasts between places, people, contexts, policies and 
communal areas in South Africa and Zimbabwe. 
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Research Methodology 
As discussed in Chapter One, the major objective the study seeks to address is to 
contribute to the empirical and theoretical understanding of ways and linkages in which 
institutions (formal and informal), networks and resource rights are organised, negotiated 
and contested in rural economies of South Africa and Zimbabwe.  To fulfil this objective, 
the study sought to answer a set of key research questions and test some hypotheses in 
order to contribute to the debate on the roles, processes and relationships between and 
among investments in hydraulic property, institutional arrangements in the broader water 
governance discourse.  The study attempts to broaden knowledge on both the theoretical 
contributions to understanding hydraulic property creation and the emergence and 
evolution of rights in informal and formal processes in rural economies by offering 
empirical and grounded evidence.  Next, I will discuss the qualitative research approach 
adopted for the study before going into details of the fieldwork processes. 
3.2.1. Qualitative research methodology 
Social research in a development project context on the dynamic processes of hydraulic 
property creation, institutional arrangements and power relations, and how they affect 
different actors is complex and requires that one use methods that will bring out the 
dynamism of the numerous intricate processes of social interaction.  Qualitative methods 
were suitable for my study as they aim at capturing the myriad perspectives of 
participants in the social world.  Qualitative research is inherently multi-method in focus 
(Flick, 1998; Denzin and Lincoln, 2000; Nemarundwe, 2003:53).  The use of multiple 
methods, or triangulation, reflects an attempt to secure an in-depth understanding of the 
phenomenon in question.  Objective reality can never be captured; we can know 
something only through its representations (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000:5).  The multiple 
qualitative methods available to the researcher include case studies, situational analyses, 
network analysis, through participant observation, dialogue, visual methods, group 
discussions and key informant interviews.  The majority of these methods played a 
crucial role in the process of data collection in the study.         
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3.2.2. Data requirements 
Given the diversity of actors that influence or are affected by investments in hydraulic 
property creation; and the attendant institutions that evolve and emerge to govern access 
to the resources, the identification of the various actors involved in shaping institutional 
processes becomes key to the institutional analysis process.  In line with the above, 
investments and materials invested in hydraulic property creation need to be interrogated 
and analysed in order to grasp the levels of contribution by the different actors; and the 
processes and types of claims they have for making such investments, as well as the 
defensibility of such claims in light of competition.  Various actors, i.e. women, men, 
rich, poor, local and traditional authorities, individuals or groups’ relationship to 
institutions are often shaped by their experiences and other social relationships (both 
formal and informal) within local and external spheres (Nemarundwe, 2003:54).  Their 
actions need to be interrogated in the context of their history, economic activities, 
ethnicity, age, and gender so as to understand how action observed at a particular time at 
the local and intermediate level is a product of and has some effect on the wider political 
economic and social systems and institutional framework (Long, 1977).  Hence, there is 
need to analyse historical processes and social relationships and how they impact on 
property right creation and institutions for water use and management.  Socio-economic 
differentiated data is required for the understanding of how property rights and 
institutions influence or are influenced by actors belonging to various socio-economic 
categories that can be defined along ownership of land, livestock and water, type/level of 
investment, as well as other variations in wealth status among community members. 
  
Identifying institutions and their membership is a major methodological challenge in a 
context where there are both formal (often visible) and informal (often hidden) 
institutions.  This study maps out institutions and related structures in Sekororo and 
Mzingwane in an effort to understand the significance of local and external institutions 
on defining patterns and processes of property rights creation, and resource access and 
use.  Within the institutions, actors have different interests, beliefs, agendas and power.  
In mapping and tracing the genealogy and processes of property rights creation and 
institutional arrangements, attention is paid to who participates in the formation of which 
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institutions, who are members of which institutional structures and why; and who has 
what rights and what and how much did they invest to secure such claims? 
 
Other methodological issues relate to how boundaries have been defined within the 
context of a catchment/hydrological zones.  The bio-physical boundaries of quaternary 
catchments in the two study sites were defined by and through operationalisation of 
policies and legislation relating to the National Water Act (1998, South Africa) and the 
Water Act (1998, Zimbabwe).  While the biophysical catchment was defined by policy 
and legislation as stated earlier, this study attempted to define the social boundaries 
related to multiple and single resource use within the confines of the two study sites.  It is 
assumed that defining the precise biophysical boundaries limits the understanding of how 
people in communal areas share natural resources within and across local, intermediate 
and global levels.  I chose catchments as the broader delineating boundary for my study 
sites, starting with the Limpopo Basin, then Olifants catchment and quaternary catchment 
B72A and B72C in South Africa, and Mzingwane Catchment Council and Shashe Sub-
catchment council in Zimbabwe.  To augment the challenges beset by purely 
hydrological catchments, I then decided to use administrative boundaries at the local 
level such Wards and Villages.  The reasons why I chose both hydrological catchments 
and administrative boundaries are given below.  Watersheds delimit catchments within 
which water flows into streams that merge to form rivers, delineating sub-basins and 
basins that appear to clearly define boundaries for water management.  Bruns (2007:33) 
argues that as water becomes scarcer in a basin, the scope of interaction and competition 
between users increases, increasing the need for, and potential benefits from, 
coordination among those sharing a common resource.  However, other factors blur the 
seeming clarity of basins as management units (Cleaver and Franks, 2003; Bruns, 2007).  
In some cases administrative jurisdictions such as; municipal, district and provincial 
boundaries, transend hydrological basins.  Conceptual frameworks for integrated water 
resources management (IWRM: Agarwal et al., 2000; Rogers and Hall, 2000; Bruns, 
2007:35) “offer the appealing prospect of coordinating solutions to many of these 
complexities, but may presume or be interpreted to require ambitious projects for design 
and implementation of elaborate new institutional arrangements”.  From a community 
 
 
 
 
 63
perspective, however, if negotiation is costly, it may be most important to engage those 
affected, and are able to contribute to solving an immediate problem and crafting 
coalitions within and between communities (Bruns, 2007).  Following Bruns’s 
observation, the most relevant scope may be to cover a problemshed (Halaele and 
Knesse, 1973) rather than necessarily including an entire river basin or comprehensively 
integrating water resources management.  Rather than clearly defined boundaries and 
complete membership, the immediate challenge from a community perspective may be to 
form an ad hoc coalition among a fuzzy set (Kosko, 1994) of people with widely 
differing stakes in a problemshed.  Thus, both the hydrological and administrative 
boundaries/catchments were employed in this study (from the hydrological greater 
Limpopo basin, catchments and quaternary catchments to the administrative districts, 
municipalities, wards and villages).  
3.2.3. Research strategy 
Using a combination of ethnographic, participatory, key-informant and in-depth 
interview techniques, I carried out comparative studies (by comparing and contrasting) of 
institutions, policies and infrastructure investments to determine the processes and 
impacts of hydraulic property creation.  While the empirical field research was designed 
at the quaternary and sub-catchment level, focusing on specific processes and patterns of 
investments, property creation and arrangements in water resources management, review 
of policies, legislation and other relevant materials was extended to national and basin 
wide application.  A multi-method approach was adopted in order to produce detailed 
analyses of various stakeholders’ strategies in influencing or getting around both formal 
and informal institutional constraints, while negotiating access to water access and 
investments in hydraulic property.  I consulted and interviewed staff from local, district 
and provincial agencies (and where necessary national agencies), non-governmental and 
private organisations, and international donor organisations and institutions with 
responsibilities for water resources and management at the local level.  Owing to the 
largely qualitative nature of the data generated from the study, the narrative approach is 
employed to present the data (Scott, 1985; Carr, 1986; Roe, 1995; Fortmann, 1995; 
Nemarundwe, 2003: 55).  This is also compounded by the objective of my study to show 
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processes of investments in hydraulic infrastructure, the interactions and relationships of 
institutional structures, and the powerplay in these negotiations and contestations.  
Quantitative data was drawn from the hydraulic property and water use surveys, which 
were undertaken in 2008 in Sekororo, South Africa, and early 2009 in Mzingwane, 
Zimbabwe.  
 
3.2.4. Identification and location of the study sites 
The study was carried put in the greater Limpopo basin covering quaternary catchment 
B72A and B72C of the Olifants catchment management area in South Africa, and Shashe 
Sub-catchment Council of the Mzingwane Catchment Council in Zimbabwe.  In South 
Africa, the study sites fell under the Maruleng local municipality, of the Mopani District 
Municipality.  In Zimbabwe, the study site fell under Ward 17 of Gwanda Rural District 
Council.  It should be emphasized here that the selection of study sites was based on the 
concepts of both hydrological and administrative boundaries.  The justification for 
choosing a mix of hydrological and administrative units of analysis is given under section 
3.2.2.  Figure 3.1 below shows the politico-administrative units (districts) and 
hydrological catchment within the Limpopo Basin, and catchments on both the South 
African and Zimbabwean sides of the Limpopo.   
In South Africa, research was conducted in Sekororo (quaternary B72A and B72C of the 
Olifants catchment management basin) in Mopani District, and Gwanda (under the 
Shashe Sub-catchment Council of the Mzingwane Catchment) in Gwanda district in 
Zimbabwe. 
Specific details about each study site within the two countries are presented in sections 
3.2.4.1 for Sekororo, South Africa, and 3.2.4.2 for Gwanda, Mzingwane, Zimbabwe. 
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Figure 3.1: Map showing administrative districts in South Africa and Zimbabwe within 
the Limpopo basin.   
 
3.2.4.1. Sekororo - Letsoalo (Sekororo), South Africa 
The study was carried out in quaternary catchment B72A of the Olifants river basin, 
which is part of the Limpopo basin. The basin is situated in the north-eastern part of 
South Africa. The Limpopo province is among the three least developed provinces in the 
country and has the lowest (0.49) Human Development Index (HDI), as reflected by the 
UNDP (2006). More than half (60%) of the population live on income less than the 
poverty income. The predominantly rural socio-economic landscape of Limpopo 
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Province reflects the inequalities inherent in much of South Africa’s economy. 
Agricultural productivity is hampered by poor soil quality, markets, meager water 
resources, and inadequate water infrastructure development. The main stable sources of 
income are pensions and welfare subsidies from the government. Small-scale rainfed and 
irrigation subsistence agriculture provide a significant part of food requirements in good 
rainfall years (Magombeyi and Taigbenu, 2008; see also Manzungu et al, 2010).   
 
Sekororo-Letsoalo area is located within the quaternary catchment B72A of the Olifants 
River Basin, which is about 60km from Tzaneen in the Limpopo province.  Eighty 
percent of the area falls under the former Lebowa homeland, which has an estimated total 
population of 56 000 (Magombeyi and Taigbenu, 2008). The study was carried out in 
four villages, which represented different levels of water endowment and water 
investment. This area is part of the Sekororo tribal authority and Letsoalo tribal authority 
and is located in Maruleng Local Municipality, Mopani District Municipality.  The study 
area is composed of 14 villages located in the B72A quaternary catchment: Balloon, 
Bismarck, Enable, Ga-Sekororo (which includes Moshate and Mahlomelong), Lorraine, 
Madeira, Makgaung, Metz, Sofaya, Ticky Line (also called Hlohlokwe), and Turkey 
zones 1-4. According to Bohlabela district Water Services Development Plan (WSDP) 
the total population of these 14 villages was 56510 inhabitants in 2002 (Bohlabela district 
WSDP, 2003). Villages have different access to water resources depending on the 
distance from the mountains. Information of distance from the mountain was used as the 
basis for selection of villages where primary data was collected.  
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Table 3.1: Main agricultural areas in quaternary B72A quaternary catchment (and B72C 
for Worcester village) 
Main Areas Rainfall and Water 
Sources 
Geology and Soils Land Use and type of 
farming  
Villages 
Drakensberg 
mountains (altitude 
>600m) 
Rainfall >700mm 
lots of springs  
 Nature reserve on the 
top, hillside farming 
on lowest slopes 
Sofaya*, Madeira*, 
Turkey*, Ga-
Sekororo* 
Central plain, north of 
Makhutsi River 
500-700mm, 
boreholes (60-80m) 
Makhutsi river 
Alluvium, deep sandy 
loam soils 
Commercial farming 
(tropical fruits, 
vegetables) Emerging 
farming 
Trichardsdal, Calais, 
Nasionaal 
Central plain, between 
Makhutsi and 
Malomanye Rivers 
500-700mm in the 
West and <400mm in 
the East 
Wells, rivers, 
boreholes, irrigation 
canal 
Makhutsi gneiss 
Deep clay and sandy 
soils 
Small-scale irrigation 
farming (maize in 
rainy season, 
vegetables in dry 
season) 
Cattle grazing, dense 
settlements 
Balloon, Sofaya, Ga-
Sekororo, Lorraine, 
Tickyline, Madeira, 
Mertz, Makgaung 
Central plain, south of 
Malomanye river 
<400mm, Wells, no 
permanent rivers  
Harmony granite, 
draining sandy soils 
Small scale dryland 
farming (maize in 
rainy season) 
Human settlements 
Turkey, Enable, Ha-
Fanie, and 
**Worcester 
Eastern plain <400mm Harmony granite Game farming or 
extensive cattle 
grazing, nature 
reserve 
Sparse farms 
 
 
Adopted and adapted from Mapedza et al (2008:12). *People from these villages have 
access to mountain slopes for farming.  **Worcester is the only village in the study area 
that falls under quaternary B72C. 
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Figure 3.2: Main Wards and Villages in B72A & B72C  
 
  
Research was conducted in four villages: Enable, Lorraine, Sofaya and Worcester.  
Worcester is the only village that falls within quaternary B72C.  The map shows the 
administrative wards within the two quaternary catchments. 
 
Figure 3.3 below shows the agricultural areas in quaternary B72A where game farming 
and preservation of nature are practiced on the eastern plain (marked in light green). 
Rainfed farming (marked in black & yellow), small-scale irrigation (shaded black & red) 
and commercial farming are practiced in the central plains (shaded chequered green), and 
shaded in blue are the Drakensberg mountains.  The four study villages were selected 
based on annual rainfall, with Sofaya and Lorraine receiving (500 - 700mm) and are 
closer to the Drakensberg mountains, while Enable and Worcester villages receive 
(<400mm) rainfall and are further out from the Drakensberg mountains.  It was assumed 
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that these villages are representative of the greater Sekororo (with a mix of relative water 
abundancy and scarcity). 
 
Figure 3.3: Agricultural Areas in Quaternary Catchment B72A 
 
 
(Source: WaterNet/IWMI, 2009) 
 
The villages fall into wards 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Maruleng municipality (Census 2001 
boundaries). Wards 1, 2 and 5 are partly included in B72A. Wards 1 and 2 include some 
commercial farms; ward 5 includes commercial farms, private game reserves and part of 
other quaternary catchments. Ward 3 and 4 are completely included into B72A. The total 
population of these 5 wards was 59319 inhabitants in 2001. In order to select villages 
from which the sample was selected, it was necessary to stratify households based on 
water access and distance from the mountain. We assumed that the level of present water 
services is a determinant of willingness to pay for water services. From previous studies 
(Kanyoka, 2008; Magombeyi, 2008) in the area we also know that access to public water 
services vary across households. The only reliable and exhaustive information available 
on access to water services in the area is at ward level (Census 2001). Household 
information on water access is not available at village level. 
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Although 85% of the total population in South Africa has access to tap water, there is 
great variation in access to water across districts and rural and urban areas. In some rural 
areas, approximately 30% or less have access to tap water (Stevens, 2007). In the former 
homeland areas of the Olifants River basin, 45% of the population has water access 
which is below the RDP standard (Lefebvre, 2005). As is the case in many former 
homelands in South Africa, infrastructure development in Sekororo-Letsoalo area is very 
low and water and sanitation services are very poor. In 2002, it was reported that 73% of 
the population consume up to 10 litres of water per capita per day (Maruleng 
Municipality, 2002; Panesar, 2006).  In addition, only 10 percent of its population is 
considered to have reliable access to water (Panesar, 2006).  The economic and social 
water scarcity, the general prevalence of poverty and the informality of water in 
Sekororo, as well as the fact that the Challenge Programme on Water and Food Project 
number 17 which partly funded field research operated in the same area, rendered 
Sekororo as a suitable research site.  
3.2.4.2. Ward 17, Mzingwane, Zimbabwe 
The study took place in Gwanda District, which is situated in the South-West of 
Zimbabwe in Matabeleland South Province. Lying midway between Bulawayo and 
Beitbridge and abutting Botswana in the south, the district is situated within a hot, dry 
area that is subject to periodic droughts. The soils are generally light and sandy and the 
ecosystem is fragile. From an economic point of view the district is relatively poorly 
endowed and cannot support arable agriculture in a secure and sustainable manner 
(ICRISAT, 2008). The primary source of income and wealth is cattle, either managed on 
a commercial basis or, more generally, as part of subsistence agriculture practised by the 
district’s peasant population (ICRISAT, 2008). There is some mining activity to the north 
of the district and a large cement factory. Otherwise the district is overwhelmingly 
agricultural and has few large settlements. Gwanda Town, the capital of the province is 
situated to the north of the district but is administratively separate from the Gwanda Rural 
District Council. 
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Figure 3.4 below shows the map of Ward 17, Manama in Gwanda District. 
 
Figure 3.4 above shows the main place names such as dams, schools and diptanks as well 
as rivers and District Development Fund (DDF) boreholes.  Private boreholes and those 
funded by Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) after 1999 are not reflected in the 
database, hence could not be plotted on the Manama map as they are not geo-referenced.  
There was hardly any socio-economic and hydrological data on Gwanda, (Ward 17) 
hence this study will, in a small way, contribute in creating such data.  The economic and 
social water scarcity, the general prevalence of poverty and the informality of water in 
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Gwanda district, as well as the fact that the Challenge Programme on Water and Food 
Project number 17 which partly funded field research operated in the same area, rendered 
Gwanda as a suitable research site.     
 
The district’s population was recorded as 119 744 in the last Census (2002:74). The vast 
majority of this population lives in communal land areas which, essentially, surround a 
belt of commercial farms around Gwanda Town and to the east around West Nicholson. 
There is one small-scale commercial farming area and one Safari area. The four villages: 
Fumukwe, Humbane, Mnyabezi D and Magaya where fieldwork was conducted are 
based in ward 17 (Manama) of the district’s 23 wards.  Ward 17 has a total population of 
6 302, where 2 812 are males and 3 490 are females (Census, 2002:74).  The total number 
of households in Ward 17 was recorded as 1 226, with an average household size of 5.1 
(Census, 2002:74).   
3.2.5. Research Methods 
To address the issues raised by the research objectives and questions in any meaningful 
way required that the study use a range of methods from the social sciences.  The level of 
analysis required ranged from detailed and in-depth case studies and interviews of 
households, groups and other social interaction over resource use to broader 
investigations to assess and tease out general views, perceptions and responses about 
particular issues.  Multiple research methods and sources of evidence were used in order 
to capture the discourses and practices of the different actors.  Triangulation was built 
into the data collection process so as to verify data collected.  Participation in community 
gatherings such as meetings, weddings and church services was also important in the data 
gathering process.  Residing in the study villages during fieldwork helped in establishing 
rapport with community members, providing leads and it facilitated the development of 
extensive social networks.  Research methods used are presented in Table 3.1, followed 
by a detailed description of each of the methods. 
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Table 3.2 Research methods, sources of data and unit of analysis 
Method Properties Sources Unit/level of analysis
Resource (availability, 
access and control) and 
institutional mapping 
Water resources, tenure 
and access to resources, 
legitimacy, 
Gender 
grazing and garden land, 
boundaries 
 
 
Participants at village 
discussions and meetings; 
village leaders; women; 
water point committee 
minutes and records; RDC 
and local & district 
municipality offices; 
DWA and ZINWA 
offices; 
Ward; Village; 
Household; Individual 
 
Transects  Boundaries, land 
holdings, resource 
availability 
Village members Household, Village 
Participant observation Local practices, 
interactions, gossip, 
conflicts, gender, power 
relations 
Meetings, workshops, 
role-plays, churches, 
funerals, parties, and 
informal gatherings such 
as bars and local teverns; 
food relief distribution  
Village, Household, 
catchment and sub-
catchment councils; local 
and district municipalities
Key informant interviews rule-setting, compliance 
and enforcement, 
mediation, access, tenure, 
policy reform and 
implementation 
Village, local & district 
municipalities, sub-
catchment and catchment 
councils, provincial and 
national government 
water departments, 
archival records; NGOs 
household, village, 
district, sub-catchment 
and catchment levels 
FGDs investments and materials 
invested, tenure security, 
gender, participation, 
conflict, sharing 
arrangements; power 
dynamics 
ordinary women and men, 
boys and girls; traditional 
& elected leaders; project 
members and non-
members; NGOs 
Household, Village, Ward
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Historical narratives Investments; Tenure; 
Settlement history; 
Conflict and mediation 
Traditional & elected 
leaders; community 
elders; archival records 
Village; Ward 
Case histories Settlement history, 
resource availability, 
leadership, interventions 
traditional leaders, the 
elderly, archival records 
village, clan, household 
Wealth ranking Wealth indicators 
(livestock, income, land, 
equipment, water 
infrastructure) 
PRA workshops, FGDs, 
traditional  & elected 
leaders, interviews 
Village 
Household 
Historical trends Resource availability, 
development and use 
FGDs, PRA workshops, 
RDC, municipality, 
traditional & elected 
leaders, archival records 
Village, Ward,  catchment 
& sub-catchment, local & 
district municipality 
Actor linkage matrix Institutional interactions; 
power relations 
Elected & traditional 
leaders; NGO and 
extension officers; water-
point committees; 
catchment & sub-
catchment councils; local 
& district municipalities 
Village; Ward; 
District/municipality 
Gender analysis Division of labour; asset 
ownership; leadership; 
access 
PRA workshops; 
community gatherings; 
meetings; households; 
NGOs; document review 
household; village; 
catchment & sub-
catchment council; local 
& district municipalities 
Role-plays 
intra & inter household 
relations;  institutional 
interactions; power 
dynamics 
participants at PRA 
meetings 
Village; Ward 
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3.2.5.1. Narratives, village meetings and focused group discussions  
Narratives are stories common to a group of people and they are called upon when 
needed, a basic resource that can be controlled.  Locke et al (1999) argues that it is 
important to know who controls the stories in narratives, while Roe (1991) talks about 
narratives and counter-narratives.  Roe (ibid:296) defines narratives as "...caricatures of 
reality, but there is no pretence otherwise for many of them ...indeed when one story 
more than others becomes the way we articulate our feelings or make sense of the 
uncertainties and ambiguities around and in us, then the force of the narrative in 
question becomes compelling".  Adams and Hulme (1999) find that such narratives are 
operationalised into standard approaches with widespread application, often leading to 
the standardised blueprint approaches to planning that have been widely criticised.  This 
thesis proceeds from the assumption that there are multiple narratives that prevail over 
the use and management of natural resources.  The dominant and well-known narrative 
concerns "externally derived notions of use, while the locally derived narrative is quite 
distinct and highlights adaptive and sustainable use behaviour" (Sithole, 1999:43).  
However, as stated by Mukamuri (1995), there are various narratives which he calls text 
which can be manipulated and vary between and among various categories of social 
actors.  In the thesis, cognisant of the arguments presented above, I placed emphasis on 
identifying particular sets of ideas, attitudes, perceptions, conceptualisation of, and views 
about water access, hydraulic property creation and institutional arrangements; and how 
these have been and are being contested and negotiated locally from within and from 
outside. 
 
Mukamuri (1995) finds that people's responses can be defined as text that is socially 
constructed out of regular negotiations and contests.  Fortmann (1995; see also Sithole, 
1999) also discusses the use of stories as discursive strategies used by individuals or 
groups.  Thus Rappaport (1995) refers to dominant narratives that are stories that 
everybody knows and these stories form the backdrops against which more localised 
stories are told.  In using narratives, one has to be careful especially where narratives are 
based on traditional norms and practices.  Sithole (1999) argues that such narratives can 
be taken for granted as social and political history yet they are not.  For Locke et al 
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(1998) claims by different people for ownership of a resource emphasise aspects of truth 
since rights in a resource are highly ambiguous and contextual.  The dominant source of 
information for this research was the use of individually or group constructed accounts 
and stories.  In many instances these stories had multiple and embedded narratives about 
different issues and concerns facing the local people. 
 
Following after Sithole (1999), discussions were divided into village meetings, focused 
group discussions and key interviews.  Village meetings were much bigger gatherings 
that were convened during the early days of consultations and immediately after the 
research was initiated.  The people who attended these village meetings were drawn from 
the village in which the meeting took place, and attendance for the meeting was open.  In 
Mzingwane, it was easy for me to organise such village meetings, where as in Sekororo, I 
had to often arrange such village meetings to coincide with other key events that brought 
villagers together to such civic meetings.  In many of the smaller meetings, the village 
was divided into age groups or by gender to facilitate greater participation rather than to 
focus on differences between social groups.  Figures of attendance varied between 28 to 
86 people at each big meeting while numbers could be as few as five people or as many 
as 14 for smaller meetings.  Follow-up meetings held in the villages often confined 
discussions to a village unit under an induna.  Attendance of women was much greater 
than of men, however, in the large village meetings, despite the assistance of a facilitator, 
women's participation was rather limited, consequently, such large meetings were only 
useful for consultation purposes and introductions.  Real discussions were held in small 
focused meetings. 
 
Focused group meetings were well attended and exceeded two thirds of each village at 
each sitting in Mzingwane (owing to low population density and to expectations of what 
might come out).  In Sekororo, such meetings were attended by more than one third of 
the village; women had more interest and willingness than men to attend such meetings.  
While methodologically, the group meetings were a challenge, they exposed the 
researcher to the diverse views, preferences and priorities of different groups on a wide 
range of issues in the villages.  Thus such groups were used to observe what Goebel 
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(1998) called the "fault lines” of power and the social dynamics within the village.  
However, the public nature of group meetings meant that there was a possibility to 
promote dissident views held by a small (and often powerful) group while silencing the 
majority views.  Fortmann (1995:2) suggested that meetings of this nature are forums for 
discursive strategies where stories are an important "oral manifestation of local discourse 
seeking to define and claim resources".  Responses at a village focused group meeting are 
therefore part of an existing or starting negotiation process where people reaffirm or 
assert views about different claims over resources or processes that are occurring. 
 
Dissident views expressed by individuals within the groups reflected the polarity of 
interests within the community and were used as foci for further exploration on process 
and relationships between and within groups.  Meetings and focused group discussions 
offered the researcher the opportunity to identify allegiances between groups, for 
example, observations were made on: which people were allied to which individuals or 
institutions, which people tended to support each other no matter what, which people 
were trying to suppress information and what information was being suppressed?  
Gestures such as sarcastic coughs, laughter, groans, grunts and facial expressions were 
also quite revealing while certain individuals or institutional representatives were making 
contributions.  Such nuances were used to differentiate between narratives and counter-
narratives. To follow-up on these subtle nuances, key interviews and more focused 
discussions were held with specific individuals representing or supporting a particular 
narrative to complement data generated from group discussions. 
 
3.2.5.2. Key informant interviews and case histories 
The purposive selecting strategy was used for identifying key informants.  Variables 
taken into consideration in the sampling of key informants are gender, wealth, leadership 
position and in-depth knowledge of the area; as well as participants representing 
particular narratives identified during group meetings and focused group discussions.  
Unstructured and semi-structured interviews (see appendix) were undertaken with key 
informants including older members of the community, people active ( and inactive) in 
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community institutions, ordinary people who use water resources in general, and those 
active in hydraulic infrastructure investments. Because of the sensitive nature of 
information about natural resource use conflict, levels of investments and materials 
invested in hydraulic infrastructure, this information was gathered through key informant 
interviews as it was deemed too sensitive to be discussed in a group setting. 
 
Case histories were used as a basis for understanding natural resource use, struggles and 
strategies in the study areas.  Elderly people deemed knowledgeable of the area and the 
history of settlement were interviewed to generate case histories.  The snowball method 
together with the experience of research assistants who lived in the study area were used 
for the identification of key informants (the elderly and knowledgeable people) (see also 
Nemarundwe, 2003).  The snowball method involves identification of, for example, one 
respondent deemed knowledgeable on a particular topic.  After discussions with her/him, 
she/he is asked to identify other potential respondents on the topic being discussed and 
the same is done with each of the latter respondents.  During fieldwork, after four or six 
case histories, the same names would come up when a respondent was asked to identify 
other potential respondents.  Of particular interest, there seemed to be much fewer elderly 
people above seventy years in Sekororo than were in Mzingwane.  The challenge of using 
case histories as a research method is that recollection is selective and often filtered 
(Sithole, 1999; Nemarundwe, 2003).  When recollecting the past, it is seldom that the 
past is reconstructed in accordance with present ideas.  Nemarundwe (2003) argues that 
in most cases important episodes or worst experiences are easily remembered.  This 
approach was important for my studies because the struggles over property rights stories, 
histories and narratives constitute struggles over meaning from different stakeholders.  To 
augment the limitation of selective or filtered recollection, I used archival records to 
triangulate and relate with the ground-truthing from the settlement and resource histories 
gathered with key informants. 
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3.2.5.3. Participant observation and role-plays 
The power relations of actors, which may have a direct or indirect impact on institutions 
that manage resources are embedded in contested and contrasting discourses.  
Institutional arrangements often symbolise contested terrains between and among various 
actors (as groups or individuals), communities versus state, settlers versus immigrants, 
women versus men, and rich versus poor (Moore, 1996).  Such contestations are often not 
expressed verbally by the actors or discussed publicly (Nemarundwe, 2003:64), but 
observations of interactions may yield important insights into how such relationships 
impact on resource management institutions and patterns of access to water by women 
and men.  Participant observation was found useful in this study to tease out such hidden 
and often unspoken actions loaded with meaning.  For example some of the information 
in this study was received through confidential voluntarism, gossip and the rumour mill 
within the study areas about certain alliances and enmity, hence, observations at meetings 
and discussions were useful in determining whether such confidential voluntarism or 
gossip had some basis on which they were founded.  While participant observation is 
sometimes romanticised, it is worth noting that a stranger very rarely becomes fully part 
of the society that s/he studies.  As Cheater (1986:22) argues, the 'social distance' based 
on class, race, education, culture, language and power is never really closed.  This social 
differentiation makes total participation impossible.  Participation and observation in 
community activities does not yield much usable data on its own, hence, it was necessary 
to ask questions in addition to observing activities.  In instances and gatherings such as 
funerals, parties and churches it was improper to take notes and thus documentation was 
done immediately after the gatherings when the researcher and assistants would be alone, 
and while information gathered was still fresh in the mind. 
 
Role-plays were developed and used in the study.  The role-plays or drama were acted 
out by members of the community to show situations, relationships or events that 
occurred in the past (and present) in relation to resources management and use.  
Households were reluctant to discuss issues related to relationships, sharing arrangements 
and processes of negotiation for resources.  Role-plays were used in the research to 
examine intra and inter-household relations as well as intra- and inter-institutional 
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interactions and relations over water access and use.  In this method, villagers organised 
themselves into smaller groups and performed small plays that portray situations 
emanating from the checklist used by the researcher.  The role-plays were highly 
interactive and wider participation clarified some issues and added aspects and new 
dimensions to the portrayal that would have been missing.  After each role-play, the 
community interpreted the role-play and discussed possible outcomes of the contested 
issues and reasons were given for the interpretation (also see Sithole, 1999).  In each role 
play it was possible to map relationships between actors and consider how participants 
interpreted (and debated) the role-play.  The use of role-play was to collect information 
on processes of negotiations over resources, interactions between various users and 
behaviour norms or practices that are often described as mundane and remain hidden in 
discussions about natural resources use.  For example role-plays were particularly useful 
for eliciting data on socio-economic status, sharing arrangements, networks and alliances 
running through the empirical chapters (4, 5, and 6). 
 
Role-plays were performed by small groups of people, sometimes mixed groups of 
women and men and other times divisions of the groups was made by gender.  These 
divisions proved useless because once people began to interact with the play, this was 
irrespective of gender because women started playing men and vice versa.  Women are 
more willing to perform compared to men.  However, though men took longer to organise 
their role-plays they still participate.  Four role-plays were performed in each village 
during the two-year phase of field research.  In many instances use of the role-plays 
proved doubly rewarding to the research as it gave back something to the community.  As 
most role-plays were of current and past events, some of these were used to clarify 
ongoing (as well as futuristic) discussion and negotiation over resources amongst groups.  
In other cases they became the foci from which decisions about natural resources were 
made.  Used in this way, role-plays were therefore similar to Forum Theatre or theatre for 
development (Boal, 1985; Cornwall et al, 1994).  Boal (1985) describes theatre as 
necessarily political, because all the activities of man are political.  As Boal (1985) states, 
the role-play becomes the rehearsal for action. 
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3.2.5.4. Hydraulic property and water use survey  
One questionnaire was used in the study to generate qualitative and quantitative data on 
which broad generalisations could be made.  Questions included in the questionnaire 
ranged from basic questions focusing on household characteristics, wealth and income 
data, to specific and more focused questions on claims/entitlements/rights to water based 
on investment in and maintenance of infrastructure that abstracts, stores and conveys 
rain/surface or ground water. It also included some questions collecting data on 
perceptions and views about use and management of water in informal economies.  The 
questionnaire was pre-tested in neighbouring villages by trained enumerators together 
with the researcher.  The pre-testing was done in adjacent villages to reduce respondents 
in the four villages of focus in South Africa and Zimbabwe.  After the pre-testing, 
corrections were made to the questionnaire.  Interviews were conducted between 
November and December 2008 in South Africa, and early January 2009 in Zimbabwe. 
 
The questionnaire was designed after the initial participatory research appraisal activities 
that were done earlier from 2006 and towards the very end of the first and second phases 
of primary data collection in 2008.  Terms and uses of resources were standardised on the 
basis of this early work.  Overall, I worked with the same research assistants that I 
engaged from the beginning, who were again trained in administering the questionnaire.    
The training occurred over a period of one week in South Africa where as in Zimbabwe it 
took four days.  The research assistants in Zimbabwe were very highly literate and 
comprehended the questionnaire, one male and one female.  The male was a former 
temporary teacher and the female was a school leaver who passed her ordinary level 
examination.  The choice of research assistants was based on literacy and facilitation 
skills.  All the research assistants were privy to the ongoing discussions within their 
village about resource use and were themselves participant observers at meetings and 
events to which they became key informants.   In South Africa, I had one male and three 
female research assistants owing to the uneasiness and reservations most female 
respondents had about fear of intrusion and security concerns with male research 
assistants (this will be elaborated under section 3.2.7.).  All the research assistants in 
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South Africa were either married or had a child, except one.  Their ages ranged between 
20 years and 32 years, young and middle-aged. 
 
Questionnaires were administered in all the eight villages of the two study sites.  In total   
240 questionnaires were administered, 30 questionnaires were administered per village in 
each of the eight villages.  The questionnaires were administered at household level and 
interviews were conducted with either spouse found at the home by the research team.  
However, owing to male out-migration from both Sekororo and Mzingwane, most of the 
respondents were women.  Sampling was done randomly for 20 questionnaires while 
purposive sampling was done for the remaining 10 questionnaires in each village. 
3.2.6. Data analysis and interpretation 
3.2.6.1. Survey data analysis 
Most questions in the questionnaire were pre-coded.  Data from the questionnaire was 
analysed using SPSS for Windows.  Differences from South Africa and Zimbabwe and 
sometimes within villages in the same country were done using descriptive statistics and 
Pearson Chi-Square Tests.  The data from the questionnaires are presented in the relevant 
chapters.  Some data were analysed using wealth categories derived from all the income 
variables included in the questionnaire.  Some of these variables were numbers of 
livestock, type of housing, land holding, household income, and source of water.  Most of 
the data related to wealth and household characteristics is presented in chapters 4 and 5.  
Five broad categories of socio-economic class were generated for the data in Zimbabwe, 
ranging from the wealthiest to the poorest; while in South Africa, four broad categories of 
class were denoted, again ranging from the wealthiest to the poorest.  I should highlight 
here that some questions that were relevant to the study were not analysed, as the data 
was spurious, for example questions relating to quantities of water, some respondents 
gave responses such as "enough or good" where specific quantities were required.  The 
same goes for the amounts invested and the farm budgets.  Consequently, data used in the 
study for these issues is derived from group discussions and interviews. 
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3.2.6.2. Qualitative data analysis 
The qualitative data generated by the study was analysed using a thematic approach.  
This thematic approach entailed sifting data from in-depth interviews, group interviews, 
focused group discussions, case histories and informal discussions according to emerging 
themes.  Ryan and Bernard (2003:85) argue that theme identification is one of the most 
fundamental tasks in qualitative research and is one of the most mysterious.  The focus in 
analysing field data hinged on discovering themes and sub-themes in texts and other 
qualitative data like images, photos or artifacts (see also Mclellan et al, 2003).  Analysing 
text involved several tasks: discovering themes and sub-themes, winnowing themes to a 
manageable few (deciding which themes are important), building hierarchies of themes or 
code books, and linking themes into theoretical models (see also Bernard, 1994; Ryan 
and Bernard, 2003). Ryan and Bernard (2003: 85-86) underscore that “...discovering 
themes is the basis of much social science research. Without thematic categories, 
investigators have nothing to describe, nothing to compare, and nothing to explain. If 
researchers fail to identify important categories during the exploratory phase of their 
research, what is to be said of later descriptive and confirmatory phases?”  In writing 
field notes, “the researcher acts as a kind of filter, choosing (often subconsciously) what 
data are important to record and what data are not” (Ryan and Bernard, 2003:100). In this 
sense, producing field notes is a process of identifying themes.  Themes in this thesis 
came from both the field data (an inductive approach) and from the researcher's prior 
theoretical understanding of the phenomenon under study. Investigator's decisions about 
what topics to cover, and how best to query informants about those topics, are a rich 
source of priori themes (Dey 1993: 98). Even with a fixed set of open-ended questions, 
one cannot anticipate all the themes that arise before analysing the data (Dey 1993:97-
98).  The act of discovering themes is what grounded theorists call open coding and what 
classic content analysts call qualitative analysis (Berelson, 1952), or latent coding 
(Shapiro and Markoff 1997).  Cutting and sorting of preliminary themes from field data 
was time-consuming but also rewarding.  After the initial pawing and marking of text, 
cutting and sorting involved identifying words, quotes or expressions that seem somehow 
important and then arranging the quotes/expressions into piles of themes that go together. 
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Themes are abstracts and often constructs that the researcher identifies before, during and 
after data collection.  Themes were developed based on both relevant literature reviewed 
for the study and from text recorded during interviews.  During the process of identifying 
key emerging themes the preliminary analysis involved looking for evidence addressing 
the main objectives and questions of the study ranging from institutional processes and 
consequences of interaction, values and practices, how people acquire and maintain 
resource rights, and some experiences and processes from catchment councils and 
permits to sharing arrangements.  With regards to the reliability and validity of the data 
and thematic analysis, Dey (1993:110-111) noted, “there is no single set of categories 
(themes) waiting to be discovered. There are as many ways of 'seeing' the data as one can 
invent”.  Perhaps Ryan and Bernard posed the most important question regarding 
validity, thus, how do investigators know if the themes they have identified are valid? 
They argue that “there is no ultimate demonstration of validity, but we can maximise 
clarity and agreement and make validity more, rather than less, likely” (Ryan and 
Bernard, 2003:103). Theme identification involves judgement on the part of the 
investigator. If these judgements are made explicit and clear, then readers can argue with 
the researcher's conclusions (Agar 1980:45).  Bernard (1994) argues that ultimately, the 
validity of a concept depends on the utility of the device that measures it and the 
collective judgement of the scientific community that a construct and its measure are 
valid. 
 
Preliminary results of the analysis were shared with local people at community meetings 
held between September and November 2008.  The feedback meetings and briefings were 
held with groups in each village in South Africa.  The villagers specified that they would 
only want to discuss issues within their village without people from other villages 
(outsiders) whereas in Zimbabwe only one meeting was held in the Ward with all the four 
villages together in one seating without problems, despite my own hesitation and fear that 
the meetings might have presented problems with political party representatives in the 
Ward. To my surprise the meeting went smoothly.  The feedback meetings in both South 
Africa and Zimbabwe generated a lot of interest as participants reflected and commented 
on the preliminary results.  Comments, questions and clarifications from these meetings 
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formed an important component of the analysis and write-up of the thesis.  I also 
presented preliminary results at a seminar held in September 2009 at the Institute for 
Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS), University of the Western Cape, where 
valuable insights and feedback was received.  A research paper on hydraulic property 
creation was published by the Challenge Programme on Water and Food (CPWF) and 
presented at the CPWF conference in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, October 2008.  Another 
research paper was also submitted for presentation at the WARFSA/Waternet regional 
symposium on water held in Victoria Falls in October, 2010 and the researcher is 
currently working on comments from reviewers for it to be published in a special journal 
with facilitation from the symposium organisers. 
 
3.2.7. Methodological challenges and issues faced during fieldwork 
I should highlight that whilst catchment and sub-catchment councils were readily 
accessible in Zimbabwe through attending meetings and workshops of these institutions, 
it was not easy to access such institutions in South Africa as district and local 
municipalities, and department of water affairs.  In South Africa I was not allowed to 
attend such meetings, hence, I could only access some reports and minutes from these 
meetings.  This was a huge challenge in terms of the depth, rigor and quality of the data 
collected, which might also reflect in the depth of the data I have in some sections of the 
thesis.  To augment this shortcoming, I had to liaise with some staff members who 
attended such meetings for discussions and interviews in order to get more insights 
beyond the official and often summarised statements projected in minutes and reports.  
Although this went a long way in addressing the challenge, I should admit it can never be 
the same compared to the experiences I had on the Zimbabwean sites. 
 
Here, I should also emphasise that manoeuvring through the data at the archives in 
Pretoria was made difficult due to financial constraints in translating documents written 
in Afrikaans, while archival records were easily accessible in Harare.  Some remarkable 
differences were also notable with the choice and number of research assistants.  In South 
Africa, I was advised that I should have a research assistant from each village the reason 
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being that there is so much emphasis on physical village boundaries such that it also 
encroaches onto the social arena.  When I asked what was problematic with a research 
assistant from one village working with me in other villages, the most remarkable 
response came from an elderly man after the first village meeting in Lorraine, he said 
"...why is it that no one from another village is allowed to access water from this village 
and vice versa?  If you can confirm that is how we live here, why would you want to 
bring an outsider to our village...so that they know our village secrets and strategies?  The 
same applies; our people will not get favourable responses for you if you take them with 
you to other villages".  There was unanimous agreement at the meeting that I should have 
a research assistant in each village.  This was also confirmed by the traditional leaders 
and elected leaders.  Their advice appeared to be a way to increase wages and avoid 
jealousies within the community.  Working and dealing with four research assistants 
required a lot more attention in terms of resources (especially finances and time) as well 
as the risk of having different interpretations of my instructions and guidance which 
might affect the data collected.  I tried to cover this challenge by making extra effort with 
each assistant during fieldwork where we reflected on each day's activities and clarified 
issues.  On reflection, maybe the suggestion and final decision to have a research 
assistant for each village worked out as an advantage in that respondents were dealing 
with someone they knew.  In Zimbabwe’s Gwanda district, however, I only had two 
research assistants whom I worked with in all the four villages without encountering any 
such problems.  Finally, I was also advised to hire female research assistants in South 
Africa because most of the key informants were women, and that households were 
generally not comfortable with male research assistants for security reasons due to fear of 
crime.     
 
Language was also a barrier during my exploratory field visits to Sekororo.  I had to rely 
a lot on translations for my interactions with villagers.  I started learning the local 
language siPedi although I should admit it was very difficult.  Within six months I could 
comprehend fairly well especially in terms of understanding conversations and following 
discussions.  My speech improved as well through fits and stutter.  By November 2007, 
my ability to converse in siPedi was fairly good although I had to be corrected on use of 
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(past and present) tenses here and there.  I am still struggling to write very good grammar 
in siPedi to date.  Maybe some of these challenges in South Africa were compounded by 
being considered a foreigner usually with derogatory connotations such as mukwerekwere 
used to refer to foreigners with some resentment.  In Mzingwane, my experiences were 
much more positive regarding language.  I was not and might still not be very fluent in 
siNdebele but I could hold my own from the outset, given my prior-knowledge of the 
language.  Although I tried my best to address these challenges, I feel compelled to share 
them as they might still colour parts of my work in ways that I might not have been able 
to fully control. 
 
3.3. Conclusions 
This chapter discussed the qualitative methodology adopted for the study, and the various 
methods used for data collection in order to triangulate the information gathered.  The 
methodological approach adopted in this study builds on conceptual issues discussed in 
Chapter Two.  The chapter discusses the data collection process based on secondary 
sources such as archival records and documents kept at both the national, district and 
municipal levels to augment primary data collected from the field.  The discussion on 
historical narratives as a method for generating information on local perceptions of 
historical processes points to the importance of such narratives as tools for justifying 
individual and/or group positions in a given context.  The conclusion of the discussion on 
the importance of historical narratives is that they are part of deliberate discursive 
strategies of the various narrators to articulate and assert the basis and legitimacy of their 
own claims to the woodland and water resources found in the study areas.  Narratives are 
used in this thesis as an analytical tool for understanding property relations and claims.  
The chapter also presented background information to the study site highlighting 
information relevant to the process of institutional analysis in the study area.  Historical 
data presented in the chapter is drawn from a combination of secondary sources and oral 
histories that were generated from key informants and archival data. 
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CHAPTER FOUR:  POLITICAL HISTORY OF WATER -
RELATED INVESTMENTS AND 
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
IN GWANDA, MZINGWANE, 
ZIMBABWE 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The history of colonial rule in Zimbabwe is the history of how a small white minority 
(never more than 5% of the total population) used land as an instrument for racial 
domination and appropriated half of the total land area for white agricultural production 
and allocate the rest less fertile land for black subsistence use7 (Zachrisson, 2004).  
Access by rural households and communities to natural resources in Zimbabwe has been 
greatly influenced by the historical political economy of the country. Prior to 
independence, in 1980, land for native black people was largely limited to Tribal Trust 
Lands (TTLs), which constituted the most resource-poor lands in the country. Title to 
these lands was held by the state, but their various uses by local people were governed by 
traditional authorities. During the 1950s, Purchase Areas, consisting of about 50 hectare 
parcels, were made available for sale to native people. In contrast to the Tribal Trust 
Lands and Purchase Areas, which held most of the black population of Rhodesia, a small 
minority of white commercial settler farmers held title to large tracts of the country’s 
most productive farmland. This unequal land (and water) distribution was not resolved at 
independence and is still at the root of many issues of access to natural resources today. 
 
Unequal access to natural resources and associated social and economic problems was at 
the core of a number of post-independence policy changes. Tribal Trust Lands were 
renamed Communal Areas (CAs); Purchase Areas were renamed Small Scale 
                                                 
7 The picture changed drastically, if not dramatically, from year 2000 to date, where almost all commercial 
farm land has been acquired (grabbed) by the state under controversial and questionable political and legal 
processes.  White commercial farmers who numbered 4000+ in 1996 were forcibly evicted from the farms 
in the continuing attacks leaving less than 300. 
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Commercial Farms (SSCFs).  High levels of inequity and land degradation were evident 
in many CAs with high population densities. This led the government to create so-called 
Resettlement Areas (RAs) (Mukamuri et al 2007). Government purchase of some large 
scale commercial farms (LSCFs) led to the establishment of resettlement area 
landholdings that were allocated to households drawn from congested CAs. As is the case 
for land, water resources also faced similar challenges.  
 
Water rights allocated under the Water Act of 1976, and earlier acts, enacted and legally 
reinforced by the colonial government attached water rights to land and led to inequitable 
allocation and access to water by favouring European areas mainly white commercial 
users.  The water rights were held in perpetuity and were administered by a centralised 
Administrative Court sitting as Water Court. The majority of potential water users in the 
African areas, particularly in communal areas, were marginalised, dispossessed and 
discriminated.  The first step was to vest all water in the white state with little or no 
recognition of prior arrangements.  With the attainment of independence this changes 
from white state to the black state without addressing the dispossession and 
discrimination, where formally everyone can apply for water rights but administrative 
issues remained discriminatory in practice. 
 
 In response to this anomaly, the Zimbabwe Government enacted the new Water Act of 
1998, which detaches rights to water from ownership of land and requires allocation of 
all water beyond primary (i.e. basic) needs through permits. The Act led to the creation of 
catchment and sub-catchment councils with the prime role of administering water 
allocation and water-related disputes at local levels, as well as processing and issuing 
permits. The Act sets limits for water uses defined as primary and commercial. Primary 
use refers to water use for domestic and human needs, support of animal life (other than 
fish farms and animals in feedlots) and for making bricks for private use of the 
owner/lessee or occupier of the land concerned or for dip tanks. The upper capability 
limit of private storage facilities for water is 5,000 cubic meters, above which a permit is 
required from the Council (ZINWA, 98). The Catchment Councils have been provided 
with authority to set practical limits on water use in order to safeguard public interests 
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where deemed necessary. This system has been designed to protect communal area 
people to an extent, in that communal people are represented by an appointee of the 
Minister in cases of disputes and threat to livelihoods.  Detailed analysis of the water 
reforms under the new Act of 1998 is presented in Chapter 7.   
 
Broadly defined categories of natural resource ownership, access and use may not capture 
the complexity of rights seen in actual practice. Realities on the ground, based on 
unpacking and understanding how people conceptualise property rights have the potential 
to unmask a great degree of complexity, characterized by disaggregated and disparate 
access to natural resources, as well as socially constructed patterns of access. Social 
relationships, kinship ties, demands for reciprocity and resource availability influence 
local practices of rights of access, over different types and locations of natural resources.  
In order to understand institutions and property rights regimes for natural resources in 
these settings, it is important to view the interface between human and natural resources, 
as embedded in both social and power relations, and as a reflection of how users and 
resource rights holders attempt to meet their livelihood needs (Nemarundwe 2003, p. 87).  
In this context, a nuanced definition and analytical approach is needed for a detailed 
comprehension of processes and activities that relate to (different) property rights 
regimes, across water (re) sources and other land-use categories.  
 
Notwithstanding the good intentions under the ‘new’ policies and legislation in the post-
colony, and conscious of the historical nature of resource access, the key objective this 
chapter seeks to address is to document and analyse the processes and genealogy of 
hydraulic property creation in Manama (Ward 17), Mzingwane catchment, in terms of 
access, use and control of the resource, and the implications of such rights on men and 
women. The questions this chapter seeks to answer are: i). how do different actors 
understand, conceptualise and present notions of hydraulic property rights, and why?; and 
ii). How and in what ways are hydraulic property rights established, maintained and 
enforced in formal and informal economies?  The chapter sets out the analyses by 
documenting the property rights creation processes and investments dynamics from the 
pre-colonial to the post-colonial Gwanda communal lands under which Manama falls.  It 
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quantifies and qualifies the levels and dynamics of investments in hydraulic property 
creation through both time and space by providing nuanced details on both private and 
communal infrastructure developments of varying proportions spread throughout the 
study area.  The chapter also touches on interrelationship between property rights and the 
emergence and evolution of formal and informal institutions. 
 
I examined the nature and patterns of investments in water infrastructure by rural 
communities in Ward 17 (Manama) by employing the concept of ‘hydraulic property 
rights creation’ to understand how people, as individuals and/or as groups, assert rights 
over water, and how such claims become legitimised (Coward, 1986; Manzungu, Sithole, 
Tapela and Van Koppen, 2010:10-13). Hydraulic property rights creation, as explained 
earlier in Chapters One and Two, refers to the creation of value of water by means of 
establishing, and recognising claims to water due to investments made in developing 
physical infrastructure and related institutional arrangements for purposes of abstracting, 
storing, conveying and/ or applying water to the field. Hydraulic property rights creation 
may be entirely ‘endogenous’ (or ‘local’ or ‘informal’). Alternatively hydraulic rights 
may also be based on government, formal Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), or 
other outsiders in which case they are ‘exogenous’. The difference between endogenous 
and exogenous is, however, not always that clear-cut because local people interact with 
‘outsiders’ in ways that blur the endogenous-exogenous dichotomy (Manzungu et al, 
2010: 12).  
 
The chapter is organised into four main sections, where the next section presents a 
political and historical account of infrastructure investments and development on (natural 
and human) resources during the colonial period.  It is followed by a section on 
communal and private investments in water resources in the post-colonial, which is 
further divided into eight sub-sections. The eight subsections are organised in the 
following order: overview of legal frameworks governing resource access; overview of 
resource access in Ward 17; investments in communal water infrastructure; private 
investments in water; institutional arrangements; institutions and property rights; changes 
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and continuities and impacts on resource rights; and in the final section conclusions to the 
chapter are presented. 
 
4.2. Colonial government infrastructure development and 
investments in water resources development 
This section sketches and highlights the application, effect and influence of the colonial 
policies on resource access in Gwanda South, and Ward 17 in particular, and 
demonstrates how the legacy of some of these policies endured into the post-colonial era. 
Materials presented here were largely obtained from historical analysis of archival 
records from the Gwanda district offices and the National Archives in Harare.  Key 
informant interviews and focus group discussions were used to ground truth information 
from archival records.   
 
The big land squeeze started in earnest in 1946 in Gwanda South with the implementation 
of the Land Apportionment Act (LAA) of 1930.  By 1948, the Native Commissioner 
(NC) of Gwanda reported that the LAA had failed to segregate the races neither did he 
think that the Act had succeeded in securing an unassailable economic entrenchment in 
land (Yearly Report, 1948).  The NC reported that only by providing some scheme of 
differential occupation coupled with developing the water supplies could the reserves 
accommodate the newcomers, people who were forcibly removed from their former 
prime land and re-settled in Gwanda.  This is where we notice for the first time the public 
development of water infrastructure in Gwanda as noted below.   
 
By way of a combination of sinking wells, drilling boreholes and dams, based on Tuli, 
Shashi, Hwali and Mnyabezi river systems, water points were dug by the local people 
who were organised into syndicates (“fifty well-sinking gangs recruited locally”) some 
three miles apart.  At each well, about 5,000 acres of land was allocated to 10 families (a 
line) and about 250 heads of cattle (Yearly Report, 1948). During this period, and 
through the general centralization plan of the Tuli Division, 820 families and 8,000 cattle 
were squeezed in Gwanda reserve, Dibilishaba Block and what was to become Shashi 
reserve in 1950 (ibid).  The NC of Gwanda estimated that during the next five years 
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(1949-54) another 2,165 families with 30,818 cattle, who still occupied European area in 
the District had to be accommodated in the reserves (NC of Gwanda to Provincial Native 
Commissioner, Byo 9/2/50). This meant that families closely related moved together after 
having been allocated a point by the local Development officer with the assistance of the 
Demonstrators (NC of Gwanda to Provincial Native Commissioner 6/9/50). As the NC of 
Gwanda reported, by 1952 there were 413 wells and “labeled as the king-pins of the 
centralization”, and over 50 boreholes and dams, meant to improve agriculture 
production and increase the pasture for grazing (Yearly Report, 1952).  The main 
objective of developing water infrastructure, it would seem, was primarily to make the 
reserves to carry double the number of people and livestock as reported by the Native 
Commissioner of Gwanda, thus “The goal to be aimed at in this district is that every 
square mile of land for native occupation be made to carry double the population” (ibid).  
The squeeze and control was not only of livestock and people but also of water. 
 
 
Insert/plate 4.1: Continuities - date signages on boreholes in Manama, Ward 17 showing 
the pre (1949) - and post- (1998) independence markings when the boreholes were 
established.   
 
The population in Fumukwe/Manama (Ward 17) was settled in homesteads in settlement 
‘lines’ under a kraalhead (sabhuku8).  Such lines9 were part of an agrarian reform with 
                                                 
8 Sabhuku is derived from the role of recording and collecting tax by the kraalhead, thus the inferred 
meaning: the one with the (tax) book. 
9 The advent of these lines and the role of the Sabhukus will be delt with in detail in the section on 
institutions.  
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roots in the 1930s, to centralise crop cultivation to blocks and arable land where 
surrounding areas were designated as grazing ground for stipulated number of livestock 
(see also Murombedzi, 1994; Zachrisson, 2004).  The colonial government forced 
villages to move their homesteads above the rivers thereby further separating grazing and 
agricultural land which further split up old village settlements (ibid, see also, Holleman 
1969: 54-55; Weinrich 1971: 47).  The land squeeze and the new settlers diversified the 
ethnic composition of the population and increased the competition for resources.  This 
resulted in congestion and environmental degradation in tribal trust lands. Ranger 
(1989:247) remarks “What an ecological catastrophe the resettlement of Africans in the 
1950s turned out to be…Africans themselves were not brought into the picture in respect 
of planning and implementation”. 
 
In pursuit of tighter control of people, livestock and natural resources, the government 
passed the Natural Resources Act in 1941 to enforce conservation measures out of 
growing concern for soil erosion in the reserves.  By 1945 a five-year plan for destocking 
in the reserves emerged as the main outcome to avert erosion.  The plan was a drastic 
measure that affected villagers in Gwanda South economically and socially10, and was 
met with resistance and evasive tactics.  Such tactics included leasing of cattle to relatives 
and kin living in neighbouring districts what was (and is) known as amasisa.  The 
unsuccessful policy of the government to limit and control livestock as part of the 
implementation of the Land Husbandry Act (LHA, 1951), was met with a lot of 
resistance by livestock owners in Gwanda South in general and Manama in particular.  
Such resistance and opposition to various attempts by the government to limit and control 
livestock through various schemes can be interpreted as resistance to the individualisation 
of land holding on both grazing and arable land leading to changing property rights.  
Such change in property rights was, and still is, a threat to people’s social and economic 
system, and complicates people’s negotiability and access to networks.  The struggle for 
control of livestock between Gwanda rural dwellers and the colonial government, and 
efforts to introduce or impose taxation and levies on livestock by the colonial 
                                                 
10 Cattle played a central role in the lives of ordinary people: was a symbol of status, used for lobola, used 
to create social bonds, and for rituals. 
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government, is a pattern that still holds today in Gwanda South.  As we shall see, state 
efforts today, as then, to impose levies on cattle ownership has taken a new dimension, 
and is coming in the form of cattle levy through the Mzingwane catchment council.  So 
far the efforts to impose a “water” levy on livestock have faced stiff resistance and its 
success is doubtful given the outstanding challenges as demonstrated in Chapter 7 on the 
hotly contested issue of the planned cattle/livestock levy by the catchment and sub-
catchment councils. 
 
Increasing popular resistance to the colonial administration and conservation measures 
resulted in the government creating local administrative structures in 1971 in order to 
tighten control over natural resources and people. This development marked the 
beginning of the Rural Councils (RCs) and conservation areas for LSCFs, now re-enacted 
into Rural District Councils (RDCs). The RDCs have been tasked to oversee day-to-day 
local government administration of rural districts.  Chiefs, headmen and kraalheads in 
conjunction with the (district) Native Commissioner were the key institutions regulating 
access, where the traditional authorities acted as both overseer and enforcer of policies in 
reserves on behalf of the government.  Public infrastructure (boreholes, wells, dams) was 
wholly owned by the state and only used by the villagers with the chiefs, headmen and 
kraalheads as custodians and enforcers.  Maintenance was done by the local government 
with the assistance of locally recruited (and trained) technicians.  There were very few, if 
any, privately owned boreholes and wells during this period.  The use of natural resources 
such as informal use of streams in the area was regulated through communal access, 
where each household (and village) was allocated arable land and designated grazing 
land, a move away from open access and transhumance practiced before the onset of 
colonisation.  However, there have been shifts from regulated access to open access and 
vice versa (with varying degrees in both emphasis and application), not withstanding 
government policies in the post-colonial era.  The next section presents and discusses 
infrastructure development and investments, and the policy changes and challenges in the 
post-colonial era. 
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4.3. Communal and private infrastructure investments: policies, 
challenges, changes and continuities in the post-colony 
4.3.1. A brief overview of the legal frameworks governing natural 
resource access in Zimbabwe: post-1980 
With the attainment of independence in 1980, the new Zimbabwean Government 
embarked on a land redistribution policy that resulted in the creation of Resettlement 
Areas (RAs). Officially, resettlement has been embarked on to redress colonial 
imbalances in access to land and water resources and to decongest overpopulated 
communal areas. The process has continued over the years, culminating in the Fast Track 
Land Reform (FTLR) exercise beginning in 2000. Pre-2000 resettlement was mainly 
located in areas of low potential, but recent ones, following the FTLR, have been more 
diverse, and moved to include areas with better soils and rainfall (Chaumba et al, 2006). 
The recent resettlement process was initially facilitated by the enactment of the Land 
Acquisition Act (1992) and has since been accompanied by the enactment of various 
legislative enactments aimed at governing access, use and benefit sharing arrangements, 
over natural resources, for both CAs and RAs. 
 
Unequal access to natural resources and associated social and economic problems was at 
the core of a number of post-independence policy changes. Tribal Trust Lands were 
renamed CAs; Purchase Areas were renamed Small Scale Commercial Farms (SSCFs).  
High levels of inequity and land degradation were evident in many CAs with high 
population densities. This led the government to create so-called Resettlement Areas 
(RAs) (Mukamuri et al 2007). Government purchase of some large scale commercial 
farms (LSCFs) led to the establishment of resettlement area landholdings that were 
allocated to households drawn from congested CAs. As is the case for land within the 
CAs, title to the newly created RAs was held by the state. However, 99-year leases were 
granted to RA settlers while women and men’s rights to land in CAs are governed by 
traditional allocations and inheritance mechanisms. In contrast, titles to landholdings 
within the SSCF sector are held by the various individual landowners. Thus, in addition 
to freehold title in the LSCFs, three types of land tenure emerged in Zimbabwe after 
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independence, each with different characteristics. These three types of land tenure are: 
communal areas (CAs), resettled areas (RAs) and Small-Scale Commercial Farming 
Areas (SSCFAs) (also see Mukamuri et al, 2007). 
 
In terms of development of post-independence rural institutions, the Prime Minister’s 
directive of 1982 introduced elected leadership through Village Development 
Committees (VIDCOs) and Ward Development Committees (WADCOs) into the rural 
institution landscape where communities historically recognized traditional leadership 
structures. The idea, as Mukamuri and others (2007) observed, was to initiate a bottom-
up approach to local governance and development strategies, and democratise local 
governance structures given the suspected complicity of many traditional leaders in 
aiding and abating colonial policies. The new development, however down-played the 
role of traditional leadership therefore resulted in confusion over management and 
allocation of communal resources. Realisation of the resource allocation impasse between 
newly created institutions (VIDCOs and WADCOs) and traditional leaders led the 
government to enact the Traditional Leaders Act (TLA) of 1998. The TLA tried to 
harmonise functions between traditional leaders and elected leaders, but with more power 
being vested in the traditional leadership structures. Of particular importance, in this 
context, is the re-instituted traditional leaders’ power to allocate land, the basis for natural 
resource access. Traditional leaders also have powers to resolve natural resource and 
social conflicts. Elected leaders such as councillors have been relegated to the function of 
facilitating development plans for their areas for submission to the Rural District 
Councils (RDCs).  
 
The Zimbabwe Government enacted the Environment Management Act (EMA) (2002). 
EMA is an overarching law that seeks to promote integrated environmental management, 
public participation, environmental education and environmental awareness, all within 
the framework of sustainable development. More important is: i). the provision for the 
preparation of national and local level environmental plans for the protection of the 
environment; ii). The setting up of the structure and division of government functions 
from those of numerous major players in order to allow for efficient and effective 
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mechanisms for coordination and cooperation among all these players; iii). Establishment 
of an environmental fund. Of particular interest in the context of this study is that EMA 
promotes incentives, focusing on resource use communities to engage in benefit sharing 
arrangements for efficient management of resources. Assessments of environmental, 
economic, social and equity-related impacts of development are an integral part of EMA 
allowing on-site and off-site impacts of developments to be evaluated over different time 
frames.  How the implementation of EMA impacts on both levels of investments and 
institutional landscape in the water sector strikes a keen interest for this study as outlined 
in the ensuing sections. 
 
At the top of the hierarchical order of functions, EMA establishes a number of statutory 
bodies, which include a National Environment Council (NEC) (with advisory roles), an 
Environmental Management Agency (EMA) (implementation roles) and an Enforcement 
Committee (EC) (enforcement roles). Apart from implementing ecological and 
conservation functions, committees under EMA are tasked with developing and 
implementing incentives for the protection of the environment; and coordinating the 
production of, on five-year intervals, the State of the Environment Report. The EMA 
agency will be decentralised to the local levels, with representatives at the national, 
provincial, district and ward levels (although this has hardly happened as yet). 
Decentralisation of water administration has also been given particular consideration in 
terms of working with Catchment and sub-Catchment Council Committees, in 
accordance with the Water Act (Chapter 20:24). However, catchments have been defined 
without taking cognisance of overarching administrative boundaries. This is likely to 
cause confusion and conflicts among different actors and planning authorities.  
 
New management regimes under EMA will require local authorities to establish 
environment committees to recommend to the RDC, measures for environmental 
protection and management. The committees will be constituted by various community 
members drawn from wards, as represented by Ward Councilors. Environmental sub-
committees will also be established and members will be drawn from two or more wards. 
Also important is the inclusion of traditional leadership members, who will constitute 
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50% of the sub-committee. This may be positive, since traditional leaders are recognized 
as custodians of the land (natural resources) on behalf of communities. However, their 
participation in key decision-making arenas is uncertain, if not piece-meal, as the 
tradition is that environmental issues have been the privilege of the technical sub-
committees, comprised largely of civil servants.   
4.3.2 Overview of resource access in Ward 17 (Manama), Gwanda 
South (Shashe Sub-catchment council). 
There are six villages in Ward 17 (Manama), although detailed fieldwork was primarily 
done in four of the villages, the study generally covered the whole ward. The village 
boundaries in Manama Ward are agreed upon verbally and are seldom physically 
demarcated, neither are the boundaries between villages and wards, except on maps 
(often used at and by centralized bureaucracies such as local and national government, far 
from the lived experiences in villages). The boundaries are often and not necessarily 
always, major landmarks such as local streams, trees, road networks, and homesteads. In 
most instances, the boundaries are fluid leading to negotiable access to resources across 
villages and wards. The fluid nature of boundaries serves as a coping mechanism for 
access to resources across villages and wards, whilst nesting confrontations and conflicts 
both between and among residents of lines, villages and wards.  As livestock is the most 
important resource and source of income for many households, land and its grazing 
potential, as well as access to water become important for our understanding of property 
regimes, household characterisation and how access is negotiated and facilitated in the 
area. 
 
A number of features of the social landscape in Ward 17 must be addressed for 
understanding the nature of access to common pool resources. Social differentiation 
entails local variations in resource endowments, including: education, employment status, 
land, water and livestock ownership, as well as other variations in wealth status among 
members of the community.  From the fieldwork the researcher carried out, one can 
denote five clusters of households in Ward 17 (Manama) depending on their access to 
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resources (land, livestock, water, and on-off farm equipment) which have inferences and 
a bearing on social relations and property rights. 
 
Table 4.1: Some Household Characteristics in Ward 17 
 
Cluster 
(household 
typology) & 
percentage of 
hhds involved. 
n=120 
Livestock Land Access to 
Water 
Main cash 
income 
source 
Participation in 
local institutions 
Salaried and 
cattle rich 
households. 
Main 
breadwinner in 
these 
households, 
usually a man, 
inherited some of 
the cattle 
 
10-15% 
Livestock-
rich families 
with 35-60 
cattle, more 
than 15 
donkeys, 
80- 200 
goats, 20-30 
sheep. 
Cropping 
land more 
than 5 
acres; 
have a 
riparian 
garden 
and a 
homestead 
garden. 
Have a 
private 
borehole 
within the 
homestead, 
and often 
another at 
the garden. 
Salaried with 
a good 
formal job: 
teacher, civil 
servant, and 
often works 
in town. 
Invests salary 
in livestock, 
owns/rents a 
store/grindin
g mill.  
Sometimes hold 
superior positions in 
committees when 
they accept 
nominations, but 
often they hardly 
want any 
involvement (very 
busy and don’t have 
the time) except after 
retirement or when 
their interests are 
threatened. 
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Have 1 or 2 
migrant workers 
(in town or 
across the 
border), local 
govt employees, 
war veterans, 
extension staff, 
retirees and 
pensioners. Brick 
under corrugated 
tin/asbestos, 
painted house, 
more than four 
rooms. 
Invested in 
livestock, 10 
cattle, 12 
donkeys, 
more than 
50-80 goats, 
several 
poultry  
Cropping 
land 3-5 
acres, 
have 
access to 
garden 
land 
Access to 
communal 
boreholes, 
dams, have 
own (un) 
protected 
well, drums 
for fetching 
& 
harvesting 
water. 
Remittances 
from 
sons/daughte
rs or spouse. 
Usually office bearers 
in local committees 
i.e. 
chairperson/treasurer. 
Participate actively 
with some (paid) 
travel to meetings. 
Nominated and voted 
by majority at 
meetings. 
Usually headed 
by men, have 
brick house with 
four rooms or 
less.  
20%  
More than 
five cattle, 
full-spun of 
donkeys, 
30-50 goats, 
some sheep, 
poultry, a 
scotchcart,  
Cropping 
land 
usually 2 
– 3 acres, 
access to 
garden 
land near 
communal 
water 
source,  
Access to 
communal 
boreholes, 
dams, and 
have own 
unprotected 
shallow 
wells(usuall
y within the 
garden) 
agro-
pastoralism 
combined 
with informal 
sector jobs 
such as 
building, 
brick-laying 
and, buying 
& selling 
Turn up for 
community meetings, 
participate actively, 
sometimes contest for 
vacant positions in 
committees as 
ordinary members 
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Household 
headed by 
widowed, 
divorced and/or 
abandoned 
women, or 
elderly and 
destitute people 
35% 
Very few 
household 
in this 
category 
own more 
than three 
cattle, own 
some goats, 
almost all of 
them have 
poultry 
Cropping 
land is 
less than 
an acre 
due to 
lack of 
labour and 
draft 
animals 
Access 
water from 
communal 
boreholes, 
project 
boreholes, 
dams and 
unprotected 
wells.   
Voluntary 
work, piece-
work for 
others, beer-
brewing, 
harvesting 
and selling 
Mopani 
worms 
 Main active 
members in nutrition 
project gardens. 
Rarely visible and 
audible in meetings, 
and hardly hold 
leadership positions 
Source: field data 2006-2008 
The table 4.1 above shows the typology of households in Ward 17.   
 
Table 4.2: Overview of infrastructure for domestic and productive uses by Village 
 
Village Infrastructure/ 
Technology 
Condition/Status of 
infrastructure 
Management 
Oversight 
Fumukwe 2 Dams Bad: heavily silted and 
dry-up during the dry 
season 
Water Point Committee 
(WPC), traditional 
leaders, Councillor, and 
Cooperative Committee
7 private boreholes Excellent: fully utilised 
& maintained 
Household/owner 
8 communal boreholes Good: 3 boreholes need 
maintenance 
WPC 
7 shallow wells Wells inside gardens are 
excellent, those on the 
riverbed are badly 
maintained 
Household/owner 
8 households with drip-
kits 
Only 3 households still 
use the drip-kits, 5 are 
clogged. 
Household/owner 
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Mnyabezi D 3 private boreholes Excellent and well 
maintained 
Household/owner 
6 communal boreholes Good: 2 broken down 
and not working 
WPC 
2 shallow wells Good although they dry-
up easily 
Household/owner 
1 dam Bad: heavily silted WPC, traditional 
leaders, Councillor 
3 households with drip-
kits 
Good, 2 used and 1 is 
clogged. 
Household/owner 
Humbane 4 private boreholes Excellent and well 
maintained 
Household/owner 
4 communal boreholes Good, 3 working and 1 
broken down. 
WPC 
3 shallow wells Bad, trampled by 
livestock. 
Household/owner 
6 households with drip-
kits 
Good: all six are fully 
utilised, need for 
unclogging. 
Household/owner 
Magaya 2 private boreholes Excellent and fully 
utilised. 
Household/owner 
1 deep well Excellent and fully 
utilised 
Household/owner 
3 shallow wells Good, fully utilised 
although they dry-up in 
winter 
Household/owner 
2 households with drip-
kits 
Good, well utilised Household/owner 
 
Please note that all boreholes in the four study sites in Gwanda are the bush-pump type 
which is manually operated by hand to pump water. 
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As can be seen from the table an emerging pattern is that individual/private water sources 
are better managed than communal water sources. At the local level are found different 
local institutions that have responsibility over local resources including water. Traditional 
leaders tend to have jurisdiction over other resources apart from water while state and 
NGO-funded/supported agencies tend to concentrate on water or specific resource units. 
Communal water (re) sources such as boreholes, small dams and wells are a mix of state-
funded infrastructure through the District Development Fund11 (DDF) and Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs). In all the four villages, the majority of boreholes 
that are functional are those funded and supported by NGOs, while the state-funded 
boreholes, under the ambit of the RDCs tend to suffer neglect owing to the economic 
collapse that accelerated over the past 10 years. Access to water resources, within each of 
the villages, is influenced by institutions deriving from historical native customs and 
norms, state sponsored structures, and donor-assisted programmes. Historically, local 
institutions have been based on rules and norms that derived from hereditary chiefdoms 
and their governing of natural resources. These institutional structures and the values that 
underlie their establishment are currently persisting, albeit at times in modified forms, 
alongside government-sponsored regional and local governance structures, and donor-
sponsored local organizations that are connected with various non-governmental 
organizations (NGO)-based development initiatives. This has resulted in a multi-layered 
structure of institutions and organizations, at times with unclear boundaries and 
overlapping mandates, which has come to represent a major challenge to rural 
households’ access to and use of natural resources, such as land, water and woodland 
resources. Apart from domestic water uses, which are very important in the semi-arid 
villages, water for gardens and for livestock is ranked as one of the most important water 
uses in this region. 
 
 
                                                 
11 The role of DDF for siting, drilling and maintenance of boreholes in communal areas has been shifted to 
RDCs since 2005. 
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Table 4.3: Importance of gardens, water sources/equipment and financing, n=120 
Type of 
garden & 
water 
source 
Person/institution who 
financed the gardens 
and water sources 
Person 
who 
does 
most of 
the work
Percentage 
of 
households 
involved 
Importance 
of gardens 
for 
household 
income 
Importance of 
gardens for 
household 
consumption 
Riverin 
garden 
Individuals/households Women 10% Very 
important 
Very 
important 
Dam 
garden 
RDC and NGOs Both 20% Very 
important 
Very 
important 
Borehole 
garden 
RDC, DDF, NGOs, 
Private 
(individuals/households) 
Both 65% Very 
important 
Very 
important 
Home 
garden 
Individual/household Women 5% Not 
important 
Very 
important 
 
Table 4.3 highlihts the types of gardens and water sources that the households access as 
well as the institutions that financed the gardens.  It also indicates the importance of 
gardens for the households. 
 
Boreholes are the most important source of water for gardens in Ward 17 and are 
financed through personal investment, NGOs and local government through the Rural 
District Council (RDC) and the District Development Fund (DDF).  The main water 
source for home gardens are boreholes within the homestead which are financed through 
personal investments, remittances and sale of livestock12.  There are borehole gardens in 
Ward 17 which are meant for targeted populations like elderly and widowed women, and 
child-headed households.  Borehole gardens are gardens found near or around a borehole 
as the main water source.  These are normally financed by NGOs where a fully equipped 
borehole, fence for the garden and some garden implements such as watering cans, hoes 
and seeds are provided at the onset of the project.  There are four such projects in Ward 
17 and only members/selected beneficiaries have access to both the borehole and the 
                                                 
12 See Table 1 for details 
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garden land with the right to exclude non-members.  The NGOs which facilitated and 
financed such projects are: World Vision, Germany DED, Kip Keino Association and 
Mvuramanzi Trust. There are borehole gardens financed by NGOs where only the fully 
equipped borehole is provided and members of the community, in consultation with their 
leadership, allocate small pieces of garden land to households in the village. The NGOs 
involved in this arrangement include EU-ECHO and Red Cross.  
 
In all the gardens in the four villages of Ward 17, members use buckets for watering their 
crops. The selection process for beneficiaries to such projects, levels of investment, 
access to land near/around the borehole demonstrate the negotiability and prevailing 
power relations.  An example is given in Box 4.1 below and more details are also 
provided under section 4.3.3. 
 
There are three small dams with a proliferation of networks of gardens in Ward 17. The 
gardens are mostly situated on the foot of the dam wall to minimize soil erosion.  For all 
the dams, households and individuals with gardens are not allowed to fetch water for 
irrigating their gardens directly from the dam for fear of water borne diseases such as 
bilharzia, but through both shallow wells and ponds dug/found on the stream-bed.  The 
rules for accessing such water are set by the funder of the project (dam) and the 
community leaders in consultation with community members (villagers).  Only livestock 
is allowed to have direct access to water from the dams.  However, incidents of people 
smuggling/poaching water from the dam at night with scotchcarts for building houses and 
moulding bricks are often reported.  Water obtained from shallow wells is often treated 
with ash to minimise incidence of diseases.  
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Box 4.1 is an elaborated case example of communal investment in water infrastructure 
by villagers in Fumukwe village with the assistance of the Lutheran World Federation. 
 
4.3.3. Public investment in water, levels of investment and materials 
invested 
Most of the respondents (80%) from the 120 households interviewed in the four villages 
have invested in water through various mechanisms and in varying proportions. The 
majority of the communal infrastructure, especially boreholes, small dams and deep wells 
were funded by NGOs and local government (both pre- and post-1980).  NGOs that 
directly facilitated and funded the (construction and) rehabilitation and provision of water 
Box 4.1:  Case 1 - Lutheran World Federation funded dam and Qinisela Cooperative 
Plans to build a small dam at the confluence of Danger and Fumukwe streams were initiated by the colonial
government in 1976 but construction of the dam was shelved before the project started owing to the escalating
liberation war.  After independence in 1980, a group of villagers started gardening on the stream-banks at the
confluence of the two streams.  Their major challenge was shortage of water during the dry season for their gardens
and livestock.  During one of its field tours, members of the Lutheran World Federation (LWF) were approached by
the villagers to assist with boreholes and a dam. 
  In the early 1990s, the LWF agreed to fund the construction of a small dam for the villagers by providing funding
and hiring earth-moving equipment.  Construction of the dam took a year to complete, and villagers who were
interested in the gardening project were asked to contribute labour and a bag of cement per household.  Those who
contributed were asked to form a committee to oversee the management and maintenance of the dam, and
households with gardens.  The committee comprised of men and women, with a male chairman and a female
treasurer and five other members.  In 2001, the political meltdown in the country took its grip on the management of
the dam and the beneficiaries with small gardens dotted on the foot of the dam wall.  War veterans in the area
demanded that a new cooperative should be formed with additional beneficiaries to the project, where extra land was
demarcated for garden expansion, and some original members of the project who were found on the politically-
wrong divide had their gardens annexed.   
  The birth of Qinisela:  The ‘new’ cooperative was re-named Qinisela, which means “be brave”.  The cooperative
has 13 members/households, 6 men and 7 women.  After the March 2008 elections in Zimbabwe, some of the
women whose gardens were annexed managed to demand the return of their land, with the assistance of the headmen
and the councillor, they got back their gardens, although smaller in size.  Two of the members are alleged to have
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services in Gwanda district include: Mvuramanzi Trust, EU ECHO, WV, CARE, PLAN, 
and DED, The Red Cross, Lutheran World Federation, and Kip Keino Association. 
 
Table 4.4: Investment in Public Water Infrastructure in Ward 17 
 
Infrastructure 
invested in 
Type/level of investment Proportion of households
investing 
Boreholes Contributed poles and labour for
fencing the boreholes, and
building the water trough for
livestock and laundry. 
Majority of households (78%)
contributed through labour.  Men
contributed through bricklaying
and fence mounting, while women
carried the poles 
Small dams Households contributed labour
during construction of the dams:
carrying stones, clearing the land
and cooking food for the
contractors  
For the donor LWF funded dam,
households contributed labour and
a bag of cement each. Men helped
with digging and land clearing,
while women helped with carrying
stones and cooking for the
contractors 
Unprotected wells Digging the well, cleaning the
well, maintaining the well 
It is mainly men who contribute
labour for digging and maintaining
the wells, while women clean the
wells.  All households that use the
wells contributed labour 
Dip tank Fetching water to fill the tank,
cleaning the tank and money for
dipping chemicals 
Most households (85%)
contributed labour to fetching
water, villages rotate on fortnightly
basis to fill the tank, only those
with cattle are required to
contribute labour and cash (US$1
per cow per quarter) 
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Project/Nutrition 
gardens 
Fencing equipment, labour and
land clearing 
Only selected beneficiary
households were required to
contribute labour in clearing the
land and putting up the fence.
Contribution and participation was
100% by all households 
 
As seen from Table 4.4, many households invested in water infrastructure especially 
through labour contributions.   
 
Most respondents reported that NGOs contributed the most in public water investment 
(67%), followed by local government (RDCs) with 28%, national government trailed 
with 3% and private investment with a reported 2% investment in communal water 
infrastructure.  This might be attributed to the heavy investment in rural water supply and 
sanitation by the district council in collaboration with and, funding from international 
agencies. The Gwanda District Integrated Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project 
(GDIRWSSP) 1995 – 2000, funded by the Australian government under the auspices of 
UNICEF, is one such project. The main activities of the project revolved around creating 
new boreholes, rehabilitating old ones and headworks construction. It forms the backbone 
of water services infrastructure for Gwanda Rural District Council (GRDC).  
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Insert/plate 4.2: Some communal water infrastructure in Manama, Ward 17 
 
In the whole of GRDC, during the implementation of the project, 261 new boreholes 
were sunk through private initiative, against a total of 230 by the project, and 50 by 
international NGOs (UNICEF, 2005).  Against this background, 211 old boreholes were 
refitted with new pumps while 35 old boreholes were rehabilitated and flushed; and 80 
community wells were deepened and 4.663 shallow wells were implemented (UNICEF, 
2005).  This shows the level of investment in communal water infrastructure in the 
district two decades after independence. Through private initiatives and investments, 
people are prepared to sacrifice to get water for domestic and productive uses, especially 
for their livestock, brick-making and gardens (see section 4.3.4 on private investments 
below). 
 
There was a lack of institutional clarity among the partners in the GDIRWSSP where it 
was recommended (by the IWSD 1997 Report) that the provincial level should confine 
itself to an advisory role, the District Administrator to take the coordination role and the 
RDC be recognised as the project manager.  Groundwater Development Consultants 
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assessed the quality of the DDF borehole drilling services in the project, and noted the 
following: DDF failed to submit activity completion reports, sticking rigidly to one 
borehole design, limited decentralisation within the organization, poor quality parts, and 
late invoicing.  There was also lack of appreciation by DDF of the need to involve local 
communities in the process of headwork construction and they failed to train sufficient 
team members for this task.  The GRDC cancelled its drilling contract with DDF and 
engaged private contractors for both siting (Hydro Utilities) and drilling (Modern 
Technology)13, after exposure to the problem of dry-boreholes.  The contractor (Modern 
Technology) sold their equipment without the RDC’s knowledge before completing the 
drilling of the outstanding number of boreholes.   
 
The number of water points under the management of villagers increased from this period 
onwards and practically all water points have Water Point Committees (WPCs) who have 
been trained under the GDIRWSSP.  The same applies in Ward 17, where all communal 
boreholes, wells and dams are managed by elected committees with traditional leaders 
and the GRDC as oversight mediation managers and compliance enforcers if and when 
there are disputes.  A large number (220) of village pump mechanics (VPMs) were 
trained.  50 out of 108 villages in Gwanda district have their own tool kit, but the others 
are able to call upon a ward-based kit14.  Through the implementation of the project, the 
downtime of boreholes with problems has been very much reduced.   
4.3.4. Private investments in water infrastructure 
The bounded nature of private water sources (fencing, access rules) allows their owners to 
control access, particularly for non-personal uses. In contrast water sources that transcend 
boundaries, such as rivers, have suffered from a lack of management control. The bounded 
nature of some water (re) sources is also correlated with attracting capital investments such as 
boreholes, wells and dams. In the previous section, we reported on one private drilling 
                                                 
13 As we shall see under private/individual water investments in 4.3.4, Modern Technology was 
enterprising and managed to enter into agreements with some households and drilled boreholes where they 
were paid in cattle rather than cash, outside the ambit of the GDIRWSSP.  This increased the number of 
people with private boreholes in Gwanda District, and Manama. 
14 The Ward Kit for Manama is not traceable, rumours abound that the former councillor converted the kit 
to own use 
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contractor who was innovative by creating demand for private water infrastructure.  He 
offered to drill boreholes in return for individuals and households, making his services 
available to 276 families in the whole Gwanda district (UNICEF, 2005), of which 8 
households in three villages of Ward 17 benefitted.  The drilling entrepreneur accepted 
payment for his services in cattle, and likewise, negotiated siting of the borehole with the 
beneficiary, explaining the technical to intertwine with the social, as much as accepting 
payment in cattle, something unheard and thought of with DDF.  Whilst such water 
supplies are not communal, they take the pressure off the local community boreholes and 
indicate a high level of investment potential, initiative and capability by households when 
the right incentives are available.  In the ensuing sections, data on private or individual 
household initiatives and investments in water infrastructure in Ward 17 and their 
implications on property rights and institutions is presented. 
 
Table 4.5: Investment in water infrastructure by individuals/households   
 
Type of 
Investment 
Number of 
households who 
own 
Costs & Funding Sources 
Boreholes 12 (total number of 
private boreholes is 
14)  
Many respondents who paid cash for borehole 
drilling didn’t remember the exact figures.  8 
households that benefited from drilling services 
by Modern Technology paid between 5 and 7 
cattle for an equipped borehole. 
Deep well 2 Financed through savings, pension and 
remittances.  Costs involved included digging and 
lining the well. 
Unprotected well 15 The only cost involved is unpaid labour within the 
household 
Water drum(s) 56 Mainly used for water storage. Each 210 liter 
metal drum estimated to cost between US$30 and 
50. Financed through sale of goats. 
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Brick-making 6 For 2 of the households primary investment was 
in a borehole, financed through livestock sales 
and savings. Hired labour used to make bricks for 
sale.  The 4 other households without boreholes 
engage in brick-making as the main source of 
income, financed through unpaid family labour. 
Cement 14 Primarily used for mounting and casting the 
borehole casings, and lining the walls of deep 
wells.  Financed through savings, salaries, 
remittances and sale of livestock 
Scotchcart 
(Watercart) 
63 Financed through: livestock sales, remittances, 
salaries and piece-jobs 
Watering can
(container) 
116 Financed through piece-jobs, sale of garden 
produce, sale of livestock and savings. 
Material for
brewing beer 
5 Beer brewing is done by the lowest-income 
earning hhds, mainly as payment for people who 
attend work-parties to help with household labour 
such as ploughing, weeding and harvesting. 
Gardens, 
boreholes for
irrigating gardens 
52+ Labour for clearing the land and for fencing.  The 
cash rich hhds use pole & wire fencing, while the 
cash poor use thorns and bushes. 
Drip-kits 19 Donated by Practical Action (an international 
NGO) for free. 
Rooftop water
harvesting 
36 By those with brick under asbestos/corrugated 
zinc, including containers (mainly 210 litre 
drums) in wet season 
Draft Power
(Cattle/donkeys) 
63 Financed through: inheritance, remittances, 
salaries and lobola (bride-price) when daughters 
are married-off. Used for ferrying water by those 
with scotchcarts. 
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Although private investments in infrastructure shown in the table confer and guarantee 
exclusionary rights to the investor, no private borehole owner in Gwanda exercised those 
rights; rather there is a general norm of sharing private water sources with kin and 
neighbours within the local networks.  Sharing however is not always guaranteed by the 
investor.  For example Mr. and Mrs. Sibanda (from Fumukwe village) own a borehole 
which was financed through the war victims’ compensation fund paid out to liberation 
war veterans.  They use the borehole for irrigating a flourishing homestead garden and 
for making bricks for sale.  Like other private borehole owners, they allow neighbours to 
access water for drinking and cooking during the wet season, while only allowing close 
kin to access such services during the dry season.  As such, during the wet season, as 
many as 12 households access drinking water from their borehole and the number 
reduces to four households during the dry season.  Mr and Mrs Ncube who own a local 
groceries shop in Fumukwe village on the other hand have two boreholes, one within 
their homestead and the other within their riverin garden.  They only allow very close kin 
access to drinking water at their riverin garden borehole, whilst no one is allowed access 
to water from their homestead garden in a container larger than five litres.  They have a 
homestead garden and a poultry project at their homestead.  The garden borehole is used 
for irrigating the garden and for watering livestock during the dry season when most 
streams and communal small-dams dry-up.   
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Insert/plate 4.3: Private boreholes for multiple uses - domestic, irrigating garden, 
brickmaking enterprise, and sharing with neighbours and close kin.  The type of fencing 
shown is used for protection against vandalism by livestock and other villagers. 
 
To access water from private boreholes and deep wells, people have to ask for permission 
from the owner, and observe the rules set out, for example: closing the gate to the garden 
after use, not to allow unaccompanied kids to the garden borehole, and helping the owner 
with garden chores.  Access to other uses such as livestock watering, gardening and 
brick-making is hardly extended to non-household members, be they kin or neighbours.  
These interrelationships between property rights and local decision-making institutions in 
communal area water resources management in a dynamic socio-economic environment 
warrants detailed examination based on an in-depth analysis of both formal and informal 
institutions. Sections 4.3.5, 4.3.6 and 4.3.7 highlight some of these nuanced observations. 
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Insert/plate 4.4: Private water sources, uses and donated technologies (drip-kits) used in 
Ward 17 as shown above.  
4.3.5. Institutional arrangements and access to water 
The study investigated access to various man-made and natural water sources that are either 
owned communally (such as boreholes, deep wells, dams, shallow wells, rivers and streams) 
or privately (mainly deep wells, boreholes, and shallow wells near homesteads and in 
household gardens). The study also investigated the existence of local institutional 
arrangements that govern access to the water sources for different and multiple water uses. In 
all the villages, boreholes and family deep wells are the main sources of cooking and drinking 
water. Dams and rivers/streams tend to be mainly used for livestock watering, gardening and 
brick making. However, a number of sources can be accessed for multiple uses, depending on 
general water availability in the area. For example, a number of boreholes are used to provide 
water for cooking and drinking, gardening and livestock watering.  Households with private 
boreholes reserve the use of their boreholes for livestock and gardens during the dry season, 
while competing with others to access water from public water sources.  
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Access to household water sources, especially for cooking and drinking, can be extended to 
neighbouring households. This is common with the majority of the households who own the 
water sources. The feature that water is essential for life and perceived as a ‘God given good’ 
discourages exclusive rights over water (see also Derman, 2000, 2003, 2005; Derman and 
Hellum, 2005; Nemarundwe, 2003; Matondi, 2001; Mukamuri et al, 2005). People who deny 
others access to water for cooking and drinking are often regarded with disdain and fall short 
of being labeled umthakathi (witch/wizard).  There is a stated belief and fear that denying 
others access to water for cooking and drinking purposes will result in privately owned 
sources being poisoned and or vandalised. These features and social relations serve to increase 
access to water sources that are privately owned. However, increased access is less common 
when it comes to other uses like gardening and brick making. Many of the households with 
gardening water sources would argue that the water is enough for their gardens only. 
 
There are a number of local level institutional arrangements that govern access to water 
sources in communal areas. The arrangements may vary depending on the source (man-made, 
natural and yielding capacity), ownership (privately owned or communally owned) and the 
purpose for which the water will be used. Rules are put in place by the relevant committees 
such as dam and borehole committees, commonly referred to as water point committees 
(WPCs)15, local leaders, the users and institutions such as the Ministry of Health and the RDC. 
For sources such as public boreholes and deep wells users are expected to contribute towards 
the maintenance of the water source. This can be in the form of money, labour or food for 
people who would be doing the work. The quantity of water abstracted can be restricted 
during times of water stress, especially droughts that are endemic in Gwanda South. This is 
achieved by preventing use of equipment such as drums, scotchcarts, wheelbarrows and 
limiting the number of 20 litre containers of water that can be abstracted per day. With regards 
to access to sources such as shallow wells and shallow wells dug along riverbeds (sediba or 
mifuku), there are rules that are put in place to maintain hygienic standards and provide fairer 
                                                 
15 The term water point committee (WPC) was popularized by NGOs in Gwanda South, where upon 
completion of a borehole, the funding and/or facilitating NGOs and local government organs prescribe the 
formation of such committees to oversee the specific/designated water (re) source.  Each borehole in Ward 
17 funded by a different donor has its own elected committee.  
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distribution among the users. Access to gardening water sources is also characterized by rules 
and regulations that seek to promote fairer distribution of water and reduction of produce theft. 
 
With uses such as gardening, livestock watering and brick making besides promoting 
fairer distribution and conservation of water the arrangements give first priority to 
cooking and drinking. The arrangements tend to be more adhered to if they relate to 
boreholes and dams especially those used for community gardening projects. Generally, 
communities tend to have few problems in monitoring water abstraction and punishing 
offenders. Traditional leaders, elected leaders and the relevant water point committees 
tend to complement and compete with each other in developing institutional 
arrangements and enforcing them. Sanctions vary from verbal warnings, suspension from 
using the source, being asked to contribute towards repairing of the pump and general 
maintenance and fines in the form of a goat, chicken or in monetary terms depending on 
the offence committed and the type of water source.  There are instances in Ward 17 
(though not very common) however, where war veterans and accomplices, running on the 
wave of political mayhem, disregarded some of the sanctions, disobeyed the rules and 
norms with the backing of the political party, ZANU PF, and emerging as a new 
institutional cluster with a lot of power.  This brought with it some loop holes in the 
enforcement system, and opportunities for some as they found a window to escape 
punitive measures under the guise of protection from the war veterans. 
4.3.6. Conceptualising institutions and property rights  
Studies on common-pool resources display that graduated and disparate levels of 
complexity and “fuzziness” exist across resource types and rights. In order to understand 
institutions and property rights regimes for natural resources in these settings, it is 
important to view the interface between human and natural resources, interface as 
embedded in both social and power relations, and as a reflection of how users and 
resource rights holders attempt to meet their livelihood needs (Nemarundwe 2003, p. 87). 
 
Dichotomization of access and use into formal and informal rights, often used to 
differentiate between official and non-official allocation and access to natural resources, 
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is not always analytically helpful. Realities, as reflected by empirical materials presented 
in this chapter, show that both categories of rights are operational for water, woodland 
and grazing resources (see also Nemarundwe 2003, Moyo, 2005; Mukamuri et al, 2005). 
This dichotomy is more relevant for the CAs than for the SSCFs, the latter being held 
under private tenure (see Matondi 2001). Access rights in the communal sector have 
tended to remain flexible because of loosely defined boundaries and the existence of 
elaborate extended family and social networks. Villages commanding grazing resources 
share with those with less and sharing of water points across villages is the norm rather 
than the exception.  
 
The informality of institutions and property rights also seems to facilitate flexibility to 
allow for resource sharing, which is a common feature across the different water resource 
types (communal, ‘project’, and private). For example, water points (dams, wells, 
boreholes) are constructed by either government or donor agencies and used by people in 
specific villages who are not, officially, the intended beneficiaries. Similarly, and as 
practiced by the colonial government, in communal areas like Gwanda, official settlers 
were registered by the government agency as bona fide beneficiaries while unofficial 
settlers have been accepted by local leaders or by local people who have allowed others 
to settle in undesignated areas. Such redistribution of resources is made possible by social 
networks, power relations and other societal dynamics in the community, and may reflect 
political developments and social capital among others. Our findings show that access to 
natural resources is in many but not all instances determined by community-derived rules 
and regulations, which community members collectively monitor, regulate and enforce 
(McCay and Acheson 1987; Ostrom 1990; Dasgupta 1993). This is particularly true for 
access to meet ‘basic needs’ - in the case of water for drinking, basic household use and 
limited livestock watering rather than universal access. 
 
Mainstream perceptions on legal and policy aspects of property rights regime often view 
practices as conforming within well defined and operationalised legislative and policy 
frameworks. The legal prescriptions are viewed as defining parameters for access and use 
but may not always be enforced in practice. In Zimbabwe, legal aspects relating to access 
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and use of resources are contained in a number of specific Acts (see section 4.3.1); these 
generally ascribe entitlement and access, while communities are more concerned with 
practical issues relating to actual use. However, changes in official policies may be 
ineffective or may not respond to practices (and expectations) by individuals and 
communities who use local strategies that seek to guarantee continued access and 
livelihoods. Changes may, however, be induced at the local level due to environmental 
and socio-economic conditions (Sithole 1999, Matondi 2001). This reflects the robust and 
reflexive nature of communal natural resources management institutions, and their coping 
mechanisms and flexibility as regards uncertainty and other pressures and challenges.  
 
Conceptualizing property rights also involves understanding values that underlie rules.  
The important value attributed to water mitigates against misuse of this resource, 
particularly in the dry parts of the country like Ward 17, Manama, in Gwanda South. 
Fears of desiccation and the adverse effects of drought, help shape a strong reverence to 
water and its associated taboos. This explains why controls over water use and access by 
different community members, is a product of socio-cultural construction, negotiation 
and networks. The emergence of ‘new’ generation institutional complexes (what I call 
hybrid institutions) such as WPCs although operating under strict instructions from the 
funders and founders, also adopt the norm of sharing water in varying degrees to non-
members and neighbouring villages. It emerges from the study results that ownership of 
water sources does not lead to exclusive use of the water resources by the owner16. There 
is little difference in terms of access for cooking and drinking purposes between privately 
owned and improved water, points and communal ones. Private access to water is 
regulated by social networks, kinship ties, and cultural values. Social controls that 
prevent exclusive use include the fear of poisoning or bad rapport with neighbours, and 
the possibility that other people may refuse to co-operate with the owner especially in 
work parties (amalimo or nhimbe)17 and cooperative cattle herding in the dry and/or 
drought season (lagisa)18.  
                                                 
16 Even though the owner can exercise such exclusionary rights, in theory, but for practical 
purposes, fear of resentment, and for mutual beneficiation, choose to exercise limited control over 
such sources by allowing others access for drinking and cooking. 
17 Where participants are often rewarded with beer for helping with assigned tasks, though mainly practised 
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4.3.7. Changes and Continuities, Property Rights and Impacts on 
Resources 
Pressures of population, poverty and changing political and social expectations and 
actions all bear on the use of resources, normally leading to changes in both their quantity 
and quality, and to changes in the rules governing their use (see Mukamuri et al, 2005).  
The effective application of rules governing use of water may be associated with 
differences in the nature of the resource and the nature of people’s willingness to observe 
social norms. The study confirms the higher level of effectiveness of control of the use of 
water by local norms, whether through elected committees or traditional authority.  One 
component causing local institutions to be more effective and efficient, as regards 
management of water as compared to grazing land, can be seen in the encouragement for 
investment in private areas. Such investment is typically in boreholes, shallow and deep 
wells, and also in small dams due to incentives of exclusive access and use for 
individuals or defined groups (within the volume limits specified by the Water Act 1998).  
In effect, this involves near-exclusive access, within the context of limited sharing of 
water from private wells and boreholes, which helps to accommodate for the basic 
domestic water requirements of other members of particular social networks. Sanctions or 
various exclusion mechanisms that limit water access to communal sources (wells, dams, 
boreholes and water points) accommodate basic primary uses by individual households19. 
The exclusion mechanisms limit water point degradation and promote equity in 
individual households’ access and use of water. 
 
Investment in water extraction has attracted donor interest, which reflects a potential to 
improve rural livelihoods, reduce hardships and, perhaps, the potential to create a more 
effective institutional setting for water than for other resources. Study results show that 
access to the different types of water resources is central to both agricultural and non-
farm income generating activities of households as well as groups throughout the year. 
                                                                                                                                                 
by widowed families 
18 Lagisa is a semi-transhumance cattle herding process long practiced by the Sotho and Ndebele in 
Gwanda, where during times of drought, they move with their cattle to the Tuli and Shashi River frontier 
for grazing and watering.  They settle in camps for up to five months until the onset of the first rains. 
19 Water for drinking and cooking, is often limited to not more than two 20 litre containers per household 
per day depending on the strength and tightness of social relations with the owner. 
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This in turn creates higher incentives for public and private investment, generally (but not 
invariably) higher social incentives for institutional management, and lower transactions 
costs for governance of most water resources (Mukamuri et al, 2005). 
 
The results raise interesting questions regarding the relative balance of power between 
local government structures, traditional leaders and communities, as well as the 
associated conflicts between top-down versus bottom-up approaches to natural resource 
management. The Traditional Leaders Act (1998), which empower traditional leaders and 
involve local people in community resource management, may be difficult to implement 
given existing local government structures such as VIDCOs and WADCOs and their 
importance for water infrastructure development. It has been observed that pressures to 
overlook norms and traditional institutions tend to increase with population pressure and 
with changes in the location and mix of populations, the very heart of Gwanda district as 
a frontier from the colonial to the post-colonial period as observed earlier in this chapter.  
We also noticed from the historical analysis that institutions are also shaped by the 
manipulation of leaders; where traditional leaders and elected leaders compete and/or 
compliment each other depending on circumstances and benevolence from the state. The 
question to ask is whether existing institutions are sufficiently secure to promote 
investment and yet flexible enough to accommodate multiple uses of water.  Despite their 
competitive and dynamic interactions, local level institutions in Gwanda seemed to be 
responsive and capable of accommodating such issues.  The need here is for institutions 
governing resource access and use to accommodate both equity and efficiency in 
allocations to various groups of people over time, thus contributing to sustainable 
livelihoods and development.   
 
Increasing pressure on norms, traditional and formal institutions surrounding natural 
resource access and use is seen in Gwanda associated with increasing population, 
changing technology, and rising economic hardships. Changes in formal institutions are 
evident in the enactment of the Traditional Leaders Act. But there is also evidence that 
social norms and informal institutions have evolved locally in relatively flexible ways 
responding to pressures of current needs.  New institutions encouraging the participation 
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of women often accompany external-donor introduced and funded projects, such as 
irrigated community gardens, often called project or nutrition gardens, which tend to have 
been emphasized by NGOs in Gwanda South. These institutions have resulted in conflict 
over leadership and changing resource control roles between women and men. Donor-
funded projects encourage women to take leadership roles much to the dismay of men. In 
some instances, where external donors have introduced projects, there has tended to be 
evidence of lack of ownership and accountability by community members, as shown in 
instances where communities fail to organize themselves to repair borehole equipment 
leading to appropriation by the clever few who rehabilitate the boreholes and set new 
regulations governing access. Where women have the leadership roles in these initiatives 
however, there has tended to be greater accountability and ownership of these projects, a 
case in point is the Ncedisizwe Cooperative (N-Coop).  N-Coop was founded and funded 
by World Vision in Fumukwe village, in settlement line number 12.  The cooperative 
comprised of one man and six women with all the leadership positions in the committee 
held by women.  The cooperative was primarily funded and founded to facilitate the 
production of vegetables for vulnerable households.  All the households who belong to 
the cooperative reported having surplus produce.  It would seem the cooperative has been 
successful in meeting its members’ needs since inception. 
 
4.4. Conclusions 
The chapter sketched and highlighted how the application, effect and influence of the 
colonial policies on resource access in Gwanda South, and Ward 17 in particular 
demonstrates a continuing and enduring legacy of some of these policies into the post-
colonial era.  This is compounded by pressures of poverty and changing political and 
social expectations impacting on the use of resources, leading to changes in both their 
quantity and quality, and to changes in the rules governing their use.  The unsuccessful 
policy of the government to limit and control livestock as part of the implementation of 
the Land Husbandry Act (LHA, 1951), was met with a lot of resistance by livestock 
owners in Gwanda South in general and Manama in particular.  Such resistance and 
opposition to various attempts by the government to limit and control people and 
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resources through various schemes endured in the post-colonial times and can be 
interpreted as problems of implementing (natural) resource management legislation 
policy where this is incongruent with information and practice of affected 
communities/people on the ground; and the need for adaptation of formal and informal 
institutions at local levels to accommodate the changing social, economic, political and 
physical environment.  Changes in natural resource legislation by the state, such as land 
and water, which is perceived to influence property rights and social relations of 
communal smallholders was, and still is, considered a threat to people’s social and 
economic system, and  is perceived to complicate people’s negotiability and access to 
networks.  The struggle for control of resources, and efforts to introduce or impose 
taxation and levies by government (or its agencies) is a pattern that still holds today in 
Manama, as it was in the colonial period. 
 
We also observed that when water is physically available (both surface and ground water) 
people invest in accessing it for multiple uses, where those who invest in private water 
infrastructure hold stronger and overarching rights to both the infrastructure and water 
conveyed.  Rights are locally and broadly conceived as the ability to set, stipulate and 
enforce one’s claim to the resource either as a direct result of investment, strong networks 
and kinship or simply by being an outright beneficiary/stakeholder of a communal 
resource.  That is how hydraulic property rights are created, understood and interpreted in 
practice (see Chapter 7 for details on taxation and imposition of levies). 
 
In order to understand institutions and property rights regimes for natural resources, it is 
important to view the interface between human and natural resources, as embedded in 
both social and power relations, and as a reflection of how users and resource rights 
holders attempt to meet their livelihood needs.  Availability of particular forums or 
platforms such as water point committees, traditional leadership and the district council 
can make negotiations possible by providing spaces within which problems and topical 
issues can be discussed.  Critical analysis of community-based natural resources 
management and institutional arrangements provides a basis for understanding how 
communities act to secure rights to water.  This is demonstrated by empirical materials on 
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how communities act to defend (and/or prolong) customary rights to water, and to 
manoeuvre within a plural framework of national and local laws, and other normative 
orders regulating access to water by increasing the number of beneficiaries on targeted 
projects to be more inclusive.  This provides potential implications for changes in 
resource access to mirror and reflect the changes in plural customary arrangements.  
Mainstream perceptions on legal and policy aspects of property right regimes often view 
practices as conforming within well defined and operationalised legislative and policy 
frameworks bounded and defined by formal and informal access. Dichotomization into 
formal and informal rights, often used to differentiate between official and non-official 
allocation and access to natural resources, is not always analytically helpful owing to 
normative sharing arrangements and practices.  
 
Gender considerably influences access to resources and associated livelihoods activities. 
Male household members and children spend relatively more time on livestock activities 
whilst women spend more time working in gardens and generally, but not invariably, on 
water collection. Essentially, women provide the labor and management for collection 
and use of domestic water and water for gardens where they earn and control most of the 
income from sale of garden produce in Gwanda, whilst men tend to provide the labour 
and management of water resources for cash income generation such as brick-making and 
livestock watering, and where capital is applied. 
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CHAPTER FIVE:    From Homeland to Democracy: The 
Politics and History of Water (Re) 
Sources Investments and Institutional 
Arrangements in Sekororo (B72A and 
B72C), South Africa  
 
5.1. Introduction 
From the beginning of South Africa’s history, water has played an important role in the 
shaping of the country, not only demographically but also politically.  Water availability 
helped to determine where and how humans lived and influence the way they relate to 
each other (Wolf, 1995:12).  The 1913 Land Act became the first marked and clear 
distinction between African Reserves and White areas.  Pursuant to the passing of the act 
plus the 1936 Land Act, 87% of the country became known as the “white land” and 13% 
as African Reserves (Ross 1999).  The implementation of the act created a dual and 
parallel economic and political development with a heavy bearing on the nature and 
course of water resources development in South Africa from the colonial, apartheid and 
post-apartheid periods.  Like all major hydraulic missions throughout the world, the 
hydropolitical history of water resources development in South Africa have been made 
possible by a number of factors including access to water, land and finance. This is an 
important point to note when discussing water investments in South Africa where often 
there are claims to the effect that there is no or little demand for productive water among 
the Historically Disadvantaged Individuals (HDIs). What is often forgotten is that the 
current demand for water use that white farmers exhibit is a result of sustained support 
(in the form of access to water, land and finance) by the white minority government for 
many decades, which was also found to be the case in Zimbabwe (Manzungu and 
Machiridza, 2009).  
 
In the 1990s, South Africa, like other southern African countries, embarked on Integrated 
Water Resources Management (IWRM)-inspired water reforms (Manzungu, 2004) 
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culminating in the promulgation of the National Water Act in 1998, four years after the 
attainment of democracy in 1994.  The much fettered 1998 National Water Act, 
celebrated for its progressive modern ideas on how to manage water resources, has not 
resulted in an improvement of access to water on the part of the Historically 
Disadvantaged Individuals (HDIs). For example, to date, only 4% of the newly developed 
water has been allocated to HDIs (Karar, 2008).  There are also other problems that 
explain the poor water access by HDIs. This chapter examines critical issues that affect 
water investments in South Africa, namely access to water, technology, infrastructure and 
finance. With regards to access to water we examine the water allocation mechanisms 
that are contained in the national legislation in relation to how they improve access to 
water on the majority of black rural communities whose water rights were largely 
expropriated during apartheid, and how this affects local investments. 
 
Notwithstanding the good intentions under the ‘new’ policies and legislation in the post-
apartheid state, and conscious of the historical nature of resource access, the key 
objective this chapter seeks to address is to document and analyse the processes and 
genealogy of hydraulic property creation in Sekororo, South Africa, in terms of access, 
use and control of the resource, and the implications of such rights on men and women.  
The questions this chapter seeks to answer are: i) how do different actors understand, 
conceptualise and present notions of hydraulic property rights, and why; and ii) how and 
in what ways are hydraulic property rights established, maintained and enforced in 
informal economies?  The chapter sets out the analyses by documenting the property 
rights creation processes and investments dynamics from the colonial, apartheid to the 
democratic and post-democracy Sekororo communal lands.  It quantifies and qualifies the 
levels and dynamics of investments in hydraulic property creation through both time and 
space by providing nuanced details on both private and communal infrastructure 
developments of varying proportions spread throughout the study area.  
  
I examined the nature and patterns of investments in water infrastructure by rural 
communities in Sekororo (B72a and B72c) by employing the concept of ‘hydraulic 
property rights creation’ to understand how people, as individuals and or as groups, assert 
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rights over water, and how such claims become legitimized (Coward, 1986; Manzungu et 
al, 2010). Hydraulic property rights refers to the creation of value of water by means of 
establishing, and recognizing claims to water due to investments made in developing 
physical infrastructure and related institutional arrangements for purposes of abstracting, 
storing, conveying and/ or applying water to the field as explained in detail under Chapter 
2. Hydraulic property rights creation may be entirely ‘endogenous’ (or ‘local’ or 
‘informal’). Alternatively hydraulic rights may also be based on government, formal 
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), or other outsiders in which case they are 
‘exogenous’. The difference between endogenous and exogenous is, however, not always 
that clear-cut because local people interact with ‘outsiders’ in ways that blur the 
endogenous-exogenous dichotomy (Manzungu et al, 2010: 12).  
 
5.2. From forced removals to homelands: a brief overview of 
colonial water legislation and infrastructure development in 
South Africa 
The institutional and legal developments regarding the country’s water resources date 
back to the arrival of white settlers in South Africa in the 17th century.  Africans had their 
water laws.  These regulations mainly dealt with the pollution of streams and laid certain 
requirements (RSA, 1970a).  It was in the 19th century that laws regarding the allocation 
of water resources among different users started to develop.  The codified water law for 
the established Union of South Africa only came in 1912, two years after the Union of 
South Africa.  
 
 In 1951 the government established the Tomlinson Commission (TC) to investigate the 
socio-economic problems of the reserves with a view of increasing their human carrying 
capacity (Davenport and Saunders, 2000).  Plans were put in place to combat soil erosion 
and large numbers of people had to be moved off the land under grand apartheid (Beinart, 
1994:154).  For Geldenhuys (1984:11) “It was the first time that territorial separation 
was legislatively explicitly linked to ethnic separation”.  The TC report was published in 
1956 and encouraged industrial firms to decentralise their activities and establish 
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factories on the border of the reserves.  Water played an important role in the 
development of the homelands, where a typical homeland’s economy consisted of a small 
number of people employed in tertiary activities such as teachers and nurses while the 
majority were subsistence farmers with an emphasis on dryland production of crops 
(Bantu, 1970:22; Hattingh, 1972:81; Davenport and Saunders, 2000:461).  Thus 
reproduction of the labour force of blacks in the homelands was the rationale behind this 
type of development (Bantu, 1964:200).  It would seem, from the ensuing argument, the 
TC report was the blueprint for agricultural development in the homelands.  By 1956 
there were already 122 irrigation schemes in the Bantu areas with a total of 13 300 
morgen under irrigation (Houghton, 1956:121; Bantu, 1970:22). The 1956 Water Act 
came as a response to South Africa’s increasing urbanisation and industrialisation, unlike 
the 1912 Act which mainly focused on irrigation.  The water Acts were for white 
development and from a water resources management perspective, water was mainly 
mobilised in the homelands to stimulate irrigation agriculture from the mid-1950s and 
early 1960s20.  In July 1966, the government appointed a Commission of Inquiry into 
Water Matters which culminated in the establishment of the Water Research Commission 
(RSA, 1970a: xii).  Small dams and water supply systems were constructed by 
government to keep the black populations out of designated “white areas” throughout the 
1970s and 1980s up to the 1990s.  The next section provides detailed analyses of key 
legal frameworks governing water investments in South Africa from the transition period 
in the 1990s to post-1994. 
5.3. From Homelands to Democracy: Water allocation and Water-
related investments in South Africa 
5.3.1. A brief overview of the legal frameworks governing natural 
resource access in South Africa 
Access to water in South Africa is formally governed by two pieces of legislation 
namely, the National Water Act (Act 36 of 1998) and the Water Services Act (Act 108 of 
1997) (Republic of South Africa, 1997; 1998). The Water Services Act governs domestic 
                                                 
20 This period coincides with the development of Sofaya and Lorraine irrigation schemes in the study area. 
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water supply services and delegates responsibilities for such services to Water Services 
Authorities (WSAs), such as municipalities and water utility parastatals and private firms.  
 
The National Water Act identifies water rights as pertaining to basic human and 
ecological needs for water. Such uses are termed the ‘Reserve’ and are given priority in 
water allocation. All other uses are regulated through ‘registration’ and through different 
types of ‘authorisations’. The four types of water authorisations are Schedule One, 
General Authorisations, Existing Lawful Uses and Water Use Licences.  Schedule One 
describes permissible uses of water that do not require a licence and do not have to be 
registered. Water use activities that fall under Schedule One include those that, due to the 
small quantities used, have a very small impact on the water resource and therefore pose 
minimal or no risk. The uses that are covered under Schedule One are indicated in Box 
5.1. 
 
 
Box 5.1: Schedule One water uses 
1. Taking water directly from any water source for domestic use in households
provided that water users have lawful access to that water; 
2. Storing and using run-off water from a roof; 
3. Small gardening that is not for commercial use; 
4. Watering animals for subsistence use; 
5. Using the water surface or surrounding land for recreational use; and 
6. Using water for emergencies, such as firefighting and drought relief. 
 
Despite the identification of the list of water uses under Schedule One, it is significant 
that there has been no official mention of the quantities that are involved. The discourse 
around Schedule One water use is that ordinary people who use water are not informed 
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and that the water is not significant.  The preoccupation is with large water use for which 
numerous studies, time and money is spent. 
 
General Authorisations are permissions that allow slightly larger volumes of water use 
from less stressed sources, such as rivers and aquifers. Such authorisations allow people 
to use water without a licence provided that the water use is within the conditions 
stipulated in the General Authorisation. For example, limits are placed on water use 
depending on the nature of use and the capacity of the resource to accommodate use 
without significant degradation. Examples of general authorizations include abstracting a 
limited amount of water from certain rivers and groundwater sources as well as storing a 
limited quantity of water in a dam. The authorisations are granted by the Minister and 
published in the Government Gazette. In view of the wide range of water use activities 
and the logistical implications of registering myriad of individual water users, general 
authorisations are used as strategies to cut down on unnecessary administrative efforts. 
General authorisations may also attach conditions relating to water management 
activities, such as monitoring and reporting, in accordance with Section 29 of the 
National Water Act.  More significantly however is a reluctance to give a blanket 
generalization for example for a communal area. It appears that providing water to 
communities under schedule one and general authorisations is not considered by policy 
makers, as  something that cannot be wholly ignored because it exists in law but is not 
pursued with any conviction. This is ironical given the potential such water can 
contribute to improving rural livelihoods. Water licences are mechanisms for regulating 
water use that exceeds the limits outlined in Schedule One and General Authorizations, 
and apply to any new (post-1998) water use that is not covered by Schedule One or 
General Authorizations.  
 
In instances where users have legally used water since prior to the National Water Act of 
1998, provision is made for ‘continuation of existing lawful use’. Such users should 
register that use and continue using water without having to apply for a licence. This 
provision is a transitional measure intended to allow existing lawful water users to 
continue using water under the same conditions, until water use is formally licensed. 
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Water licences give new water users formal authorization to use water, and specify the 
conditions under which the water can be used. Licences are issued by ‘responsible 
authorities’ namely, the Department of Water Affairs (DWA) or future Catchment 
Management Agencies (CMAs). Currently, the licensing procedure requires new and 
potential water users to apply for a licence with the responsible authority namely, the 
Regional Office of DWA, who forward to Head Office. This regulatory function is 
envisaged to devolve to CMAs when these become fully operational. 
 
The question that can be asked is whether the water law permits improves the water 
rights of the HDIs and how this influences investments in water infrastructure by rural 
communities.  Experiences to date suggest that there is evidence of administrative 
discrimination in water allocation. This is because although the 1998 National Water Act, 
which was meant to redress the past injustices in water access, ushered in a number of 
interventions, which among other things, abolished riparian right system, other caveats 
were put in place, which tend to retain the status quo. For example a licence-based water 
allocation system that is meant to protect public interest, is high on the agenda of state 
officials. The implementation of the new water allocation system has been bedeviled with 
numerous problems including verification of actual water use and compulsory licensing, 
and has got priority whilst redress is enshrined in a strategy but hardly implemented. The 
problem has been worsened by the fact that even those avenues that are contained in the 
law for empowering HDIs, such as General Authorisation have not been utilized. Instead 
there are allegations of lack of effective water demand on the part of the HDIs. The 
question that needs to be answered is whether the fundamental issue is one of capacity 
deficiency for hprc or administrative injustice.  The preoccupation is with large water use 
for which numerous studies, time and money is spent.  This has provided a distraction to 
address urgent livelihoods issues as is the reluctance to register black water user 
associations which could empower communities to secure their water rights.  There are 
several options that could be pursued, including formalising existing traditional 
committees at village and ward level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 133
Pursuant to the aforementioned, the Free Basic Water (FBW) policy was officially 
launched in July 2001 although the pace of implementation in rural areas has been slow 
due to varying technical, financial, political and logistical problems at local and 
municipal levels (Balfour et al., 2005) as attested by key events in Sekororo. The only 
notable interventions done so far for public water supply were that by Non Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) (and local municipality) like Mvula Trust and World Vision, and 
the very slowly progressing Mametja-Sekororo Regional Water Scheme scheduled to be 
completed by 201121.  In general domestic water service delivery in the study area is poor 
and the aging infrastructure is badly maintained. A significant proportion of households 
consume less than the recommended RDP and UN standards (Morardet et al, 2009). 
Household engagement in water use for productive purposes is limited by scarcity of 
access to water resource.  
5.3.2. Investment in water, levels of investment and materials 
invested: 1994 and beyond 
As already said the prosperity of white agriculture was a result of state support. In this 
section we assess the degree to which the post-apartheid state has supported investments 
in water infrastructure by the HDIs. One area where the state support has been 
demonstrated relates to smallholder irrigation schemes that were developed by 
government as part of social integration in homeland areas during the apartheid era. In 
the Limpopo Province there are 126 smallholder schemes that became dysfunctional 
following sudden withdrawal of state subsidies by the post-apartheid government after 
1994 (Tapela, 2009). This appears to have resulted in a deepening of food and livelihood 
insecurity within rural communities adjacent to irrigation schemes. However, since 2001, 
there have been moves to resuscitate smallholder irrigation farming.  
 
Significant government expenditure has been directed towards rehabilitation and 
development of irrigation infrastructure and ‘revitalization’ of crop production in these 
communities. Between 2001 and 2004, the Limpopo Provincial Department of 
Agriculture set aside a total of R224 million (US$22.4 million) to fund an initial phase of 
                                                 
21 Personal communication with the technical services manager Mr. Mashala June 2009 
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the Revitalisation of Smallholder Irrigation Schemes (RESIS) Programme. A further 
R248 million (US$24.8 million) was allocated towards funding the second phase or 
“RESIS-Recharge”, of which R84 million (US$8.4 million) was budgeted for 2005 to 
2006 and R164 million (US$16.4 million) for 2006 to 2007. Revitalisation of underused 
irrigation schemes has been bolstered, at the macro-economic policy level, by the 
Department of Agriculture’s identification of irrigation development as one of the five 
priority areas for the Accelerated Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (AsgiSA). 
RESIS and RESIS-Recharge have also been supported by the Limpopo Provincial 
Growth and Development Strategy (PGDS), which states that resolving challenges of 
poverty, unemployment, food insecurity and rural development in the province will 
depend largely on investment and growth in the agricultural sector.  
 
With progression from RESIS to RESIS-Recharge, however, there has been a shift in the 
focus of government interventions. The RESIS Programme aimed at “re-building socially 
uplifting (and) profitable agribusiness” through “a comprehensive programme to 
structure, train and capacitate smallholder farmers to run their scheme profitably and 
sustainably” (de Lange, 2004).  The objectives of RESIS-Recharge have shifted towards 
infrastructure development and the involvement of white commercial farmers or 
“strategic partners” in crop production in the schemes22. Strategic partnerships or ‘joint 
ventures’ provide a useful context for examining the manner in which hydraulic property 
rights creation issues, particularly those pertaining to land tenure rights and water access, 
have been grappled with amid attempts by the RESIS and RESIS-Recharge Programmes 
to commercialize small-scale irrigation farming. Since the earlier phase of RESIS, the 
predominant type of strategic partnership in the various study areas has been contract 
farming. Mayson (2004) defines this type of joint venture as an agreement between 
small-scale farmers and private investors, such as established commercial farmers or 
processing and/or marketing firms, in which farmers commit to supplying an agreed 
quantity of goods of a special quality. In exchange, the farmers receive payment for 
produce as well as support with credit, training and extension services, production 
machinery and other resources.  
                                                 
22 Interview with senior officials of the Limpopo Department of Agriculture in Polokwane, 12 March 2008.  
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There also have been efforts to support rainwater harvesting through a grant and loan 
scheme where people can construct tanks that is managed by the DWA. After a delayed 
start, the project seems to be underway.  There is no record of the people in the study area 
benefitting from the facility. Apart from state-sponsored rainwater harvesting 
interventions there are also individual and NGO attempts and initiatives to invest in water 
infrastructure as will be shown in subsequent sections. 
5.3.3 Household Characterisation and Resource Access in Sekororo 
The quaternary catchment B72A and B72C is part of Ga-Sekororo-Letsoalo tribal 
authorities (or simply Sekororo), with a large part of the catchment (80%) falling under 
the Lebowa homelands, and an estimated total rural population of 56,000 (South Africa 
Census, 2001). Table 5.1 shows the number of households and total population of the 
four study villages of Enable, Lorraine, Sofaya and Worcester.  As highlighted earlier, 
the Limpopo province is among the three least developed provinces in the country and 
has the lowest (0.49) Human Development Index (HDI). More so, levels of poverty are 
relatively high, with 60% of the population living in households with an income less than 
the ‘poverty income’ (Limpopo PGDS, 2004). Poverty income is defined as “the 
minimum monthly income needed to sustain a household and varies by household size”. 
The predominantly rural socio-economic landscape of Limpopo Province glaringly 
reflects the inequalities inherent over much of South Africa’s space economy. The 
highest concentration of poor households lives in former homeland areas like Sekororo. 
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Box 5.2 History of the Sekororo-Letsoalo area 
(Sources: Ramay and Beullier, 2005; Liebrand, 2006; Van Koppen, 2007a; 2007b; Mgombeyi 
and Taigbenu, 2008; Mapedza et al, 2009; Manzungu, et al, 2010) 
• Before the arrival of European settlers in the 1830s, people lived on the higher plateau and mountains slopes 
which enjoyed better soils and rainfalls than the lower plain which, moreover, was infested with tse tse fly and 
malaria. The elevation also allowed for watching enemies, like the Swazis, coming. The traditional farming 
system was agro-pastoral with a clear distribution of roles between men (preparation of land for cropping, 
breeding of livestock) and women (in charge of the crops and domestic tasks). The plots close to the rivers were 
occupied first. Cattle grazed on communal lands and were protected at night in the family kraals. 
• 1830: Louis Trichard one of the leaders of the Great Trek stayed in Trichardsdal on his way to find a trading 
route between the Highveld and Delagoa Bay (now Maputo). These first contacts with Africans were friendly. 
 • Gradually relations turned sour with increasing competition for fertile and well watered land. From 1850s, 
European colonisation started.  European farms (mainly cattle breeding) expanded on the more fertile and better 
watered lands included the Sekororo area. Black population was increasingly forced into taxation and labor 
provision. 
• After the 1st world war, in 1920, a number of British settlers formed the Officers Colonial Land Company 
(OFCOLACO) and started farming. After several attempts of livestock farming and various crops and the 
collapse of the company, land was purchased by individual farmers who opted for tropical fruit production 
(mangoes, paw-paw). They built a first irrigation canal from the Selati River with the support of government. 
The irrigation system was run successfully until severe droughts of the 1960s. The basis of inequitable economic 
relations between African population and white settlers, which later become the core of the economic and 
political power of the apartheid system, was put in place: easy access to land and water resources for white 
farmers, abundant and cheap labor provided by black populations. However, contrary to other regions like 
Sekhukhune land and countries outside South Africa, this area did not provide many migrant workers to the 
mining industry in the Highveld. 
• The Land Acts of 1913 and 1936 further reinforced the exclusion of black Africans from access to land, as they 
were assigned to a limited portion of the country, the reserves. After 2nd world war, war veterans were given 
land in the area and started orchards of mangos, bananas, and vegetables. Black inhabitants provided agricultural 
labor organised through black foremen, under harsh conditions. 
• In 1948, the new government of apartheid introduced the department of agriculture and water affairs as well as 
the conservation department, under which the “betterment policy” demarcated land into residence, cultivation 
and pasture zones for Africans. Hillside farming was forbidden, and so did the cutting down of trees and 
cultivation near river beds. Some white farmers left and forced removal of people from different tribes and 
origins (Sotho and Shangaan speaking people) started, resulting in the weakening and even destruction of the 
social fabric. Increasing population on a limited land quickly resulted in over exploitation of natural resources 
(overgrazing, depletion of water). Land was allocated by traditional authorities (and sometimes formalized in 
writing through a Permission to Occupy) 
• In the mid 1950s, impoundments were constructed across rivers and streams to hold water for irrigation and 
domestic use in the adjacent white areas. This marked the intensification of irrigation schemes in the area. With 
the powers of allocating water in the government‘s hands, water provision to black farmers was considerably 
limited and often frequently interrupted. 
• 1960s: creation of the Selati Irrigation board, which was assigned powers and functions in accordance with the 
1956 Water Law. A new canal was built with government support and water allocation made to 12 white 
properties (total scheduled area of 998ha). 
• 1970s: Creation of the Lebowa homeland, which was the most important one in Transvaal. Farms in the Selati 
catchment were bought by the South African Development Trust for the purpose of consolidating the Lebowa 
homeland, some of them being leased back to white farmers in the meantime. New black immigrants joined 
existing villages and Shangaan-speaking people were forced to move to a new homeland, Gazankulu. All these 
displacements caused major tensions among the population. 
• In 1984, proclamation of the Lekgalameetse Conservation Area on the Drakensberg escarpment. In 1986, 
extension of Lebowa homeland, eviction of some white farmers. The Lebowa government started to build 
electricity and domestic water supply infrastructures. 
• The election of a democratic government in 1994 brought about considerable relaxation of the rules inimical to 
the development of the black population. Control over land and water management loosened with withdrawal of 
people previously employed to manage land and water. As a result, cultivation on the mountain slopes for short 
term food crops; tree felling and cultivation near riverbanks increased. Irrigation schemes were no longer 
maintained. Land claim and restitution process were and are still translated into the settlement of new emerging 
farmers, supported by the new agricultural policy. 
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Agricultural productivity is hampered by poor soil quality, meager water resources and 
inadequate water infrastructure development.  The soil types are sandy loam to loamy 
sand and are generally poor and highly susceptible to erosion. The main stable income 
source constitutes pensions and welfare subsidies from the government, with small-scale 
rainfed and irrigation subsistence agriculture providing a significant part of food 
requirements in good rainfall years (Magombeyi and Taigbenu, 2008).  The following 
paragraphs and tables provide analyses of resource access in the four villages where the 
study was conducted. 
 
Table 5.1: Number of households and total population in four villages in the Sekororo 
area 
Village Total number of households Total population 
Enable 459 2 756 
Lorraine 1 445 8 667 
Sofaya 515 3 089 
Worcester 186 1 115 
Total 2 605 15 627 
Source: Maruleng Municipality IDP Review 2005/2006. 
 
Table 5.2 below summarizes the socio-economic characteristics and categorization of the 
households in Sekororo.  There are variations in wealth status across villages, as the 
highest number of wealthy households (Bahumi), 73, is in Lorraine village, Sofaya had 
23, Enable had 8, and Worcester has 2.  Most salaried people, especially public sector 
employees such as teachers, nurses, extension officers and local government employees 
reside in Lorraine and Sofaya villages.  On the other hand, the poor and poorest 
households are predominantly in Worcester and Enable villages.  It is important to 
highlight that most wealthy/rich households do not necessarily have larger livestock 
heads than the Magareng and Bahloki groups, although they tended to have bigger pieces 
of land.  It would seem livestock is not considered as a symbol of wealth by the most 
affluent households unlike the middle and poor sectors of society. 
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Table 5.2: Household Characteristics in Sekororo (B72a and B72c23) 
 
Wealth Ranking Cluster 
(and income sources) 
Livestock Land Access to water Main Cash income 
source 
Participation 
in local 
institutions 
Bahumi (rich/wealthy): own 
and drive expensive cars, 
and big houses. Some own 
shops and Bar Lounges.  
Chiefs also belong to this 
cluster. 
Hardly have 
cattle, when they 
do they often 
have less than 5, 
some goats, 
several chickens.
Arable land 
ranges from 2 
to 40 ha, 
irrigated 
homestead 
garden 
Private borehole, 
tap inside the house 
and yard, more than 
5000 litre storage 
or roof-top water 
harvesting 
tank/container, 
water vending  
Salaries, business 
enterprise, savings, 
pensions. 
Rarely 
involved in 
local level 
institutions 
except for 
offering 
support to 
candidates of 
their choice 
Magareng (middle/working 
class e.g. teachers, nurses, 
and extension officers): 
largely depend on salaries. 
Some have cars. Most 
Indunas fit this group. 
Have more than 
10 cattle, few 
households also 
have goats and 
chickens.  
Arable land 
ranges from 1 
ha to 2 ha, very 
few have 
homestead 
gardens 
Tap inside yard or 
within 100 metres, 
2000 litre rooftop 
harvesting tank, 
multiple 210 litre 
storage containers, 
water vending 
Salaries, savings, 
pensions. 
Hold key 
positions in 
both ward and 
village 
committees, 
often as 
chairpersons. 
Are seen as 
better 
representatives
                                                 
23 Three of the four villages chosen for the study Enable, Lorraine and Sofaya are located within the 
quartenary B72a, while the fourth village, Worcester is located in B72c. 
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Bahloki (the poor): depend 
on social grants, RDP-style 
houses (four rooms). 
Have less than 6 
goats, less than 
four donkeys, 2 
cattle, and 
several chickens 
1 acre to 0.5 ha 
cropping land, 
member of 
community 
gardens,  
CSP24 often 
200metres away, 
river/stream, 
multiple 25 litre 
containers for 
harvesting/fetching 
and storing water, 
Social grants, piece 
jobs such as 
security guards, 
vending and farm-
labour 
Actively 
participate in 
local 
institutions and 
contest for 
positions, often 
elected as 
secretaries, 
treasure etc. 
Bahlokihloki/Badidi/Badits
ana (the very poor): depend 
on piece jobs such as 
digging toilets, herding 
cattle, house-cleaners 
Only have a few 
chickens 
1 acre cropping 
land, member 
of community 
garden 
CSP often 
200metres away, 
river/stream, less 
than 5 x 25 litre 
containers for 
harvesting/fetching 
and storing water. 
Social grants, piece 
jobs such as 
digging toilet-pits, 
herding cattle, 
house-
keeping/cleaning. 
Very active in 
targeted 
government 
and donor 
funded 
projects, often 
as beneficiaries 
and 
representatives 
of beneficiaries
Source: Own primary field data 
5.3.4. Access to domestic water, and infrastructure for domestic 
water supplies 
Domestic water infrastructure in the four villages includes communal stand pipes (CSPs), 
boreholes; rainwater harvesting tanks (see Table 5.3).  The quantity of water used by a 
household is related to number of water sources, the quality or state of infrastructure, and 
the attendant institution mandated with the oversight for handling water issues. Table 5.3 
shows the quantities of domestic water that are consumed in the four villages.  The most 
common sources of water vary depending on the village.  A yard tap connected to DWAF 
system is a common source in Sofaya.  Communal standpipe (CSP) is the main source of 
water in Worcester, whilst the river is the mostly used source in Enable.    
                                                 
24 CSP: Communal Stand Pipe, used generally to refer to public communal taps. 
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Table 5.3: Summary of infrastructure for domestic water supplies in Sekororo 
Village Infrastructure Condition/status of 
infrastructure 
Management oversight
Enable 12 Communal stand pipes (CSPs) Bad: only 5 functional, 
maintenance required 
Water 
committee,induna 
4 private boreholes Good Individual/household 
1 communal borehole (supplies the 
reticulation line) 
Good: erratic diesel supplies for 
the pump 
DWA/Maruleng 
municipality 
2 concrete storage tanks & 
reticulation line 
Bad: leakages, blockages & 
vandalism common 
DWA/Maruleng 
municipality 
2 jojo tanks Good: Not yet in use DWA/Maruleng 
municipality 
264 rooftop harvesting tanks Good: some require attention Individual/household 
Lorraine 61 private boreholes Excellent: fully utilised & 
maintained 
Individual/household 
21 CSPs Bad: only 3 functional. 
Maintenance & system upgrade 
needed 
Water committee, 
induna 
3 boreholes Good: only 1 functional DWA/Maruleng 
municipality 
1 steel storage tank & one concrete 
tank & reticulation line 
Bad: leakages, blockages and 
vandalism common 
DWA/Maruleng 
municipality 
Sofaya >276 yard taps Fully utilised & good state Water 
committee/induna 
<8 CSPs Fully utilised & good state Water committee 
4 concrete tanks & reticulation line Good: maintenance challenges DWA/Maruleng 
municipality 
Canal Good: but badly needs 
maintenance 
Irrigation 
committee/LDA 
Worcester 11 CSPs Bad: only 8 are functional, need 
maintenance 
Water 
committee/induna 
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24 jojo tanks & reticulation line Bad: only 8 being used. 
Maintenance required 
DWA/Maruleng 
municipality 
2 boreholes Bad: only 1 being utilised, diesel 
supplies sporadic 
DWA/Maruleng 
municipality 
 
Source: Own primary field data and (Manzungu et al, 2010) 
The quantity of water used by a household is related to number of water sources, the 
quality or state of infrastructure, and the attendant institution mandated with the oversight 
for handling water issues. Table 5.3 shows the quantities of domestic water that are 
consumed in the four villages.  The most common sources of water vary depending on 
the village.  A yard tap connected to DWAF system is a common source in Sofaya.  
Communal standpipe (CSP) is the main source of water in Worcester, whilst the river is 
the mostly used source in Enable. A number of households ask for water from neighbours 
who in some cases sell this water to them especially in Lorraine village where public 
communal standpipes and yard taps do not work well and households are obliged to use 
alternative sources. Hence it is not surprising that obtaining water from water vendors is 
the most common source for households in Lorraine, where households reported that they 
buy water for R1 for a 25litre container and some pay R15 per 250litre container of 
water.   
  
Domestic use is used here to refer to household uses such as cooking, drinking, cleaning 
and bathing.  Note, most households in Sekororo do not have flushed toilets. 
 
Table 5.4: Overview of domestic water use in Sekororo 
Water availability Village Litres/head/day % satisfied with
water quality 
Scarce 
 
Enable 31 10.3 
Worcester 19 3.3 
Abundant Lorraine 20 46.7 
Sofaya 19 70.0 
Source: Own primary field data  
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In Enable people obtain most of their water from the river and from rainwater harvesting 
rooftop tanks because of the unreliability of the reticulation system. The highest per 
capita water consumption in Enable was however compromised by the fact that the water 
was of poor quality as attested by only a tenth of the respondents approving its potability. 
In Sofaya the per capita consumption was low despite a reasonably well functioning 
reticulation system because a third of the village was not connected to the reticulation 
system. Due to the fact that water is physically relatively abundant, people invested in 
infrastructure to connect their own yard taps to the main reticulation line for an average 
connection fee of R150 (once-off payment).  In Lorraine the public water reticulation 
system is almost non-existent owing to vandalism and neglect. The village depends 
entirely on the 61 privately owned boreholes.  Despite the existence of private boreholes 
the rather low per capita consumption in Lorraine indicats intra-village variability as most 
households donot have boreholes. The low perception of water quality is because some 
households supplement the water they purchased from the borehole owners (vendors) 
with water from the river. In Worcester, except for the two days per fortnight where and 
when the communal stand taps yield water, almost the entire village depends on water 
from the stream and stream-bed dugouts, and it is of poor quality.  It is important to note 
that per capita water consumption fell below the recommended consumption of 50 litres 
per day (Gleick, 1999).  It should be noted however that domestic water use is more than 
consumption. 
 
Except for private boreholes almost all the water sources are considered to be unreliable 
in the greater Sekororo. Even households with private taps connected to the main 
reticulation line cannot have water supply at all times hence their reliance on multiple 
sources for water. Respondents ranked sources of water from the worst to the best based 
on quality and distance to the source. The source of water is positively and significantly 
related to the water quantity and multiple uses, where as indicated earlier, those with yard 
taps, and those with private boreholes enjoy multiple uses of water at their disposal.  
There was a positive relationship between household income and access to private taps, 
boreholes, water quantity, and multiple uses. Households that have higher incomes can 
afford to have private taps and hence have higher water consumption.  It is not conclusive 
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why there is no single household with a private borehole in Worcester village.  
Explanations provided seem to point towards the general prevalence of poverty within the 
village, which ranks as one of the poorest in both socio-economic terms and water 
availability and access terms.  The high prevalence of private boreholes in Lorraine is 
also another notable exception. During group interviews and discussions, it was 
explained that most people employed by government reside in two villages, Mertz and 
Lorraine, hence, they were able to afford to invest in boreholes and pumps. There were 
also stories of selling cattle to raise money for the purchase of boreholes. Generally, 
households with higher incomes can afford to have better access, exposure and 
affordability to technologies such as pumps, boreholes and storage facilities.  
 
Levels of participation in construction, operation and maintenance of public 
infrastructure varied from one village to another.  In Worcester village, there was a 
remarkable contribution in both cash and labour in construction because of the high 
dependency on the few public community stand pipes. In Sofaya, labour contributions 
were also high in digging the trenches for the connections from the reticulation line to 
yard taps.  Each household was required to contribute labour. Failure to contribute to one 
aspect of the different phases (of communal infrastructure) did not seem to curtail the 
rights of those who failed to participate due to kinship ties and weak enforcement by the 
authorities. In general there is a willingness to contribute to maintenance of infrastructure 
that people depend on. 
5.3.5. Public and Private Investments in Water Infrastructure and 
Technologies 
5.3.5.1. Public communal investments 
This section documents the dynamics of local investment in water infrastructure by 
communities in Sekororo. It provides evidence of local initiatives in developing 
infrastructure for domestic, crop production and other productive uses. The examples that 
are given include situations where people initiate things by themselves, adapt public 
schemes and use government and NGO-supported infrastructure. Table 5.5 shows water 
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infrastructure that is also used for productive purposes. In this case investment is not 
limited to physical artifacts –it also includes investments in time. 
 
Table 5.5: An Overview of water infrastructure in Sekororo  
Water 
Resources 
Village Own 
Infrastructure 
Public/NGO infrastructure 
Scarce 
  
Enable 4 boreholes 264 roof-top harvesting tanks 
(RHTs),12 CSPs, 1 borehole, 
and 3 storage tanks 
Worcester 0 2 boreholes,4 storage tanks, 11 
CSPs, 
Abundant 
  
Lorraine 61 boreholes, 7 
pumps, 1 furrow 
56 ha abandoned scheme, 3 
CSPs 
Sofaya 276 yard taps 72 ha abandoned25, except 5 ha 
WV supported,2 boreholes,3 
storage tanks, drip kits 
Source: Own primary field data 
 
As explained under the domestic water uses, the table shows that where there is physical 
water availability, people invest in infrastructure.  It is important to note that some of the 
infrastructure is used for both domestic and productive water use.  As water is needed 
everyday for basic domestic consumption, frequency of supply, reliability of supply, 
nearby fall-back options, and distance of water source is very important for households 
and a good indicator of the quality of water services. Supply of water, reliability of 
supply and distance determines how water is used and stored for multiple uses.  People 
with access to year-round reliable supply of water within short distances engage in more 
multiple uses and use more water than those without reliable supply, and have to cover 
longer distances to the water sources. Only 61 households in Lorraine and 4 in Enable 
reported that water is available to them everyday and at all times owing to private 
                                                 
25 This refers to the unutilized 72 ha irrigation scheme owing to the withdrawal of subsidies by the 
government. 
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boreholes. 276 households in Sofaya, all with yard taps, have access to water every day 
for limited hours. Most of the households in Worcester and Enable have access to water 
from the reticulation line (through CSPs) twice per week.  However, during the wet 
season, 264 households in Enable have water available to them everyday and at all times 
due to the prevalence of roof-top water harvesting tanks that were funded by World 
Vision. As a coping strategy, they store harvested water and maintain access to other 
multiple sources of water like vending, the communal stand pipes from the reticulation 
line and rivers.  Water harvested is usually reserved for use during the dry season. Based 
on the frequency and reliability of supply, Sofaya has the best water access whilst 
Worcester has the worst owing to a limited number of water sources, and infrequent 
supply from the CSPS.  The next section (section 5.3.5.2) provides detailed examples of 
the various self-initiated investments observed and documented in Sekororo.  
 
All the 120 households which were surveyed reported that they store water in containers 
ranging from 20 litres to 7000 litres in capacity. This is mainly because the frequency of 
supply of water is poor for most of the villages and they say that this is sometimes 
attributed to bursting of pipes and other infrastructure failures. There is lack of water 
security, people are not certain about the times of water supply as they sometimes go for 
periods sometimes lasting up to three weeks without piped water in Enable, and 
Worcester, and up to one week for Lorraine. Only Sofaya is relatively water secure, 
because people hardly go for more than three days without piped tap water. Most people 
in the Bahloki and Baditsana/Bahlokihloki categories report that they use the 25 litre and 
250 litre containers to store water. A household has on average 6 small containers (20-
25litre) and 2 big containers (200-250litres) for storing water (i.e., a storage capacity of 
520 to 650 litres, 87 to 108 litres per person). This is enough water to cover basic needs 
of 25l/person/day if water comes every five days or twice a week, but not enough if they 
stay without water for a week. Only 7% of the population reported that they have jojo26 
tanks and these have a capacity ranging from 1500litres to 7000litres. These large storage 
                                                 
26 Jojo tanks are green plastic containers of various sizes that come with an inscription “Jojo” from the 
manufacturer. 
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containers are primarily owned by households with boreholes and/or are wealthy (the 
bahumi).  
 
5.3.5.2 Self-initiated Investments 
a. Pump schemes  
Self-initiated pump-schemes are found in Lorraine village.  Pump-scheme is used to refer 
to farming system where motorized water pumping is applied to draw water for irrigation. 
There are seven farmers who abstract water for irrigation from Makhutswe River using 
privately acquired pumps. The pumps are shared with eight other farmers for which they 
are required to contribute labour for moving pipes as well as fuel for the pumps. The total 
area that is irrigated by the 15 farmers is 36 ha. Irrigated plot sizes range from half 
hectare to 7 ha with 1.2 ha being the average.  Some of the farmers with irrigated plots 
across the river also own plots within the Lorraine irrigation scheme, a public-funded 
scheme which has fallen into disuse (see below).  Apart from investing in the pumps, 
piping and fuel, farmers have also to invest in land clearing.  No hired labour is used for 
operating the pumps. The man transports the pump using a wheel barrow from the 
homestead to the plot and vice versa whenever irrigation is undertaken. Purchase of fuel, 
checking fuel levels and carrying out general maintenance is the responsibility of the 
male members of the household.  Female members mainly engage in weeding, 
transplanting and harvesting crops.  Crops grown include maize, tomatoes, beans, carrots, 
sweet potatoes, beetroot and spinach among others. 
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Insert/plate 5.1: Direct abstraction of water from Makhutsi river for irrigation in 
Lorraine. Source: Own primary field data 
The right to water conveyed by the pumps is related to the investment made. As one 
farmer put it, “If you did not provide for it, invest in it, you therefore cannot measure it or 
levy it, let alone license it”27.  He qualified his statement by explaining that most of the 
farmers struggled to raise money to buy the pumps and pipes for irrigation without 
external support, hence such farmers exercised full control regarding the ownership and 
usership rights.  In these contexts informal law prevails. According to the farmers the 
state should not and could not be allowed to levy or license the farmers’ use and 
enjoyment of their sweat, because it (the state) did not provide the infrastructure. To 
safeguard their interests farmers did not readily provide information relating to their 
irrigation activities. Although ownership and entitlement to the water conveyed is 
exclusive to the investors, actual usage is shared with those close in social circles such as 
kin, good neighbours and friends. However, they are required to make one form of 
contribution or another, especially through financial payment for fuel used by the pump. 
 
                                                 
27 Personal communication December 2008 
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b. Boreholes 
As noted earlier private boreholes are only found in two villages. In Lorraine there were 
61 boreholes while Enable had three.  In Lorraine village water is used for backyard 
gardening, car wash, and water vending.  Boreholes in Enable are also used for backyard 
gardening.   Reasons for investment in boreholes were given as insurance against general 
water scarcity due to both natural and dysfunctional local institutional arrangements, and 
as a form of social security. For some few respondents the investment was precipitated by 
problems they faced as new entrants in the villages where they were often given the last 
priority as new comers, or no connection as infrastructure was already built, hence 
problems of new connections in an existing scheme.  
 
Insert/plate 5.2: Borehole pumphouse and storage tank, and drip irrigation in Lorraine 
 
Areas irrigated by each household on their backyard gardens vary in size from 5 x 10 
metres to 8 x 15 metres.  Most households with boreholes in Lorraine village have drip-
kits for their backyard gardens which they bought (the kits) from a local agricultural 
warehouse in OFCOLACO.  The motivation behind the usage of drip-kits seems to be an 
effort to minimise the electricity costs for the borehole pump.  Crops grown in backyard 
gardens include onions, tomatoes, rape, cabbage, beetroot, beans and peas.  Most 
backyard gardens are operational for the greater part of the year except during the rainy 
season when rainfed maize is planted, in which case supplementary irrigation is required. 
Households with boreholes and backyard gardens do two to three crops per year.  The 
other benefits derived from borehole investment is sale of water, where people without 
boreholes paid 50 (South African) cents up to early 2008 and R1 from August 2008 for 
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20/25 litres of water.  The charges are meant to offset the electricity bill for the borehole 
pump, which have increased due to increases in ESKOM tarrif charges.  
 
c. Rainwater harvesting 
A case in point of individual hydraulic property creation, through water harvesting and 
storage, is that of a brick-making enterprise in Enable village. This was illustrated by one 
individual who invested in a brick making machine at a cost of R11 400, a run-off 
harvesting tank with a capacity of 10000 litres, and twelve 200litre drums. He has three 
employees to make bricks for sale.   The three labourers make an average of 480 bricks 
per day where each brick costs R1.20.  During the dry season, the entrepreneur uses his 
truck to fetch water from the river using the 200litre drums three times per week.  Like 
elsewhere, investing in this infrastructure ensures exclusionary ownership and usership 
rights over both the water conveyed and the products realized. 
 
d. Off-river gravity furrow irrigation 
The off-river gravity furrows are found in Lorraine village and are used on land in the 56 
ha formal gravity irrigation scheme which became derelict after 1994 when the state 
withdrew subsidies. The scheme was abandoned because farming had become too costly 
without subsidies.  The other important reason was that the management committee failed 
to get the scheme running.  
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Insert/plate 5.3: Off-river weir, furrow and irrigated plots in Lorraine 
 
A group of 12 villagers (9 women and 3 men) resuscitated irrigation of their plots by 
investing in a new furrow (see insert 5.3).  They each own 0.4 ha and collectively work 
on 4.8 ha, where they grow an assortment of crops including beans, vegetables, tomatoes, 
sweet potatoes under (flood) irrigation between May and August.  The furrow is locally 
known as megero28. The resuscitation of furrow irrigation began with the initiative of 
three women and one man, and then the group grew to 21 before some of the members 
dropped out after failing to honour the requirement to contribute labour for digging and 
cleaning the furrow.  The main costs incurred by the furrow irrigators included labour for 
the initial digging of the furrow and building the impoundment across the river.  Digging 
                                                 
28 Megero is plural for furrows. 
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the furrow was primarily done by men while the laying of stones, earth and the plastic 
sheet on the ridge of the impoundment was done by both men and women.  Furrow 
maintenance (cleaning up) is primarily done by women on a rotational basis.  This is 
where the importance of control is demonstrated.  Members are physically present all day 
in rotation to ensure those who did not contribute do not use the water, and to guard 
against vandalism by livestock.  It is mainly women who spent most of the time in the 
field as watch persons.  The farmers involved have a working informal arrangement 
where if members do not participate in the maintenance works or such other duties as 
required of them, such members would not be allowed to access water.  The general 
oversight for dispute resolution and rule enforcement rests with the induna for the village. 
 
The main challenge the farmers face is water scarcity due to competition for water from 
the pump-irrigators. The upstream furrow irrigators were accused of diverting the whole 
stream/river flow to the detriment of the downstream pump-irrigators.   The problem 
between the furrow irrigators and the pump-irrigators was solved amicably after one of 
the furrow irrigation members became creative by perforating the plastic sheet on the 
impoundment to let some flow go through.  This eased the tensions between the two 
groups.  There is hardly any technical and financial support available from the state for 
this group of farmers.  Both the furrow and pump irrigators face huge water scarcity 
issues owing to the massive diversions by upstream white commercial farmers.  When 
asked if they was any dialogue of effort to channel or communicate with the upstream 
white commercial farmers, one of the pump irrigators responded using an analogue thus 
“…we, the small scale down stream farmers are like the leaves at the tip of the tree, and 
the white commercial farmers are like the trunk and branches of the tree…we are 
powerless, we can not do anything to them”.  It would seem that there is a general 
unwillingness to engage with- or fear of - white commercial farmers. 
 
e. Hillside cropping in Sofaya 
There is a rapid increase of farmers abandoning their plots in the 72 ha Sofaya irrigation 
scheme to clear land and farm on the mountains in Sofaya village.  The patches of land 
cleared for cultivation on the hillside are hardly accessible except for one gravel road 
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used to ferry farm produce back to the village.  There were more than 35 farmers 
involved from three different villages practicing hillside farming.  On the hillslopes 
facing Sofaya village, only villagers from Sofaya and Mahlomelong are allowed to farm 
there.  On the other side of the mountain, people from other villages also have plots. Box 
2 shows a typical story. 
Box 5.3. Narratives of hillside farmers 
The three male farmers introduced us to five more farmers, three females and two males. 
We staged our first “group meeting” with the farmers as almost an incidental event.  All
the eight hailed from Sofaya village, and all have irrigation plots allocated to their
households, either directly to them or as heirs to their parent’s plots.  The farmers were 
motivated to move and farm on the mountains for various reasons ranging from
uncoordinated farming management in Sofaya, government interference, withdrawal of
government support, lack of enough water to irrigate, vandalism of crops by livestock, to 
high costs of inputs such as fertilizer and hiring of tractors for ploughing.  In the hills the 
farmers do not use fertilizers and tractors, hence the production costs are much lower
rendering hillside farming more favourable and lucrative compared to the derelict 
irrigation scheme.  They did not have to ask for anyone’s permission to have access to
the pieces of land they have.  As one of them put it “…if you have the energy to clear the
land and work the land, all you do is work on it”. 
Source: Own primary field data 
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Insert/plate 5.4: Hillside farming in Sofaya  
 
Plot sizes on the mountains range from 0.2 ha to 1.6 ha.  The crops grown on the 
mountains are not irrigated.  The mist and morning fog help cushion the crops from the 
dry-spell often experienced during the rain season. The total irrigated area falls between 
10 and 15 ha29.  The main cost incurred by the farmers was land clearing, sometimes with 
help from others on rotational basis.  Crops grown on the mountains include maize, sweet 
potatoes, pumpkins, beans and other cash crops.  Farmers do two crops per year, with 
maize and sweet potatoes during the rain season, and beans immediately after the maize 
harvest.  Yields from mountain farming are reportedly much higher than on the irrigation 
scheme.  Farmers report harvests of between one and half to 5 tonnes per ha per season. 
   
Farmers on the mountains have full control of the pieces of land they work on, which 
they unequivocally call “our land” as opposed to their abandoned plots on the irrigation 
                                                 
29 This is a rough estimate, it can be a little more or less, we were not given the opportunity by the guards 
and plotholders to visit all the plots. 
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scheme often sited as “government land”.  They were clear that on government land, they 
had very few liberties on what to do, and there was hardly any attempt to attend to 
farmers’ problems on time, unlike the mountain plots where they enjoy full ownership 
and usership rights.  The farmers allege that many people are not interested in farming on 
the scheme because there is no support from government anymore, and when support 
does come, it is piecemeal and often comes a little too late for the farmers.  On the 
mountain plots, however, farmers use donkeys for cultivation, and sometimes resort to 
hand-hoeing especially for the second crop in the season, a much cheaper and sustainable 
option for them. 
5.3.5.3. NGO-assisted activities 
a. Irrigation in Sofaya 
World Vision helped to fund a group of five women to irrigate a 1.5 acre piece of land 
within the 72 ha greater Sofaya irrigation scheme.  The name of the project is 
Ikarameleng30.  The support was in form of a fence (within the main perimeter fence) of 
the Sofaya irrigation scheme, ploughing using a tractor and inputs such as fertilizer and 
seed.  It also included drilling of a borehole and construction of two underground brick 
and concrete storage reservoirs. The Limpopo Department of Agriculture (LDA) also 
contributed by providing and installing ‘ready made, high pressure drip kits, some of the 
highest quality on the market.  The group won the local municipality women’s group of 
the year for two successive years, and came third on the district municipality competition.  
Produce from the plot is sold both within Sekororo and as far afield as Pretoria and 
Johannesburg with support from WV. Crops grown range from groundnuts, rape, 
tomatoes, maize, beetroot, spinach, carrots, sweet potatoes to beans, onions and cabbages.  
The drip-kits from the LDA were in derelict state for almost a year and parts of the kits 
were burnt.  The women removed the kits and resorted back to flood irrigation.  The point 
to underscore here is that Ikarameleng still gets water from the main canal, hence the 
underground water reservoirs built with funding from WV are meant to be an exclusive 
buffer for the project members only, and not other farmers within the greater Sofaya 
irrigation scheme. 
                                                 
30 Loosely translated, it means ‘Respond for yourself or by yourself’. 
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Insert/plate: 5.5: Irrigation canal and irrigated plot at Sofaya Irrigation scheme (top), 
and donated fence by World Vision to a group of women (bottom) 
 
Although World Vision made an effort to assist some farmers, the 0.6 ha plot is really a 
drop in the ocean for the expansive 72 ha scheme.  The total irrigated area for the whole 
scheme in 2006-2007, 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 cropping seasons was less than 5 
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hectares.  Many farmers complained of high costs of production, lack of coordination 
among farmers, water shortages and crops being vandalized by livestock.  On the other 
hand, livestock owners, some of whom are plot holders in the scheme, counteract by 
arguing that if people do not want to cultivate their plots, they will not stop using the 
uncultivated parts of the scheme as grazing pastures for their livestock, and the unused 
water from the overnight storage dams within the scheme for livestock watering. 
 
b. Water harvesting and borehole irrigation 
The most outstanding examples of roof-top water harvesting storage are found in Enable 
village, where more than 250 households invested in rooftop-rainwater-harvesting storage 
tanks with financial and material assistance from World Vision. The tanks were 
constructed using brick, cement and concrete to harness rain water from rooftops of 
houses.  The beneficiaries were selected by World Vision staff in consultation with local 
leaders31.  The tank sizes range from 2000 to 7000 litres in capacity.  Water from the 
tanks lasts up to six months on average from the end of the rain season into the dry 
season, depending on priority of use and size of household.  Water harvested is used 
regularly during the rain season and is saved for important household uses only from 
February onwards.  The owners of the tanks have exclusive entitlement to the water 
harvested and stored.   
                                                 
31 It was highly politicized during and after the implementation owing to the central position of one of the 
WV staff members who also happen to command a lot of respect within some religious denomination, with 
allegations rife that most of the beneficiaries were from that religious group. 
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Insert/plate 5.6: World Vision funded rooftop harvesting tank in Enable.  The number 
264 stands for the 264th beneficiary from the World Vision funded project in the village. 
 
The intervention by World Vision prompted other villagers who did not benefit from the 
project to invest in their own tanks as well.  Many preferred to purchase the cost-effective 
and reliable plastic tanks, commonly referred to as jojo tanks.  In the other three villages, 
there is a higher prevalence of jojo tanks than brick and concrete ones although not as 
many compared to Enable.  Poorer households (without external intervention) rely on 
smaller storage containers such as 210 litre containers and numerous smaller 20/25 or 30 
litre containers to keep up with the erratic and unreliable (and sometimes chaotic) water 
supply services. 
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Insert/plate 5.7: Jojo tanks for communal water supply in Worcester.  The tanks are 
owned and managed by the Maruleng local municipality and the DWA regional offices at 
the Oaks. 
 
In Enable, Sofaya and Worcester, World Vision supports groups of women and men with 
water access through provision of water pipes, building of water storage tanks and 
fencing equipment.  This exogenous intervention in the three villages delineates between 
those who benefit and those who cannot benefit from the project, it is not necessarily 
public in the sense of all the village benefitting nor is it private.  The Worcester Garden 
Project (WGP) has a membership of 33 households, with a committee to oversee use and 
management of members’ activities as prescribed by the funder.  World Vision funded 
the drilling and equipping of a borehole, built a concrete storage tank (about 10000litres 
capacity) and a 7500 litre jojo tank to irrigate one acre of land subdivided into rows. Each 
household within the Worcester garden project was allocated five rows measuring 5 
metres in length and 8metres in width where they can grow crops of their choice.  The 
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total irrigated area for the Worcester project, just like the Enable one, is almost 0.6 ha.  
Crops grown in the two ‘projects’ include tomatoes, onions, rape, cabbage, maize, 
spinach, carrots and beetroot among others.  The produce is mainly for household 
consumption with some managing surpluses to sell. 
 
Water conveyed by the borehole and stored in the tanks is for access by project members 
only.  Project members cannot use such water for other purposes such as domestic uses 
and livestock watering, not even in extreme times of scarcity.  October 2007, there was 
no water in Worcester village for three weeks and yet water was available at the WGP, 
and no one used that water to meet their domestic use needs, not even the committee 
members.  The project committee, in liaison with both the induna and the village WC 
enforce such control measures.  This compliance might be attributed to the general 
extreme scarcity of water in Worcester.   
 
5.3.5.4. Common threads in local investments: Individual and group 
rights 
A number of common threads can be picked up from the cases that have been described 
above.  These threads relate to the connection between individual investments as it relates 
to the community within which the individual finds himself/herself. First it is clear that in 
Sekororo there is evidence of willingness and ability to invest in water infrastructure and 
related activities such as land clearing, for example. The investment was found to vary 
according to the socio-economic status of the individual/household and water availability 
as well as from village to village. The main private financing arrangements available 
include each or a mix of savings, sale of livestock, pensions and grants, and retirement 
funds.  A notable examples is one where a farmer took out a soft loan from a bank to 
have a borehole drilled and equipped at his home for a total cost of R36, 000 and another 
farmer sold his three oxen to purchase an R9000 water abstraction pump, while some 
women used their welfare grants from government to pay for usage of pumps from other 
farmers to cover fuel costs.  One couple intimated that they paid between R1,250 and 
R2,500 per hectare for land clearing. Most households estimated that they took between 
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one and two months to get the job done.  Fencing the land was another important 
development cost and was estimated at R 1000 per hectare.32  Each borehole owner has a 
storage container to which water pumped from the borehole is stored.  The containers 
vary in size from 5000litres to 10000 litres with a cost of between R3400 to R 580033.  A 
5000 litre jojo tank costs R3400 whereas a 10000 litre tank costs R5800. 
 
Exclusiveness of property rights generally varied with ownership of the infrastructure and 
the type of security such as fences that curtail others from accessing the resource, yet 
sharing of both water for irrigation and domestic uses is not uncommon under social 
arrangements organised along kinship, friendship and religious lines where reciprocal 
relations exist.  In other instances, such as access to private boreholes, the relationship is 
that of patron and client or buyer and seller where anyone can access water provided they 
are able to pay the R1 per 25 litres of water required by the borehole owners.  Although 
sharing is common within villages, it is remarkable that there is no sharing of water 
between and among villages even under instances of severe shortages, hence one’s 
geographical location determines and sometimes restricts their access to water.  The 
physical boundaries separating each village from the other act as resource access 
boundaries, where no member from another village, regardless of their relations with 
members from neighbouring village, are simply not allowed to access water from 
‘communal/public’ systems despite being close.  This also applies to daughters who 
married in other villages (out from their village).  It requires further research to explore 
reasons for this. 
5.3.6. Institutional Arrangements and Access to Water 
There are different committees and structures for the different villages, and within 
villages.  Some individuals are found in more than one committee. Villagers may elect 
the same people into different committees.  In Worcester, some members are nominated 
by the induna, where such nomination became a vote of confidence that spurs the 
individual to perform better as they are obliged to avoid embarrassing their nominator.  In 
such cases, nomination becomes highly significant and much more valued than being 
                                                 
32 From focus group discussions held in Lorraine December 2008. 
33 Estimated costs provided by the respondents 
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elected by compatriots.  Private water source institutional arrangements are products of 
reciprocity i.e. social networks of actors created through the family, kinship ties, and 
good neighbourliness extend to include patron-client relations where one sells and others 
purchase a commodity (water).  NGO supported committees might not necessarily have 
the legal backing or clout enjoyed by both the traditional and modern authorities, hence 
they draw their allegiance from the people due to the material and financial support they 
provide which are time bound and dependent on donor support.  When NGOs withdraw 
support, these committees lose their vibrancy like what happened to some water 
committees when Mvula Trust left Sekororo. 
 
Insert/plate 5.8: Worcester water committee meeting July 2007 
 
Table 5.6: Villagers’ perceptions of water-related institutions 
Category Structure Constitution Perceptions Mandates/Comments 
Traditional 
Authorities 
Induna Lineage 
nominee/hereditary 
Very active Land, water, livestock, woodlands 
and pastures 
Chief Lineage 
nominee/hereditary 
Very active Land, water, livestock, woodlands 
and pastures 
Local 
government  
District 
municipality 
Elected Active Water supply, infrastructure 
investment 
Local 
municipality 
Elected Active Water supply, investment in 
infrastructure, maintenance 
Ward  Elected (councillor) Active  
Government 
department 
DWA Appointed Active  
LDA Appointed Active  
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NGOs  Sekororo 
Water Supply 
by Mvula 
Trust 
elected water
committees 
Active during 
Mvula presents 
& inactive after 
NGO left 
Provision of infrastructure and 
capacity building support. 
Heralded the formation of water 
committees in Sekororo 
Worcester 
Garden 
Committee 
Elected committees Very active Provision of infrastructure, setting 
up committees, and other support 
Enable Garden 
Committee 
Elected committee Very active Provision of infrastructure, setting 
up committees, and other support 
Sofaya 
Women’s 
Group 
elected water
committees 
Very active Provision of infrastructure, setting 
up committees, and other support 
Interest Groups NAFU Elected Dormant  
Matsivo 
Savings Group 
Voluntary 
subscriptions 
Active Moral and material support for 
livelihoods and during bereavement
Source: Focused Group Discussions (field data) 
 
Committees are defined as active when they: have meetings; solve problems, collect fees, 
enforce sanctions, and fulfill public obligations. 
 
Local level institutions’ survival highly depends on the trust local people have in them as 
a direct consequent for meeting their needs and interests.  Institutions such as traditional 
authorities tend to be more accountable to the people as compared to formal and modern 
institutions such as the municipality and Department of Water (formerly department of 
water affairs and forestry).  Traditional authority therefore tends to be more popular at the 
local level despite their (traditional authorities) own frailties in dealing with the 
messiness of minute power issues (see Table 5.6).  The Department of Water and the 
local municipality tend to emphasize the management of water, a specific resource, while 
the traditional authorities and attendant informal institutions appear to be there to manage 
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social-relationships that influence different actors’ access to an array of natural resources 
that include land, woodlands and water.  This gives traditional authorities a holistic 
approach to resources management unlike the ‘formal’ institutions that tend to be sector 
oriented.   
 
Public supported infrastructure collapsed in three of the villages leading to private 
initiatives re-inventing part of the schemes through individual initiative with or without 
help from external agencies.  There is a diversity of rules regulating access to public 
infrastructure, where most of the communal infrastructure such as CSPs, boreholes and 
tanks are considered to be the property of the municipality and department of water, and 
only those two entities are associated and burdened with the day-to-day maintenance and 
control of the infrastructure.  Yet in terms of access to water conveyed by the 
infrastructure, the rules of access tend to vary according to village.  Despite all the 
challenges, private investors still share water conveyed by their pumps with other farmers 
and villagers through social (informal) arrangements that exist among the farmers. 
 
Although traditional authorities generally base their power on the benevolence of their 
subjects to follow their leadership a closer analysis in Sekororo (and elsewhere e.g. 
Mzingwane in Zimbabwe), showed chiefs and indunas re-align themselves with 
organisations and institutions perceived to bolster their positions.  For example, one 
narrative has it that the Blyde initiative to bring water to the greater Sekororo villages is 
aptly named the Mametja-Sekororo Regional Water Scheme after canvassing by the 
paramount chiefs Sekororo and Mamejta to the municipality.  Yet the counter-narrative 
by the chiefs indicate that it was the municipalities (district and local) that realised the 
indispensable character of the traditional authorities, hence the recognition by naming the 
new scheme ‘Mametja-Sekororo’.  By naming the grand water supply project after the 
chiefs, they portrayed the traditional leaders as key elements in the project, despite the 
fact that they played very low-key roles.  Keeping and updating the village register is 
another instrument of power, and key in managing and controlling people’s use ofnatural 
resources such as water and land.  In cases where one negotiates with the induna to have 
siblings or spouse working away from the village for more than 12 months registered as 
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ordinary resident, whose interests are represented on a daily basis,   this is used to either 
inflate or deflate the status of the induna, and of the households in question in 
maintaining the key networks in place. 
 
Local level structures are often made up of the same individuals, operating in different 
capacities in the different structures.  There is a maze of institutions in Sekororo dealing 
with water issues. There is often no formal definition and communication of which 
organisation should be doing what yet a closer analysis reveals that rather than being 
independent entities, local level structures are often made up of the same individuals, 
operating in different capacities in the different structures.  For example, all the indunas 
are either directly involved in the different committees in their village, or they appoint or 
nominate a representative.  This renders conflicts in objectives and interests of different 
organisations neutralized by having the same individuals sitting in the various committee 
structures, yet this also is the reason why some committees are not meeting.  Kinship ties 
in Sekororo influence who holds what positions especially in water committees, project 
committees and civic committees.  Examples include the Worcester induna who 
nominated one of his relatives to the water committee; and the World Vision garden 
project where the NGO appointed some members of the garden project without going for 
elections only to turn out that two appointees are related to some WV staff.  Both the 
traditional and modern authorities find themselves having to deal with cases of 
adjudicating in an environment of growing resource scarcity.  Actors shift their allegiance 
from one institution to another as part of the strategies of ensuring security of resource 
access.  Institutions that bring quick responses and benefits at a particular time get the 
most favours and NGOs become very handy in this regard. 
 
While the local municipality and department of water may survive and thrive owing to 
the legal backing by formal legislation statutes such as the Water Services Act, indicators 
on the ground point towards huge challenges of infrastructure vandalism which might 
render the modern institutions to become shadows of what was intended of them, unless 
traditional leaders are made an integral part of the monitoring system.  Conflicts relate to 
the legitimacy of certain traditional leaders in the community owing to past claims to 
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particular positions and confrontations.  For example, in Enable village, the induna faced 
resistance when he tried to impose participation by all villagers in some traditional 
rituals.  Some villagers did not attend nor participate citing their religious beliefs.  This 
apparent defeat of the induna prompted widespread disregard and lack of respect for the 
leader.  Yet, during our survey, we observed that the induna in Enable village is named as 
the main and best placed authority to settle water issues in the village.  This makes it 
difficult for villagers to challenge the traditional authorities publicly but resort to passive 
resistance techniques. 
5.3.7. Scope and Implications: Infrastructure Investments and 
Productive Uses 
The above cases documenting the dynamics of local investment in water infrastructure in 
four villages in Sekororo area raise the important question of what does this all mean for 
the wider South African society.  As indicated in the methodology section the four 
villages were carefully chosen to represent the different water situations that are found in 
the Sekororo area. Between them the four villages account for 28% of the total number of 
households and population in the greater Sekororo area. Statistically this is a 
representative figure of what happens in Sekororo.  We limit our extrapolations to 
investments in productive water use because this makes it possible to compare with state 
initiatives meant to assist individuals and groups of farmers to invest in water 
infrastructure as reflected by investments in irrigation schemes. In domestic water supply 
it is accepted that the state will directly invest in water infrastructure. As can be seen 
from Table 5.6 there was a positive correlation between water availability and 
investment. In water scarce villages although people engage in infrastructure investments 
for water conveyance, harvesting and storage, what they use the water for is very limited 
to primarily domestic uses and small backyard garden irrigation.  It is also significant that 
it is in the water scarce villages that we see little private investment. The cross-cutting 
common thread is that where and when water resource availability as well as access and 
supply is assured, people are willing to embark on larger-scale productive uses, beyond 
their domestic needs.   
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Table 5.7: Number of households irrigating specified area in Sekororo 
Average 
irrigated area 
(ha) 
Enable (Water 
Scarce1) 
Lorraine 
(Water 
Abundant1) 
Sofaya 
(Water 
Abundant2) 
Worcester 
(Water Scarce2) 
<0.002 5 0 48 18 
0.05 1 4 0 0 
0.2 0 1 3 0 
0.4 0 0 6 0 
1 0 1 0 0 
 
The data also raises issues that pertain to regulation. As can be seen from Table 5.7 the 
proportion and number of households tends to be larger for small irrigated areas and vice 
versa.  This has practical implications regarding how the regulation of water use for these 
categories of farmers can be implemented.  Depending on the thresholds that are agreed 
upon the administrative burden can increase or decrease. Efforts to legislate the numerous 
small quantity users, whether for productive uses or otherwise, would involve dealing 
with thousands of applicants/clients. If the focus is restricted to the real huge water 
quantity users, the process will not only be feasible but also avoid the tedious and 
messiness of dealing with too many insignificant water users.  This underlines the 
importance of correctly focusing the implementation of Schedule One use, General 
Authorizations and licenses so that these are responsive to the needs and demands of 
informal water users, who, as we have demonstrated in this chapter, are willing to invest 
in water infrastructure. Such an approach can help alleviate the high poverty levels. 
Unfortunately the current approach of seeing and hearing no evil about Schedule One use 
and General Authorisations, while it may appear to provide sufficient leeway for informal 
water users is counterproductive as illustrated by the reluctance to issue community-wide 
authorizations. This is a policy position that needs to be clarified. 
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Table 5.8:   Distribution of irrigated area as a proportion and number of households in 
Sekororo, extrapolated for all households in Sekororo 
Size (ha) % villages No of households 
<0.002 69 7 728 
0.05 5 560 
0.2 4 458 
0.4 6 672 
1 1 112 
Source: Own primary field data, and Manzungu et al (2010). 
 
For both domestic and productive water use there is a need to revisit the institutional 
arrangements so that they respond to issues on the ground.  For example with regards to 
domestic water supply while state law apparently is accepted and adopted through the 
local municipality, DWAF and allied government departments, provisions and confirmed 
by the integration agreement between the municipalities and DWA,  new rules and the 
new institutions are renegotiated and reinterpreted in the context of already existing 
norms and institutions. The composition of most water committees, managing communal 
infrastructure, reflect the significance that traditional leaders and their families place 
upon them in the wider struggle over property rights.  In all private connection to the 
main reticulation line in Sekororo, the chiefs have been actively consulted, paid a 
connection fee ranging from R150 to R260, and were among the initiators of the 
refurbishment of the water infrastructure. They were also instrumental as mediators and 
adjudicators where and when members of a communal property venture have disputes. 
With regards to productive water use we see some of the institutional actors that are 
relevant in domestic water supply and new ones such as the Limpopo Department of 
Agriculture. There was an overlap between DWA, Limpopo Department of Agriculture 
and the local municipality in terms of service provision, dispute settlement, and 
leadership control.  This puts and/or leaves chiefs in a powerful position. The institutional 
deficiencies illustrate that it is not physical scarcity that is the problem. In the Sofaya 
irrigation scheme land and water were not scarce and yet the 72 ha scheme lay idle with 
people preferring to go up the mountain to cultivate. During group discussions most 
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people were tired of the “collective” or “communal” blanket recommendations that the 
Department of Agriculture was keen to impose. In such circumstances the Department of 
Agriculture would have better served by consulting the cultivators. But that by itself 
would not have been enough. The Department of Water Affairs would also have been 
better served by opening up channels of communication with the cultivators with a view 
to making the cultivators form a water users association as provided for in the law.  This 
has not happened in Sekororo, where DWA officers insist water for productive uses is the 
responsibility of the Department of Agriculture, and vice versa.  From our evidence, it 
would seem that DWA is responsible only for domestic water supply in Sekororo, while 
the Department of Agriculture is responsible for productive uses. 
5.4 Conclusions 
Most wealthy/rich households do not necessarily have larger livestock heads than the 
Magareng and Bahloki groups, although they tended to have bigger pieces of land.  It 
would seem livestock is not considered as a symbol of wealth by the most affluent 
households unlike the middle and poor sectors of society.  It is also wealthier households 
that tended to have access to private boreholes. 
 
Although public water schemes are formally designed for one single-use, they are 
invariably used for other non-planned uses as well such as canal water being used for 
multiple uses by households in Sofaya village. Water agencies may try to prevent this as 
‘illegal’, usually in vain. This bias towards single water uses, as reflected by the apparent 
single focus on domestic water supply by DWA at the local level in Sekororo, and solely 
water for productive uses by the Department of Agriculture is anchored in administrative 
sub-sectors according to single uses, so the domestic sub-sector, irrigation sub-sector, and 
livestock sub-sector.  
 
The chapter also showed that households with better water access in terms of good 
frequency and reliable supply, as well as short distances to the water source tend to have 
higher water consumption levels, and for multiple uses.  In contrast people in water 
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scarce villages, where water supply is infrequent and unreliable, tend to restrict their 
water uses to domestic uses. 
 
Traditional leaders play an important role in managing water resources owing to their 
power in managing the allocation of land.  Hence, despite efforts to democratise resource 
management at the local level through elected councillors, traditional leaders seem to 
remain more relevant.  The prevailing perception amongst people in Sekororo seems to 
point towards favourable ratings for traditional leaders as better enforcers and arbiters in 
local water disputes compared to the ad hoc and often fragmented interventions by the 
different and competing local and national government agencies. 
 
There are dynamic local investments in infrastructure development initiatives in 
Sekororo.  Most of the initiatives are self-funded through personal savings, sale of 
livestock, and pension grants.  On the other hand, there are numerous NGO and 
government supported interventions such as rainwater harvesting tanks, fences and drip-
kits.  The overall conclusion is that support for infrastructure investment in water 
development is essential and should be scaled up in order to maximize benefits for the 
majority of rural poor households. 
 
There are various water committees at the local level in Sekororo, yet there is no direct 
and clear linkage with intermediate institutions such as municipalities, where linkages 
exist, they are often weak and do not account to the constituent of water 
users/stakeholders.  This leaves a huge operational void in terms of both scaling up and 
out of the institutional structure.  There are several options including formalising existing 
traditional committees.  
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CHAPTER SIX:    Hydraulic Property Rights Creation in 
South Africa and Zimbabwe – A 
Conceptual Analysis 
6.1. Introduction 
The research results presented in chapters four and five focused on patterns and processes 
of investments in water infrastructure and the creation of property rights in Gwanda and 
Sekororo.  There are striking historical parallels between colonial- and apartheid-era 
policies and practices on rural governance of resources and contemporary government 
planning in the two research sites.  This chapter provides conceptual and analytical 
insights on how the dynamic processes played out in South Africa and Zimbabwe 
(presented in chapters four and five) can be understood within the broader property rights 
and institutions debates.  Mainstream institutional approaches and arrangements for water 
governance in South Africa and Zimbabwe barely address the arena of water governance 
and civil organization below those of large-scale bureaucratic units created by 
governments at sub-national levels.  Local government has not effectively penetrated 
downward into this landscape with their bureaucratic structures, their incursions into it 
being unenforceable and frequently appropriative. Given this vacuum in effective 
bureaucratic institutionalism, rural populations have had to rely on management forms 
which derive in large part from their pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial heritage of 
communalism, with a shift in the locus of decision-making from centre to periphery, and 
vice versa.  Recent scholarship has pointed out major deficiencies in any simplistic 
programmatic application of this assumption.  It isolates the local from larger societal 
structures; assumes local homogeneity in the face of manifest differentiation; is 
ahistorical; ignores power relationships; and tends to be overly determinative. In the light 
of these critiques a social constructionist stance is adopted which regards institutions as 
being highly dynamic and flexible, subject to constant manipulation by individuals or 
interest groups for their own instrumental purposes.  It is this dynamism, negotiation and 
interplay of stakeholders that necessitates a broader and closer analysis of the role 
investments in property rights creation play in mediating access to resources. 
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The concept of hydraulic property rights creation is used here to elaborate and critically 
analyse the role of investments in communal and private infrastructure and the resultant 
property rights regimes and institutional arrangements that emerge.  The concept places 
the locus for institutional development and rights creation firmly in the province of local 
collectivities themselves (the resource users); it is they who have the prerogative and 
power to seek centripetal consensus to counter the centrifugal tendencies of sectional 
interest.  This is with regards to users in both public and private investments.  The 
concept also entails understanding the existing patterns of rights and their embeddedness 
in social, political and economic institutions.  For people to make effective claims 
requires a number of complementary strategies and conditions often manifested in social 
relations and identities, where existing rights as claims are legitimised by social 
structures and norms.  The mere designation of rights alone is not enough to ensure their 
realisation.  Communities in Gwanda and Sekororo developed hybrid forms of rights 
which are neither typically communal nor exclusively private.  Hydraulic rights consist of 
a bundle of collective and individual rights which can be categorized as: ‘group rights, 
project rights, communal rights, and private rights’ which are often guided by normative 
plural arrangements.   
 
As highlighted in Chapter 1 and subsequent chapters, hydraulic property rights creation is 
defined as the process of establishing recognized claims to water of certain quantity and 
quality on a particular site at certain timings (Coward, 1989; van Koppen, 2009; 
Manzungu et al, 2010). Making investments in the physical infrastructure to abstract, 
store, and/or convey water and, thus, create such use value of water in terms of quantity, 
quality, site and timing, is the single most important ground for vesting claims to water 
conveyed. Others who have not contributed to the investments can be excluded, although 
this is lesser the case for all those needing drinking water and for household and 
community members. Investments may be individual (like investments in small pumps or 
homestead wells), or communal (like village reservoirs and irrigation furrows). Processes 
of hydraulic property rights creation may be entirely ‘endogenous’ (or ‘local’ or 
‘informal’), with claims recognized at the local level by communities, or they may 
depend upon government, formal NGOs, or other outsiders (publicly supported or 
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‘exogenous’). In the case of public investments, governments who build the systems can 
exert claims, but the public constructors mostly expect users to take up at least part of the 
investments in operation and maintenance, as a (pre-) condition for their formal 
entitlement to the water conveyed. Lack of clarity on such hand-over and lack of other 
needed support may lead to a process of ‘hydraulic property rights extinction’, where, 
water could physically be made available, but nobody exerts claims.  Hydraulic property 
rights creation is useful in this analysis informed by the broader significance of 
institutional arrangements and water investments for the evolution of resources 
governance in Southern Africa and Zimbabwe as demonstrated in chapters four and five. 
  
This chapter explores the process of property rights creation which may be entirely 
‘endogenous’ (or ‘local’ or ‘informal’), with claims recognised at the local level by 
communities, or they may depend upon government, formal NGOs, or other outsiders 
(publicly supported or ‘exogenous’).  The emphasis underscored here is that the very 
notion of property is a human construction and not a natural “occurrence”, thus property 
arrangements set the rules concerning how people relate to one another with regard to 
water (land and technologies).  The chapter also highlights how property can be altered as 
and when new ideas come into play, re-shaped in response to novel and innovative 
technologies.  Finally, they can be re-done when political or economic power shifts 
within the contextual environment and society involved. There is emphasis on the notion 
that property situations contain multiple property forms and are not always mutually 
exclusive (private taps/boreholes are private in ownership, with various accesses 
negotiated with others, and does not necessarily imply exclusive usage).  Several forms 
of property may co-exist in a given place, where each property alternative is constructed 
and maybe changing in reaction to one another and to other factors.  The ability of some 
actors to select the arena of law, custom, or convention that will favour their objectives 
(forum shopping) invokes the importance of political-economic and cultural forces 
beyond the legal sphere that determine who can use law, custom or convention, when and 
for what purposes.  Within this access terrain, the notion of property is located as one 
aspect of factors in a larger array of institutions, social and economic-political relations 
and strategies that shape benefit flows.  In this sense, access analysis requires attention to 
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property as well as illicit actions, entitlement relations, networks and the histories of 
these factors.  The next sections will provide material evidence and analysis to 
demonstrate and underscore the issues highlighted above. 
6.2. Access, Infrastructure and Investments: Implications and 
Observations from Sekororo and Mzingwane 
Analysing water (and other resources’) access in Sekororo and Gwanda involved a three-
tier process that started with identifying and mapping the flow of benefits from the 
different water sources by individuals, households, and groups within the community.  
The second phase entailed identifying the mechanisms by which different actors involved 
gain, control, and maintain the benefit flow and distribution.  The final stage anchored on 
an analysis of the power relations and networks informing the mechanisms of access 
involved in situations where and when people obtained water within the villages. 
 
A salient feature in the two chapters is the co-existence and hybridisation of different 
forms of rights which combine private, project (often donor funded), family based and 
village based forms of water governance.  Government agencies in Sekororo and Gwanda 
do not have the resources to fulfill their managerial mandates and need to incorporate the 
services of the broader rural populace, often through multiple entry-points inter alia 
traditional leaders, local committees and networks.  Rural households in these 
circumstances, in-place and beyond the effective control of government, are the real 
arbiters of environmental destiny and should be given the proprietorship role that this 
position dictates, beyond mere stewardship. Although these structures seem localised, 
informal and far removed from state driven set-ups; they are not mutually exclusive and 
immune to internal and external influences such as new technology, laws and policies 
that apply at the regional and national levels, let alone the globalised discourses on 
natural resources management, and scholarship.  
6.2.1. Rules of access, rights and enforcement of sanctions 
Rules of resource management guarantee not only a sustainable mode of utilization but 
also guarantee equal chances of access for all members of a community.  The existence of 
 
 
 
 
 174
a differentiated set of rules makes it fairly easy to decide if somebody contravened 
established norms and standards.  For example, the existence of acknowledged civic 
committees, water committees, chiefs, private owners, and local government structures as 
accepted institutions making and enforcing decisions on communal management of 
resources makes it possible to establish and sanction transgressions.  But how does this 
apply in Sekororo and Gwanda?  Rules of access for communal resources and their 
enforcement varied from village to village as much as between Sekororo and Gwanda.  In 
Sekororo, rules of access for communal resources in the four villages are presented in the 
paragraphs below, followed by evidence found in Gwanda. 
 
Some rules for water access in Sekororo include: i). first come first serve basis, ii). each 
person is allowed to fill-up a maximum of four 25litre containers at a time, iii). containers 
larger than 30 litres are not allowed, iv). if more than one person from the same 
household is in the queue, the other household members should join the rear of the queue, 
v). no illegal connections. These rules are conceived by water users (especially women), 
water committees and the Department of Water Affairs (DWA).  Application of the rules 
varies and are interpreted and perceived differently by the stakeholders across villages.  
For example, in Enable, a person can fill up all their containers, regardless of size before 
others have their turn, while in the drier parts of Sofaya village, households that footed 
the bill for maintaining communal water infrastructure set access rules to restrict usage.  
A good example is where one woman moved the CSP within her homestead and only 
allows access to other villagers between 6am and 6pm, where only ten neighbours are 
allowed access anytime of the day, and there is compliance.  The most outstanding 
observation was when the municipality water truck delivered 4000litres of water in 
Enable and all the water benefitted only two households who were first in the queue.  
They brought a number of large containers each with a maximum storage of 210litres, to 
collect water from the municipality water tanker.  To move this water to their homes, 
they used smaller 25litre containers and wheel-barrows.    Claims abound of how some 
households manipulate the system by conniving with the truck drivers to notify them of 
any impending deliveries, what time it will be made and the place.  That information 
gives one an edge over others, and often benefits the politically powerful and the socially 
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well-connected, far from the rhetoric of equal access.  The subversion of the rule on 
quantities in Enable was necessitated by the failure of the induna and water committee to 
sanction the first violators of the rule, hence water access from both CSPs and municipal 
truck has turned out to be open access (organised) anarchy as illustrated above.  The 
village of Enable is also notorious for illegal connections to the reticulation line, with 12 
such connections observed and recorded owing to the lackluster performance of the WC, 
induna and inaction by DWA after numerous complaints.  Sofaya, in contrast, has enough 
water to provide for other villages downstream, for example there is a pipe which crosses 
Sofaya to supply Tickey Line. However, because of political conflict, villages cannot 
agree on sharing water.  Sofaya village gets water from streams in the mountain, which is 
stored in 5000litre and 10000litre reservoirs that feed into the reticulation line. More than 
70% of the households in Sofaya have yard-taps, a privilege compared to Enable and 
Worcester.  There are huge variations within the four villages in Sekororo in terms of 
water availability, its frequency, and the rules that govern and regulate access. 
 
Enforcement of the rules and regulations vary across villages for communal property 
rights.  Worcester village is the driest village in Sekororo, and that’s where maximum 
enforcement of rules is observed especially by the users.  As the participants at the focus 
group discussion in Worcester clarified “It is not about the water committees enforcing 
sanctions or dealing with violators, it’s about the people who feel the pain of water 
shortages defending their rights, men and women who queue to get water.  If we don’t 
stand up and fight for what belongs to us…no one will”. The water committee (WC) in 
Worcester is quite active and effective. Its actions made an impact on the decision to set 
up new tanks and standpipes in the village.  Coordination between municipality and 
DWA, the two key water service delivery and enforcement units, is not easy. 
Representatives from the two departments can sit together in a meeting but when it comes 
to implementation every institution is doing its own thing. There is acknowledgement 
that there is a big rift between DWA and Maruleng municipality in the region generally 
characterised by mistrust, resentment and suspicion, where DWA members strongly feel 
that the municipality water services department should be integrated into DWA and not 
the other way round.  DWA is still the water services provider in the area.  According to 
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the law the municipality is responsible for taking care of the reticulation and use of water, 
not DWA. DWA is only responsible for filling up the tanks and maintaining the 
infrastructure.  The main narrative from DWA is that the municipality does not and is not 
planning properly and heavily under-resourced.  Hence, it does not help much to integrate 
the local DWA functions into the municipality water services division.  Rather, it is the 
municipality water services division that was supposed to be integrated into DWA.  The 
counter-narrative as succinctly presented by key members of the municipality points 
towards differences between political promises made by elected officials and concrete 
service delivery issues and targets as lived and practiced.   
 
Owing to the lack of integration and separation of duties and responsibilities between 
DWA and the municipality, many residents of Sekororo kept asking the same question 
thus “If operation and maintenance of existing infrastructure is questionable and liable to 
neglect and vandalism with existing infrastructure, what guarantee is there that the 
Sekororo-Mametja water supply project (pipes and accessories) will be treated 
differently?”.  A closer analysis reveals that the challenge in Sekororo is not the lack of 
infrastructure but rather there is lack of; capacity and coordination to maintain what is 
there, and the ability to synchronize institutional efforts by fragmented and competing 
sectors.  This analysis concurs with findings by Mvula Trust (1999) where they observed 
that although government was able to silence its critics by stating that three million 
people had received water (post-1994), it placed too much emphasis on the physical 
infrastructure such as taps and pipes.  Not enough emphasis was placed on the 
sustainability of these projects (Van Wyk, 2001).  The counter argument provided by 
both DWA and the local municipality is that infrastructure vandalism has been a way of 
protest in the fight for democracy; hence, communities still believe that vandalism is an 
option to have their voices heard.  They often cite lack of community education and 
mobilisation as the main cause without taking reflective and self-introspection of the very 
institutions that are responsible for water service delivery.  There seems to be concerted 
efforts by government departments and allied agencies to always pass on the blame to 
someone or some other institution. 
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In Gwanda, the majority of the communal infrastructure, especially boreholes, small 
dams and deep wells were funded by NGOs and local government (both pre- and post-
1980) with villagers making contributions through labour, materials and cash as 
presented in chapter four.  Several NGOs facilitated and funded the (construction and) 
rehabilitation and provision of water services in Gwanda.  Private investments in 
infrastructure in Gwanda confer and guarantee exclusionary rights to the investor, 
although there is a general norm of sharing private water sources with kin and neighbours 
within the local networks.  The tendency and trend in Gwanda, like elsewhere in 
Zimbabwe, and as also shown earlier in Chapter 4, (see Derman and Hellum, 2003, 2005;  
Derman et al, 2007; Nemarundwe, 2003; Matondi, 2002) is for private owners of water 
resources to allow access for drinking water to kin and neighbours regardless of them 
having exclusionary rights.  The feature that water is essential for life and perceived as a 
‘God given good’ discourages exclusive rights over water and acts as a normative sanction to 
encourage sharing away from issues of who invested what. People who deny others access to 
water for cooking and drinking are often regarded with disdain and fall short of being labelled 
umthakathi (witch, plural is abathakathi).  As indicated earlier, there is a stated belief and fear 
that denying others access to water for cooking and drinking purposes will result in privately 
owned sources being poisoned and or vandalised (Nemarundwe, 2003). These interactions and 
social relations serve to increase access to water sources that are privately owned although 
increased access is less common when it comes to other uses like gardening and brick making. 
Many of the households with gardening water sources would argue that the water is enough 
for their gardens only. 
 
Thus, while rules and regulations for accessing water can be propelled by stakeholders, 
WCs, indunas, chief, district councils, municipalities, NGOs and governmental agencies; 
the very same rules are negotiated and undone by corruption; political networks and 
powerful alliances with and within the community and the state (see also Bolding, 2002; 
Mehta, 1998; Cleaver, 1998).  Such unbundling and violation of rules tends to undermine 
and dissolve communal rights and serve the interests of those with privileged access to 
political power and strategic information.  People may create ‘new practices and 
institutions’ to take care of what the custodians of the rules and regulations could or 
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should have done.  The events observed in Gwanda and Sekororo suffice to illustrate this 
point.  One distinctive phenomenon observed in the two research sites is that access to 
communal water sources is geographically-bounded. In Sekororo, communal 
responsibility has been redefined where the ‘community of users’ has been reduced to 
inhabitants of one village. As stated earlier, only members of a village can access such 
resources, and there is non-negotiable access for non-village members (including 
daughters married out to neighbouring villages, from their own village), yet in Gwanda, 
although there are certain restrictive measures in place that delineate access by village, 
access to water for drinking and cooking is not denied anyone, even if they are not from 
the village in question.  These activities do not proceed according to fixed rules; rather, 
they have an ad hoc character.  Therefore the institutions governing resources under such 
circumstances cannot, as Douglas (1985) and Mosse (1997), argue, be merely viewed in 
terms of individual economic costs and benefits as espoused by much conventional 
institutional theory.  They argue (Douglas, 1985; and Mosse, 1997 in Mehta et al 
1999:30) that such views do not make room for the fact that material interest cannot be 
separated from social relationships, or for the fact that natural resources management also 
proceeds out of shared assumptions concerning issues such as justice, fairness and 
reciprocity.    
 
Cleaver’s (1998) research in Nkayi district in Zimbabwe reinforces the view that 
institutions governing water management are opaque, flexible and contingent.  
Conventional institutional theory would have us believe that most water management 
practices take place through formal bodies such as water committees. Cleaver’s research 
findings, as with our findings in Gwanda and Sekororo also demonstrate and/or suggest 
that most of the action concerning water takes place outside the formal realm in the 
context of the daily practices of everyday life and through regular forms of social 
interaction mediated by existing social networks.  The management rules portrayed here 
are not undisputed and are actually changing over time, gradual in some instances and 
rapid in other instances.  Berry (1993:104) observed that “People’s ability to exercise 
claims over land remains closely linked to membership of social networks and 
participation in both formal and informal processes”.  This social and political 
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negotiation over resource rights means that people are not operating simply as individuals 
independent of context; they are social actors engaged in processes of negotiation with a 
wide range of social and political implications.  In consequence of people’s continuous 
investment in the ‘means of negotiation as well as the means of production’ (Berry, 
1993:15) ‘rural institutions often operate as arenas of negotiation and struggle, rather than 
as closed corporate units of accumulation and resource management’ (ibid:20-21), as is 
conventionally assumed.  Thus property rights regimes are characterised by; often 
ambiguous rules, flexible membership of organisations (unlike state and NGO pro- and 
pre- scriptions), and overlapping and contested boundaries. 
6.2.2. Sectoral fragmentation in water governance: narratives and 
counter-narratives     
According to the Water Services Act (WSA) of South Africa, the municipality is 
responsible for taking care of the reticulation and use of water, not DWA. DWA is only 
responsible for filling up the tanks and maintaining the equipment such as boreholes and 
storage reservoirs.  This has often led to allegations and counter-allegations between 
DWA and the municipality.  The DWA narrative claims the municipality is not planning 
properly and is inherently inefficient.  The manager of DWA at the Oaks claimed “I’ve 
never seen a project put in place by municipality from A to Z which works and is 
sustainable. They invested in storage tanks and boreholes without testing the water or 
purchasing the pumps.  Municipality is even failing to pay the electricity bill. They have a 
tank that they used only for funerals. ‘Why should I have to die to get water? Maybe I 
died because I was thirsty”.  The counter-narrative is that the municipality claims that it 
wants changes and is keen to re-allocate water for multiple uses, and not only for 
domestic uses, yet the DWA seems less interested apparently because it wants water to 
remain in the same hands.  There is a strong belief within the municipality that there is a 
big difference between political promises and concrete service delivery issues, where 
water service delivery falls within the municipality’s mandate.     
 
The on-going Sekororo-Mametja regional water supply scheme meant to ease water 
problems has already created some antagonism between the two government 
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departments.  According to DWA, the infrastructure, planning, financial and capital costs 
for the project are the sole responsibility of the municipality.  DWA will only take over 
the operation and maintenance of the project after the construction and installation by the 
municipality. The water services technical manager at Maruleng municipality asked a 
poignant question, thus: “If operation and maintenance of existing infrastructure is 
questionable and liable to neglect and vandalism, what guarantee is there that the 
Sekororo-Mametja water supply project (pipes and accessories) will be treated 
differently?”  A closer analysis reveals that the challenge in Sekororo is not lack of 
infrastructure but rather a lack of capacity and coordination to maintain what is there, and 
the ability to synchronize institutional efforts by fragmented and competing sectors.  It 
also becomes apparent that the new structures and institutions (DWA and municipality) 
are not necessarily new in terms of water management; rather they are more pronounced 
as new institutions of power.  In light of the above, and pursuant to hydraulic property 
rights creation, the questions arises, who safeguards the property, DWA or municipality?  
The answer lies in the cooperation and/or smooth integration of the two institutions. 
 
In Gwanda, the battle-ground is often between and among elected leaders, hereditary 
leaders, project leaders (usually NGO-supported) and war veterans.  The designation of 
some boreholes as single purpose water sources (i.e. gardening or livestock watering or 
drinking) and the selection of beneficiaries for NGO-funded projects brought the multiple 
institutions involved in water management to a confrontation.  The true characteristics of 
some of the institutions involved, and the roles they claim to have in water governance 
are better illustrated by the conversation or should I say confrontation at a focus group 
discussion (FGD) of local leaders in Ward 17.  The Rural District Council (RDC), 
represented by councillors has the primary responsibility of water supply and sanitation 
in rural Zimbabwe.  Discussing resource access at the FGD, the councillor vehemently 
remarked: “I am a legitimate leader, elected and backed by the majority…am the official 
representative of the people in this ward.  The chief and headmen assist here and there 
but their role is not representing people to government and on development issues.  So 
you cannot come here in this ward and talk to people without my knowledge or 
permission”.   The headman of Fumukwe village responded, in sarcastic fashion, thus 
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“…we are the custodians of the land on behalf of both the dead and the living.  In this 
village, no one except the chief, headmen and sabhuku can and has authority to allocate 
land without consulting us.  How does one claim to be a leader of the people when they 
do not have anything to give?”   The VIDCO chairman, often representing interests of 
party politics weighed in with the councillor in claiming (and legally so) that land 
belongs to government.  War veterans, although not an institution renowned for resources 
management, often take opportunistic chances to either veto or violate standing norms 
and practices.  The management of resources in Gwanda is about how people negotiate 
their situations for accessing water.  The primary institutions that play instrumental roles 
are those with access to power especially war veterans.   
 
The war veterans have on several occasions managed to revoke some decisions made by 
NGOs in selecting beneficiaries for nutrition garden projects without much resistance 
owing to their excessive use of force that sometimes culminates into outright violence.  
For example, World Vision selected beneficiaries for a nutrition garden in Ward 17.  The 
NGO supplied and funded the beneficiaries with an equipped borehole, fenced garden 
land, cans for watering and hoes for cultivation.  Just a few days after the project 
commenced operation, war veterans challenged the selection criteria used by the NGO 
arguing that those selected to benefit tended to be overwhelmingly members of one 
political party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC).  They argued that this was 
done at the expense of members of the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front 
(ZANU PF).  Consequently, the war veterans unilaterally decided to add double the 
number of beneficiaries to the project in order to even out the numbers between the two 
political party members in the project.  Hence, war veterans have become a vocal and 
powerful institution in their own right.  The NGOs, the chiefs and headmen, and local 
government representatives often do not have the power to intervene.   
 
Most of the challenges and observations made in Mzingwane (and Sekororo) point 
towards the remnants of ‘invented traditions’ left by colonial rulers (Berry, 2002).  Berry 
(ibid) argues that far from disappearing with the end of colonial rule, invented traditions 
proliferated, complicating the relationship between popularity and legitimacy post-
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colonial.  Cognizant of these power-play dynamics, resource users in the four villages in 
Gwanda invoke multiple rules and appeal to more than one authority, creating space for 
negotiation and manoeuvre.  As Berry (2002:656) puts it, people continue to seek 
resources and influence through multiple channels, renegotiating relationships in the 
process.  Hydraulic property rights do not necessarily operate in isolation, but offer 
exclusionary rights which are socially negotiable in accessing resources to suit prevailing 
circumstances. 
 
Donor attempts to eliminate inequity and foster democratic and equitable access to water 
resources and associated benefits neglect crucial aspects concerning coping with 
resource-scarcity challenges.  Consequently, we have witnessed the proliferation of 
simplistic interventions for community management which override on-the-ground 
realities and undermine the flexible and dynamic character of local institutional 
arrangements, their dynamic responses to socio-cultural, economic and political contexts 
within which they are embedded.  What donor interventions have done, in part, and not 
withstanding some notable benefits observed in improving poor women’s and men’s 
access to water; is to try to implement cross-cutting measures that force inclusivity and 
democracy on society that is inherently heterogeneous and manifestly stratified in 
political, social and economic terms.  This has often led to half-measured success owing 
to the one-size-fit-all type of interventions, and the creation of new kinds of property 
(project rights) which produces fundamental changes in resource access.  Mixed 
experiences with donor intervention observed in chapters four and five illustrate this 
point.  The World Vision and government supported intervention in Sofaya irrigation 
scheme and the management of Worcester garden project in Sekororo; and the case from 
Mzingwane where war veterans contested the selection process of beneficiaries 
highlighted above are some of the illustrative examples.  
6.3 CONCLUSIONS 
Analysing the materials presented in chapters 4 and 5 allows the revisiting of the HPRC 
concept (Coward, 1986), and the dynamics that it presupposes and engenders.  It is clear 
from the analysis given in this chapter, that hydraulic infrastructure in semi-arid 
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environments is a key resource and often a pre-condition for livelihood security.  
Hydraulic infrastructure ties different people together, moreover, the the investment 
needed to develop water infrastructure often transcend the capacity of the individual 
irrigator or household, leading to multi-onwership arrangements.  Thus invariably 
complex productive practices, social interactions and economic transactions emerge 
around hydraulic infrastructure.  These interactions, if they endure over time and lead to 
patterned behaviour, in fact reflect the existence of institutions. 
 
It is generally true that instances of hydraulic property creation that are primed on private 
investment provide the investors with primacy in deriving the benefits of their 
investments as well as obliging them to take care of maintenance duties, this manifested 
in the general notion of normative sharing arrangements in both private and communal 
infrastrucuture for drinking water in the two countries.  Increased investments in land and 
water infrastructure leads not only to the intensification of the use of land and water 
resources, it also leads to more intense social relations.  It was observed that such 
relations became more asymmetrical in some instances. 
  
Other asymmetries which have been observed are to do with the kind of patronage that is 
wielded by different leaders on communal infrastructure.  We noticed that external 
intervention such as the drilling and equipping of boreholes, provision of fencing 
equipment and other inputs by NGOs in Mzingwane tends to lead not to property 
extinction as postulated by Coward (1986) but to hydraulic property reconfiguration, 
where a set of new leaders (war veterans; women etc) is added to the existent set of 
leaders.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN:  Institutional Networks, 
Bureaucracies and Hierarchies of 
Power for Water Governance in 
Zimbabwe’s Communal Areas 
 7.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides detailed results/answers to the following questions a). How and to 
what extend do existing policies and legislation that govern and regulate access to and 
control over water resources influence (and are influenced by) hydraulic property 
creation? What are the national policies on paper?  How are they operationalised?  How 
are they implemented in Mzingwane, if implemented at all?  How do they interface with 
practices? b). How and to what extend do prevailing formal institutional arrangements 
adequately address the informality of water use by the majority of rural small-scale water 
users? If institutions should serve a purpose, what purpose should they serve?  
What/which institution should be responsible for infrastructure development?  Are 
catchment management agencies and councils the appropriate vehicles for meeting the 
expectations of informal water users?; and c). How relevant and practical are single 
purpose and resource-specific institutions wrought by the water reforms such as 
catchment councils and management agencies for managing water resources at the local 
level where people use multiple institutions?  The chapter provides detailed accounts, 
cases and analyses of power dynamics and intricate interrelations between and among: 
the policies, legislation and frameworks governing natural resources; the existing and 
resultant institutional arrangements; and the nature property rights and investments take.  
Focus centres on how local government through Rural District Councils (RDCs), 
catchment and sub-catchment councils, government departments (veterinary, agriculture 
and lands, forestry) interrelate on policies, legislation and frameworks governing resource 
access and control interact with both the users (rich and poor, men and women, new and 
old residents) and other institutional structures (local networks, traditional authorities, 
elected leaders) in accessing, managing and controlling the resource.  The chapter 
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documents the dynamic processes of engagement, negotiations, contests, conflicts and 
sharing arrangements that exist. 
 
The main focus of this chapter is to address the policy implications emanating from the 
disjointed scale problem between local/regional institutional patterns and intermediate 
institutional structures such as sub-catchment councils, RDCs, local and district 
municipalities and other departmental agencies.  The key challenge this chapter addresses 
is how intermediate-level public/private/NGO support agencies for water development 
and governance build upon the strengths, while overcoming the weaknesses of informal 
water arrangements.  Related questions include:  How can new institutions for managing 
the new infrastructure become more robust and sustainable by tapping the strengths of 
informal water arrangements?  How can “project rights” to newly developed water (and 
often land) be allocated more equitably and efficiently to both women and men water 
users for domestic and productive uses?  Which public support is fundamental for 
catalysing informal infrastructure development and supporting more informal 
construction, operation and maintenance?  The chapter will endeavour to address these 
questions by presenting empirical materials from the Mzingwane catchment.  The next 
section presents background and context to the water reform policies and laws in 
Zimbabwe, and the implications and processes for the implementation of such policies 
and laws in practice.    
7.2. Background to national and intermediate ‘water-reform’ 
management institutions 
7.2.1. A synopsis of water governance laws and policies in Zimbabwe 
Catchment councils are established by the Minister of Rural Resources and Water 
Development34, in consultation with the Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA).  
ZINWA is a parastatal formed after the passing of the ZINWA ACT (Chapter 20:25) in 
1998.  The functions of ZINWA are to advise the Minister on the formulation of national 
policies and standards on water resources planning, management and development, water 
                                                 
34 The name of the Ministry has changed over the years but the duties of the minister responsible remain the 
same. 
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quality and pollution control and environmental protection, hydrology and hydrogeology, 
dam safety and borehole drilling and water pricing among others (Zimbabwe, 1998b).  
According to the Water Act (Chapter 20:24), it is the responsibility of the Minister to: 
 Fix the number of members representing water users in the river system who shall 
constitute the Catchment Council and the manner in which they are elected or 
appointed, 
 Assign a name to the Catchment Council, 
 Prescribe the procedure at the meetings by the Catchment Council in discharge of its 
functions, and 
 Fix the remuneration and allowances payable to members of a Catchment Council 
from funds allocated from the Water Fund. 
 
Catchment Councils on the other hand, are supposed to undertake several functions 
which include the following: prepare an outline plan for its river systems, determine 
applications and grant permits for water use, regulate and supervise the use of water, 
supervise the performance of sub-catchment councils, and resolve conflicts among water 
users (Zimbabwe, 2000a, Manzungu and Kujinga, 2002).  Statutory Instrument 33 and 47 
of 2000 define a stakeholder as any person under the jurisdiction of the catchment/sub-
catchment Council who has an interest in water.  The main stakeholder groups 
constituting membership of catchment and sub-catchment councils include communal 
farmers, Commercial Farmers Union (CFU), RDCs, Small-Scale Commercial Farmers 
(SSCF), resettlement farmers, Indigenous Commercial Farmers’ Union (ICFU), 
Zimbabwe Farmers’ Union (ZFU), large scale mines, urban authorities, industry, small-
scale mines and any other stakeholder group that the sub-catchment council may identify 
( Zimbabwe 2000a; see also Manzungu and Kujinga 2002).   
 
Sub-catchment Councils (SCCs) have jurisdiction over sub-catchment areas, where the 
composition of SCCs does not differ from that of Catchment Councils (CCs).  SCCs 
consist of elected representatives from all the stakeholder groups.  The maximum number 
of the representatives per catchment or SCC is 15.  Stakeholder representatives on the 
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SCCs elect their own chairperson and vice chairperson who then represent them on the 
CC.  The functions of SCCs are as follows: 
 Regulate and supervise the exercise of permit allocation including ground water use, 
 Monitor water flows and use in a CC in accordance with the respective allocations, 
 Promote catchment protection, 
 Monitor waste discharge, 
 Assist in data collection and participate in catchment planning, 
 Collect rates and fees, and 
 Collect levies (Zimbabwe 2000b). 
 
The Minister of Rural Resources and Water Development has powers to abolish a CC or 
SCC, alter the area for which it was established and to change the membership or the 
name of the sub-catchment council (Zimbabwe 1998b).  The Water Act (Chapter 20:24) 
and the ZINWA Act (Chapter 20:25) also stipulate that each catchment council should 
have Catchment Outline Plans (COPs).  COPs should: 
 Indicate major water uses, 
 Proportion of the potential yield allocated to different water uses, 
 Indicate maximum permissible levels of exploitation of water and relevant quality 
standards, 
 Phasing of any development and priority of that proposed development, 
 State the relationship of the development proposals with neighbouring river systems, 
 Identify reserved area for dams and water for future use and benefits for the 
environment, 
 Indicate priorities in utilisation and allocation of water taking into account CC policy 
guidelines provided by the Minister, and 
 Provide for changes in priorities of use due to the availability of water or social or 
economical priorities (Zimbabwe 1998b). 
 
The Ministry of Rural Resources and Water Development approves catchment outline 
plans. 
 
 
 
 
 188
7.2.2. Operational Guidelines and Rules for Catchment and 
Subcatchment Councils 
According to the Water Act (Chapter 20:24) and statutory instruments 33 and 47 of 2000, 
stakeholder representatives of CCs and SCCs are supposed to hold office for a term of 
three years (Zimbabwe 1998; 2000a and 2000b).  If a stakeholder representative wants to 
resign from the CC or SCC, he or she has to write a letter of resignation to the 
chairperson.   Furthermore, a representative who absents himself or herself from three 
consecutive meetings without previously obtaining leave of the CC or SCC will have his 
or her position declared vacant.  A catchment or sub-catchment council is required to 
give notice of every meeting to each representative, giving date, time and place of the 
meeting, together with the agenda, at least 14 days before the date of the meeting.  CCs 
and SCCs are not supposed to discuss any matter that is not on the agenda unless at least 
two thirds of the members present agree to the matter being discussed.  Two thirds of 
members of a CC or SCC constitute a quorum (Zimbabwe 2000a, Zimbabwe 2000b). 
 
Between the 1st and 31st of October of each year, CCs and SCCs have to convene their 
annual general meetings (AGMs).  The main purpose of each of them to hold AGMs is to 
receive and consider the chairperson’s report, consider the adoption of the financial 
statement of a CC or SCC, elect members to fill any vacancies and to transact any 
business that may be appropriate (Zimbabwe 2000a, Zimbabwe 2000b).  Applications for 
water permits are forwarded to the catchment council for consideration.  Applicants pay a 
fee of Z$200035 for their application forms to be processed.  The various monetary 
payments are set by the Minister, in consultation with the CC.  Statutory instrument 47 of 
2000, section 14, subsection 1 and 2 stipulates two requirements which have to be 
fulfilled before a water permit is approved by a catchment council (Zimbabwe 2000b; see 
also Manzungu and Kujinga, 2002).  The stipulations are that, “The Catchment Council 
shall notify…any other persons whose interests are likely to be affected by such 
application and shall be given a period by which objections and comments maybe 
                                                 
35 Although the amount is stated in the statutory instruments, the figure changed dramatically, like 
everything else, during the hyperinflationary and political meltdown experienced between 2000 and early 
2010, before the introduction of multi-currency system. 
 
 
 
 
 189
lodged”.  An applicant shall be allowed time to make representations before a catchment 
council at a time, place and date set by the catchment council.  Having provided the 
background and guidelines, the next section examines how these policies are 
operationalised and implemented in the Mzingwane catchment council and the Shashe 
subcatchment council under which Ward 17, Gwanda falls. 
 
Although it might sound clear cut how members of CCs and SCCs are elected or 
appointed in written text, the reality of representation and the selection process for 
communal area representatives is riddled with power play and contestations.  For large 
scale commercial water users, their representation and selection of members in CCs and 
SCCs seemed orderly and in line with provisions in text.  This can be attributed to the 
generally organised manner amongst large-scale water users owing to the need to avoid 
unnecessary confrontation amongst them.  In contrast, communal area water users are 
represented by traditional leaders, the RDCs, ward councillors and the ZFU amongst 
others.  This, as shall be demonstrated in sections 7.3.1 and 7.3.6, presents challenges that 
often manifest in contestations and power play, at the expense of substantive issues.    
7.3. Catchment and Subcatchment Council Processes: 
Experiences from Mzingwane Catchment Council and 
Subcatchment Councils  
The researcher attended meetings of the Mzingwane catchment council and the Shashe 
sub-catchment council in order to document the processes, debates and outcomes of the 
deliberations between and among stakeholders in the catchment.  Where attendance at 
meetings was not possible, the researcher relied heavily on records of minutes of the 
meetings and interviews with stakeholders who attended the meetings.  Although effort 
was made to cover the issues of the Mzingwane catchment council deliberations in detail, 
emphasis was placed on the intermediate level institution, that is, the Shashe sub-
catchment council and its inherent stakeholder representatives.  Analysis from the Shashe 
sub-catchment council (SSC) meetings highlight important issues upon which 
deliberations were based.  The key themes and processes documented and analysed in 
Mzingwane catchment under the SSC include: attendance of meetings, stakeholder 
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contributions, livestock levies, changing representatives, water permits, and travel and 
subsistence allowances.  These themes and issues are covered in detail in sections 7.3.1, 
7.3.2, 7.3.3, 7.3.4 and 7.3.5. 
 
The table (7.1) below shows the surface water resources in Shashe subcatchment council 
(SSC) and provides data on indicators such as potential capacity, current usage, and 
percentage utilisation.  The table is instrumental in that it gives a background to some of 
the revelatory processes and deliberations about the resource in the sub-catchment.  The 
SSC meetings and agendas are based primarily on the water resources outlined in the 
table, the stake upon which negotiations and deliberations are based for both equitable 
sharing and allocation. 
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Table 7.1: Surface Water Resources in Shashe Sub-catchment  
Sub-
Catchment  
Sub-
zone 
River Name  
Total 
Potential 
 10³m³
Present 
Utilisation
10³m³ 
% 
Utilisation 
SHASHE  
BM Umchabezi 144000 11412 7.9
BR Ramaqabane 84000 81033 96.5
BS1 Hwali 22000 1874 8.5
BS2 Lower Shashani 56000 11600
20.7
BS3 Upper Shashani 72000 18935
26.3
BS4 
Lower 
Semukwe 24000 732
3.05
BS5 
Upper 
semukwe 78000 15535
19.9
BS6 Sansukwe 26000 3548 13.6
BT1 Lower Tuli 44000 2022 4.6
BT2 Mid Tuli 32000 2670 8.3
BT3  Mwewe 84000 3716 4.4
BT4 Mtsheleli 166000 17573 10.6
BT5 Upper Tuli 92000 9529 10.4
Sub total 924000 180179 19.5
  Grand Total 2314000 487667 21.1
 
Source: Zimbabwe National Water Authority, Bulawayo Offices: 2009. 
From the table, it can be noted that there is general under-utilisation of the water 
resources in the SSC except for Ramaqabane River.  This underscores the point that the 
problem is not of physical water scarcity, but also that of economic water scarcity, where 
resources are not available to develop the water resources to full potential.  What the 
government, ZINWA, CCs and SCCs lack are economic resources and political will to 
develop water infrastructure. 
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7.3.0. The Issues Discussed 
7.3.1. Attendance at Meetings and ‘Travel & Subsistence Allowance’ 
“Our challenge is how to bring together small and big users so that they can appreciate 
the issues at stake and see what role they can play”36  This statement, poignant as it is, 
characterises and embodies the challenges of CCs and SCCs in handling multi-
stakeholder and interest groups towards a common goal on water issues.  An analysis of 
attendance at meetings by the various stakeholders in the Mzingwane CC and the Shashe 
sub-catchment council between 2006 and 2010 show that attendance was generally low, 
where a number of stakeholder representatives failed to attend meetings without prior 
notice or excusing themselves.  The stakeholder representatives from most of the 
communal areas, the councillors, failed to attend almost half of the meetings convened, 
while the representatives of large-scale commercial farmers (the few left after the 2000 
land reform and attendant race relations issues), and representatives of large agricultural 
estates attended almost all the meetings.  For example, the chairman of the Mzingwane 
Catchment Council, Mr. Ncube, represents Mwenezana Estate, a very large commercial 
irrigation enterprise with a very big stake in the water sector in the dry catchment, thus he 
participates actively and never failed to attend a meeting37.  The Gwanda Rural District 
Council (GRDC) representatives also attended all the meetings.  This could be attributed 
to the fact that almost all the meetings are held in Gwanda town where the GRDC offices 
are based, and that the vice-chairperson of the sub-catchment is also an employee of the 
RDC.  Chief Mate, one of the first female chiefs in Zimbabwe also attended 60% of the 
meetings.  She was also the only female stakeholder representative in the CC who was 
present at all the meetings that we attended, where the rest of the stakeholder 
representatives are male.  Our observations at three of the meetings we attended, the chief 
never spoke or raised any issues.  Although it might be an accepted norm that the chief 
does not speak or address audiences directly but through a representative, she hardly 
utilised this privilege either.  Some councillors pointed out that the chief hardly 
contributes anything because she is not elected by a constituent, but is forced into the 
                                                 
36 Discussions with Mr. Phanuel Ncube, Mzingwane Catchment Council chairman 2009. 
37 Interviews with the Catchment Manager, Mr Rosen October 2008, and July 2009. 
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system as a stakeholder representative by the authorities.  The Zimbabwe Farmers Union 
(ZFU) representatives hardly attended more than three meetings.  This could be attributed 
to the power issues between the councillors and headmen as to who represents the 
interests of communal area stakeholders at these meetings.  The councillors however, 
were the preferred de facto representatives of communal farmers, and they attended 45% 
of the meetings scheduled.  Their preference was not by their constituents, but through 
their position as representatives of the RDCs at the ward level, where most people regard 
them as merely an extension of the remote institution.  The attendance patterns of the 
different stakeholder groups highlight that the SSC meetings were generally poorly 
attended by representatives of small-scale water users. 
 
The catchment manager, appointed by the Zimbabwe National Water Authority 
(ZINWA) attended all the meetings and had the highest number of representatives at all 
catchment council meetings.  The ZINWA representatives, that is the catchment manager 
and his/her technical support staff, through the catchment manager’s office, was one of 
the most active stakeholder representative in the meetings as well.  When issues of 
ZINWA dominated stakeholder representation at CC meetings were raised, the catchment 
manager argued that there are no regulations which require that there be a balance of 
stakeholders from different interest groups on catchment council except provision that all 
sub-catchment councils must be represented38.       
 
The low attendance levels by small-scale water users, particularly primary water users, is 
largely attributed to the lack of interest by catchment and sub-catchment councils on 
deliberating issues of primary water use, except the proposed and contentious livestock 
levy.  Everyday issues of water use and water infrastructure, for example rehabilitation or 
construction of new infrastructure, for small gardens, brick-making, beer-brewing and 
water for domestic uses in communal areas were hardly on the agenda of the meetings.  
The councillor for Ward 17 highlighted that attending the Shashe sub-catchment council 
meetings makes him drool with envy when he hears about all the water that large-scale 
                                                 
38 Interviews with ZINWA staff at Bulawayo offices October 2008. See also Derman, Ferguson and Gonese 
(2000). 
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commercial farmers and people in Gwanda urban have, yet he was also quick to point out 
that, sub-catchment council business is about people who pay for water.  The attendance 
records of meetings also helps us in understanding the importance and probably value of 
the stake in water, and the effort the players invest to safeguard and defend their interests.  
Although it might seem as though the communal areas stakeholder representatives are 
less interested in attending such meetings, their biggest handicap is budget for transport 
to and from Gwanda town to their constituencies.  Given that catchment and sub-
catchment councils have been battling to generate income, especially after the decimation 
of the large-scale commercial farming community, the situation became dire for the sub-
catchment councils to the extend that the payment of travel and subsistence allowance 
virtually stopped, and with it attendance to meetings by representatives of small-scale 
water users.   
 
Issues of travel and subsistence allowance for representatives of stakeholders to attend 
meetings were raised on almost all the occasions meetings were held.  The Shashe sub-
catchment council paid what the chairman called nominal travel and subsistence 
allowances.  Information on how much the travel and subsistence allowances paid per 
stakeholder representative per seating was not easily available.  Unlike catchment 
councils, sub-catchment council representatives, particularly those from communal and 
resettlement areas, do not have the financial resources required to attend meetings, hence 
financing travel and subsistence becomes one of the topical issues they raise at such 
meetings.  The sub-catchment councils are hardly generating enough and sustainable 
revenues from the commission they get for water levies, so they have to rely on well-
wishers and donors for the institutions to remain viable, at least in terms of multi-
stakeholder representation.  
 
It would seem wider political processes and economic problems have curtailed the pace 
and direction of the reforms for all the stakeholders.  The frequency of holding meetings 
has been reduced from monthly basis to a meeting every two or three months due to lack 
of resources.  This has tended to affect the effectiveness of the Mzingwane catchment and 
sub-catchment councils.  Only representatives from large-scale commercial water users 
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and ZINWA had the capacity and financial resources to attend catchment council 
meetings. 
7.3.2. “If you don’t provide it…you cannot levy it?”   
The new water levies and sub-catchment council’s right to levy permit holders provides 
for the sustainable financial and economic viability, as scheduled in the laws and 
statutory instruments.  There was also discussion on the proposed cattle levy (livestock 
levy) at one of the most intensely debated catchment council meetings. Previous 
submissions to the Ministry had asked for the catchment to be allowed to levy farmers for 
the cattle they own, the rationale being that Mzingwane is a cattle rearing area, and that 
all cattle rearing activities in the area are commercial activities, regardless of how many 
beasts one owned. The issue also touched on the justice of imposing the levy since 
places, such as Beitbridge has no water to talk of, and farmers would resist on the 
grounds that they could not be charged the same as farmers in wetter parts of the 
catchment. It was also not clear how the levy would be collected, whether the sub-
catchments would collect the levy by themselves, or they would liaise with existing 
structures such as the Department of Veterinary Services or chiefs and councilors. 
Mzingwane is the only catchment council proposing for this levy in Zimbabwe.  Below is 
a full account of the debate and exchanges at the meeting.  The following is an account of 
the conversations. 
Mr Moyo a councillor and livestock owner was the first to pose a question on the 
proposed cattle/livestock levy, and the whole conversation ensued thus:  
“Whose water are we asking the farmers to pay?”   
To which the catchment manager responded 
  “Every livestock (that is) cattle should pay”.  
Mr Moyo interjected again thus 
“The catchment council should involve all stakeholders, and review the proposed 
levy issue…because we cannot implement what we agreed in year 2000, six years 
later...when will this thing (the levy) be effective?”   
Again the response that was given came from a ZINWA official, 
 “…when and as the minister ascend and agree”.   
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Mr R. J. Moyo explained that “…the issue of water is a problem not only for drinking but 
in general.  Therefore legislation that was passed in 2000 cannot be implemented ad hoc 
just like that”.  Mr Sibanda, one of the representatives from ZINWA responded that 
“…cattling (livestock-keeping) is commercial and that is where levies will be collected 
per mombe per mombe (per beast per beast)”.  Again Mr. R .J. Moyo interjected and 
challenged the meeting to clarify how the proposed levy will be implemented in a 
catchment like Mzingwane with very variable water availability, thus, “Tell me, Mwenezi 
where there is water, compared to Makhado where there is hardly any water to talk 
about, how do you implement and operationalise it?  People are fighting to have water 
for drinking in some parts of the catchment; moreover some of us are poaching water”.  
It was explained that earlier in 2000 when the legislation about the livestock levy for 
Mzingwane CC was mooted, they had agreed on a fee of Z$10 per beast across the 
catchment, but the figure has to be reviewed in light of the hyper-inflationary 
environment besieging Zimbabwe at the time.  After intense arguing, Mr R.J. Moyo 
indicated that he agreed to move on to the next item on the agenda on the basis of 
progress for the meeting, not because he was happy the issues about the proposed levy 
were adequately addressed.  As a parting short, his last remark was “You can charge me 
water when it is there, not when it is not there and I have to travel long distances to 
access it.  So if you do not provide it you cannot levy it”.  The catchment council 
chairman, Mr. Ncube responded with certainty thus “It is the president’s water”, to much 
laughter in the meeting room.  Up to March 2010, the proposed levy had not been 
implemented in Mzingwane catchment, still waiting for the Minister to give the council 
permission to implement the levy.  It would seem that the Mzingwane catchment council 
is assuming that the catchment and sub-catchment councils are representative bodies so 
there is no need to consult again with a wider population.  However, the discussion on 
livestock levy serves to highlight the challenges of representability at these meetings, and 
question the appropriateness of catchment and sub-catchment councils as viable 
platforms for addressing the needs of the majority smallholder farmers in communal 
areas.  From the foregoing, it would seem that CCs and SCCs do not provide the best 
forum for deliberating the agendas of communal area stakeholders, yet they appear to be 
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more robust and spot-on in addressing the objectives of large-scale water users (see 
section 7.3.6).  
   
Catchment councils still face the problem of how to finance their operations, and still rely 
heavily on donor funding. Money is needed to pay staff salaries (the extra hand requested 
by data collectors, for example), to buy equipment (computers) for day-to-day running of 
office, and to rent office space. To go round this problem the solution is perceived to lay 
on the ‘supply’ hence the proposals to introduce new levies. One member complained 
that it was unfair to introduce levy after levy (today you ask people to pay for one thing, 
the next day you ask them to pay for another).  A closer analysis and repeat interviews 
and discussions with the chairman of the Mzingwane CC eventually provided more 
information on the problems curtailing the introduction of the levy.  Mr Ncube, the 
Mzingwane CC chairman indicated that the Minister had only written a letter endorsing 
and authorising the catchment council to implement the proposed levy instead of a 
government gazette as required by the law, hence, the catchment could not implement the 
levy on the basis of a letter.  The catchment council found another way around the 
problem and resorted to levying water use for livestock on the basis of landholding 
capacity and land tenure, where the levy is only charged on all land designated as 
commercial land in the catchment at a flat rate of $1 (USD) per beast per year.  This new 
arrangement solved the problem of the catchment council since the measure did not 
require a gazette or letter.  The council does not require to individually count the number 
of livestock each commercial farmer owns, rather, they calculate the land-holding 
capacity for livestock, for example, if commercial farmer X has 40 ha with a livestock 
(cattle) holding capacity of 50 cattle, X will be charged (USD) $50 per year regardless of 
whether he/she has more or less than 50 cattle.  The chairman of the Mzingwane CC 
argued that it is a fair system, where people are only charged for water use.  However, 
collecting the levy is still economically not viable given the costs incurred in collecting 
the levies.  It would seem that the issue of imposing a livestock levy on communal 
smallholder farmers has been shelved, at least for now.  
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Issues of how to link the water user to the sub-catchment and catchment council are 
issues the CCs and SCCs grapple with daily and there seems to be no easy way out. 
Suggestions on how cattle levies are to be collected bring to the fore these issues. Sub-
catchment councils are not known on the ground level, yet at this level there are already 
cattle levies being collected (dipping levy). Issues such as how sub-catchment councils 
can work with the existing structures remain thorny given the lack of downward 
accountability by the SCCs and CCs. Questions were raised on whether there is need to 
add another tier to implement policy at the water user level given the largely normative 
and plural arrangements practiced. If councilors and headmen/women are brought into 
the structures, how will politics at village level affect the running of water affairs at that 
level? From our findings, we observed that although sabhukus and councillors compete 
for control and power within the villages, they also give each other room to manoeuvre.  
Although it is possible for sub-catchment councils to be entirely represented at the lowest 
tier, it is also possible that the existing structures can be used to work together with other 
departments (like Veterinary Services) in the same way the Zimpost (Postal Office) and 
the Zimbabwe Republic Police work with other institutions (for example, Zimbabwe 
Broadcasting Holdings) in the licensing of radios. 
 
7.3.4. Renewal of Permits and Issuing of New Permits 
The Mzingwane CC has experienced a lull in the renewal of permits by water users.  One 
of the items often raised and discussed at meetings was whether people were renewing 
their permits.  Records of the MCC meeting held on Tuesday 22 August 2006 show that 
the renewal of permits in the catchment has slowed down in three of the four sub-
catchment councils, except Upper Mzingwane SCC.  The Mzingwane catchment council 
(MCC) and ZINWA agreed on the process to be followed when applying for water 
permits.  In that arrangement, the four sub-catchment councils will collect water permit 
application forms from ZINWA offices.  People who want to apply for water permits are 
required to go through the sub-catchment councils.  An application fee is chargeable for 
all applications.  This was done to discourage petty applications.  Sub-catchment councils 
collect the application fees and forward the completed forms and money collected to the 
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ZINWA.  From the ZINWA, if the application is approved, it would then be passed on to 
Mzingwane Catchment Council for possible final approval.  Such processes are done 
during full catchment council meetings of the Mzingwane catchment.  It is during such 
meetings where and when the catchment manager presents such an application for 
approval.  If the catchment manager presented an application for approval, the 
chairperson of the catchment council simply asked the other stakeholder representatives, 
particularly those from the sub-catchment area from where the application originated, if 
they had any objections.  If there were no objections, the chairperson would ask any two 
people to support the application for approval.  If and when there are two people to 
support the application, the catchment council would issue a provisional water permit to 
the applicant.  During our observation of Mzingwane catchment and sub-catchment 
councils between 2006 and 2009, we did not witness the approval of a provisional water 
permit or full water permit, what we witnessed however, was the renewal of some 
existing permits.  It should be noted here that most commercial farmers and other large-
scale water users, owing to administrative proficiency, easily managed to convert their 
existing water rights into permits after the launch of the Water Act of 1998 and 
subsequent statutory instruments.     
 
From the initial stages to date, the reform process has centred on commercial water such 
as changing water rights to permits and the development of a new water allocation and 
pricing system.  These are issues which most immediately affect commercial farmers, 
urban authorities and mines whose activities underpin both the user-pay principle and the 
general Zimbabwe economy.  While these large-scale water users use most of 
Zimbabwe’s waters, they comprise only a small percentage of the total number of users.  
The majority of water users, that is, communal and resettlement area residents use the 
resources for domestic purposes and for small-scale (also often commercial) agriculture, 
livestock, brick-making, gardening and other production.  Although exemptions of 
primary water uses are observed in Mzingwane, there is no clear cut definition or 
explanation on the upper limit of primary and the lower limit of commercial water uses.  
These are issues that the catchment council and sub-catchment council grapple with 
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especially with regards to the majority of small-scale water users, some of whom engage 
in what might be called commercial uses. 
7.3.5. Funding of Catchment and Subcatchment Councils 
Catchment councils are funded through the ZINWA while sub-catchment councils are 
supported through levies on permits.  This renders many sub-catchment councils barely 
useful and sustainable since they have few or no permit holders.  In Mzingwane, the four 
sub-catchment councils largely depend on ZINWA and the catchment council for funds.  
The resource challenges (financial, skills and capacity) besetting the MCC spell disaster 
for the four sub-catchment councils.  One of the primary aims of the reform process was 
to make water management self-financing.  In pursuit of that goal, commercial water 
users pay for the water they use or store as well as pay a levy for the general management 
of the water sector (Dube and Swatuk, 2001).  The levies collected by sub-catchment 
councils are meant to help them finance their operations.  The ZINWA asked all sub-
catchment councils to collect water levies on its behalf at the rate of Z$25 000 000 
(twenty-five million)/ML per quarter for directly abstracting water and Z$220 000 
000/ML for providing raw water from its water sources.  Out of the amount that each 
sub-catchment council collected, it would get a commission of about 10%.  However the 
commission is not adequate to cover their operational costs.  Another key observation 
from our discussions and interviews with CC and SCC staff is that the new water 
management institutions do not have an association which could be used for lobby and 
advocacy for instance advocating for higher commission rates.  The catchment manager 
reiterated that such an association might also be used by the catchment councils and sub-
catchment councils to lobby the Minister to accelerate the implementation of 
amendments to the Water Act, and other pertinent issues like the proposed livestock levy 
for Mzingwane.  
 
I observed that most of the white commercial farmers with farms invaded by the ruling 
Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) party supporters and those 
with farms designated for settlement were no longer paying rates.  This strained the 
financial revenue of the catchment and sub-catchment councils.  The Mzingwane 
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catchment and sub-catchment council representatives agreed that they would not force 
the embattled commercial farmers to pay the levies.  The council also decided against 
enforcing the acquisition of permits by the ‘new farmers’, a politically correct term for 
the land invaders.  According to the chairman of the MCC, it would seem that the 
decision not to force the invaders to apply for water permits was more to do with the fear 
of reprisal from politically well-connected invaders and government (and ZANU PF 
party) officials who dominate the land reform beneficiary list.  All the four sub-catchment 
councils of the Mzingwane catchment have not been able to collect much in levies owing 
to the dwindling number of white commercial farmers, and also to the fact that the 
catchment does not have many commercial water users.  From 2000 onwards, the levies 
and rates charged for commercial water use were lagging behind hyper-inflation rates 
prevailing in the economy.   
 
As noted earlier on issues of travel and subsistence, the capacity of catchment and sub-
catchment councils to function effectively was negatively affected by the lack of financial 
resources.  There are other dimensions that compromised the capacity of the new 
institutions such as lack of sufficient knowledge, experience and information of the 
stakeholders concerning the various aspects.  There is also the fact that all decisions of 
the Mzingwane catchment council and sub-catchment councils had to be sanctioned by 
ZINWA.  For example, rates collection was hampered by the fact that ZINWA had not 
put in place the necessary regulations in time to match the sky-rocketing inflation.  The 
same bottlenecks also slowed the processing of permit applications as ZINWA had to 
make up its mind on the various issues.  The chairman of MCC highlighted that the 
catchment council was not yet self-financing and could not afford to pay for office 
expenses, high travel and subsistence allowances for stakeholder representatives, and 
financing the implementation of the catchment outline plans (COP).  It is not clear who 
has the responsibility for human resources in the MCC and SCCs although the 
chairpersons of SCCs appear to have a bigger role.  An analysis of the CC and SCC 
human resources reveal that most of the SCC and Mzingwane catchment staff, recruited 
by the CC, are technical persons who are conversant with water management issues, but 
might not have the requisite administrative and management skills to deal with the day to 
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day operations of the catchment and sub-catchment councils.  The CC and SCC pay 
salaries for their staff members.  There is generally high staff turnover in sub-catchment 
councils due to low salaries and poor conditions of service.  There is no accounting 
procedures manual for reference in purchasing and recording of transactions across the 
four sub-catchment councils.  Funds obtained from commissions, levies and from donors 
are all handled in one bank account.  Payments of levies can be done through permit 
holders making direct payment at the sub-catchment office, payment done through 
posting of cheques to the sub-catchment council, and the collection of levies by outreach 
officers from permit holders in their areas.  All the money collected is banked into a sub-
catchment council’s bank account.  The sub-catchment council retains the commission 
from the money collected and remits the rest to ZINWA.  The sub-catchment council 
writes a cheque to ZINWA. 
7.3.6. Catchment and Subcatchment Council Agenda-setting and 
concerns of communal area farmers and residents   
In trying to analyse who sets the agenda of issues and topics discussed at catchment and 
sub-catchment councils, I attended CC and SCC meetings and workshops.  The meetings 
and workshops were augmented by records of minutes of previous meetings, interviews 
and discussions with stakeholder representatives.  Communal and resettlement area 
stakeholder representatives brought issues that are instrumental for their constituents such 
as silted dams, broken down boreholes and the need for more water infrastructure such as 
irrigation schemes.  These issues often came up in meetings, sometimes outside the 
agenda set for the meetings.  A key observation made was that stakeholder 
representatives of communal and resettlement areas do not see the value or benefit of 
being involved in catchment and sub-catchment council business where they are more 
“spectators than players”39.  He (the councillor for Ward 17) pointed out that water 
management issues such as the administration of permits, rates, levies and finances for 
offices of the CC and SCC seem to have dominated the issues and business of catchment 
and sub-catchment councils.  He asked a critical question that helped to clarify some of 
the challenges stakeholder representatives of communal and resettlement areas face, thus 
                                                 
39 Personal communication with councillor for Ward 17, 21 October 2008.  
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“when are we going to have irrigation development in communal areas and construction 
of dams for ordinary people discussed in these meetings?”  It is apparent from 
observation of CC and SCC business that those interested in water development such as 
communal and resettlement farmers tended to see no benefit or incentive to fully involve 
themselves in the catchment and sub-catchment council agenda that does not seem to 
include the core issues of water infrastructure development which address their most 
pertinent challenges.  This is despite the fact that the establishment of catchment and sub-
catchment councils has created, in principle, an opportunity for all water users to be 
represented and participate in water planning, development and management.    
 
The use of English in meetings and the presence of technocrats with experience in water 
management issues did not seem to provide an even platform for the participation of the 
small-scale water users such as communal farmers.  Similar observations were made by 
Sithole (1999; 2001) where she noted that conducting catchment council business in 
English hindered other stakeholder representatives who were not fluent in English from 
making contributions.  The use of language as an excuse for non-contribution was easily 
shot-down by the catchment manager who argued that representatives who do not 
participate in meetings are not necessarily hamstrung by language, in fact their challenges 
are to do with their legitimacy as representatives of a constituency because they are often 
either hand-picked or nominated by the politicians or the RDCs, and therefore did not 
represent people with a stake in water.  How and on what basis do such people contribute, 
he asked?  Whereas other stakeholder groups such as large-scale commercial farmers, 
mining and urban authorities had appropriately elected/appointed and accepted 
representatives from their constituencies, the communal areas were represented by 
diverse representatives ranging from the chiefs, councillors and the rural district councils  
to sabhukus, who do not necessarily speak with the same voice, nor articulate and push 
for issues of the constituent, but seem to view their representation as a source of power 
and authority to silence and ward-off competitors.  Councillors were particularly vocal 
and imposed themselves as official elected representatives of communal area water users 
on the basis that they were popularly elected by their constituent, at the ward level.  As 
such, their argument seemed to win over the CC and SCC owing to the favours they 
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received from the GRDC.  On the other hand, local level water committee representatives 
and traditional leaders also claim a stake at representing the same constituent.  One would 
assume that such diversity might work to the advantage of the communal area water 
users, yet this was often not the case.  The chief argued that what is required is for the 
people at village and ward level to elect people who will represent and articulate their 
issues at catchment and sub-catchment councils.  Sustainability of the new institutions 
seems to depend to a large extent on the perceived and tangible benefits flow to the water 
users (as WUAs) which in turn will motivate the WUAs to honour their obligations to the 
councils. 
 
In their common focus on water there are huge gaps in understanding, knowledge, 
experience and priorities between different stakeholder sectors, especially between and 
among the large-scale commercial users (farmers and miners) and small-scale farmers.  
However, the biggest disappointment for communal area water users is the government 
which acts as both their de facto representative and as an intermediary.  The government 
is de facto representative of communal area water users in the sense that the Minister of 
water resources serves to protect the interests of small-scale water users, while at the 
same time, the government, through the RDC act as representative of the communal 
areas.  The government’s shortcomings, from the perspective of the communal area water 
users, include inadequate resources to respond to communal area water needs, and 
inability to collect revenues from these areas for services provided, not as mere rent-
seeking, to make government programmes sustainable.  Despite sitting on huge amounts 
of dam waters in the catchment, government is seen to have failed to make such water 
available for productive uses by communal area users.  “Although we might not have a 
lot of money or other resources in our villages, why has the government not given us a 
chance to have access to water infrastructure such as dams and boreholes?  They say 
white people and big companies in town pay for water, yes; they pay because water is 
made available to them.  If the government makes water available, what will stop us from 
paying for using it if we can also enjoy irrigation farming?  The NGOs can testify to the 
willingness and ability of our people to invest in water infrastructure as long as they see 
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or perceive the benefit.  What we lack is necessary support”.40   I also observed that with 
the emphasis on water permits and levies by the CCs and SCCs, the interest of communal 
area farmers and water users, who are not interested or required to apply for permits, gets 
lost. 
 
The marginal position of small-scale farmers in communal areas in the catchment and 
sub-catchment council processes and agendas is underscored by two principal factors.  To 
begin with, they rely on small dams, boreholes, deep and shallow wells which also serve 
as sources of primary water supply, and have yet to receive much attention and focus in 
the water reform process.  Secondly, many of these users are unlikely to become water 
permit holders and may not contribute significantly financially to catchment and sub-
catchment councils.  The only exception for Mzingwane catchment might be the 
introduction of the livestock levy which would also rope in many communal farmers who 
own livestock as catchment and sub-catchment clients.  This apparent marginalisation 
flies in the face of the new Water Acts and policies which aim to attain equity in the 
water sector.  The current water laws and policies and the institutional arrangements 
underlying them might need to be revised if a more inclusive approach to water 
management is to be realised. 
 
7.4. Institutional Linkages, Resources, Representation and 
Power 
The operational concept in water reform has been stakeholder participation.  In the 
broadest sense, anyone who uses water might be well considered a stakeholder.  Under 
the Water Act (Chapter 20:24) of 1998 and experiences from the catchment and sub-
catchment councils, is it clear that stakeholders are drawn from identifiable categories of 
users which represent economic sectors (urban, industrial, agricultural, small-scale 
farmers and mining).  This system of representation makes it difficult to move away from 
existing strong vested economic interest in water management toward a more inclusive 
model.  My findings seem to resonate with Derman et al (2000: 15), in their observation 
                                                 
40 Focus group discussion with ward committee members, October, 2008. 
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that it seems “the government has assumed the role of speaking for the disadvantaged or 
those without the means to insure their own access to water”.  This represents a 
continuation of the long-standing pattern of centralization of power by the state, 
‘speaking for the people’.  Mechanisms need to be found for the poor to speak for 
themselves through deliberative platforms that enable stakeholders a platform to voice 
their concerns and interests.  In this regard communal area people and their 
representatives argue that ZINWA, CCs and SCCs must consider investing in the 
participation of third tier units such as water user associations and water point 
committees at village and ward level.  This might also include hosting SCC and CC 
meetings within the ward or village where the majority of people live.  The ZINWA, CC 
and SCC representatives from powerful stakeholders are most financially able to meet the 
cost of travel than pacing the budget and burden of travel costs on poor smallholder 
farmers. 
 
The analysis of CC and SCC meetings indicates that they focus on a limited number of 
topics and issues.  Although the themes and agenda at CC and SCC meetings slightly 
varied from one meeting to the other, the broader issues, especially the consistent and 
persistent ones, remained the same in most of the meetings.  What is often not adequately 
analysed is who is setting the agenda at CC and SCC meetings?  A closer assessment of 
catchment council and sub-catchment council records, and observations from meetings 
reveal a consistent pattern of how powerful stakeholders representing large-scale farmers, 
commercial estates, and the ZINWA almost always have their way at setting the agenda 
for meetings.  Powerful stakeholders still dominate, and make the most contributions.  
The stakeholder representatives who attended meetings regularly were also the same 
people who dominated the proceedings in both catchment and sub-catchment council 
meetings.  White large-scale commercial farmers have an interest, experience and 
expertise on water issues for productive uses, but probably because of race relations at 
the moment they are reluctant to participate actively.  Rural District Councils in the 
Mzingwane catchment in general, and the Gwanda Rural District Council in particular, 
had some of the highest attendance in catchment and sub-catchment council meetings.  
The RDCs felt obliged to attend most of the meetings owing to their strategic position as 
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local government representatives at district level, and also to asset their authority as 
official representatives of the ordinary people.  The Gwanda Rural District Council 
(GRDC) took over responsibilities from the DDF and other government agencies for rural 
water supply and sanitation, hence they felt strongly that they represent the biggest 
constituents in terms of population, and yet use disproportionately low quantities of 
water, for which CC and SCC considered primary use, and not central to their 
deliberations.  The silence or failure to raise issues by the GRDC at CC and SCC 
meetings might be a sign of financial constraints to invest in water infrastructure for the 
majority of communal area dwellers.  It might also be an issue of exercising privileged 
authority and power without the accompanying responsibilities.  
 
What kind of accountability exists between stakeholders and the groups they represent?  
There seems to be weak accountability to the stakeholders by the representatives.  The 
communal and resettlement farmers are not well represented by the Zimbabwe Farmers’ 
Union (ZFU) an organisation of mainly communal and small-scale farmers.  Not all 
communal and resettlement farmers are members of the ZFU.  This poses issues of 
legitimacy regarding their status of representing communal and resettlement area farmers.  
The ZFU representatives at CC and SCC meetings and workshops often give feedback to 
members of the organisation only, and not on a regular basis.  There seems to be some 
downward accountability although there is hardly any recorded sanctions on ZFU 
members who did not provide feedback to their constituent.  The Rural District Council 
(RDC) and traditional leaders also represent the communal and resettlement areas.  
Representatives of the RDCs are chosen and often appointed by the chief executive 
officer of the RDC in consultation with the District Administrator, to be part of the CC 
and SCC, yet they seldom report back to the communal and resettlement constituents, 
rather they report to their head-office.  There is very limited accountability to the rural 
communities by the RDC representatives.  The role of the RDC as stakeholder 
representatives of communal and resettlement areas is synonymous with centralization of 
power and authority by local government structures, where the government claims to 
represent and speak for the ordinary people, yet it is hardly accountable to them in 
processes and procedures of catchment and sub-catchment council issues.  Another 
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challenge is geographical representation as some of the stakeholder representatives are 
not known by the stakeholders who are supposed to have chosen them.  The stakeholder 
representatives cover large areas and have problems with transport to effectively service 
the areas especially in communal and resettlement areas where distances are quite long.    
 
What expectations do these different stakeholder groups have of the water reform? From 
our observations, the stakeholders do not speak with one voice as there are fundamental 
differences among them as their views and the policies they support or oppose are often 
contradictory.  I noticed that the socio-economic background of stakeholders determined 
to a large extent their participation and contribution in the debates.  This might explain 
why representatives from communal areas did not participate in the discussions, let alone 
afford to attend meetings due to lack of financial resources.   The views of large-scale 
commercial farmers and urban authorities differed from communal area farmers.  
Communal area stakeholder representatives and their constituents were more concerned 
with livelihood issues such as fixing boreholes for domestic water supply, watering 
livestock, and for irrigating small vegetable gardens.  Yet within the communal areas, 
there seems to be huge differences on issues of priority and emphasis between women 
and men, where men tended to be concerned with infrastructure investments in small 
dams and boreholes for productive uses such as livestock watering, brick-making and 
medium to large scale irrigation.  On the other hand, women’s concerns, though not 
uniform, generally tended to shift towards prioritizing small amounts of water for 
vegetable gardens, small livestock such as goats, and clean portable water for domestic 
uses.  As has been noted in 7.3.5 above, regardless of how important their concerns and 
issues, communal area stakeholder representatives and their constituents have found it 
difficult to get these issues discussed and debated in catchment and sub-catchment 
councils.  Their response, often with financial and material assistance from donors, has 
been to form water committees at the village and ward levels.  It is in these local level 
institutions where women took active roles in both management and maintenance of 
water infrastructure, and participate as office-bearers in these committees.  Yet in the 
framing of the water reform legislation, third tier organisations are hardly legally 
recognised although there have been efforts to connect them to CC and SCC.  These third 
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tier organisations are also poorly funded and their sustainability and sphere of influence 
hangs in the balance, beyond the village and ward levels within which they operate. 
 
At the catchment level there is a Catchment Manager who is an employee of ZINWA and 
who according to the water act is responsible for the day-to-day management and 
administration of the affairs of the catchment council.  The relationship between the 
Catchment Manager and the catchment council appears confusing, where the manager is 
employed by ZINWA and thus accountable to ZINWA but works on the advice of the 
catchment council.  It is organizationally confusing that the day-to-day management and 
administration function is the responsibility of the manager whilst on the other hand the 
manager acts on the advice of the council and is not supervised by the council.  It is also 
not very clear as to whom the catchment manager is accountable, ZINWA or CC or both.  
Therefore the power of the Mzingwane catchment council over the catchment manager is 
not clear and seems rather unenforceable.  To further complicate issues, observation of 
the CC and SCC operations show that although the new institutions (CC and SCC) are 
legal entities, they remain part of ZINWA, if not its appendages.  There is minimum 
autonomy considering that catchment council’s operations and financial obligations and 
accountability are to ZINWA.  The catchment manager’s office provides secretariat 
service to the CC.  Each sub-catchment council in Mzingwane has plans to recruit their 
own secretaries/treasurers/bookkeeper who are paid and thus accountable to the SCC and 
not necessarily to ZINWA.  If and when the SCCs are able to finance such positions, they 
will retain autonomy from ZINWA, but as of 2008, only Shashe sub-catchment council 
was seeking to recruit a bookkeeper and rent offices from where s/he will operate.  
 
As reported earlier, and worth repeating here for emphasis, is the lack of financial 
resources by the Mzingwane catchment council and the Shashe sub-catchment council to 
pay for travel and subsistence allowances owing to low or non-generation of enough 
income from water rates, levies and permits.  This did not only undermine the attendance 
and participation by mostly financially constrained communal area stakeholder 
representatives, but also faced legitimacy issues in terms of the acceptability of their 
decisions within those constituencies.  The lack of financial resources also undermined 
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the autonomy of the institutions where they had to rely on well-wishers and donors for 
financial help.  This lack of financial autonomy and lack of accountability by the 
ZINWA, catchment and sub-catchment councils to their constituencies both within their 
organisational level, and to their subordinate constituents, (the third tier structures), often 
a result of up-ward accountability, made it difficult for stakeholder representatives to 
enforce the decisions made.  Another key observation is that the autonomy of catchment 
and sub-catchment councils is undermined by the fact that the state, through the ZINWA 
and office of the catchment manager, allocated to itself disproportionately huge powers, 
in contradiction to the democratic ideals of the reforms.   
 
Local and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and donors contributed 
the most funding for water infrastructure and institutional set-up for the reforms, with 
GTZ and SIDA being the most notable donors. Donors and NGOs calls for more 
meetings when compared to other institutions at the local level, from village to ward, to 
district. The important and remarkable observation to make is that the main attraction for 
attending such meetings is beyond natural resources issues, but food relief and inputs are 
a good lure as well.    
 
There seem to be a common understanding especially among the communal area 
stakeholders that the micro-catchment level (ward size as a guide) should be adopted as 
the lowest tier for integrated natural resources management.  Yet the challenge is what 
type of representation and who to represent them remains an issue of substantial 
contestations and negotiations.  Elected leaders like councillors are more swayed to push 
for the adoption of the Ward as the lowest tier unit given that councillors are elected to 
represent an administrative Ward in Zimbabwe, hence, giving them more leverage and 
clout in jockeying for representing the communal area people.  In principle, councillors 
are the lowest tier representatives of local government as councillors of the RDCs.  
During fieldwork community members voiced their concerns and fear that if councillors 
represent them in all the issues, worse still, water issues, there is less room for continuity 
given that they are political representatives serving the interests of the party for which 
they won the ticket.  For example, councillor Moyo for Ward 17 was elected on a Zanu 
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PF party ticket and never intervened when and where community members complained 
that liberation war veterans were interfering with donor-funded projects and imposing 
beneficiaries.  Alternative representation lies in traditional leaders, who are also fighting 
for space and power to represent the communal area constituent in catchment and sub-
catchment council issues.  Chiefs have become de facto representatives of their 
constituencies across all catchment councils in Zimbabwe, while headmen/women are not 
guaranteed such space; they have to fight for it.  This created tensions within the 
community and opportunities for forming a common water user association or water user 
representative group at this level remain largely remote.  This flies in the face of 
catchment and sub-catchment council initiatives and calls for integrated water resources 
management where traditional leaders on the one hand and elected leaders on the other, 
argue that community representatives should be the focal-point at CCs and SCCs. 
Informal and formal communal areas water user groups can benefit from forming a union 
like other stakeholder groups.  
7.5. Livestock, Water and Gender in Semi-arid Catchment and 
Subcatchment Council Business 
Although women constitute the majority of water users there is a remarkably low 
involvement and representation of women in catchment and sub-catchment councils.  Mr 
Ncube, the Mzingwane catchment council chairperson explained that this is so because 
women’s water use is usually confined to primary water use.  A closer analysis at the 
issues deliberated at catchment and sub-catchment council meetings leaves no doubt that 
the priorities and agenda of small-scale water users, particularly women, hardly make an 
impression to CC and SCC whose priorities are paying clients who use water for 
commercial purposes.  While it appears that women are active members of third tier 
organisations, very few have been elected to SCCs or CCs.  The questions to ask is who 
speaks for their interests on CC and SCC and what might be done to facilitate their direct 
participation in the new water management institutions and support their use and access 
of water for productive uses?  Although these issues have not commanded the attention of 
those most active in catchment and sub-catchment councils, women have managed to 
carve out some useful networks and alliances at the user-point and within broader social 
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arrangements at the local level.  It was evident from our fieldwork that when water 
projects, if not water reform, moved to the grassroots level, women took on active roles. 
 
The election process for catchment and sub-catchment members has not taken a 
deliberate effort to ensure that there is gender balance in the council.  Below is the 
gendered nature of the four sub-catchment councils of the Mzingwane catchment. 
 
Table 7.2: Number of Councillors in Each Sub-catchment by Sex 
 
Sub-catchment Council Total number of members Women 
Lower Mzingwane 15 0 
Mwenezi 15 2 
Shashe 15 1 
Upper Mzingwane 15 0 
Mzingwane Catchment 15 1 
Source: Mzingwane Catchment Council Reports 
 
The table above shows clearly the under-representation of women in catchment and sub-
catchment councils.  Only 3 of the 60 councillors are women. Although there are several 
factors explaining this skewed representation in the Mzingwane catchment and sub-
catchment councils, the key ones revolve around the main activities in the semi-arid 
catchment, livestock keeping.  The very nature of livestock ownership is a gendered 
issue.  From colonial to post-colonial strategies, owners of large cattle herds could often 
evade the various destocking measures of the state by leasing cattle to relatives, often 
living in adjacent districts in Matabeleland under a system called amasisa.  Leasing of 
livestock to relatives although primarily male dominated, is also filtering to women as 
well.  This helped in making women beneficiaries of such leases to be de facto 
stakeholders when livestock and water issues are deliberated at the local level although 
this has yet to manifest in representation at local, SCC and CC levels.  In Ward 17, as 
elsewhere in Gwanda district and the greater Mzingwane catchment, individualisation of 
land holding on arable and grazing lands leading to changing property rights, was, and 
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still is, a threat to people’s economic and social system, and it poses a threat of sidelining 
women in the process.   
 
Owning livestock (izifuyo) is the mainstay of the economy for many rural households and 
the villagers see it as the number one source of income.  Gender differences in the 
livestock holding in Mzingwane (as elsewhere in Zimbabwe see Scoones and Wolmer 
2002:26) are substantial with cattle as the main means and indicator of male power.  
What has, been underestimated are women’s strategies of building up small stock and 
gardening as individuals as well as households and farming projects.  Women can easily 
own, buy and sell smallstock, yet it is difficult to do the same for cattle.  To buy cattle 
one has to be registered and be able to produce a record of dipping through a government 
dip registry with the Veterinary Services.  This provides an obstacle for most women due 
to male dominance in the cattle industry.  Realising this obstacle, women in Mzingwane 
are increasingly involved in purchasing and ownership of donkeys which they use as 
draft power to hire out in order to earn their own incomes, independent of their male-
counterparts.  Women are hardly represented in grazing committees and livestock 
committees in Mzingwane, as much as they are not generally represented in sub-
catchment and catchment councils.  The proposed livestock levy to be effected and made 
payable per livestock (cattle only) might bring communal area farmers to the CC and 
SCC business as paying water users yet it will perpetuate the gendered nature of 
ownership, and hence representation.  Like their small vegetable gardens that do not 
attract the radar of CC and SCCs, women’s investments in smallstock (sheep, goats and 
chicken) also unintentionally keep them on the sidelines when and where water issues are 
discussed, debated and negotiated at intermediate and higher levels.     
7.6. Conclusions 
Water rights in Zimbabwe have always been torn between what the law says (legal) and 
what is morally right (legitimate).  The problem does not seem to go away because while 
the legitimate issues are recognised, they are seldom legalized as illustrated by changing 
definition of primary water right; beneficial/efficient use of water versus social realities; 
lack of clarity between what is called economic and what is called social; and most 
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importantly, merit of centralized and decentralised management where a hands-off 
approach by the state can expose smallholder farmers to injustices while an overbearing 
state can emasculate local innovations. 
 
The regulations framing the new water management system are moulded on a large scale 
commercial farming model without giving much thought to the needs of the new and 
innovative forms of irrigated cropping that are gradually emerging within the common 
property regimes in the communal lands. In communal areas and resettlement schemes 
both men's and women's access to water still relies heavily on customary use rights.  This 
study (see chapter four) revealed that while social norms have precluded the pricing or 
denial of water for life-sustenance purposes, there is some limited evidence of pricing of 
water, from private and public sources, for uses in irrigated gardens, as well as barter of 
water for access to land, labor or draft power.  This might be an opportunity from which 
the CC and SCCs can penetrate the communal areas, especially through new water 
infrastructure development and rehabilitation of existing infrastructure, rather than mere 
awareness campaigns without tangible benefits to the ordinary people.  This will render 
catchment and sub-catchment council business meaningful and relevant to the communal 
area users as a constituent.  More financial support from government and donors could 
also leverage the participation of more community members in productive water use, and 
their involvement in water reform institutions. 
 
From the initial stages to date, the water reform process has centred on commercial water 
such as changing water rights to permits and the development of a new water allocation 
and pricing system.  These are issues which most immediately affect commercial farmers, 
urban and rural authorities, and mines; whose activities underpin both the user-pay 
principle and the general Zimbabwe economy.  While these large-scale water users use 
most of Zimbabwe’s waters, they comprise only a small percentage of the total number of 
users.  The majority of water users, that is, communal and resettlement area residents use 
the resources for domestic purposes and for small-scale (also often commercial) 
agriculture, livestock, brick-making, gardening and other production.  For the communal 
and resettlement area constituents, the catchment and sub-catchment councils have 
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generally neglected them due to two main reasons, firstly that they are primary water 
users and therefore not regulated, and, secondly because the communal area constituent 
will pose a huge administrative burden in terms of monitoring and implementation if they 
were to be regulated and licensed.   
 
It would seem wider political processes and economic problems have curtailed the pace 
and direction of the reforms for all the stakeholders.  Although the reform process has 
been going on for twelve years, it is too early to reach any firm conclusions about the 
impact of the reform on stakeholder representation and participation, institutional 
arrangements and gender equity.  However, patterns, trends and inferences can be drawn 
on the nature and direction of the reform through tracing the reform processes. I have 
observed on the whole that catchment and sub-catchment council members are dedicated 
to their basically voluntary work.  Given the fact that the Mzingwane catchment and sub-
catchment councils have gained momentum and are performing well, that is holding 
meetings through deliberative platforms and processing permit applications, under 
difficult circumstances, it might be necessary to keep tracing and tracking the water 
reform processes as the political and economic environment in the country (hopefully) 
improves and stabilises.   
 
On the surface catchment and sub-catchment councils appear to be downwardly 
accountable as they are elected by stakeholders (see 7.2.2).  However, who the 
stakeholders represent and the criteria for such representation is poorly defined especially 
for the small-scale communal water users. The most active, powerful and best organised 
stakeholder groups, the large-scale commercial farmers, miners and urban and rural 
authorities have largely defined the agenda and deliberative processes for the new 
institutions, as much as the agenda is also determined by the water reform laws and 
policies.  Sustainability and acceptance of the new institutions will depend to a large 
extent on the perceived and tangible benefits flow to the water users (as WUAs) which in 
turn will motivate the WUAs to honour their obligations to the Councils. 
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Finally, underlying political and economic ideologies seem to be in perpetual conflict.  
For example, the noble political objectives of millennium development goals (MDGs) are 
undercut by such concepts as beneficial use of water, which punishes smallholder farmers 
by relegating them to second class primary exemptions with little or no scope for 
improved productive uses through infrastructure development.  Therefore, interventions 
aimed at optimising and reallocating water use, assuming shared interests, attempting to 
monopolise water allocation decision in a single forum, and pursuing comprehensive, 
anticipatory planning such as ambitious river basin planning like IWRM inspired 
catchment councils may fit poorly with the dynamics of community collective action 
based on normative plural arrangements.  So they may be prone to being ignored, resisted 
and rejected by the majority of smallholder water users.  Modest institutional 
modifications that fit the dynamics of community collective action and help secure rights 
and resolve pertinent issues may meet with greater success apart from being sustainable. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT:  Bureaucracies and Hierarchies of 
Governance for Water Management 
in Sekororo, South Africa 
 
8.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides detailed results/answers to the following questions (South Africa): 
a). How and to what extend do existing policies and legislation that govern and regulate 
access to and control over water resources influence (and are influenced by) hydraulic 
property creation? What are the national policies on paper?  How are they 
operationalised?  How are they implemented in Sekororo, if implemented at all?  How do 
they interface with practices? b). How and to what extend do prevailing formal 
institutional arrangements adequately address the informality of water use by the majority 
of rural small-scale water users? If institutions should serve a purpose, what purpose 
should they serve?  What/which institution should be responsible for infrastructure 
development?  Are catchment management agencies and councils the appropriate 
vehicles for meeting the expectations of informal water users?; and c). How relevant and 
practical are single purpose and resource-specific institutions wrought by the water 
reforms such as catchment councils and management agencies for managing water 
resources at the local level where people use multiple institutions?  The chapter provides 
detailed accounts, cases and analyses of power dynamics and intricate interrelations 
between and among: the policies, legislation and frameworks governing natural 
resources; the existing and resultant institutional arrangements; and the nature property 
rights and investments take.  Emphasis centres on how local government through district 
and local municipalities, Department of Water Affairs (DWA) and other government 
departments (health, agriculture, and cooperative governance), service providers (bulk 
water), NGOs and tribal authorities interrelate on policies, legislation and frameworks 
governing resource access and control interact with both the users (rich and poor, men 
and women, new and old residents) and other institutional structures (local networks, 
elected leaders) and NGOs in accessing, managing and controlling the resource.  The 
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chapter documents the dynamic processes of engagement, negotiations, contests, conflicts 
and sharing arrangements that exist. 
8.2. Background to South African Water Reform Institutions and 
Policies  
8.2.1. A Synopsis to Legal, Institutional and Policy Frameworks in 
South Africa 
The history of South Africa’s water policy, law and institutions reflect the increasingly 
complex needs of multiple stakeholders (agriculture, mining, industry, cities, the newly 
enfranchised) represented by different state forms and their characteristic political 
regimes: the Dutch East India Company; The British Empire; the Union of South Africa; 
the apartheid and post-apartheid republics (Swatuk, 2010: 521).  These political regimes 
have all used central state-power to serve particular interests.  Present-day water policy, 
practice and management are the result of historical dynamics not easily displaced by 
generalised discourses of good water governance under various guises and rubrics inter 
alia integrated water resources management, river basin councils, and catchment 
watersheds among others.  This section will highlight the processes and challenges in 
reforming the water sector 1994 onwards as the historical aspects prior to 1994 were 
covered in some detail in chapter 5.  With the abolition of the ten South African 
‘homelands’ (which exercised various degrees of self-government under apartheid), the 
jurisdiction of the new Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) became 
countrywide.  The then Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry initiated a process to 
review all the water related legislation in May 1994. This led to the White Paper on 
Water Supply and Sanitation Policy of 1994, the Water Law Review Process (1995), the 
promulgation of the Water Services Act (WSA) (Act No. 108 of 1997) and the National 
Water Act (NWA) (Act No.36 of 1998). The new-found democracy also influenced the 
shaping of the water clause (s 27(1) (b)), (which states that everyone has a right to have 
access to sufficient water) in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (Act 
No. 108 of 1996).  According to Schreiner et al., 2004, ‘the new water policy and 
legislation sets an enabling framework for water use to contribute to poverty eradication 
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and it is based on three principles of equity, sustainability and efficiency and enables the 
redress of historical imbalances in access to water’.  The following sections present an 
outline and analysis of the key processes, policies and legislation. 
8.2.2. The Water Law Review Process (1995) 
The Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry initiated a process to review all water related 
legislation in May 1994. Seetal and Quibell (2005), argue that the critical starting point in 
the Water Law Review Process was political leadership and the demonstration of a 
political will to effect change in water resources management and water services 
provision. Improving access to water for domestic uses by the millions of South Africans 
was a priority for the democratic government due to political, social and democratic 
reform in South Africa, international declarations and the prominence given to 
fundamental human rights and environment related matter during the second half of the 
20th century. The constitution of S.A provided the foundation for the policy and 
legislative framework because the previous water legislation was inadequate (Thompson, 
2006). 
 
Seetal and Quibell (2005) argue that the effectiveness of the Water Law Review Process 
and the success of future water management depended on three critical factors: 
1. The development of policy and legislation needed to be an open  and consultative 
process 
2. Lessons from international, regional and local experiences had to be taken into 
consideration to avoid repeating earlier mistakes 
3. The integration of the water sector and other socio-political and socioeconomic 
development in the country 
 
The Water Law Review Process started in March 1995, with the publication of a booklet 
titled You and Your Water Rights - A Call for Public Response, which was intended to 
stimulate public interest and debate on the subject and to solicit comments (Seetal and 
Quibell, 2005:156).  
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The public comments were then incorporated into a set of principles developed by a 
Water Law Review Panel. Public consultation session were held and principles to guide 
the drafting of the new water law were finalised and published as the Fundamental 
Principles and Objectives for a New Water Law for South Africa, which was approved by 
government’s cabinet in November 1996 (Seetal and Quibell, 2005:156, Thompson, 
2006). The Fundamental Principles and Objectives for a New Water Law for South 
Africa defines 28 principles within the categories of legal aspects of water (principles 1-
4), the water cycle (principles 5-6), water resources management priorities( principles 7-
11), water resources management approaches (principles 12-21), water institutions 
(principles 22-24), and water services (principles 25-28). The principles and objectives 
led to the publishing of the White Paper on National Water Policy (NWP) outlining the 
direction for the development of the water law and water management systems for the 
new South Africa. The NWA was drafted and enacted in 1998 based on these principles 
and objectives to give effect to the NWP. The WSA was drafted at the same time as the 
NWP and it was enacted in 1997.  
8.2.3. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) 
The constitutional clauses relating to water give every person a fundamental right to an 
environment that is not harmful to his or her well being, and requires the environment to 
be protected for the benefit of the present and future generations, through reasonable 
legislative and other measures that secure ecologically sustainable development and use 
of natural resources while promoting justifiable economic and social development 
(Section 24 (a) and (b) (iii)) of the constitution.  The South African constitution, section 
25 (4) (a), commits the South African nation to land reform and to reforms that bring 
about equitable access to all South Africa’s natural resources, including water resources. 
Section 25 (8) further states that the state must take legislative and other measures to 
achieve such reform in order to redress the results of past racial discrimination.  Section 
27 sub section 1 (one) states that everyone has the right to have access to sufficient food 
and water and that the state must make reasonable legislation to achieve realization of 
these rights.  However noble these constitutional clauses, they faced some criticism for 
focusing redress (and reform) on past racial imbalances without giving much thought and 
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consideration for endemic and persistent gender discrimination in water access 
(Thompson, 2006:138. cited in Masangu, 2008:27).  Schreiner et al (2004) were more 
positive about gender in the legal texts.    
 
According to Thompson (2006), the constitution grants a right of access to sufficient 
water (i.e. quantity) and not a right to adequate water (i.e. quality). This right does not 
mean the provision of water in all households or for all undertakings, but at least access 
by all persons to long-term sustainable provision of a level of water supply, and basic 
minimum, potable water close to all households. Thompson (2006) argues that “the 
extent of state duties differs according to the economic resource available to different 
sectors of the population, those with sufficient economic means already have access to 
sufficient water as they could afford to pay water services providers to provide it to them, 
therefore, the different spheres of government should direct their attention to those 
without the necessary means and without access to water”. In order to ensure that this 
right is realized progressively, the state must implement reasonable legislative and other 
measures, and ensure that its water delivery programmes enable local governments to 
deliver potable water services within the necessary support from the provincial 
government.  
8.2.4. The Water Services Act (No 108 of 1997) 
The Water Services Act (WSA) was promulgated in 1997 before the National Water Act 
(NWA) was drafted, due to urgent need to tackle the backlog in rural drinking water 
supply inherited from the apartheid era, especially in the former homelands (van Koppen 
et al., 2002).  The Act recognises that water services should be undertaken in a manner 
consistent with the broader goals of water resources management, but as noted by 
Soussan et al (2002), there are areas of uncertainty in the overlap of the WSA and the 
NWA.  The WSA establishes the management of water services through the structures of 
local government which do not coincide spatially with the hydrological divisions made 
for water resources management in the NWA, and this raises problems of uncertainties 
over responsibilities and limitations to capacities at all levels especially within local 
government. Nicol and Mtisi (2003) argue that these uncertainties suggest a need for 
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more flexible boundary demarcation and the capacity to change according to the 
problems and needs as they arise. 
 
Van Koppen et al (2002) argue that the decision to promulgate the Water Services Act 
before the National Water Act may lead to an artificial separation of water used for 
domestic and productive purposes. In this separation there are presumptions that water 
resources could be managed by ignoring domestic uses of the same water source (van 
Koppen et al., 2002). Van Koppen et al further argue that there are assumptions that local 
government, with support from the Department of Water Affairs (DWA), is solely 
responsible for meeting domestic water needs of the poor and that institutions such as 
Catchment Management Agencies (CMAs) and Water User Associations (WUAs) are 
concerned with “Water Resource Management” and can ignore domestic water needs of 
the poor (2002).  This separation may be justified in areas that domestic water needs are 
well catered for, but would risk alienating all those South Africans whose domestic water 
needs remain unmet from mainstream water management. 
 
The Act was also drafted before the local government transformation process was 
finalised and the Strategic Framework for Water Services was published, and Thompson 
(2006) argue that the Act should now be amended to reflect the outcome of this process 
and framework. Institutional reform in communal areas combined with the overall shift 
from central government to decentralized local government-based provision of services, 
results in what Nicol and Mtisi (2003) describe as a scramble for responsibilities and 
control by different institutional actors.  
8.2.5. The Strategic Framework for Water Services (2003) 
The White Paper on Water Supply and Sanitation published in 1994 recognised that all 
South Africans have the right to a healthy environment and that it is the intention of 
Government to create the enabling environment necessary to ensure that all South 
Africans have access to acceptable levels of water supply and sanitation. According to 
Thompson (2006), much has been achieved since then and the white paper played a key 
part in creating an enabling environment. The white paper was focused on the 
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establishment of a new national water services function and on the role of National 
Government in assuming a direct delivery function to provide basic water and sanitation 
services rapidly to people primarily living in rural areas.   Since 1994, the context has 
changed significantly and the white paper was replaced by the Strategic Framework for 
Water Services of 2003. The Strategic Framework provides a comprehensive summary of 
policy with respect to water services sector in South Africa and a strategic framework for 
its implementation over the next 10 years. The framework sets out a comprehensive 
approach to the provision of water services to eliminate backlogs in basic water services 
and improving the levels of service over time. The framework focuses on institutional 
reform of water services provision.   
 
The strategic framework for water services states that “water programmes should be 
designed to support sustainable livelihoods and local economic development”. According 
to the framework (2003) the provision of water supply services has significant potential 
to alleviate poverty through the creation of jobs, use of local resources, and provision of a 
long-term livelihood for many households. 
The purpose of the strategic framework is to articulate a national vision for the water 
services sector41 and it stipulates the following core goals: 
 All people have access to an appropriate, acceptable, safe and affordable basic supply.  
 All people are educated in healthy living practices and the wise use of water. 
 Water services are provided equitably, affordably, effectively, efficiently, and in a 
sustainable manner with gender sensitivity.     
 All Water Services Authorities are accountable to their citizens, have adequate 
capacity to make wise choices and able to regulate services provision effectively. 
 The price of water services reflects the fact that it is a social and economic good. 
 Basic services would be subsidized. 
 
                                                 
41 Water services refer to water supply and sanitation services and include regional water schemes, local 
water schemes, on-site sanitation and the collection and treatment of wastewater. The SFWS also has 
productive uses, for example the notion of climbing the water ladder for multiple uses is worthwhile to 
mention here. 
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The Strategic Framework for Water Services (SFWS) of 2003 also states that “DWAF 
water services assets will have to be transferred to water service authorities with the 
Department of Provincial and Local government regulating and overseeing the activities 
of local government”.  This call for change is amplified in Sekororo between the local 
municipality and the local offices of the DWA as a result of duplicity of duties and 
bottlenecks in integrating the two institutions as presented in chapters 5 and 6. 
8.2.6. The National Water Act (No 36 of 1998) 
The purpose of the NWA is to ensure that the nation’s water resources are protected, 
used, developed, conserved, managed, and controlled in ways which take into account the 
following factors amongst others: meeting basic human needs; equitable access to water; 
redressing the results of past racial and gender discrimination; Promoting the efficient, 
sustainable, and beneficial use of water in the public interest; facilitating social and 
economic development; providing for growing demand for water use.  The National 
Water Act led to the abolishment of the former system of permanent riparian rights and 
its replacement with a system of water management authorities which would serve as the 
custodian of the nation’s water resources (van Koppen et al., 2002; 2003).    
 
The National Water Act (1998) emphasizes equity in access to water resources, benefits 
and services, particularly for those who have not benefited from the country’s water 
resources, such as women and the poor. Prasad et al (2006) note that the S.A water laws 
necessitate looking at equity in relation to “access to the desired quantity, quality, and 
reliability of water resources; access to safe and clean drinking water and sanitation 
services; and access to direct and indirect benefits or impacts, including from cooperation 
from others, from the use of water resources”.  Even though the stated objective of the 
Act is to redress past inequities, van Koppen et al (2002;  2003) argue that the status quo 
of the apartheid era remains unaltered in two important ways: in terms of existing lawful 
water use and the composition of the civil service. Existing water use refers to situations 
whereby water users that were drawing water for productive uses and had legal rights 
(e.g. riparian rights, or permits) to do so two years before the new Act was promulgated, 
will retain this right. The Act thus accepts the inequities prevailing at that time. 
 
 
 
 
 225
Inhabitants of the ex-homelands generally do not have any documents to prove existing 
lawful water use, but they can refer to the notions of use and quantity embedded in what 
are typically verbal contracts or local water tenure arrangements. The composition of the 
civil service is relevant because there were no retrenchments in the government 
administrative service nation-wide. 
  
The NWA recognises the need to establish suitable water management institutions to be 
able to achieve the purpose of the NWA. The Act defines water management institutions 
as Catchment Management Agency (CMA), a water user association (WUA), a body 
responsible for international water management or any person who fulfils the function of 
a water management institution in terms of the Act. The aim of the NWA is to establish a 
CMA in all the 19 Water Management Areas (WMA) of South Africa. The purpose of 
establishing a CMA is to delegate water resource management to the regional or 
catchment level and to involve local communities, within the framework of the National 
Water Resource Strategy (NWRS). WUAs will enable individual water users who wish to 
undertake water-related activities for their own benefit to form cooperative associations.  
 
The establishment of CMAs requires the participation of stakeholders in the management 
of water resources at ground level. The governing bodies of these institutions should be 
representative in terms of including sections of the population that were previously 
unrepresented in governance forums, especially black people and women (van Koppen et 
al., 2002 and 2003). Van Koppen et al (2002) argue that even if composition of the 
governing board is equitable, the issue is how the CMA will deal with the fact that only a 
limited group of water users in the water management area will be reached in the process 
of establishing the CMA. According to van Koppen et al (2002), to overcome the above 
issue of representation, the CMA should have a well designed process to institutionalize 
public participation according to the subsidiary principle, so as to ensure the historically 
marginalized are empowered, and should coordinate water management planning and 
implementation with government structures at local, district, provincial, and national 
levels.  The approach to establishing water user associations is three-pronged: The 
transformation of existing irrigation boards to WUAs; the conversion of government 
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irrigation water schemes to WUAs; and the establishment of new WUAs (Schreiner et 
al., 2004). 
 
The four types of water authorisations, as we noted before in chapter 5 and worth 
repeating here, are Schedule One, General Authorisations, Existing Lawful Uses and 
Water Use Licences.  Schedule One describes permissible uses of water that do not 
require a licence and do not have to be registered. Water use activities that fall under 
Schedule One include those that, due to the small quantities used, have a very small 
impact on the water resource and therefore pose minimal or no risk. The uses that are 
covered under Schedule One are indicated in Box 8.1. 
 
 
Box 8.1: Schedule One water uses 
 
1. Taking water directly from any water source for domestic use in households
provided that water users have lawful access to that water; 
2. Storing and using run-off water from a roof; 
3. Small gardening that is not for commercial use; 
4. Watering animals for subsistence use; 
5. Using the water surface or surrounding land for recreational use; and 
6. Using water for emergencies, such as firefighting and drought relief. 
 
 
 Despite the identification of the list of water uses under Schedule One use it is 
significant that there has been no official mention of the quantities that are involved. The 
discourse around Schedule One water use is that people are not informed and that the 
water is not significant.  The preoccupation is with large water use for which numerous 
studies, time and money is spent. 
 
General Authorisations are permissions that allow slightly larger volumes of water use 
from less stressed sources, such as rivers and aquifers. Such authorisations allow people 
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to use water without a licence provided that the water use is within the conditions 
stipulated in the General Authorisation. For example, limits are placed on water use 
depending on the nature of use and the capacity of the resource to accommodate use 
without significant degradation. Examples of general authorizations include abstracting a 
limited amount of water from certain rivers and groundwater sources as well as storing a 
limited quantity of water in a dam. The authorisations are granted by the Minister and 
published in the Government Gazette. In view of the wide range of water use activities 
and the logistical implications of registering myriad of individual water users, general 
authorisations are used as strategies to cut down on unnecessary administrative efforts. 
General authorisations may also attach conditions relating to water management 
activities, such as monitoring and reporting, in accordance with Section 29 of the 
National Water Act.  Significantly there is a reluctance to give a blanket generalization 
for example for a communal area. It appears that providing water to communities under 
Schedule one and General Authorisations is of nuisance value to policy implementors, 
something that cannot be wholly ignored because it exists in law but is not pursued with 
any conviction, at least in stressed catchments. This is ironical given the potential such 
water can contribute to improving rural livelihoods.  
 
Water licences are mechanisms for regulating water use that exceeds the limits outlined 
in Schedule One and general authorizations, and apply to any new (post-1998) water use 
that is not covered by Schedule One or General Authorizations. Water licences give 
existing and new water users formal authorization to use water for productive and 
beneficial purposes, and specify the conditions under which the water can be used. 
Licences are issued by ‘responsible authorities’ namely, the Department of Water Affairs 
(DWA) or catchment management agencies (CMAs) as indicated earlier on. Currently, 
the licensing procedure requires new and potential water users to apply for a licence or to 
register their water use with the responsible authority namely, the Regional Office of 
DWA. This regulatory function is envisaged to devolve to CMAs when these become 
fully operational.  The Olifants CMA under which quaternary B72A and B72C in 
Sekororo falls is not yet operationalised, except that mainly the Limpopo Regional Office 
of DWA is seen as proto-CMA. 
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8.2.7. The Municipal Structures Act (1998) and the Municipal Systems 
Act (2000) 
Past policies left a legacy of gross inequities in municipal services. Before 1994, 
municipalities served the former white areas while rural areas were served by regional 
services councils and separate structures were responsible for service delivery to black 
people in the former homelands. The Municipal Structures Act (1998) states that “there 
was a need to develop a democratic and developmental local government in which 
municipalities could fulfill their constitutional obligations to ensure sustainable, effective 
and efficient municipal services, promote social and economic development, encourage a 
safe and healthy environment by working with communities in creating environments and 
human settlements in which all south Africans can lead uplifted and dignified lives”. This 
led to the enactment of the Municipal Structures Act (Act no 117) of 1998 and the 
Municipal Systems Act (Act no 32) of 2000. The Municipal Structures Act and the 
Municipal Systems Act define the structures and approaches to developmental local 
government. The purpose of the Municipal Structures Act, amongst others was to provide 
for the establishment of municipalities in accordance with requirements relating to 
categories and types of municipalities (Masangu, 2008).  In tandem with the Water 
Services Act and the National Water Act, the Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 makes 
the preparation of an Integrated Development Plan (IDP) a legal requirement on the part 
of municipalities.  Reform of water services delivery is thus directly related to the 
successful transformation of local government in South Africa.  Integrated development 
planning by district and local municipalities is highly problematic and complex owing to 
high prevalence of poverty in these constituencies, rendering water service delivery one 
of the most prioritised needs. 
8.3. Implementation Process, Experiences and Challenges to 
Date 
Before the National Water Act of 1998, South Africa had a patchwork of plural legal 
systems: riparian rights, Government Water Control Areas, permits for e.g., forestry, and 
customary water rights in former homelands (Van Koppen, 2010). The new Act 
recognized all ‘existing lawful uses’ (as fiercely negotiated by the vested users, see also 
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De Lange, 2004) and introduced permits only for all new uses. Van Koppen (2010:16) 
highlighted that although some existing uses needed to be regulated as well, the 
assumption that one first needs to change a legal system into permits before one can 
regulate did exist in South Africa. Registration of existing uses, whether lawful or not, 
was made obligatory in 1999. This information fed into a data base primarily designed 
for information collection and billing purposes. In this data base, over 63,000 individual 
and organized water users (out of a population of 47 million) are registered. Revenue 
collection among the large-scale users is improving, also because the administration for 
invoicing partly draws from these registrations. However, the line between obligations 
such as registration and payment and a legal claim is thin. Initially, some officials and 
registered users assumed that registration and payment were the initial steps to convert 
their existing lawful use into the first-class entitlement of a permit. This invoked the 
Department of Water Affairs to be even more explicit about the disconnection between 
fulfilling regulatory obligations like registering and payment and any legal claims.  
 
The National Water Resource Strategy started with an impressive participatory process 
from 2002-2004 with some provision for revision settled through donor-funded internal 
debate on Water for Growth and Development.  The legal and policy provision for the 
establishment of CMAs brought with it a lot of promise to fill the institutional challenges 
of making a balance between vested users, but more and more DWA and also efforts to 
become more equitable.  In the beginning, there was an active start, but soon pace slowed 
down with only a few CMAs functioning.  There was apparent lack of powers for the 
newly establishing institutions.  In most of the CMAs, or rather designated CMAs, the 
Department of Water Affairs (DWA) remains proto-CMA.  By proto-CMA, the regional 
office becomes the stand-in CMA in place of the originally planned and yet to be 
implemented CMA.  The chief director for Polokwane Regional Office put it succinctly 
“I am the proto-CMA for Olifants.  That means I am the chairman, the board and the 
secretary”42.  He reiterated that from 2007 debates about ‘institutional alignment’ with 
proposed 9 CMAs attached to the 9 Regional Offices have gained momentum.  There is 
                                                 
42 Discussion with the Chief Director for DWA Regional Offices Limpopo, Monday 15th December 2008. 
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also a call for politico-administrative water management zones rather than purely 
hydrological catchments as planned originally.   
 
The administrative proficiency of the different stakeholders in the water sector in South 
Africa grossly differs. Large-scale users, primarily commercial farmers, metropoles, 
industries, electricity and mines, are better informed about procedures and know the 
formal language of the application forms and how to fill-in or complete the forms. They 
are mobile and well connected to relevant officials and to their own broad network. They 
have bank accounts and are able to smoothly pay any fees. If needed, they can hire 
consultants and lawyers to carry out the job and hold government accountable, also on 
administrative procedures.  Van Koppen (2010:13) observes that “In South Africa, for 
example, the tail is wagging the dog with many large-scale users submitting complaints 
to the Water Tribunal regarding permit applications. Informal small-scale users lack these 
attributes”.  
 
South Africa is most explicit in its policy goal of redressing inequities from the past and 
allowing, under certain conditions, taking water from the ‘haves’ to allocate to the ‘have-
nots’ to that end. The vested large-scale users endorsed the conversion of existing lawful 
uses into permit systems as the supposedly only way to achieve this goal. Costly pilot 
efforts of such area-specific ‘compulsory licensing’ projects since 2003 are stalled and 
not a single drop has been re-allocated for historical justice. Moreover, out of the 1304 
permits for new water uses that were allocated between 1998 and 2008, only 2.5 percent 
were for Historically Disadvantaged Individuals.43 All other licenses were for white-
controlled enterprises. Only recently, the much more readily available regulatory options 
for the state, as custodian of all water resources, receive somewhat more attention. 
Straightforward options, that merely need political will and enforcement capacity, are to 
prioritize new water uses by HDIs and to reduce the assurance of supply of vested users 
in physically stressed basins. 
 
                                                 
43 P. Dlamini and M. Msibi. Compulsory licensing. Draft report. (Pretoria: Water Research Commission 
South Africa 2009).  
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Against this background, governments lack the capacity and resources to process many 
permits. This administrative limitation affects especially the many small-scale users, who 
add most to these burdens, while the volume of these uses is typically seen as 
‘insignificant’. So, not for their own fault, small-scale users have less access to the 
possibility to obtain entitlements. Exempting de minimis uses limits these administrative 
burdens for water uses that hardly impact on the overall water resources. As mentioned, 
the South African Water Act goes a step further and also provides for so-called ‘General 
Authorisations’.44 These are blanket authorisations for water uses in a certain area or by 
certain users. The thresholds are far above the de minimis uses, which are called Schedule 
One uses in South Africa. General Authorisations further reduce the administrative 
burdens for the Department of Water Affairs. However, while this alleviates the logistic 
chores of government, the question is what exemptions mean for the water users 
affected?  It would seem, as shall be argued in later sections, that exemptions for 
Schedule One uses have become the excuse for government not to invest in developing 
water infrastructure for the majority, what van Koppen calls ‘increasing the size of the 
pie’ rather than continuously trying to share a small pie amongst many stakeholders.  
People rightly see it as a second-class entitlement of little legal use when it really matters 
owing to its lack of priority within the reforms. 
 
Changes in the way water rights are allocated may have negative impacts on those that 
were using water beneficially and in such situations, a person may claim compensation 
for any financial loss suffered in consequence via the Water Tribunal (NWA sections 22 
(67) and 43-48).  Van Koppen et al (2003) argues that “the inclusion of the above clause 
weakens the possibility of reallocating water, but there is a safeguard built into the Act 
that exempts payment of this compensation if the reallocation was for: “providing for the 
reserve, rectifying an over allocation of water use from the resource in question, or to 
rectify an unfair or disproportionate water use”. Compulsory licensing is in its early 
stages but Schreiner et al. (2004) believe that it is the most powerful tool in achieving 
                                                 
44 Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, Assignment to develop and test methodologies for 
determining resource specific General Authorizations under the National Water Act, prepared by Ninham 
Shand (Pty) Ltd and Umvoto Africa and Synergistics Environmental Services for Director, Water 
Allocation, Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, South Africa, November 2006, 
WFSP/WRM/CON6002.  
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equity in access to water and in ensuring that water is used optimally in achieving both 
black empowerment and poverty eradication. Van Koppen et al., 2003, argue that 
compulsory licensing will be highly effective and necessary to regulate a small number of 
high volume users, but it is inappropriate to know current water use by a majority of 
small-scale users or to provide any legal protection against efforts of high volume users 
to forcibly continue control over scarce resources. 
 
Despite the enabling framework provided by legislation and policy, and the wide 
recognition of the need to redress past imbalances in access to water, and to democratise 
water management institutions, experience to date has shown the difficulties of ensuring 
full participation in these institutions (Schreiner et al., 2004; Anderson, 2005; Masangu, 
2008). Full participation by the historically disadvantaged is hindered by a lack of public 
awareness among those who do not have access to communication technologies and 
electricity (Schreiner et al., 2004, Anderson, 2005). According to Schreiner et al., (2004), 
the major challenge in terms of participation in many rural areas has been how to involve 
poor communities and in particular women. Many members of these communities feel 
disadvantaged as the process is new for them, and they may not have the background 
information that other representatives (e.g. commercial farmers, mining and industrial) 
have on water management. The meetings for the establishment of the various CMAs 
currently initiated are often not easily accessible (Anderson, 2005; Nicol and Mtisi, 
2003). Effective participation by HDIs requires more than just getting the parties to the 
table and the mere presence of representatives of poor communities is not an indication of 
their involvement in the participatory or decision-making processes (Karar, 2003 cited in 
Faysse 2004; Schreiner et al., 2004, Anderson, 2005).  But how are such processes 
facilitated? Anderson (2005) argues that there is a need for communication strategies that 
will empower and engage all sectors due to the range of cultures involved in the process.  
Our fieldwork observations in Olifants catchment, especially regarding local government 
as there is no CMA as yet, will help highlight some of these challenges and processes. 
 
Another challenge in the formation of the institutions is that of power imbalances. 
Dominance and power by those who controlled water in the apartheid era continues. 
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Commercial farmers and irrigation boards are in a potentially strong negotiating position 
to influence the direction of the CMA while the disadvantaged communities continue to 
suffer from significant power imbalances in knowledge and expertise (see van Koppen et 
al., 2002  2003; Anderson, 2005; Masangu, 2008:36). Anderson (2005) argues that in 
order to make catchment management work and to truly empower the poor, the water 
sector in South Africa needs to build techniques to transform the most powerful actors to 
understand the needs of the poor and marginalized and that this issue is often overlooked 
amongst competing research agendas. Anderson (2005) observed that ‘an analysis of 
power dynamics within the water sectors would make a valuable contribution to South 
Africa’s water management discourse and would require a combined effort from DWA, 
research institutions and water management practitioners’.  The following section will 
highlight some of the nuanced observations from the field in Sekororo on how the water 
reform is panning out.   
8.4. Local Government and Water Service Delivery: “Policy is 
DWA…and Implementation is Municipality” 
8.4.0. Issues, Observations and Experiences from Olifants Catchment 
Pursuant to the Water Services Act, the water and sanitation functions are the 
responsibility of local government in South Africa.  However local government structures 
lack resources, institutional capacity and the necessary skills to undertake appropriate 
planning.  They often operate in the contexts of extreme poverty and marginalisation 
where development needs and expectations are the greatest.  With the establishment of 
the new municipalities in 2000, many of the provisions with regard to water service 
institutions came into effect.  The two municipalities in the study area, Mopani District 
municipality and the Maruleng local municipality began implementing the new water 
service provision mandate.  Water needs are taken into account in the drafting of specific 
proposals for development projects within each municipality’s Integrated Development 
Plan (IDP).  Municipalities secure financing for water resource development from the 
Municipal Infrastructure Grant Fund of the Department of Provincial and Local 
Government, and the Independent Development Trust among other sources.      
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The Mopani District Municipality embarked on a water treatment, reticulation and supply 
project for water provision to the greater Sekororo communal areas.  The project dubbed 
Mametja-Sekororo Regional Water Scheme started six years ago but only gained 
momentum last year with the laying of reticulation pipes and the construction of the 
treatment works at the Oaks in Sekororo.  The project is complex in infrastructure 
development and maintenance, requires high administrative skills, long-term planning 
and wide stakeholder participation.  It remains to be seen how the project evolves from 
planning to implementation and operationalisation.  However, based on our observation 
and tracking of the project thus far, there are many challenges that need to be sorted out 
regarding payment of services, stakeholder consultations and representations, and 
maintenance servicing and cost recovery plan.  Local residents in Sekororo are hardly 
aware of the project apart from seeing the contractor at work with the reticulation line.  
Payment for services remains a central challenge in both district and local municipalities, 
especially for the rural residents, and is one of the major reasons for tensions with 
consumers. The emphasis on developmental governance encouraged the South African 
government to delegate control of water service delivery to local municipalities.  This 
seems appropriate in spite of the many problems associated with a lack of municipal 
capacity and non-payment by consumers.  The focus, on the part of local government 
(district and local municipality) in the Olifants catchment, as elsewhere in South Africa, 
is shifting from water infrastructure development and improvement to recovering 
payment for these services.  The Mopani district municipality and the Maruleng local 
municipality are struggling to cope with water delivery due to low skills and institutional 
capacity. 
 
Technical expertise for the bulk supplies is already limited and fully in hands of private 
firms, and there is no technical support, neither for domestic nor productive, for the small 
scale users who will not be able to invest themselves at further scale.  Water service 
delivery that focuses primarily on physical planning at the broader scale tends to lack the 
necessary sense of local ownership by stakeholders, hence, chances are high that 
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infrastructure vandalism and neglect that occurred during the apartheid era and continued 
post-1994 might persist despite massive capital expenditures by municipalities.   
 
8.4.1. “If Water Service Provider or Municipality cannot supply water 
– they must go” 
At a water workshop held at the Water Research Commission on 24 June 2010, attended 
by senior DWA officers and representatives of communities the question came up where 
one participant asked, “What is the responsibility of DWA?” The response came from 
senior DWA representative “To allocate water, but who should ensure that allocation is 
taken up? It is the role of other departments.  In the past, we tried to work with the 
department of agriculture but maybe we did not try hard enough”.  This sort to reiterate 
the point that water supply in a community or to communities is the responsibility of 
local government and other line departments such as agriculture.  However, a community 
representative retorted “Its water, so it should be DWA, DWA is water”.  This prompted a 
response from the newly re-named department of Cooperative Governance and 
Traditional Affairs (COGTA) who pointed out that “…we are aware of instances where 
communities went for more than four days without water.  This can not be tolerated.  
Municipalities often give lame excuses.  If water service providers or municipality cannot 
supply water they must go…they can no longer be tolerated”.  
 
This happens in a context where 60% of allocable water should be in black hands by 
2024 as planned and envisaged by government (DWA, 2006; Van Koppen, 2007).  Also 
mentioned already in Van Koppen (2007) and at the workshop stated above, there is a lot 
of pressure for municipalities to deliver services to frustrated residents of poor 
communities where expectations are very high.  Where district and local municipalities 
fail to deliver water service, the COGTA representative further explained that the 
provincial government will take away sanitation, water, municipal health services and 
electricity.  The COGTA is a player within the institutional set up in the water sector.  
The renaming of the department from department of provincial and local government to 
cooperative governance and traditional affairs emphasizes the aim to bring back 
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coherence into the governance system and get area-wide sector agreements.  After 
questions and fears were raised that the provinces are going to be too powerful, the 
COGTA representative euphemistically responded “It is centralisation for better 
decentralisation…it is not about making provinces more powerful but more 
interventionist and responsive”.   There were also clarifications if not more confusion 
about the IDPs and Provincial Growth and Development Strategies (PGDS) which are the 
basis for local government operations.  One outcome that was very clear from the 
meeting was that there is no firm engagement between and among government 
departments that are suppose to cooperate for development and service delivery, where 
provinces did not have better (clear) engagement with district and local municipalities 
and vice versa, let alone engagement with other government departments and service 
providers.  This is a vacuum that not only Sekororo experiences, but a creation of the 
learning curve given that the notion of local government is still relatively young in South 
Africa, basically since 2000, and such hiccups are bound to happen. 
 
8.4.2. Who is the driver of what is needed and where? 
There is acknowledgement that there is a rift between DWA and Maruleng municipality 
in the region generally characterised by mistrust, resentment and suspicion, where DWA 
members feel that the municipality water services department should be integrated into 
DWA and not the other way round.  DWA is still the water services provider in the area.  
The DWA still has full responsibility for operation and maintenance of most essential 
water infrastructure: elevated tanks, jojo tanks, concrete reservoirs, reticulation, main 
pipeline and boreholes.  This is despite the official narrative from the Maruleng 
municipality that DWA had already been integrated into the municipality water services 
section45.  According to the law the municipality is responsible for taking care of the 
reticulation and use of water, not DWA. 
  
The municipality (district and local) is responsible for taking care of the reticulation and 
use of water, not DWA. DWA is only responsible for filling up the tanks and maintaining 
                                                 
45 Interviews with Mr Maluleke DWA local office manager 4th December 2008; and Mr T.W. Moagi & Mr 
K.B. Bambisa at the DWA Oaks offices in Sekororo. 
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the equipment such as boreholes and storage reservoirs.  This has often led to allegations 
and counter-allegations between DWA and the municipality.  The DWA narrative claims 
the municipality is not planning properly and is inherently inefficient.  The manager of 
DWA at the Oaks claimed as noted earlier elsewhere “I’ve never seen a project put in 
place by municipality from A to Z which works and is sustainable. They invested in 
storage tanks and boreholes without testing the water or purchasing the pumps.  
Municipality is even failing to pay the electricity bill. They have a tank that they used 
only for funerals. ‘Why should I have to die to get water? Maybe I died because I was 
thirsty”.  The counter-narrative is that the municipality claims that it wants changes and 
is keen to re-allocate water for multiple uses, and not only for domestic uses, yet the 
DWA seems less interested apparently because it wants water to remain in the same 
hands.  There is a strong belief within the municipality that there is a big difference 
between political promises and concrete service delivery issues, and the province for 
water service delivery falls within its constituency, and legally so.  The municipality on 
the other hand does not have the skill-set and capacity to rollout the water delivery 
system.     
 
The on-going Sekororo-Mametja regional water supply scheme meant to ease water 
problems has already created some antagonism between the two arms of government.  
According to DWA, the infrastructure, planning, financial and capital costs for the 
project are sole responsibility of the municipality.  DWA will only take over the 
operation and maintenance of the project after the construction and installation by the 
municipality. The water services technical manager at Maruleng municipality asked a 
poignant question, thus: “If operation and maintenance of existing infrastructure is 
questionable and liable to neglect and vandalism, what guarantee is there that the 
Sekororo-Mametja water supply project (pipes and accessories) will be treated 
differently?”  A closer analysis reveals that the challenge in Sekororo is not lack of 
infrastructure but there is lack of capacity and coordination to maintain what is there, and 
the ability to synchronize institutional efforts by fragmented and competing sectors.  It 
also becomes apparent that the new structures and institutions (DWA and municipality) 
are not necessarily new in terms of water management; rather they are more pronounced 
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as new institutions of power.  In light of the above, and pursuant to hydraulic property 
rights creation, the question arises, who safeguards the property, DWA or municipality?  
It would seem that property rights in this context are a battleground for powerful and 
technical people to assert their authority in determining the outcome of communal 
infrastructure investments on behalf of the users.  This in turn serves to highlight the 
institutional malady that exists within the water sector in South Africa from the user level 
to the intermediate level. 
8.4.3. Service Delivery, Water Sector and Local Government: 
Reverting to Semantics 
Realising the growing pressure and frustrations by communities owing to the slow pace 
of service delivery, residents in some urban and peri-urban municipalities in South Africa 
took to the streets and demonstrated, often damaging property and infrastructure in the 
process.    With regard to water, people stress the lack of money to improve their access 
and mainly think about individual options to improve their access when they can afford 
them (individual storage, private boreholes). They do not seem to believe in collective 
solutions and are quite hopeless about institutions or actors who are supposed to help 
them especially at the intermediate level: water committee, ward councillor, local and 
district municipality, owing to repeated frustations with failed promises on service 
delivery. One reason could be that for years, the solutions implemented at the village and 
intermediate level by the previous government (under homelands) and by district and 
local municipalities, have failed to meet people’s demand and expectations that were 
raised at the attainment of democracy in 1994.  The demonstrations against service 
delivery failures did not only embarrass the government, but also pushed the government 
to act by firing and replacing incompetent and corrupt municipalities.  That seemed more 
like treating symptoms rather than providing a cure; hence, at their recent meeting in 
Durban, delegates attending the ANC national general council felt that the use of the term 
"service delivery" should be stopped because it inculcated a sense of entitlement among 
people46.  Delegates raised concerns that the term should no longer be used because it 
encourages dependency. The term, delegates argued, makes people believe that they will 
                                                 
46 News24, in an article by Bongani Mthembu, 24/09/2010. 
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get everything from government," said Bathabile Dlamini, African National Congress 
(ANC) national executive committee member.  She elaborated thus "South Africans were 
mobilised people before 1994. They were hard workers but that has changed.  They are 
now demobilised because they think that government will do everything for them. They 
don't contribute anything. They destroy what they have when they demand something". 
 
It is one thing acknowledging past mistakes as government departments but there is need 
to do a postmortem in order to learn from past mistakes.  Indeed, 15 years into democracy 
and one decade after the NWA, small-scale productive water uses in South Africa occur 
in spite of government neglect.  They also occur in response to government’s blatant 
failures to develop water infrastructure, and is often associated with the previous 
government, deeply mistrusted by the people for not prioritising the HDIs. This is 
compounded by the seemingly lack of an own vision on smallholder agriculture and lack 
of a neutral body (not commercial developers) to engage in an infrastructure development 
agenda.  There is increasingly a complete disappearance of any infrastructure 
development agenda for HDIs for productive uses except rainwater harvesting and RESIS 
as mentioned before.  As if that is not enough, the infrastructure that was functioning 
largely collapsed in former homelands with complete withdrawal of any 
management/subsidy.  Dealing with such issues is beyond the capacity of the 
municipalities (district and local), hence the growing interest and involvement of the 
provincial government in infrastructure development and service delivery.  The COGTA 
department seems to be making headway in re-introducing the infrastructure development 
agenda for the HDIs. 
8.4.4. “We are a playground…but even a playground is well-looked 
after than we are”  
With all the departments that are supposed to deal with water issues seemingly abstaining 
from responsibility at the user level; it is the users who are left bare.  “We are a 
playground, but even then, a playground is well-looked after than we are”47.  During 
apartheid, water services provided by the government of homelands were limited, when 
                                                 
47 Community representative at the Water Governance Workshop held in Pretoria 24 June 2010. 
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and where they existed, they were only left to rudimentary networks of public standpipes. 
Most of the existing networks in the area were built during the 1980’s, some 
improvements (weirs, reservoirs) and extensions were added after 1994 and beyond.  
During the transition period of  1995-2000 a number of policies were changed by the new 
government (National water Services Act of 1997, National Water Act of 1998), hence 
there was only a slight improvement in water services (only less than 12%) more 
households were connected to private taps in rural areas of Limpopo province. Although 
district and local municipalities argue that one of the main reasons for poor infrastructure 
development and maintenance is the non-payment for water services by communities 
(basically getting free water so the narrative goes), there is a counter-narrative by 
communities who argue that water is not for free: people pay for water either with their 
time, when they have to transport it or by buying storage equipment, paying to connect to 
a network or to drill their own borehole.  These are some of the challenges they face as a 
result of poor management and maintenance of infrastructure by local water service 
providers. 
 
There are various water committees at the local level in Sekororo, yet there is no direct 
and clear linkage with intermediate institutions such as municipalities, where linkages 
exist, they are often weak and do not account to the constituent of water 
users/stakeholders.  This leaves a huge operational void in terms of both scaling up and 
out of the institutional structure.  The institutional structure for water governance in 
South Africa might be best depicted as shown in figure 8.1: 
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Source: adopted and adapted from Benito et al (2010:658) 
8.5. Power, Resources, Knowledge and Interests 
One of the biggest challenges in the formation and implementation of the water 
institutions is that of power imbalances between and among the different stakeholders. 
Dominance and power by those who controlled water in the apartheid era continues. 
Commercial farmers and irrigation boards are in a potentially strong negotiating position 
to influence the direction of the CMA while the disadvantaged communities continue to 
suffer from significant power imbalances in knowledge and expertise ( see van Koppen et 
al., 2002  2003; Anderson, 2005).  As we observed in Sekororo, the downstream furrow 
and pump irrigators seemed powerless to engage and/or confront white commercial 
farmers upstream to discuss the perennial water challenges on a shared river. An analysis 
of power dynamics within the water sectors helps with understanding South Africa’s 
water management discourse.  My observations reveal that although the Mopani district 
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municipality has embarked on infrastructure development for the Mametja-Sekororo 
water scheme, there is still a daunting challenge of negotiating with farmers who hold 
most of the water rights/licenses for the Blyde dam.  To date, progress has been slow 
although negotiations are continuing.  Insiders within the municipality hinted that there is 
firm resistance by the farmers to allow the municipality to draw water from the Blyde. 
 
Within the DWA, from the head-office in Pretoria to regional (provincial) offices and 
local (district and local municipality) level, there seem to be a graduated understanding 
and application of the various policies and laws which makes implementation a 
discretionary choice of the officers on the ground.  Whilst looking for information on the 
Olifants catchment and for quaternary B72A and B72C specifically, I observed that what 
the people at the head-office have are official stand-points, which I would call 
‘politically-correct’ images and reflections of the department.  At the regional and local 
offices, the discourse changes somehow to a more interactive and iterative one.  Apart 
from the foregoing, there is also often conflicting and/or inconsistencies in the data from 
the head-office and from regional and local offices.  During one of the discussions with a 
senior official from the department, he pointed out that “There is bookish information 
that you get in Pretoria at the DWA head-office…and there is real information that you 
get at the regional offices.  We are the information”48.  He further explained that although 
most of the data and information might be at the head-office as well, information and data 
on practical application and implementation of the reform process resides with the 
regional and local offices.  A senior officer at the head-office counter-posed that “… 
regional and local offices cannot do anything without authorisation and permission from 
the head-office, and that all the information and reports from the regional and local 
offices are shared with the head-office which oversees the process nationally, …and that 
the real position and state of water affairs in South Africa can only come from the higher 
offices in Pretoria”49.  We also observed that there is growing uneasiness at local offices 
that the Proto-CMA is too powerful for its own good, where the chief-director has too 
                                                 
48 Personal communication with senior manager for Limpopo Regional Office, Monday 15th December 
2008 
49 Personal communication with a senior DWA official who wanted to remain anonymous, Thursday 18th 
December, 2008. 
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much and disproportionate huge powers for effective roll-out and implementation of 
water reform processes within Limpopo province.  There were allegations that local 
officers are not allowed to make any decisions without first consulting the regional office.  
This, as local officers allege, only serves to slow the pace and timely response to urgent 
needs and requirements by the local people whom the officers are meant to serve.  It 
would seem there is little delegation and devolution of power from the regional offices 
down to the local offices of DWA.   
 
As highlighted earlier, there are power struggles and positioning at the regional and local 
offices as well, both within and between departments responsible for implementation of 
water service delivery.  For example, the infrastructure planning, financial and capital 
costs for the Blyde River water reticulation (the Mametja-Sekororo project) to Sekororo 
are by Maruleng municipality.  When all the construction and installation is completed, 
operation and maintenance becomes the responsibility of DWA50.  This has already 
created some antagonism at the local level with the two departments operating as 
exclusive entities despite the official undertaking and requirement that the local DWA be 
integrated into the municipality water services department.  It would seem that DWA 
officers at the local level are uncomfortable with the sweeping changes reminiscent of the 
local government structures fearing that they would lose their clout and autonomy in 
discharging their duties.  From the local municipality perspective, the integration of 
DWA into the municipality is seen as a progressive goal towards achieving service 
delivery, without emphasising the fact that the municipality would have scored huge 
points in the on-going tussle for power between the two departments.  Although the 
municipal offices and the DWA offices at the Oaks in Sekororo are located within the 
same building, and far from claims of integration, there still seems to be a rift between 
the two.  One of the key reasons is that the DWA officers strongly feel that the 
municipalities (district and local) are primarily driven by political innuendo and pressure 
such that they over-promise to the communities without being realistic about what can be 
achieved within given time frames.  One DWA officer underscored this point, thus, “I 
                                                 
50 Interviews with Mr T W Moagi and Mr K B Bambisa at the DWA Oaks offices, Thursday 4th December 
2008  
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have worked for the department of water affairs for 14 years, and people in the 
department realise the difference between political promises and concrete service 
delivery issues…whereas the municipality is under pressure to promise things that are not 
achievable especially because councillors feel the pressure and/or threat of being voted 
out in the next elections, that is the real challenge”51.  This demonstrates that local 
government structures and departments are embroiled in power fights in the ‘inner 
circles’ with little or no interest in taking any outside ‘collaboration’ for the greater good 
of the constituencies that they are supposed to serve.   
 
On the other hand, the Maruleng municipality water services department officials 
strongly feel that the main challenges being experienced emanate from short-sightedness 
within the local DWA offices, in that they want to continue with only water delivery for 
domestic uses and not broaden to productive uses as well for people to improve their 
livelihoods.  The argument I pose here is that an improvement in water quantity for 
households could make more households use water for multiple uses and hence improve 
the households’ livelihood and ability to pay for water services.  Van Koppen (2010) also 
observed that allowing for small-scale productive uses at and around homesteads can 
bring income that can enhance the sustainability of infrastructure operation, maintenance 
and depreciation. As calculated by Renwick52 (cited in van Koppen, 2010), income from 
productive activities is generally sufficient to repay the investment costs for intermediate 
multiple use within half a year to three years, besides financing operational costs. Thus, 
the provision of water for domestic uses can be cross-subsidised. This financial 
sustainability is especially important for the poorest community members who need such 
services most.   
                                                 
51 Personal communication with DWA officers at the Oaks offices, Thursday 4th December, 2008. 
52 Renwick, M. Multiple Use Water Services for the Poor:  Assessing the State of Knowledge. Winrock 
International, Arlington, VA, USA (2007). Downloadable on internet: 
http://www.winrockwater.org/docs/Final%20Report%20Multiple%20Use%20Water%20Services%20Final
%20report%20feb%2008.pdf 
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8.5.1. Hydrologically-based water governance and politico-
administrative governance: where to CMAs 
A (deliberate or forced) delay in rolling out CMAs full-scale due to administrative and 
capacity issues, are as much a result of challenges to the applicability of hydrological 
basin management versus politico-administrative management and has stagnated the 
reform process in South Africa.  This according to DWA insiders, is a result of the very 
impractical conception of CMAs which threaten to reflect the past (continuing the 
inequitable access to water) upon roll-out rather than the anticipated future of stakeholder 
participation, representation and consultations.  Discussing with and interviewing water 
managers, we observed that the delay also symbolises the realities between the need for 
change in the water sector by some constituents (government and its tripartite alliance 
partners) and the struggle for continuity by those with vested interests (big business, 
mining industry and agriculture).  This apparent stalemate, among other reasons, led to 
delays in the set up of these water management institutions (see Karar, 2003 cited in 
Faysse 2004). By 2003, no CMA had been enacted, and there was only one small holder 
WUA and around 20 WUAs which came from former irrigation boards and one large-
scale non-agricultural WUA (Karar, 2003 cited in Faysse 2004). The first CMA, 
Inkomati, was established in 2004 and became functional in the 2006/2007 financial year 
(DWAF, 2007b).  Although there was a drive for CMA establishment in some water 
management areas, the negotiated change is not that clear-cut.  
 
During the 2005/2006 financial year, nine WUAs were established, six of which were 
new associations and three were transformed irrigation boards (DWAF, 2007b; Masangu, 
2008: 36).  Three of the newly formed WUAs are in Limpopo province and are made up 
of resource poor (read black) farmers only.  The chief director at the Limpopo regional 
office indicated that some of the earliest water user associations (WUAs) were normally 
formed by people who want to protect their own interests and stake in water and 
safeguard against efforts aimed at equitable sharing and redress53.  Amidst these 
challenges, the Olifants CMA is yet to take off the ground.  This is compounded by 
growing debates and calls for institutional alignment (from 2007 onwards) with proposed 
                                                 
53 Interview with Mr Allison Matukane at the Limpopo Regional Offices, 19th July 2006. 
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9 CMAs attached to the 9 Regional Offices across the country.  Hence, in practice, DWA 
remains proto-CMA almost everywhere in South Africa.  There are also no CMA 
strategies, but in meantime DWAF’s own Internal Strategic Perspectives serve as proto-
strategies.  It remains to be seen how the process of institutional alignment will pan out 
but at the moment, one is inclined to infer that the rolling-out of CMAs as typical 
hydrological/catchment basins might not be realised unless drastic action is taken by 
government and other stakeholders.  
 
Another observation we made during fieldwork is that there is a growing uneasiness with 
the use of consultants by the DWA.  Insiders within DWA and some of the consultants 
hinted that the department on its own does not have capacity to perform its functions.  As 
the argument goes, the department is equally not competent to supervise the work done 
by the consultants.  The result has been a perpetuation if not collussion by the 
consultants, not out of bad intentions, to maximise on financial gains from work done for 
the department.  As one consultant who formerly worked for DWA for 17 years remarked  
during an interview “...they did not want to pay us a little more for our skills when we 
were with the department, now they pay a lot more for their ignorance.  A week hardly 
passes without senior members from the department calling me for advice and 
consultations.  What is prevailing at DWA is a system where people are promoted to 
senior positions without the necessary requisite skills and competencies”.  The consultant 
further argued that in most instances, the consultants have to collude in order to help 
shape the agenda of the department especially given that their recommendations are 
usually taken as ‘gospel truth’.  It is this seemingly uncontrollable influence by 
consultants and the budgets used to cover their costs that make some of the DWA 
insiders wonder if the agenda of redressing past imbalances will be met, given that most 
of the consultants are former employees of the department with a large skew of 
dominance by white male consultants, whom they allege did not largely favour 
challenging the staus quo.  However, this does not necessarily mean that one will 
necessarily carry out assignments to the detriment of addressing past racial imbalances.  
When I posed these issues to senior DWA officials in order to get clarity, I was left 
convinced that the issue of consultants dominating the shaping of the agenda and quality 
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of work by the department is a norm rather than an exception.  This does not mean that 
consultants do not deserve fair value for their competencies, rather, the issue borders on 
sustainability and implications on budgetary allocations.  How does the DWA justify the 
continuing existence of poor water (re)allocation to the HDIs given the huge budgets 
spent on consultants?  A DWA insider argued that the issue of use of consultants is not 
only within DWA but endemic within and across different government departments in 
South Africa.  There were also allegations bordering on corruption with regards to the 
awarding of contracts to consultants within the department54, an avenue that I was 
cautioned not to pursue for my personal security and also for purposes of protecting some 
of the insiders that cooperated with me during interviews and discussions.      
8.5.3. Licenses: administrative discrimination and dispossession 
Pertaining to the implementation experiences with regard to general authorisations and 
licenses, we observed that there is a real big rift between the majority small-scale users 
and large scale users in terms of both knowledge and capacity to comprehend with the 
process.  Large-scale users are better informed about procedures and know the formal 
language of the forms and how to fill them as reported earlier.  They are mobile and well 
connected to relevant officials. They have bank accounts and are able to smoothly pay 
any fees. If needed, they can hire consultants and lawyers to carry out the job and hold 
government accountable, also on administrative procedures. Van Koppen (forthcoming, 
2010) sums it well, thus “…In South Africa, for example, the tail is wagging the dog with 
many large-scale users submitting complaints to the Water Tribunal regarding permit 
applications. Informal small-scale users lack these attributes”.  The key observation here, 
as indicated earlier, is that general authorisations and permit systems although well-
intended, have become instruments and elements of administrative discrimination against 
the majority at the expense of the few powerful, experienced and knowledgeable 
stakeholders. 
 
                                                 
54 Some of the alleged corruption was widely reported.  For example see: http://mg.co.za/article/2010-07-
16-water-affairs-leaking-after-probe 
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The South African Water Act provides for so-called ‘General Authorisations’.55 These 
are blanket authorisations for water uses in a certain area or by certain users. The 
thresholds are far above the de minimis uses, which are called Schedule One uses in 
South Africa. General Authorisations, as indicated earlier, further reduce the 
administrative burdens for the DWA. However, while this alleviates the logistic chores of 
government, the question is what exemptions mean for the water users affected.  It is 
apparent that the government lacks the capacity and resources to process many permits. 
This administrative limitation affects especially the many small-scale users, who add 
most to these burdens, while the volume of these uses is typically seen as ‘insignificant’. 
So, not for their own fault, small-scale users have less access to the possibility to obtain 
entitlements. Exempting de minimis uses limits these administrative burdens for water 
uses that hardly impact on the overall water resources.  Van Koppen56 contends that the 
advantage of exemptions from users’ perspective is that it removes the obligation to 
apply for a permit and the disproportionate transaction costs, either to prove the 
legitimacy of existing uses or to take up new uses. If the thresholds are sufficiently high 
to capture most rural customary water uses, General Authorisations could bypass the 
thorny issue on how to convert customary rights into individual permits. To reiterate the 
argument presented earlier, the main question raised, for example in debates on Schedule 
One and especially General Authorisations in South Africa, concerns the legal status of 
these authorisations. Consequently it is feared that exemptions relegate the majority of 
small-scale users, not for their own fault, to a second class entitlement.   
 
Other regulatory goals that invariably emerge in interviews with water managers, concern 
registration of water use to better know the resource to be managed; water allocation in 
the case of water scarcity; and, to a lesser extent, pollution prevention. It is claimed that 
such regulation in a common interest is also in the interest of the poor, who may be most 
                                                 
55 Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, Assignment to develop and test methodologies for 
determining resource specific General Authorizations under the National Water Act, prepared by Ninham 
Shand (Pty) Ltd and Umvoto Africa and Synergistics Environmental Services for Director, Water 
Allocation, Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, South Africa, November 2006, 
WFSP/WRM/CON6002.  
56 In discussions about the experiences and challenges in rolling-out the water reform processes in South 
Africa, in her forthcoming publication “Water Allocation, Customary Practice and the Right to Water: 
Rethinking the Regulatory Model”. 
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affected by e.g., pollution. As a starting point, enforcing a nation-wide entitlement system 
to regulate everybody for any water use is a very drastic measure especially in Southern 
Africa where there was neither any thorough prior analysis of problems nor a menu of 
regulatory options, out of which to choose the most effective one for that problem. 
Similarly, there was -and still is- no quantitative estimate, neither of the numbers of water 
users to regulate or to be exempted for regulation, nor of the volume of their water uses. 
Early implementation experiences reflect the limited success and even the creation of 
new obstacles of enforced permit systems as regulatory tools. 
 
Significantly, for implementing the formal policy goal to re-allocate water from the haves 
to the have-nots, the myth surfaced that one needs to change a legal system before one 
can regulate. For emphasis and as reported earlier, South Africa is most explicit in its 
policy goal of redressing inequities from the past and allowing, under certain conditions, 
taking water from the ‘haves’ to allocate to the ‘have-nots’ to that end. The vested large-
scale users, we noted earlier, endorsed the conversion of existing lawful uses into permit 
systems as the supposedly only way to achieve this goal. Worth repeating here is that 
costly pilot efforts of such area-specific ‘compulsory licensing’ projects since 2003 are 
stalled and not a single drop has been re-allocated for historical justice. Moreover, out of 
the 1304 permits for new water uses that were allocated between 1998 and 2008, only 2.5 
percent were for Historically Disadvantaged Individuals.57 All other licenses were for 
white-controlled enterprises. Only recently, the much more readily available regulatory 
options for the state, as custodian of all water resources, receive somewhat more 
attention. Straightforward options, that merely need political will and enforcement 
capacity, are to prioritize new water uses by HDIs and to reduce the assurance of supply 
of vested users in physically stressed basins. 
8.6. Conclusions 
This chapter explored how and to what extend existing policies, institutions and 
legislation that govern and regulate access to and control over resources influence (and 
                                                 
57 P. Dlamini and M. Msibi. Compulsory licensing. Draft report. (Pretoria: Water Research Commission 
South Africa 2009).  
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are influenced by) hydraulic property creation by providing a critical analyses, outline 
and synopses of the policy, legal, and institutional processes and the environment under 
which they are evolving.  It also demonstrated some of the emerging issues and 
observations from experiences in implementing the policies and legislation thus far.  Key 
broad statements of conclusion that can be drawn from the chapter include:  
 Government still fails to use their powers as owner of the nation’s water resources 
any better yet, more appropriate use of that power remains possible; 
 The prioritization of water uses under the National Water Act needs to be reviewed to 
give priority recognition to and protection of access to water for rural livelihoods; 
 Effective institutional co-ordination between the Departments of Water Affairs, 
national and provincial departments of Agriculture, Land Affairs and Rural 
Development and local government is required and critical in developing a specific 
and co- ordinated approach to ensuring water to poor rural communities within a 
multiple use approach; 
 There is limited vision and technical expertise on the sort of infrastructure that would 
serve the purpose of providing water to rural communities 
 Despite the incursion and onslaught of new policies and legislation, a key feature of 
customary systems (used by the majority of de minimis users is its holistic approach 
to water development and management and the use of multiple sources for multiple 
domestic and productive uses.  
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CHAPTER NINE:   Reflections, Analysis and Implications of 
Water Reform Policies in South Africa 
and Zimbabwe 
9.1. Introduction  
This chapter is designed to provide necessary analytical insights and highlight the major 
discourses and narratives that shape and define the water reform in Zimbabwe and South 
Africa based on data presented in chapters 7 and 8.  It provides a conceptual analysis of 
how property rights are created and transformed through time and how they shape (and 
are shaped by) policy, legislative and institutional processes for governing water 
resources. In this section I go beyond hydraulic property relations to look at some of the 
wider connections and interrelations between (and among) global discourses on broader 
issues of water governance and local realities as governments grapple with issues of 
reforming the water sector from national to local levels.  I demonstrate how these 
discourses are negotiated, contested, and conceptualised by the stakeholders at different 
levels to broaden our understanding of how policies are framed, operationalised and the 
processes involved. 
 
The broader conceptual analysis discussed here is set in the body of cultural and political 
ecological research that has coalesced around a set of ideas drawn from discourse theory, 
critical histories of science, hydraulic property creation and the sociology of 
development.  The chapter considers how African water governance issues are framed 
and the practical implications of received ideas on policy, legislation and institutional 
arrangements. This is done by examining the structural, institutional and scientific origins 
of various narratives that shape and inform water governance discourse. From the early 
days of conquest, colonisation and apartheid, through to post-apartheid and post-colony, 
the persistence of received ideas on the African environment can in part be explained by 
their practical effect in serving the interests of individuals and institutions making up the 
development apparatus.  In contrasting the water governance narratives expressed in 
international (integrated) water resources management documents (concepts, reports and 
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papers) with those of regional and intermediate level institutions, and those of water-user 
representatives at various scale (from village to district to national), it would be 
misleading to suggest that a homogeneous view prevails on either side.     
 
9.2. Reflections on Water Reform in Zimbabwe and South Africa 
Since (current) water reform largely originates in international discourses and policies 
including the Dublin Principles, Agenda 21, inter alia, we will address how these 
international policy changes are being understood and adopted for South Africa and 
Zimbabwe national water policies.  During the 1990s and early 2000s, policy reforms put 
much emphasis on integrated water resources management (IWRM).  The premise 
appeared to have been that if we can get the institutions (laws, regulations, organisations) 
right, the water will easily flow to where it is needed.  Consequently, the two countries 
overhauled their water law and related regulations, and formal water titles were 
introduced, in the form of registered water permits or water rights, as well as water levies 
and fees.  The expectation was that formalising water use and introducing fees would 
stimulate more rational water use and development.   
 
The results of these reforms have, however, been limited in South Africa and Zimbabwe, 
and there is a growing realisation that without physical hydraulic infrastructure people in 
semi-arid environments will not be able to enjoy access to sufficient productive water 
(van der Zaag et al, 2010:138; see also Grey and Sadoff, 2007; World Bank, 2007).  The 
emphasis to move toward demand management, which involves working within the 
existing limitations of the found resource, rather than augmenting supply, and toward 
consideration of water resources as part of a wider ecosystem, through the promotion of 
integrated water resources management (IWRM) reflects global thinking (e.g. the Dublin 
Principles; Agenda 21) as well as local realities (Swatuk, 2000: 9).  Yet, while 
recognising that access to both potable water for essential consumption and commercial 
water for production have favoured a minority throughout the region, the new water 
architecture claim that replicating this form of provision at national level is neither 
economically feasible nor ecologically sustainable (Swatuk, 2000; Derman and Ferguson, 
2001). Swatuk (2000:217) further highlights that this position rehearses the global debate 
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involving over- consumption in the North versus over-population in the South, and poses 
two poignant questions thus: Now that a privileged minority have access to piped water, 
can a government deny the same to its marginalized majority? If so, on what basis is this 
decision being made? 
  
Clearly there are contradictory forces at work. For example, the new water architecture 
hopes to work toward a fairer and more sustainable allocation of resources. Yet, if the 
Catchment Councils and Management Agencies in particular and the water sector in 
general are to be self-financing, this means that each has a vested interest in the 
continuing and probably expanding sale of water for commercial use  (Swatuk, 2000; 
Walker, 2006; Schreiner et al, 2010). This therefore means that catchment management 
institutions (Agencies and Councils) are likely to favour those that can pay for water, i.e. 
those who already know how to exploit the resource. Yet, there is also claim that 
integrated water resources management requires working within the limits of the specific 
catchment. So, ‘creating’ new water requires not augmenting supply but in restraining 
demand.  Besides, given that the major users in the two countries have historically had 
their water heavily subsidised, if paying for it at all, it remains to be seen how the state, in 
both Zimbabwe and South Africa, where subsidies for small-scale water users have been 
withdrawn or do not exist, will meet the goals of fairer and sustainable allocation. It also 
raises questions about new systems of delivery for those historically disadvantaged by the 
colonial and apartheid system.  Under these circumstances, one wonders if new systems 
are built, who will pay the full cost – and yet the Councils, as we have noticed from 
evidence in Mzingwane, increasingly nudge towards encroachment on primary water 
uses for levies. 
 
Bureaucratic delays in approving legislation, dealing with applications, and sanctioning 
local plans can also be a threat to the water reform process. For South Africa and 
Zimbabwe, the new Water Acts took a long time to be finalized and passed probably 
because consultations with various stakeholders tend to be time-consuming. After they 
were passed, one would have expected a quick implementation of the reforms but that 
was not to be. A string of statutory instruments designed to operationalize the Water Acts 
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took long in coming such that two years after the Acts were passed, very little had 
changed in the water sector.  However, Zimbabwe managed to fast-track the 
operationalisation of CCs and SCCs nationwide, yet South Africa is still grappling with 
the issue of operationalising CMAs. These delays tend to reflect badly on the government 
because it gives the impression that the government itself does not have confidence in its 
new policies despite having legislation in place (Chikozho, 2003: 12; Walker, 2006). 
 
Creation of new institutional structures at the catchment level (CMAs, CCs and SCCs) 
also has the problem of not recognizing the role that existing institutions can play in 
resource management. In most cases, both traditional and modern local government units 
are already in existence when the reforms are initiated. To link the new structures to the 
existing structures is not easy. Some members of the old structures might even feel that 
their territory has been invaded and friction ensues.  These instituions need time to adjust 
to their new roles, they also need time to adjust to the need to bury their differences with 
other different stakeholders who are part of the new institutions and cooperate with them. 
This cannot be a smooth process because the new institutions are not familiar with the 
new roles. It is also impossible to wish away the mistrust that exists between and among 
groups that were originally divided by history (Swatuk, 2000; Chikozho, 2003). 
Unfortunately, in the execution of their duties, the new institutions are expected to 
interface effectively with the institutions that historically held ownership, management 
rights, and benefits from the natural resource. As Oakley et al (1991:4) states, centuries 
of domination and subservience will not disappear because we have "discovered" the 
concept of participation. Under these circumstances, the fruits of decentralizing 
management responsibilities can only be realized (if at all) in the long term. In any case, 
as Ostrom et al (1999:281) points out, having larger numbers of participants in common 
property resource management increases the difficulty of organizing, agreeing on rules, 
and enforcing the rules. 
 
Our analysis seems to point towards a contradiction between the new water laws and 
dominant policy agendas of the water reform institutions (as reflected in chapters 7 and 8) 
on the one hand and the rural realities of informal water users on the other.  The 
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challenge of most rural people in Southern Africa in general, and Zimbabwe and South 
Africa in particular is to encourage and provide support for investments in water 
resources development for multiple uses so as to enlarge the pie of available water 
resources for all, rather than sharing the limited pie that has been developed to date.  This 
seems at odds with the priorities and dominant discourses of governments and 
international water development and investment institutions. 
 
The water reform in both countries do include a focus on women as water users and 
highlight the need to include women in water management decision making and practice. 
However, I contend they do not adequately address the differentiation of women water 
users, particularly regarding women as productive farmers. Nor do they address issues of 
power within households and communities that shape men and women’s participation in 
both informal and formal water management institutions, as well as their access to water 
resources. 
9.3. Infrastructure Development and Water Reform 
While a great deal of state investment has gone, since 1994, into the provision of safe 
drinking water, access to water for productive purposes by the rural poor has received 
less attention, and little has changed in this regard over the past fifteen years. As a result, 
access to water for productive purposes mirrors the ongoing economic inequity in the 
country. Innovative work done by Cullis and van Koppen (2008) in applying Gini co- 
efficient methodology to access to water shows a high Gini co-efficient for access to 
water across all provinces. Access to the benefits of water use is similarly skewed (see 
also Schreiner et al, 2010).  There is a need for the infrastructure to enable access to 
water, whether it is infrastructure for storage, pumping from boreholes, or transmission 
and distribution, and whether it is large infrastructure, small infrastructure, or somewhere 
in between (ibid). Often this is lacking, although there are some subsidies available for 
such infrastructure from the Department of Water Affairs and the Department of 
Agriculture. 
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One reason for the lack of a rural infrastructure development agenda is a remarkable 
discontinuity in the historical memory of the importance of state investments to catalyze 
infrastructure construction and maintenance (Schreiner et al, 2010: 18). One of the first 
tasks that the white governments took up in the 19th century was the stimulation of 
irrigation by white farmers. Huge subsidies went into public and private infrastructure, 
water users’ organization, research, and related input and market provision. Broader 
political- economic considerations such as solving the poor-white problem, territorial 
encroachment, long-term national food security, political gain, and export for foreign 
exchange justified this state expenditure. Yet, the discourse altered profoundly after 1994 
with requirements such as ‘economic viability’ and full cost-recovery suddenly in favour 
 
Another reason is the persistent reference in water planning to ‘the’ agricultural sector, 
‘the’ forestry sector, and, indeed, ‘the’ national economy. The extreme dualism in the 
agricultural sector and inequities in general, are disguised by the use of such terms (ibid). 
As a result, water as a force in shaping agrarian reform is poorly conceptualized. For 
large- scale farmers, this discourse helps avoid future competition for water and markets. 
Progress in conceptualizing and implementing agrarian reform will be critical to 
changing approaches in the water sector.  Unlike the pre-1994 government in which the 
departments of agriculture, forestry, and water collaborated strongly to promote national 
irrigation goals, such coordination is weak in the government today. Moreover, since the 
1970s the Department of Water Affairs has shifted its attention to infrastructure for the 
‘urban and industrial economy’, especially in Gauteng, the water-scarce economic hub 
(Van Koppen, 2008) and ever-larger inter-basin transfers. There is, thus, no institutional 
champion to drive a new infrastructure development agenda for the ex-homelands, where, 
moreover, local government is still very young (Schreiner et al, 2010). 
 
There also seems to be limited vision and technical expertise on the sort of infrastructure 
that would serve the purpose of providing water to rural communities. The wealth of 
small- scale technologies promoted in other countries, such as mechanized groundwater 
or river lifting pumps, in-situ water harvesting techniques, various types of reservoirs, the 
use of wetlands, and point-of-use treatment for safe drinking water, are poorly known, let 
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alone promoted, in South Africa (Schreiner et al, 2010:19).  In Zimbabwe, there seem to 
be more focus by the Rural District Council and NGOs on such technologies (Swatuk, 
2000). 
 
Finally, Schreiner et al (2010) argue that current approaches have reinforced the century-
old neglect of poor water users’ own initiatives. Yet, informal water initiatives abound, 
for domestic and productive uses. In Sekororo, the NGO-supported schemes or 
government domestic supplies, which are often used for small-scale productive use, are 
not reliable. The formal irrigation schemes have collapsed and are only used where 
private players or NGOs have informally entered into parts of the schemes. And yet 85 
percent of the households use water for irrigation: 69 percent irrigate areas less than 
0.002 ha, but 5, 4, 6 and 1 percent cultivate respectively more than 0,05; 0,2; 0,4 and 1 ha 
(Manzungu et al 2010; Schreiner et al, 2010:19; see also chapters 7 and 8). In most cases, 
these are private initiatives which function well and which would be a sound basis to 
further develop and promote appropriate technologies.  The same applies for the vibrant 
and dynamic private initiatives in Mzingwane, Zimbabwe. 
9.4 Conclusions 
While there is clear evidence of the impact that access to water can have in improving 
livelihoods in rural areas, current approaches under the water reform in South Africa and 
Zimbabwe have failed to support an agenda that would realize such benefits. In order to 
realize these benefits, three factors must be addressed: 
 policy and legislative reform: the prioritization of water uses under the National 
Water Act needs to be reviewed to give priority recognition to and protection of 
access to water for rural livelihoods; 
 a programme providing and enabling the development of appropriate water 
infrastructure to support rural livelihoods is also urgently required; 
 effective institutional co-ordination between water reform institutions and 
government departments (e.g. Water; Land Affairs; Rural Development) and local 
government at national, provincial and local level is critical in developing a specific 
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and co- ordinated approach to ensuring water to poor rural communities within a 
multiple use approach. 
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CHAPTER TEN:  Discussion and Conclusions 
10.1. Introduction 
This chapter synthesises and reviews the findings of this study in a thematic manner that 
allows for reflection on the key issues relating to research objectives and hypotheses.  
The thesis examined whether IWRM-inspired water reforms respond to- and address the 
diverse realities and needs of women and men in informal (and formal) rural economies.  
Some central themes run throughout the findings of the study and these are linked to the 
study objectives presented in Chapter One.  These themes include: the mismatch between 
water reform plural customary arrangements; socio-economic status, history and patterns 
of access to resources; communal area stakeholder participation and representation in 
catchment management institutions; investment strategies and responses in hydraulic 
property rights creation; and emergence, resilience or pervasiveness of traditional 
authorities in natural resources management.   The chapter also offers some 
methodological and theoretical reflections adopted for the study, and presents 
conclusions and recommendations drawn from the results.  The first section of the 
chapter (10.2) revisits the objectives that guided this study, and summarises, review and 
discuss the major findings related to each objective.  The second section (10.3) explores 
the conclusions, policy insights and implications drawn from the findings in this study.  
The last section presents policy recommendations and potential areas for further research. 
 
10.2. Water Reforms and Property Rights Creation: Governance 
Discourses and the Plight of Small-scale Water Users 
10.2.1. Mismatch between water reform policies and legislation with 
realities of plural customary arrangements  
Unfortunately in the region there tends to be outright antagonism or a begrudging 
acceptance of the reality of local water management arrangements as practiced by those 
in informal economies in favour of externally-driven water reforms.  Such reforms are 
thought in terms of stakeholder participation, democratisation of resources, and improved 
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governance. Experience on the ground, however, paint a different picture –there is no 
root and branch of the reforms to institutionalise local management as claimed. It would 
appear that the efforts amount to little more than local incorporation into state-defined 
agenda. The state has remained largely oblivious if not antagonistic to the reality of local 
management of the resource in which traditional legal frameworks play an important role.  
Modernisation drives have tended to scoff at the concept of legal pluralism choosing 
rather to preach the virtues of statute law although few converts seem to be won over by 
the new message.  There is a distinction between what is written in initial texts and local 
realities.  However, as local concerns, discourses and practices are making their mark on 
international laws and policies and vice versa, laws start recognising local realities.  
Water laws seem to have taken long to recognise and incorporate local realities. This 
trend can be observed in relation to international law’s increased recognition of women’s 
and indigenous peoples’ uses of water and land.  The concept of “mobile law” and 
“globalization” draws the attention to the interactive character of international law and 
policy making concerning the right to livelihood, water and land.  Focusing on interaction 
and interplay this paradigm moves beyond the simplistic notion of international human 
rights and African customary laws as distinct, separate and opposing norms and values.  
 
At first glance it would appear that the notion of primary water in Zimbabwe legislation 
would be linked to the indigenous idea that no one should be denied access to water. 
However, this seems not to be the case. Primary water, in the sense of the Water Act is, 
as the integrated water management system in Gwanda where land and water for 
livelihood cutting across the commercial-domestic divide illustrates, not a category 
among African peoples in Zimbabwe (see also Hellum, 2004). It was an introduced 
concept stemming from a residual, non-reflective category in the earliest imposed 
Southern African water laws. Hellum (2004) argues that in discussions with drafters of 
Zimbabwe's new water law, they stated they assumed the concept came from Roman 
Dutch law, remained there unchanged and was then incorporated into the new Water Act 
without further reflection. There was no explicit concern with customary law and 
customary water rights unlike other areas of colonial regulation such as land, marriage, 
inheritance and even political leadership. 
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Van Koppen (2010) argues that unlike the land frontiers, the water frontiers have not 
been reached as yet in most parts of Sub-Saharan Africa. Only 3.5 percent of water 
resources have been developed due to the lack of financial, technical and institutional 
resources to construct the storage and infrastructure to make more water available for 
human use year-round. Our findings resonate with van Koppen’s argument that the issue 
is not one of regulating water, but developing it. This was the option followed by all 
middle- and high-income countries, who increased the pie of water available for all, 
including the poor, through infrastructure development.  Experiences, interviews and 
discussions with water managers in Zimbabwe and South Africa point towards an 
IWRM-inspired agenda in operationalising the water reforms in both countries.  What has 
been missing from the start of the reforms, and in the agenda of the key institutions 
spearheading the reforms, is the infrastructure agenda for developing water resources 
rather than merely shifting emphasis to regulatory measures such as permits and licences.  
Water scarcity is often framed and used to divert attention away from developing water 
infrastructure by emphasising the issues of sharing what is available.  The pre-occupation 
of catchment councils and management agencies with second generation issues such as 
regulatory aspects presupposes the availability of water used by people to be shared.  By 
ignoring first generation issues of infrastructure development, oblivious by its omission 
from catchment forum agendas in Zimbabwe and South Africa, the water reform process 
ostensibly misses an opportunity for discussing the development of water infrastructure.  
Yet by portraying water scarcity as an inevitably limited pie to be regulated via ‘markets’ 
of individual permits, attention is drawn away from this option.  Only if all physically 
available water resources have been committed and basins are closing, poor people’s 
better access to water may require a distributive water reform, as for land (see van 
Koppen et al, 2010).    
 
Yet, permit systems in customary rural areas start all over again what has failed for land: 
trying to replace customary water rights based on the notion of communal ownership, 
into administration-based individual exclusive claims. Moreover, water titling is much 
more complicated than land titling. Water is a fugitive, highly variable resource, which is 
very costly to measure. This renders the mere administration, let alone the update of 
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permit systems, an even more insurmountable logistic burden (van Koppen, 2010).  
Further, even if permits were well administered, they are of little use in water entitlement 
conflicts. Scarcity situations are seasonal, variable and unpredictable. The estimated 
average annual water volumes allocated, as stipulated in most permits, are of little value 
for arbitration in ever-changing contexts. Instead, prioritization and conflict resolution 
mechanisms are needed, which are at the heart of any of the plural water rights regimes, 
especially (but not exclusively) stemming from investments in hydraulic property 
creation.  This offers realistic, practical and enforceable claims by the majority of water 
users in the communal areas.  There is ignorance or reluctance to embrace multiple legal 
frameworks that exists on black Africa with the state caught up in a web of contradictions 
where on one hand the state has on it statute books Western-inspired laws, while on the 
other hand, there is a desire and the reality of living out the African customary 
experience. 
 
The IWRM discourse revived and promoted the enforcement of permit systems with even 
greater force, without questioning its colonial purposes.  In line with global discourse on 
legal reforms of the 1990s, the colonial permit systems were revived in South Africa and 
Zimbabwe.  The Water Act of 1998 in Zimbabwe also made some changes only to its 
colonial permit systems that had continued after independence. Permits became 
temporary instead of providing perpetuity rights that the colonisers had previously set. 
Fees were also tied to permits in order to finance the newly established Catchment 
Councils. Again, this enforcement of permit systems in remote communal rural areas 
superseded customary water rights.  If governments and others seek to realise a human 
right to water and sanitation, food and livelihood and to improve the wellbeing of the 
large majority of rural constituencies, they need to expose the deep-rooted colonial 
legacy of imposing single water laws in plural legal contexts and ensure full recognition 
of the informal and customary water arrangements that provide vital livelihoods to the 
poor, also outside the ambit of the state. However, permit systems have often already 
been promulgated, so the practical question remains whether such recognition of legal 
pluralism can still somehow occur within the framework of permit systems without 
relegating such arrangements to second class status. 
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There are questions of how far bureaucratic institutions based on individual rights and the 
principles of modernity undermine social trust, relationships based on the ethics of care 
and mutual interdependence.  While these bureaucratic arrangements are not necessarily 
inclusive, fair and emancipatory, socially embedded institutions may reproduce social 
divisions or gloss over inequality.  We agree with Cleaver (1993; 2000; 2004) that in 
recognizing the plurality of institutional arrangements and avoiding the sterile 
dichotomies of traditional and modern, formal and informal, economic and social, and 
local and global, we should beware of normatively attributing value to particular types of 
arrangement.  Despite this caution, Cleaver asserts that “…plurality also creates 
opportunity, processes of bricolage, of borrowing, of institutional improvisation which 
may create space for negotiation, contestation, and for different voices to be heard”.  The 
argument follows that rather than seeing plural and ad hoc institutional arrangements as 
dysfunctional (as does much development policy (Berry, 1994), we could see their very 
plasticity as providing scope for shaping social distribution and relationships in more 
equal and emancipatory direction (Cleaver, 2004).  The informality of institutions and 
property rights seems to facilitate flexibility to allow for resource sharing primarily 
access to water. For example, in Zimbabwe, water points (dams, wells, boreholes) are 
constructed by either government or donor agencies and used by people in specific 
villages who are not, officially, the intended beneficiaries.  There is a general norm of 
sharing water in Gwanda, Zimbabwe.  However, our observations in Sekororo points to 
the contrary, where people seemed only to access water from public infrastructure in their 
villages of residence, without sharing with others from other villages.      
10.2.2. Socio-economic status, history and patterns of access to 
resources 
Some families in Gwanda who were visibly better off appeared to have regular sources of 
income, which often included remittances from household members working in cities and 
the diaspora. While some families claimed that the diaspora was their major source of 
income, the majority of households relied on subsistence farming and vending in 
Gwanda, Zimbabwe.  In Sekororo, South Africa, sources of income mainly included 
social grants, pension grants, child support grants, some remittances, and subsistence 
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farming.   From field research, we can note that households facing severe water shortages 
were poorer than households not facing such shortages.  They face water shortages owing 
to their general poor socio-economic standing in society which renders them more 
vulnerable and less able to invest in own private water sources.  As observed in both 
Gwanda and Sekororo, households with private water sources engaged more in multiple 
water use than those without private water sources.  However, even poor and vulnerable 
households managed to carve out strategies to access water from both communal and 
private sources.  The most common strategies include labour exchange and investments 
in social capital such as membership and associateship in local institutions like burial 
societies, churches and project support groups.   It is necessary to recognise that the 
benefits of infrastructure investment in water provision cannot be measured in narrow 
economic terms alone.  Where beneficiaries cannot afford to pay full cost of services 
provided to them, social incentive-compatible subsidy schemes have been designed and 
implemented by non-governmental organisations with the support of local communities. 
  
Our findings resonate with Cleaver’s observations that despite the possibility that new 
bureaucratic institutions could be emancipatory in including people previously excluded, 
in Gwanda and Sekororo, the poorest people rarely participate in such fora due to time, 
labour and financial constraints, lack of political clout and also by virtue of the amounts 
of water that they use, primary water in Zimbabwe, and Schedule One use in South 
Africa.  We observed that most poor people in both Sekororo and Gwanda relied heavily 
on NGO supported and initiated projects, without which, they hardly afford such 
investments.  Schedule One describes permissible uses of water that do not require a 
licence and do not have to be registered.  Water use activities that fall under Schedule 
One include those that, due to the small quantities used, have a very small impact on the 
water resource and therefore pose minimal or no risk (details presented in chapter 8).  
Moreover, we also observed that the poorest individuals and households are characterised 
by limited networks and often spend most of their time on immediate livelihood issues 
thereby impending their ability to processes of bricolage (see Cleaver, 1993; 2004) 
through daily social interaction.  Under these circumstances, recognition of differences in 
socio-economic power amongst resource users necessitates a focus on the daily 
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interaction and beliefs (largely framed on wealth, power, resources and income) upon 
which such inequalities are based, if we are to avoid reproducing these in new 
bureaucratic institutions. 
  
The provision of water for small productive activities, such as home gardens, fruit trees 
and small off-season vegetable plots, helps in addressing many household livelihood 
challenges in particular of female-headed households in multilocal livelihood systems.  
Agricultural water interventions should no longer be based on the assumption of 
specialised or increasingly specialising irrigation farm units managed by full-time 
professional farmers, but be prepared to assist in overcoming bottle-necks in manifold 
context-specific ways (FAO, 2008).  Building on existing local knowledge and avoiding 
the introduction of unnecessarily sophisticated farm management systems contribute to a 
better uptake of technologies and takes into account the part-time nature of many farm 
activities. Such interventions and investments should be considered in complement, and 
not in opposition, to the more conventional medium- and large-scale investments in 
surface water storage and irrigation.  Great attention has to be paid to the form in which 
access to water is increased, there is no "one size fits all" strategy that can be 
recommended and each livelihood condition must be considered individually and in its 
historical and cultural context.  Hence, although poverty might be a limiting factor for 
some households in terms of decision-making, they are still, in their own way, able to 
carve out strategies for accessing multiple sources of water.  Some of the strategies 
include participation and membership in reciprocal relations such as providing labour in 
exchange for access to private water sources, membership and/or association with 
religious groups such as churches in exchange for multiple benefits from the network and 
work-parties. 
 
10.2.3. Communal Area Stakeholder Participation and Representation 
in Catchment Management Institutions  
While one of the goals for water reform in Zimbabwe is to institute more coordinated 
planning across sectors by having representatives of sector-based agencies sit on 
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Catchment Councils, field research to date suggest that the net effect of the reliance on 
the new administrative institutions maybe to reduce participation and representation by 
small-scale and communal area water users compared to what was intended (see also 
Derman et al, 2002; 2005).  Where and when they are represented and participate, their 
voices are often muted or marginalised in formal deliberations.  Field research (see 
Chapter 7) indicates for example that there is relatively little participation from 
representatives of communal areas (Agritex, RDCs, councillors and traditional leaders) in 
catchment councils, in part because the scale of financial costs makes it difficult for these 
representatives to attend meetings.  
 
Local government reforms are underway in Zimbabwe but coordination between these 
institutional changes and those in the water sector is not well-established.  My 
observations and findings indicate that little communication or coordination takes place 
between the Rural District Councils and the catchment councils despite the fact that the 
former water infrastructure utility, the District Development Fund (DDF) has now been 
incorporated into the RDCs; and continues to be a major source or distributor of 
development funds for small-scale dam construction, boreholes and other water and 
sanitation projects.  The results, in many instances, are that the water development needs 
of resettlement and communal area farmers (and dwellers) are marginalised by catchment 
councils as demonstrated by the issues discussed and debated at the (CC and SCC) 
forums which primarily focus on promoting large-scale commercial water use.  
Therefore, with regards to decentralisation/devolvement attempts through CCs and SCCs, 
although offering the opportunity for people to manage the resources, the necessary 
rights, control and power have been denied them, so these institutions have not been 
effective and useful for the majority of communal area resource users. 
 
Despite the enabling framework provided by legislation and policy, and the wide 
recognition of the need to redress past imbalances in access to water, and to democratise 
water management institutions, experience to date has shown the difficulties of ensuring 
full participation in these institutions in South Africa ( see chapter 8, also see Schreiner et 
al., 2004; Anderson, 2005). Full participation by the historically disadvantaged is 
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hindered by a lack of public awareness among those who do not have access to 
communication technologies and electricity (Schreiner et al., 2004, Anderson, 2005). 
According to Schreiner et al., (2004), the major challenge in terms of participation most 
rural areas has been the lack of involvement by poor communities, particularly women. 
Many members of these communities feel disadvantaged as the process is new for them, 
and they may not have the background information and knowledge that other 
representatives (e.g. large-scale farmers, mining and industrial) have on water 
management. The meetings for establishment of CMAs are often not easily accessible 
(Anderson, 2005; Nicol & Mtisi, 2003). Effective participation by HDIs requires more 
than just getting the parties to the table and the mere presence of representatives of poor 
communities is not an indication of their involvement in the participatory or decision-
making processes (Karar, 2003 cited in Faysse 2004; Schreiner et al., 2004, Anderson, 
2005). Anderson (2005) argues that there is a need for communication strategies that will 
empower and engage all sectors due to the range of cultures involved in the process.  
More important, the water managers need to be cognizant of the fact that for the reforms 
to be effective, efficient and sustainable, the needs and challenges of small-scale (often 
informal) users have to be part of the core-agenda.  The needs of small-scale users 
include but are not limited to the provision of support systems such as subsidies to both 
private and communal initiatives in developing water infrastructure for multiple uses, and 
the use of inclusive forums for managing resources.    
 
Financing arrangements for the new institutions seem to be stuck in a quagmire.  
Catchment and sub-catchment councils raised huge hopes with external funding at their 
inauguration but the excitement soon fizzled when external support ended in Zimbabwe; 
and state support withdrawal in South Africa.  Dube and Swatuk (2002) and Manzungu 
(2002) highlight the dangers of such donor dependency, among other things, questions of 
sustainability and issues of autonomy in chatting the way forward.  Dube and Swatuk 
(2002) questioned the commitment of donors to the reforms arguing that funding was 
frozen due to power political issues at the national level, but the withdrawal of such 
funding had profound effect on still-teething local and intermediate level institutional 
structures less able to foot the financial costs of the reforms.  Van Koppen (2003:1052) 
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suggests that attaching rights to water to fees for that water encourages non-participation.  
She found farmers’ questions, thus, “…why should rural people pay for a resource they 
have long used for free if there is no evident benefit to them?” (ibid).  We noted earlier 
(in chapter 7) how the contentious the issue of a livestock levy panned out in Mzingwane 
catchment, where stakeholders from communal areas question the essence of levying 
them for water upon which the catchment and sub-catchment councils has hardly 
developed and/or provided.  It would seem the pressure to raise money tended to violate 
primary water provisions in this regard.  Evidence from studies by Mukheli et al (2002) 
suggests that where historical class and race differences continue to determine resource 
access, any attempt to impose user-pay fees on poorer people will elicit a confrontational 
and political response.   
 
The reforms in Zimbabwe did not only cause chaos for the agriculture industry and the 
predominantly white commercial farmers, it threw the entire water reform process into 
disarray, hence raising questions regarding the wisdom of treating land and water as 
separate resource use issues (see also Derman et al, 2001; Swatuk, 2005).  This raises 
issues on how catchment councils sought to operationalise the water reform being 
cognizant of the parallel process of land reform.  The shrinking revenue base, through 
collection of levies from permit holders seemed to have forced the Mzingwane catchment 
council to consider imposing levies on all livestock owners in the catchment.  This 
encroachment, largely attributed to shrinking revenue, was a direct result of the chaotic 
land reforms.  Operationalising the water reform process in Zimbabwe cannot be entirely 
separated from land reforms for analytical purposes.  
 
My observations on operationalising the water reform process in Zimbabwe and South 
Africa (see chapters 7 and 8) demonstrate how prioritizing the user pay principle (in legal 
texts and by catchment councils) through administrative policies such as permits and 
licensing may have ambiguous (if not undesirable) outcomes for the rural small-scale 
water users.  Prioritising the user pay principle may indeed raise levels of appreciation for 
the importance of natural resources, and where values are delivered at producer levels, 
can constitute a powerful incentive for local collective entrepreneurship and innovation 
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especially from communal resource users (also see Murphree, 2004).  But it can also 
open the door wider for elite appropriation of benefit and drive socio-economic 
differentiation, in both national and local contexts, far from the intended goals of 
equitable access and use of the resources.     
 
The second challenge in the formation and operationalisation of catchment management 
institutions is that of power imbalances.  While attempting to bridge inequalities between 
commercial white and black water users the reform, through resource management 
institutions such as catchment and sub-catchment councils in Zimbabwe, gives little 
thought to the situation in communal areas and resettlement schemes where poor women 
and men often lack resources to capture water for improved productive water uses 
through cropping, livestock and water dependent small scale activities such as gardens. 
Dominance and power by those who controlled water in the apartheid era continues in 
South Africa despite multiple initiatives and intentions to the contrary. To underscore 
what was reported earlier for emphasis, commercial farmers and irrigation boards are in a 
potentially strong negotiating position to influence the direction of the CMA while the 
disadvantaged communities continue to suffer from significant power imbalances in 
knowledge and expertise ( see van Koppen et al., 2002 & 2003; Anderson, 2005). 
Anderson (2005) argues that “to make catchment management work and to truly 
empower the poor, the water sector in South Africa needs to build techniques to 
transform the most powerful actors to understand the needs of the poor and marginalized 
and that this issue is often overlooked amongst competing agendas”. Anderson (2005) 
further argues that ‘an analysis of power dynamics within the water sectors would make a 
valuable contribution to South Africa’s water management discourse and would require a 
combined effort from DWA, research institutions and water management practitioners, 
and most importantly political will from those with authority, resources and power. 
It was hoped that the broadening of stakeholder representation beyond white commercial 
farmers and including black communal area farmers, members of Rural District Councils 
and indigenous commercial farmers, would lead to more efficient and locally appropriate 
priorities. The CASS team’s surveys (2000-2002) and my observations have indicated 
that key stakeholders, such as headmen or indunas and local entrepreneurial champions, 
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identified at the village level are not represented on Councils. Observations at Catchment 
Council meetings indicate that the few women present are usually either administrative 
technocrats or secretaries, and not necessarily productive water users, except for the 
female chief in Mzingwane.  Neither in the new water laws nor in the Statutory 
Instruments implementing the catchment management institutions in Zimbabwe has any 
mention been made of how to incorporate women more fully as stakeholders in water 
management and development (Hellum 2001). This is despite women’s heavy 
involvement in agricultural production and household water provisioning featuring 
significantly in the Dublin principles.  South Africa has a designated quota on water user 
associations and monitors catchment management agencies.  However, since the Olifants 
CMA has not been operationalised we can only speculate on whether such quotas are 
enforced, and indeed monitored, had it been operationalised. 
 
10.2.4. Investment strategies and responses in hprc: Reflections from 
Sekororo and Gwanda 
The drivers of water investments at the local level in Sekororo and Gwanda communal 
areas seem largely to be people retrenched and/or retiring from their jobs and engaging in 
small-scale farming as demonstrated in chapters 4 and 5 where we noticed the value of 
contributions made by pensions, social grants; and remittances from towns and the 
diaspora; as well as investments from personal savings and through labour contributions.  
Historical and recent expansions in private water infrastructure in Gwanda seem to be 
linked to increased investments in water, livestock and housing by those working in 
towns and across the boarder in South Africa and Botswana.  In Ward 17, Gwanda 
district in Matebeleland South where families have been systematically migrating for 
generations, diasporans appear to manage well and remit reasonable amounts to their 
families. While more comprehensive and exhaustive studies need to be done, my work 
would suggest that income differences within Zimbabwe’s rural areas are being 
maintained and exacerbated by the remittances from Zimbabweans in the diaspora.  The 
diaspora are defining and determining new property systems as much as those who are 
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present although it might be at a small-scale and for multiple productive and domestic 
uses. 
 
On the other hand in South Africa, Sekororo, the trigger of investments in water is largely 
attributed to three main factors, the dysfunctional and vandalized communal water 
infrastructure, dysfunctional formal water management institutions, and entrepreneurship 
initiatives by individuals and households, with or without external intervention, and again 
mainly diaspora.  It is a context where water users blame local government (district and 
local municipality) for poor service delivery, in turn; the departments blame water users 
for vandalizing infrastructure and for being less-organised and lacking cooperation.  The 
diaspora and richer households also play a big part in small-scale water investments in 
South Africa especially investments in electrified boreholes and pumps, irrigation 
furrows, rooftop-harvesting storage tanks and general water storage tanks.  The study also 
found that everyone had a right to access water for drinking, in principle, and that no one 
who had invested in water investments could be deprived of it (see also Bolding et al 
2010).   
 
Within communal or ‘project rights’ in Zimbabwe, any member who did not participate 
in construction and maintenance could be denied water from the infrastructure apart from 
water for drinking which is considered too essential for life, and cannot be denied anyone 
(see also Derman et al, 2005; 2007).   Some infringements on long-term beneficiaries 
occurred in Gwanda, Zimbabwe largely as a result of interventions by war veterans, and 
the perceived bias by NGOs, where communities reshaped and re-constituted 
membership in some communal water arrangements, what I  have called ‘project rights’ 
(see also Meinzen-Dick, 2004) largely owing to the local understanding of such access 
issues.   
 
In general, despite the growing investment in water and new forms of irrigated cropping 
in the Gwanda study area, the principles of allocation of garden land and water reflected 
demand for broader household needs and capacities by local people to use multiple water 
sources for multiple uses. No distinction was made by water users between domestic and 
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productive land and water use where the aim was to ensure the basic needs of the family. 
Neither the site of more commercialized agriculture and growing investment in water nor 
the existing (political and economic) crisis had led to the total enclosure of resources. It 
appears that in this area, customary norms and institutions have been able to respond to 
multiple needs while maintaining a focus on ensuring resources for livelihood in a broad 
and holistic sense. However, I noticed increasing reciprocal strategies to share water from 
private sources which included some form of water vending, labour exchange and the use 
of social networks such as kin and church membership. I sense a pattern of increasing 
inequality as villagers who are in command of social and economic resources are 
accessing two or more private water sources and gardens for themselves. Important 
resources in this respect are labor, access to seeds and fertilizer and equipment for 
transport of water from available sources in other villages in the event of drought. While I 
have noted the strength of local management systems, I may also see that the local water 
management systems may be adversely affected by the general breakdown of law and 
order that has taken place at all levels of law and society in Zimbabwe as a result of the 
economic and political crisis.  Examples of war veterans acting with impunity in stifling 
and/or changing the goals of targeted infrastructure development by NGOs for vulnerable 
groups, such as women, widows and orphans in Gwanda, where the local institutional 
structures seemed powerless to intervene (as elsewhere in Zimbabwe), provide a chilling 
reminder. 
 
New innovative forms of commercial cropping emerging within the common property 
regimes in the communal lands, such as women’s gardens in Gwanda, Mzingwane, 
represent a challenge with regard to draw a dividing line between commercial and 
primary water uses embedded in the laws and policies. These uses render problematic the 
deep historical imposed division between commercial and primary water. In its 
discussion of the user pay principle, the draft Water Management Strategy for the 
Government of Zimbabwe emphasises that the user pay principle, in order to be socially 
and morally acceptable, requires subsidies to vulnerable groups (Robinson; 1998, 37; 
Hellum, 2004).  Perhaps the Mazowe Catchment Council's debate as to what constitutes 
commercial water illustrates the issues that the increasingly market driven water 
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discourse is giving rise to (see Derman and Hellum, 2003; 2005). When drawing a 
dividing line between commercial and primary water use they relied upon a technological 
answer. If the water is moved by hand, it is according to this view, not commercial. If it is 
moved by some of form of machine, it will be considered commercial (see Hellum, 
2004).  It is such challenges in interpreting and implementing the reforms that helps 
bringing clarifications and understanding to the myriad examples such as the proposed 
livestock levy in Mzingwane which stakeholder representatives from communal areas 
vehemently resisted (for now) on grounds of fairness.  The stakeholders reiterated that 
livestock watering is not subject to permit regulation as long as the animals are not 
penned and/or in enclosure and they have to take the animals for watering.  This 
coincides well with the provisions of primary water uses under the water act, although the 
stakeholder representatives of communal areas did not use concepts such as primary 
water, which the ZINWA and CC managers used often. 
   
If there is to be a significant change in access to water, then representation patterns will 
have to be altered in terms of gender and class, not just race. Equally important is to 
rectify the mismatch between the law and policy framework that the water reform has put 
in place over the plural, gendered and social realities and legalities on the ground. While 
the notion of primary water certainly speaks to respecting basic needs, as second class 
entitlement, the division between commercial and primary water does not sit well with 
the way of sharing, both with regard to safe drinking water and dry season gardens with 
available water sources that we observed in Mzingwane. To deny someone drinking-
water and to a certain extent land with available water for vegetable gardens necessary 
for livelihood was associated with different kinds of sanctions for those denying others 
such access. Secondly, there is a gap between the seemingly class and gender neutral user 
pay principle based on a division between commercial and primary water uses and the 
gendered and social reality where poor women and men fend for their families by 
growing vegetables both for consumption and sale. By overlooking social and gender 
differentiation in relation to allocation and uses of water the seemingly neutral water laws 
and policies are likely to be to the effect that existing social and gender inequities are 
reinforced (see Hellum, 2004).  Both local practices and international human rights, 
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particularly the growing discourse of a human right to water, call into question the 
division between primary and commercial water embedded in international and national 
water policies such as Zimbabwe’s. 
 
Drawing a boundary between water as an economic and social good the human right to 
water protects the poor, women, children and families by setting standards that are 
binding for international, national and local policy, law and decision makers. To make 
these rights real through investments in infrastructure, tensions and gaps between 
international, national and local laws will have to be reconciled.  The Zimbabwean case 
points to the continued importance of a centralized and elite ruled nation-state putting 
race before gender and other social inequalities. While vesting all land and water in the 
President, neither the Constitution nor the Water Act recognises a right to water for 
communities and individuals. In South Africa where the right to water is embedded in the 
Constitution and the legislation of the country, poor water users (often those in urban and 
peri-urban areas) are challenging the legality of policies and practices through the 
national court system, an example is that of the Phiri residents in Soweto who mounted a 
legal campaign against Johannesburg water policy and the use of pre-paid water meters 
(see Muller, 200958).  Although the Zimbabwean case exemplifies a centralized and elitist 
state at the broader level, I was surprised that when it comes to institutions directly 
engaged and mandated with water reforms (the CCs and SCCs), the institutions in 
Zimbabwe were more transparent and responsive to stakeholders and outsiders.  For 
example, researchers and other interested parties (citizens and non-citizens) are allowed 
to attend catchment and sub-catchment council meetings without problems.   
 
Yet in South Africa, where the right to water is embedded in the constitution and is 
touted as a democratic model, outsiders are (often) not allowed to attend local and district 
municipality meetings, let alone meetings at the national Department of Water Affairs 
(DWA).  The best municipalities and the DWA offer are reports and records (edited 
versions) of the deliberations and/or interviews.  The researcher was not allowed to attend 
                                                 
58 http://www.mg.co.za/article/2009-07-21-a-phiric-victory-for-the-poor 
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official DWA and Maruleng local municipality meetings despite numerous requests to do 
so.  The excuse given that such meetings were internal matters and only privy to 
employees of the departments, although justifiable and understandable, did not provide 
the same scope as in Mzingwane, Zimbabwe.  Apart from interviews, the few first hand 
opportunities the researcher got to observe deliberations by DWA officials were during 
public discussions and debates at workshops and conferences.  It should be noted though 
that the DWA, like other government departments in South Africa, makes available 
official documents on their website which renders access easy regardless of location. 
However, it was difficult for the researcher to experience first hand unedited debates and 
discussions within the department, like was done with ZINWA and the Mzingwane 
catchment council in Zimbabwe. 
10.2.5. Emergence, Resilience or Pervasiveness of Traditional 
Authorities in Natural Resources Management 
Although there have been deliberate efforts in both countries to override and/or neutralize 
the role of traditional leaders immediately after independence in 1980 (Zimbabwe) and 
post-1994 (South Africa), they (traditional authorities) seem to adapt and 
metamorphosize into multiple purpose institutions that are responsive to people’s needs, 
or simply continue what they have been doing.  From the findings in Sekororo, we noted 
how the chief and his indunas are considered by water users as the best institution in 
mediating access to water as well as enforcing sanctions on transgressors in both 
communal and private water sources, despite some reluctance by local municipality and 
DWA to engage with them on water issues in favour of elected councillors.  In Zimbabwe 
on the other hand, we also noticed the recognition of traditional authorities (chiefs) in 
catchment and sub-catchment councils where they are members by virtue of their position 
as representatives of the people, although they are less instrumental in community water 
management owing to power struggles with war veterans. 
 
Ntsebeza’s (2005:14) work in Xhalanga, South Africa, highlighted that “…the survival of 
traditional authorities can be linked directly to their control of the land allocation process 
at the local village and Tribal Authority levels, rather than popular support”.  The passing 
of the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act (2003) which acts as a 
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foundation for the establishment of Traditional Councils empowered to administer and 
allocate land in rural areas lead to skepticism on compromising democracy.  Ntsebeza 
(2005:15) argues that “…upholding a Constitution that enshrines democratic principles in 
the Bill of Rights, whilst acknowledging a political and developmental role, or roles, for 
unelected and unaccountable traditional authorities…is inconsistent and contradictory”.  
Notwithstanding the noble and critical observations by Ntsebeza, our findings from 
Sekororo seem to point towards a responsive traditional leadership.  This might partly be 
because of accessibility of the indunas and chiefs, and also that traditional authorities, 
unlike elected councillors and municipal officials, do not operate as single purpose 
institutions, and perceive water with its multiple uses.  Elected officials such as 
councillors and municipal officials were less responsive to people’s challenges such as 
reports of illegal connections to the reticulation line, which is their mandate.  Yet when 
such issues are reported to traditional authorities, they seemed to be robust and quick in 
mediating and exercising their powers. One remark made by an NGO leader in Sekororo 
underscores the dynamics between elected and hereditary leaders “…that elected officials 
such as councillors are more interested in maximizing benefits during their tenure and 
often forget the electorate, by the time they want to be re-elected, people do not vote 
them in again, and whatever promises and commitments they promised, disappear with 
them…yet traditional authorities are ever present and have to face the community, so are 
obliged to be responsive to undo the elected officials.  Moreover, elected officials can be 
fired for reasons of accountability, but the induna and chief can not be fired”. However, I 
content that the traditional authorities still maintain a powerful position in the community 
owing to their ability to manoeuvre into relevance by maximizing on their control over 
land and their role as multi-purpose institution, and grabbing opportunities from the 
failure of elected leaders, as well as some benevolence from the state. 
 
In terms of development of post-independence rural institutions in Zimbabwe, the Prime 
Minister’s directive of 1982 introduced elected leadership through village development 
committees (VIDCOs) and ward development committees (WADCOs) into the rural 
institution landscape where communities historically recognized traditional leadership 
structures (Nemarundwe, 2003; Mukamuri et al, 2004). The idea was to initiate a bottom-
 
 
 
 
 277
up approach to local governance and development strategies. The new development, 
however, down-played the role of traditional leadership and has resulted in confusion 
over management and allocation of communal resources. Realisation of the resource 
allocation impasse between newly created institutions and traditional leaders led the 
government to enact the Traditional Leaders Act (TLA) of 1998. The TLA tried to 
harmonize functions between traditional leaders and elected leaders, but with more power 
being vested in the traditional leadership structures. Of particular importance, in this 
context, is the re-instituted traditional leaders’ power to allocate land, the basis for natural 
resource access. Traditional leaders also have powers to resolve natural resource and 
social conflicts. Elected leaders have been relegated to the function of facilitating 
development plans for their areas for submission to the Rural District Council (RDC).  
From our findings in Zimbabwe, we observed that traditional leadership and kin networks 
are a major component in safeguarding and enforcing rule compliance within the water 
sector in communal areas (see also Sithole, 1999; Derman et al,2000, 2005).  However, 
the level of involvement and the degree of participation by both the traditional/customary 
authorities and the state varied from one village to another, as well as from one water 
source to another depending on whether it is privately owned, communally owned or 
‘project’ owned, often manifested in reciprocal relations. 
 
From the foregoing, it is a false dichotomy (after Cleaver, 2004) to pose a realm of 
‘traditional’ informal, culturally and socially embedded institutions against a ‘modern’ 
domain of rationally designed committees and formal structures, and to suggest that one 
is likely to be better than the other at resolving conflicts or managing natural resource 
use.  Cleaver (2004: 17) offers a poignant analysis where she argues that “Local resource 
management arrangements are a complex blend of formal and informal, traditional and 
modern”.  This coincides well with our findings where there are multiple institutions 
involved in managing resources ranging from traditional leaders, elected leaders, and in 
some instances, ‘project-leaders’ and private interventions by war veterans.  It is within 
this complex hybrid and multiple institutions where power contestations and negotiations 
take centre stage.  Hence, we agree with Cleaver (ibid) that the evolution of collective 
decision-making institutions may not be the process of conscious selection of 
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mechanisms fit for the collective action task (as in Ostrom’s model in formalising 
irrigation systems so needs being rational) but rather a messier process of piecing 
together shaped by individuals acting within the bounds of circumstantial constraint.  
 
The argument continues with the suggestion from the systems analysis discourse that 
water governance cannot be properly understood in terms of fixed, predictable states; it is 
better perceived of as resilience in a complex, evolving biophysical-cum-social system 
comprised of structures which interact across scales of place and time and which move 
through adaptive cycles of growth, accumulation, restructuring and renewal (see 
Murphree, 2004). Resilience is characterized by the capacity of the system (and its sub-
systems) to absorb disturbance and evolve in response to change.  In this formulation 
social institutions, being anthropogenic and responsive to purposive interventions for 
human well being, are critically central.  This being so there is a strong case for 
institutional development, in the evolutionary mode, to be given priority in the objectives 
of communal approaches such as water resources management.  The role of local level 
institutional arrangements, especially focusing at the lowest level of proprietorship as a 
starting point cannot be overemphasized.  This includes conferring them with authority as 
proprietors and delegating authority to them for managing the resource rather than simply 
decentralizing responsibilities without delegating or ceding decision-making powers to 
them. 
10.2.6. Theoretical reflections: Hydraulic Property Rights Creation 
Using empirical knowledge about people’s local experiences, problems and practices is 
employed in this study in a continuous dialogue with the constantly evolving hydraulic 
property rights principles encompassing the right to water conveyed, and to a smaller or 
lesser extent related to that, the right to livelihood, the right to food and the right to 
health. By taking the social and economic human rights principles relevant to people’s 
access to water down to the living laws and realities of female land and water users and 
the national water laws and policies in South Africa and Zimbabwe,  the aim of this thesis 
is to contribute to a contextual and situation sensitive property rights creation approach as 
living experience by people who access, use and manage the resource for their 
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livelihoods, far from the paper-based rights approach (permits and licenses) upon which 
the water reforms in South Africa and Zimbabwe are based, yet tangibly empowering the 
administrative proficient. 
 
Analysing the findings presented in this thesis allows the revisiting of the hydraulic 
property rights creation concept through reflection (Coward, 1986a &b; see also van der 
Zaag, Bolding, Uiterweer and van Koppen, 2010; Manzungu, Sithole, Tapela and van 
Koppen, 2010), on the dynamics it presupposes and engenders.  It is clear that hydraulic 
infrastructure in semi-arid environments is a key resource and often a pre-condition for 
livelihood security and socio-economic development.  Our findings coincide with 
observations by van der Zaag et al (ibid) that hydraulic infrastructure ties different people 
together, simply because infrastructure crosses compounds, community and village 
boundaries depending on the siting.  The investment needed to develop communal water 
infrastructure (canals, wells, small-reservoirs, boreholes etc) often transcend the capacity 
of the individual household or farmer, leading to multi-ownership arrangements.  As a 
result, complex productive practices, social interactions and economic transactions 
emerge around hydraulic infrastructure.  When and if these interactions endure over time 
and lead to patterned behaviour, they become institutions (see also van der Zaag et al, 
2010).  This is in agreement with van der Zaag et al (ibid) and Oakerson (1992), for 
whom the interplay between the bio-physical and institutional resources, as well as the 
resulting patterns of interaction, form part of, and in fact constitute, a resource 
management institution. 
 
The findings from the study shed some light on the dynamics that tend to emerge around 
water infrastructure.  The findings first confirm that there is a mutual interaction between 
material and symbolic resources.  It follows in this argument that if a person decides to 
invest in hydraulic infrastructure such as irrigation, boreholes or canals and or conduct 
maintenance, his or her claim to that resource changes because of the water infrastructure 
use value (van der Zaag et al, 2010: 151), and with it the social relations with other 
people.  However, as van der Zaag et al (ibid:152; see also Manzungu et al, 2010) 
observed this also works the other way round where the water management practice is 
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constituted by the material and symbolic resources that are recursively linked.  The 
findings show that increased investments in land and water infrastructure leads not only 
to more intimate social relations but that such relations also became more asymmetrical 
and reciprocal.  These social relationships also have a moral dimension (Van der Zaag et 
al, 2010), having to do with social recognition, respect, and basic norms of equity, of 
sharing private water sources under a general norm that no one is denied water for 
drinking.   
 
These findings also confirm what Van der Zaag and others (2010) observed, that water 
management involves the combination of material and social resources that extend 
beyond the immediate and local reality.  Van der Zaag et al (2010:152; see also Van der 
Zaag et al, 2001; Wester, 2008) succinctly observed that “The interplay between the 
water-land networks and social networks gives rise to water-networks” or hydro-social 
networks that tie the local to larger geographical and institutional levels in complex 
ways”.  The important analytical observation to make here is that outside parties can 
influence local dynamics, for example through decreeing new laws and regulations or 
through investing in local water infrastructure development, yet local level responses or 
initiatives may influence these outside parties and may create interesting resonations, in 
an often iterative but spontaneous manner (see also Van der Zaag et al, 2010).  However, 
it should be borne in mind that hydraulic property creation always enlarge local control 
over water; yet, it seems to thrive in a context of asymmetry and power differentials.  
Where state subsidies and support were withdrawn in both South Africa and Zimbabwe, 
the result was that people abandoned the schemes and reverted to own initiatives.   
Hence, the resultant local resource management arrangements are a complex blend of 
formal and informal, traditional and modern, where the evolution of collective decision-
making institutions may not be the process of conscious selection of mechanisms fit for 
the collective action task (as in Ostrom’s model of crafting institutions) but rather a 
messier process (see also Cleaver, 1993; 2004) of piecing together shaped by individuals 
acting within the bounds of circumstantial constraint.  
 
 
 
 
 281
10.3.0. Conclusions, Policy Insights and Implications: South 
Africa and Zimbabwe 
An important conclusion for both South Africa and Zimbabwe, regarding to how and to 
what extend existing policies and legislation that govern and regulate access to and 
control over resources influence (and are influenced by) hydraulic property creation is 
that a regulatory system that reaches, at best, a tiny minority of citizens (large-scale 
commercial water users) for decades to come, can in no way claim that such regulation is 
tied to the only valid legal entitlements in the country. This underscores the urgent need 
to disconnect regulatory tools from entitlement systems, conceptually and practically, and 
to recognize customary arrangements in their own right. To this end, customary 
entitlements should only be transformed when a better alternative is needed and feasible.  
It is clear that hydraulic infrastructure in informal water sectors and in semi-arid 
environments, is a key resource and a pre-condition for livelihood security and socio-
economic development.  Furthermore, the evidence from our research suggests that using 
permit systems for regulation in middle- and low-income countries with a majority of 
rural small-scale individual water takers and undeveloped water resources, is not only 
cumbersome, but problematic and challenging. Administrative regulatory measures such 
as registration, payment and pollution prevention can work if they are well targeted to a 
minority of formal large-scale users.  Our observations and analysis indicate that if 
governments and others seek to realise a human right to water and sanitation, food and 
livelihood and to improve the wellbeing of the large majority of rural constituencies, they 
need to expose the deep-rooted colonial legacy of imposing single water laws in plural 
legal contexts and ensure full recognition of the informal and customary water 
arrangements, and hydraulic property rights that provide vital livelihoods to the poor, also 
outside the ambit of the state. Customary rights are also pivotal in finding solutions for 
the paper assault to poor people’s existing water entitlements, which are typically 
governed by customary arrangements, under ongoing water reform. Imposing one single 
regime, permits, ignores the reality of plural systems.  
 
Another overall conclusion that can be drawn between Sekororo and Gwanda as cross-
cutting is that the state has largely neglected the first generation issues of infrastructure 
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development for small-scale water users and uses in poor rural communities.  From the 
evidence presented in Chapters 4 and 5, I glean out a cross-cutting thread of the dynamic 
investments through individual initiatives and efforts, as well as support from NGOs.  
What was missing was the active role of the state in facilitating and financing 
infrastructure development in poor rural communities of Gwanda and Sekororo.  I 
conclude that in both South Africa and Zimbabwe, the state has abdicated its 
responsibility to provide support for new water development, hence, people tended to rely 
on NGO support and own initiatives.  Although commendable, the individual initiatives 
and NGO support is not enough and we strongly suggest the state should do more in 
terms of financing and facilitating infrastructure development in these constituencies to 
augment the efforts of local people and NGOs. 
 
By focusing on second generation issues such as managing water, the state in both 
Zimbabwe and South Africa, withdrew subsidies and support systems for water 
investments leading to hydraulic property extinction, where water users fail to enforce 
their water rights.  In Sekororo, South Africa, the withdrawal of state support led to 
people not claiming their rights and abandon some of the irrigation schemes opting 
instead to farm on the mountains.  In Zimbabwe, the withdrawal and/or end of state 
support for the rural water supply and sanitation programme yielded similar results, 
where people resorted to self-initiatives and support from NGOs. 
 
The institution of traditional authorities seemed to be resilient through manipulation by 
both colonial and post-colonial government in Zimbabwe, and apartheid and post-1994 
democratic government in South Africa; and has metamorphosized to become an 
entrenched organ of holistic resource control especially land, through their ability to 
manoeuvre and manipulate the weaknesses of elected leaders, often with the benevolence 
of the state.  Their entrenchment in control over land and other resources led to 
competition with elected local government representatives, especially councillors.  This, 
as noted, created a battleground where competing interests manifested in intense 
powerplay tussling to gain support among resource users as legitimate enforcers and 
arbiters in South Africa.  In Zimbabwe, the authority and power of the traditional 
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authorities also seem to rely heavily on the benevolence of politicians, and is increasingly 
being eroded by the emergence of war veterans.  Generally, it would seem that the 
traditional authorities in both Gwanda and Sekororo have endured and prevailed in the 
continuing struggle for control over resources. 
 
The sectoral divides that characterize both the professional water sector and the global 
proponents of water reform, are alien to communities.  It was noted that when 
communities themselves construct infrastructure or adopt infrastructure, they do so for 
multiple uses, including drinking, cooking, sanitation, hygiene, but also livestock, 
gardening, irrigation of crops and trees, brick-making and crafts, small-scale enterprise, 
and cultural functions.  In Zimbabwe for example, people did not distinguish between 
primary and commercial water uses, just like in South Africa where people’s experiences 
did not distinguish between domestic and productive water uses.  There seemed to be 
more priority for domestic uses in both Gwanda and Sekororo.  A feature of customary 
practices, not withstanding the inherent criticism for excluding women and regarding 
them as minors, that appeared to be very fruitful for realising gender equity in hprc is the 
holistic and integrated nature of customary practices and governance which realises and 
recognises the multiple uses of water for livelihoods, not withstanding various efforts 
from NGOs and the state to impose alien concepts.  The MUS approach to water services 
builds upon these informal holistic practices. 
10.3.1. Conclusions and Recommendations: Sekororo, South Africa 
While there is clear evidence of the impact that access to water can have in improving 
livelihoods in rural areas as demonstrated by the dynamic private initiatives in the four 
villages of Sekororo, current approaches under the water reform in South Africa have 
failed to support an agenda that would realize such benefits. In order to realize these 
benefits, the following factors must be addressed: 
 Policy and legislative reform - the prioritization of water uses under the National 
Water Act needs to be reviewed to give priority recognition to and protection of 
access to water for rural livelihoods;  
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 Given that there is is a remarkable discontinuity in the historical memory of the 
importance of state investments to catalyze infrastructure construction and 
maintenance, a champion department or other structure must be given the mandate to 
drive a programme of providing and enabling the development of appropriate water 
infrastructure to support rural livelihoods; 
 There seems to be a complete bureaucratic blockage in South Africa where there is 
seemingly political failure and political indifference on the part of government and its 
structures especially towards the rural poor. Effective institutional co-ordination 
between water reform institutions and government departments (e.g. Water Affairs; 
Land Affairs; Rural Development) and local government at national, provincial and 
local level is critical in developing a specific and co- ordinated approach to ensuring 
water access to informal poor rural communities within a multiple use approach; 
 A conscious attempt must be made by practitioners in this field, including government 
officials, to understand and promote the wide range of appropriate technologies 
available in this field. In this regard, partnerships with other developing countries that 
have much greater experience in this regard than South Africa could assist 
immensely; 
 When water is physically available (both surface and ground water) people invest in 
accessing it for multiple uses, where those who invest in private water infrastructure 
hold stronger and overarching rights to both the infrastructure and water conveyed.   
 
10.3.2. Conclusions and Recommendations: Gwanda, Zimbabwe 
While there is clear evidence of the impact that access to water can have in improving 
livelihoods in rural areas as demonstrated by the dynamic NGO-supported and private 
initiatives in the four villages of Gwanda, current approaches under the water reform in 
Zimbabwe have failed to support an agenda that would realize such benefits. In order to 
realize these benefits, the following are key concluding statements: 
 Zimbabwe’s water reforms, in their current form, ignore the first generation hydraulic 
mission such as the development of adequate water infrastructure to harness water 
resources for social and economic development for rural small-scale users. Without 
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access to water/infrastructure, there is nothing to manage for rural small-scale users.  
A programme providing and enabling the development of appropriate water 
infrastructure to support rural livelihoods is urgently required; 
 By imposing a new layer through the introduction of resource management 
institutions on the hydraulic landscape, such as catchment and sub-catchment 
councils, the state intended to redress and address the inequitable access to water.  
Regardless of the good intentions, the new water resource management institutions 
became popular for rent-seeking without service improvement to water users.  This 
has seen the Mzingwane catchment council seeking to impose levies on direct water 
access for livestock and other uses without service improvement; 
 Dichotomization into formal and informal rights, often used to differentiate between 
official and non-official allocation and access to natural resources, is not always 
analytically helpful owing to normative sharing arrangements and practices.  These 
practices in Mzingwane, Zimbabwe point toward the existence of a set of interrelated 
norms of sharing of land and water that are essential for livelihood.  Clean drinking 
water and access to land with available water are shared between and within village 
households;   
 Although the current multi-level and multi-layered political crises in Zimbabwe pose 
challenges to the use of concepts and notions such as human rights generally, in terms 
of the catchment management institutions reform, Zimbabwe seems a lot more 
transparent and progressive in terms of implementation and usefulness of its water 
governance structures, the catchment, sub-catchment councils, and there seems to be 
growing recognition of third tier water user units, committees and associations; 
 The idea of a priority right to primary water for basic human needs, including 
domestic, animal and house-building functions, is unique in the region.  It has meant 
that such water in principle has been protected from the growing demand for ‘user 
pay’ which, according to the Water Act, is restricted to commercial water.  However, 
given the growing scarcity of resources we can easily envision the Catchment 
councils and the Zimbabwe National Water Authority, under pressure to be self-
financing in the context of a national economic crisis, attempting to obtain revenues 
by re-defining these small garden and livestock uses as commercial ventures; 
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 On the surface Catchment and sub-catchment councils appear to be downwardly 
accountable as they are elected by stakeholders.  However, who the stakeholders 
represent and the criteria for such representation is poorly defined especially for the 
small-scale communal water users. The most active, powerful and best organised 
stakeholder groups, the large-scale commercial farmers, miners and urban and rural 
authorities have largely defined the agenda and deliberative processes for the new 
institutions, as much as the agenda is also determined by the water reform laws and 
policies; 
 interventions aimed at optimising and reallocating water use, assuming shared 
interests, attempting to monopolise water allocation decision in a single forum, and 
pursuing comprehensive, anticipatory planning such as ambitious river basin planning 
like IWRM inspired catchment councils may fit poorly with the dynamics of 
community collective action based on normative plural arrangements.  So they may 
be prone to being ignored, resisted and rejected by the majority of smallholder water 
users.  Modest institutional modifications that fit the dynamics of community 
collective action and help secure rights and resolve pertinent issues may meet with 
greater success apart from being sustainable; 
 When water is physically available (both surface and ground water) people invest in 
accessing it for multiple uses, where those who invest in private water infrastructure 
hold stronger and overarching rights to both the infrastructure and water conveyed. 
10.4. Areas for Further Research 
 It requires further research to understand and unpack why water access from public 
water infrastructure is only accessible by residents of the village, and not shared with 
other villagers, in Sekororo. 
 The recent developments to increase the role of local government in catchment 
council management in Zimbabwe warrant more attention as it might change or 
reshape the on-going dynamics. 
 The issue of catchment-based boundaries and planning versus administrative 
management zones that seem to be considered in South Africa needs to be studied, 
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more as a way of incorporating the merits from the two systems, rather than either of 
the systems. 
 The use or reliance on consultants is endemic in South Africa.  Further studies are 
necessary not only to find viable options to facilitate building capacity within 
government departments but also to retain skilled personnel.  The extent, influence 
and impact of hiring of consultants by the DWA in South Africa might be 
exaggerated; hence, further research in this area is imperative.  
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APPENDICE 1: THE QUESTIONNAIRE USED IN THE STUDY 
Household-level uses and property rights creation Questionnaire 
I, Pinimidzai Sithole, a PhD student with the Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies 
(PLAAS), University of the Western Cape, am carrying out a survey in Gwanda, Zimbabwe and 
Sekororo, South Africa, Limpopo Basin.  The survey is funded by the Challenge Programme for 
Water and Food (CPWF) and the International Water Management Institute (IWMI).  The survey 
seeks to solicit your insights and advice about the existing water rights in informal economies, 
and the potential impacts such water rights have on your household, village and community.  In 
order to do so, we will be asking you questions about water use, access, rights, technologies, 
management, and investment.  However, we need to understand how water rights in informal 
economies affect different households: very poor, poor, and non-poor; households headed by men 
and households headed by women; households that are close to water sources/points, households 
that are farther away; etc.  We would therefore request that you give us open and clear answers to 
the various questions, recognizing that your answers, and the answers to these questions from 
other households we interview, will be fundamental to our understanding of water rights in 
informal economies in South Africa, Limpopo Basin.  Please note that your answers are 
confidential.  
Household survey and overview  
Enumerator Self Check (field), print name: …………………………………………………. 
Questionnaire Number: ……………………………………………………………………. 
Date Questionnaire Entered ……………………..Print Name …………………………… 
Date Questionnaire Validated………………….. Print Name ……………………………. 
Supervisor Comments: ……………………………………………………………………… 
Data Entry Supervisor Comments: ………………………………………………………….. 
 
Village Name: ……………………….......... Village Code: ……………………………… 
Interviewer Name: ………………………... Interviewer Code: ………………………….. 
Date: …………………………….. (Day, then month as single 4 digit code) …………….. 
Household GPS reading S…………………… E ……………………………………….. 
Enumerator: For the interview, interview the household head, her/his spouse, or other senior 
household decision-maker.  For factual questions, the respondent can call upon other members of 
the household for help in answering.  However, for opinion data, no other household member can 
respond. 
 
A. General 
 Gender of Respondent (household member interviewed): ………………………….... 
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  [Explain what is meant by household] 
1.  Who is the head of the household you ‘belong to’? ……………………………………… 
____ - 1 male [male head/other senior male decision-maker present at least  
6 months over the past 12 months]  
____ - 2 female de jure [female mentioned as head]  
____ - 3 female de facto [male stated as head, but absent more than 6 months  
over the past 12 months and has not returned on a weekly or biweekly basis for 
the bulk of the past year, and no alternative male head mentioned] 
 
2. We would like to understand better the structure of your household.  How many people 
currently ‘belong to’ this household, whether living here most of the year or living 
elsewhere most of the year? [Enum: Reference period is the past 12 months]  
a) Total number of people ‘belonging to’ the household ______________ ____  
b) Number living here ______________________ ____  
c) Number living elsewhere __________________ ____ 
 
(The following table only applies to those ‘living here’.  Exclude those indicated as living 
elsewhere) 
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       1. Formal emp. 
2. Informal emp. 
3. Subsistence agric. 
4. Cash crop farming 
5. Retired/Pension 
6. Self-employed 
7. Social/gvt grant 
8. Own enterprise 
(specify) 
9. Other  (specify) 
 1 - 
Head 
     
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
Total Annual Incomes  
 
5. Do you store water? Yes No  
 If yes, 
 
a. What type of containers do 
you use to store water? 
b. How many of 
them do you 
have?  
c. How 
many of 
them do 
you use? 
d. How 
often do 
you fill 
them up? 
e. How 
long does 
this water 
last? 
Small containers (20-25 )     
Big containers (200-250)     
Jojo tanks (specify volume)      
Brick and concrete tank (specify 
volume) 
    
Rain Water Harvesting tank 
(specify volume)??????? 
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Other (specify volume)     
 
6. Please provide the following information regarding your farming and livestock 
ownership? 
 
Crop Crop1 2 3 4 5 6 Total 
Dryland        
Area planted                  
                                       
Total yield                     
                                       
Total income                 
                                      R 
Irrigation       R 
Crop       Total 
Area planted                  
                                       
Total yield                     
                                       
Total income                R 
                                     R 
 
Livestock 
       
Owned (list all)       Total 
        
Sold       R 
        
Total income       R 
        
 
 
 
7. What are the main sources of lighting in your household? [Rank in terms of proportion of 
contribution e.g. percentage]  
____ 1 electricity  
____ 2 paraffin  
____ 3 gas  
____ 4 candles 
____ 5 firewood 
____ 6 generator 
____ 7 solar 
____8 other 
  
8.  What are the main sources of energy for cooking in your household? [Rank in terms of 
proportion of contribution e.g. percentage]  
____ 1 electricity  
____ 2 paraffin  
____ 3 gas  
____ 4 candles 
____ 5 firewood 
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____ 6 generator 
____ 7 solar 
____ 8 other 
 
B. Access to Supply (Water and Technologies) 
 
1. Overview matrix for household water use: Please fill in the matrix? 
Uses  
 
Sources of 
water 
(from 3.3.1 
or private 
technology 
(specify) 
Water 
conveyance 
Male/femal
e 
Costs 
labor/cash 
Quantity 
(No of 
20l 
buckets 
or 200l 
drum per 
day/week
, specify) 
When 
use 
1=all 
year 
round 
2= dry 
season 
3=wet 
season 
4=other 
(specify
) 
Priorit
y 
1=very 
high 
2=high 
3=low 
4=very 
low 
Enough2 
quantity 
1=Yes 
2=No 
3=Sometimes 
Enough3 
quality 
relative 
to use 
1= Yes 
2=No 
3=Somet
imes 
Drinking        
Cooking        
Bathing        
Washing 
clothes 
       
Toilet flushing        
Cattle        
Sheep/goat        
Trees        
Home garden        
Field irrigation        
Rainfed        
Fishing        
Brick making        
Food 
processing sale 
       
Other 
enterprise 
(specify) 
       
Ceremonial        
 
 
2. Seasonality matrix: Please complete matrix by asking a, b, and c. 
a. What are the three most important 
water points/sources that you 
use/access in the dry season? 
b. What are the three most 
important water points that you 
use/access in the wet season? 
c. Who is the custodian of the water 
point (s)? 
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 5. Custodianship/Ownership key: 
 1. Household 
 2. NGO (specify) 
 3. Government (specify) 
 4. Municipality 
 5. DWAF 
 6. Chief/Induna 
 7. Other (specify)…………… 
 
 
3. Are there clear and understood rules regarding access to and use of your water points? 
 …….1 yes …….2 no …….3 do not know 
 5. a) (If yes to 3) who is the agency or authority responsible for setting the rules? 
  ………….1 not certain 
  …………..2 Water (Point) Committee 
  …………..3 Tribal/traditional authority 
  …………..4 DWAF 
  …………..5 Municipality 
  …………..6 Owner 
  …………..7 NGO 
  …………..8 Gvt 
  …………..9 Other……………………… 
 
 b) (If yes to 3) what are the rules?.......... 
  
 c) Are the rules enforced? …….1 yes ……….2 no …….3 don’t know 
 d) If yes, who enforces which rules?........................................ 
 e) Are those who breach/break the rules punished? If yes, specify what fines, penalties?.... 
 
C:  Communal Infrastructure Hydraulic Property Rights Creation 
1. For the communal infrastructure identified/indicated (choose all cases), how was it done?  
What was your involvement? 
 
 a. Planning/ local approval …….1 yes ………2 no 
 
 If yes, how were you involved?.......................... 
 
 Who (else) was involved? ………………… 
 
 b. Site selection  ……….1 yes ………..2 no 
 
 If yes, how were you involved? ………………… 
 
 Who (else) was involved? ………………… 
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 c. Financing/Capital costs ……….1 yes ………2 no 
  
 If yes, how were you involved? ………… 
 
 Who (else) was involved? …………… 
 
 d. Construction  ……….1 yes …………2 no 
 
 If yes, how were you involved?............................ 
 
 Who (else) was involved?............................................... 
 
 What were the costs?  ………1 cash ……….2 labour ……….3 equipment
 …….4 other 
 
 e. Operation  …………1 yes  …………2 no 
 If yes, how were you involved?.................................... 
 
 What were the costs? ………1 cash ………..2 labour ………3 equipment
 ……4 other 
 
 Who (else) was involved?................................ 
 
 f. Maintenance ……….1 yes ………..2 no 
 
 If yes, how were you involved?............................... 
 
 What were the costs? ………1 cash ……….2 labour ………3 equipment
 …….4 other 
 
 Who (else) was involved?.......................... 
 
 Over the past years, has your main water point had a breakdown or stopped yielding 
water?     
  ____ - 1 yes ____ - 2 no ____ - 3 do not know 
  
  a.) [If yes] What was the reason for the absence of water? [Tick up to 3 responses]   
  ____ - 1 lack of diesel/petrol  
  ____ - 2 water point went dry  
  ____ - 3 system broke (underground)  
  ____ - 4 system damaged (above-ground) 
  ____ - 5 other ____________________________________________ 
 
  b.) Was it repaired?  ………..1 yes ………...2 no 
 
  c.) If yes, who repaired it, and at what cost?........................................... 
 
 d.) How long did it take before it was repaired?............................. 
 
 g. Rule Setting  ……….1 yes ……….2 no 
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 If yes, how were you involved?........................................ 
 
 How does one become a member?..............................  
 Was anyone excluded from membership for some, or all uses?..................... 
 
 Who (else) was involved?......................... 
 
 What are the rules?............................. 
 
 h. Rule Enforcement  ………1 yes ………2 no 
 
 If yes, how were you involved?....................... 
 
 How are the rules enforced?........................ 
 
 i. What is your opinion on performance of management committee? (specify)……… 
 
 
D: Case studies hydraulic property rights creation for individual private 
infrastructure (using all cases from the Community….) 
  
 Planning Phase 
1. How did you have the idea to invest in your private 
infrastructure?....................................... 
2. Did you discuss this with other household members? …….1 yes ……..2 no 
 a. If yes, who did you discuss with?........................... 
 b. If no, why not?....................................... 
3. Were they involved in the decision-making?  ………1 yes ………2 no 
 a. If yes, how were they involved?......................................... 
 
4. Did you have to ask permission to anyone to construct/install the technology and start 
abstracting/storing water? ……..1 yes ……….2 no 
 a. If yes, where or to whom did you ask 
permission?............................................................... 
5.  Is the water resource seen as a ‘community property’ – who is in/out? 
 ………..1 yes ……….2 no 
6. Was there any competition with many people wanting to put their technologies?  
 ………..1 yes ……….2 no 
 a. If yes, how was this solved?............................ 
 
7. Did people abandon earlier investments because of too much competition?  
 ………1 yes ……….2 no 
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 a. If yes, who?............................. 
 b. If yes, what were the reasons?....................................... 
 
8. How was the technology selected?............................... 
 
9. Were there various options?  …………1 yes ………2 no 
 a. If yes, what were the options?................................. 
 
10. Which particular technology was opted for?......................................... 
 a. Why was this technology opted for?................................................ 
11. How do investors get the technical information to undertake these development 
activities?................................................ 
  (In each case give details e.g. size of pump and how easy it is to acquire diesel or 
petrol)………… 
12. How did site and lay-out selection take place?......................................................... 
 a. who was involved (specify women, men, boys, girls)? …………… 
 b. how were they involved?.......................... 
13. How was site selection related to land rights?  
 a. whose land was the site selected?.......................... 
 b. what rights do you have over land?.............................. 
 c. was anyone displaced or inconvenienced by the project?.................. 
14. Is the construction of infrastructure reserved to only landowners? 
 …………1 yes …………2 no  
 a. If no, can a tenant invest in infrastructure? …….1 yes ……..2 no 
 b. If yes, what are the conditions for such investment?....................... 
15. What do women and leasers without primary titles to a plot do to obtain access to 
land?....... 
  a. Does that discourage them to invest in infrastructure? ………1 yes ……..2 no 
 b. If yes, how does that discourage them?.....…………………. 
 c. Do they have to pay for water and land (specify)?  ……….1 yes ……….2 no 
 d. What form of payment (cash, labour, other)?................................... 
 e. Are there cases where they were put off the land again?.................................. 
 f. Do private owners sell or share their water?.................................. 
16. Are investors aware of the requirement for registration or application for Licence? 
 ……1 yes ……2 no 
 a. Were they obliged to do so? Yes No 
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 b. If yes, did they do it (register or apply)?......................... 
17. Would they be willing to pay for water use to government? ………1 yes ……2 no  
18. Have there been public hearings on this issue here?  
 
Construction phase 
19. Who participated in the purchase and installation/construction of the technology, in cash 
or kind?  
20. Is the fact that somebody factually made the investments in the construction related to the 
entitlements to the water conveyed?  ………….1 yes …………2 no 
  a. If yes, how?  
21. Is this right hereditary? …………1 yes ………..2 no  
 a. If yes, to who? ……..1 sons ………2 daughters ……….3 both ……..4 
other 
22. Can people who did not invest in the capital and operational costs still have access to the 
water conveyed by the technology? ………..1 yes ………..2 no 
 a. If yes, who can access (gender, kinship, community)?......................................  
 b. What type of right? …………………… 
 c. On what basis is such access arranged?............................. 
23. Did female household members participate equally in the construction/installation? 
 ………...1 yes  ………….2 no  
 a. If not, why not? 
 b. If no, does this affect women’s future entitlements to the water conveyed?  
 ………..1 yes  …………..2 no 
 c. If not, why not? 
 d. If yes, is there a way to still strengthen women’s entitlements? 
 ………….1 yes …………2 no 
 e. If yes, how can women’s entitlements be strengthened?...................................... 
    f. Is any cash income derived from water supply?   Yes  No   
     
    g. If yes to above,   
 a.  What is the income derived from sales of water used for? …………… 
 b.  Is income from water access used to invest in assets (social, financial,  
  physical, natural, human)?........................... 
    c.  If so, what form does this investment take?......................... 
 
 
 
Costs – benefits  
24: Enterprise Budget (for Water dependent enterprise) 
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Item/Activity Crops (field) Crops 
(garden) 
Car Wash Brick-
making 
Livestock 
Wet 
season 
Dry 
season 
Wet 
season
Dry 
season
Water Use in 
Litres 
       
Labour/man 
days (specify 
gender) 
       
Fertilizer      -   -   -  
Water pump        
Other inputs        
Output 
produced 
       
Output sold        
Output 
consumed 
       
Price sold        
        
Water unit in litres, number of 25 litre containers/ or drums, or volume pumped  
 
25:  Farm Budget (For farming enterprise identified) 
Item/Crop Maize Tomatoes Cabbage Beans Sweet potatoes 
Wet 
season 
Dry 
season 
Wet 
season 
Dry 
season 
Wet 
season 
Dry 
season 
Wet 
season 
Dry 
season 
Wet 
season 
Dry 
season 
Water Use in 
Litres 
             
Labour/man 
days (specify 
gender) 
          
Fertilizer           
Energy cost            
Ploughing           
Land rental           
Chemicals           
Output 
produced 
          
Output sold           
Output 
consumed 
          
Price sold           
           
 
List all the most important crops a. Irrigated.................. b. Rainfed…………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
26. How do you market your products? Explain in detail…………………………… 
27. Do you experience problems in marketing? ………...1 yes  ………..2 no 
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 a. If yes, what are the problems?.................................. 
  
28. Who decides about the use of the harvest (gender)? 
 ………..1 man ………….2 woman …………3 both man& woman …..4 other 
 
29. Who decides about the money gained (gender)?  
 ………..1 man ………….2 woman …………3 both man& woman …..4 other 
 a. If other, specify……………… 
 
30. Which support was provided? …….1 information ……2 technical training  
 ………3 institution-building  ………4 credits ……...5 financial ……….6 other 
 
31. Was the support provided satisfactory?  ……….1 yes ……….2 no …….3 
somewhat? 
 
  a. Could support be improved?  ………..1 yes  ……….2 no 
 
 b. If yes, how?........................................... 
 c. If no, why not?............................ 
Other water management issues 
32. How do you prioritize water use under scarcity? Explain……………………… 
33. Do you discuss this with family members and are they involved in the prioritization?  
 ………1 yes ………2 no 
 a. If yes, who is involved?  ...........1 man ………2 woman 
 ……….3 both woman & man ………4 girls ………..5 boys …….6 Other 
 b. Is there sometimes disagreement?............................................. 
 c. If so, which by whom?............................................................ 
34. Do you experience water pollution issues? ……….1 yes ………2 no …….3 
don’t know 
 a. If yes, what pollution issues?.................................................................... 
 b. If yes, how can such pollution issues be solved?....................... 
35.  Which social arrangements, or physical fencing exist? Explain…………………… 
  
36. Where do people get information about water (NGOs or Govt)?    
 
37. What institutions assist with water issues (any water point committees)?  
 
38. Are there any problems with getting information or assistance from institutions?  
  
39. What factors negatively affect water supply? (drought, damage from livestock, other  users 
etc).  
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APPENDICE 2: CHECKLIST AND MATRIX USED FOR IN-DEPTH 
INTERVIEWS AND FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS 
Labeling for Focus Group Transcripts: 
Site: 
Number Participants: 
Focus Group Sample: (e.g., men or women, young or old) 
Focus Group Interview No. 
Date of Interview: 
Facilitator ID: 
Recorder ID: 
Who is involved: (e.g. women, men, irrigators/non-irrigators, migrants/long-term residents, 
upstream/downstream, etc?)................................................................ 
Over what issues (document all the issues highlighted)……………………………… 
With what resources: (e.g. i. resources available plus skills; ii, wealth status and literacy; iii, 
relationship between participation and economic status)………………………….. 
With what impact:  (e.g. impact of involvement on policies, decisions made or deferred; 
contestations and conflict resolutions)………………………………………………….. 
With what personal goals and at what anticipated costs…………………………………. 
 
 
 
 
 
